^r 


■ 

M 


THE  LIBRARY 

OF 

THE  UNIVERSITY 

OF  CALIFORNIA 

PRESENTED  BY 

PROF.  CHARLES  A.  KOFOID  AND 

MRS.  PRUDENCE  W.  KOFOID 


PHILOSOPHICAL    CLASSICS. 


A   TREATISE 


CONCERNING   THE 


Principles  of  Human  Knowledge. 


BY 

GEORGE   BERKELEY,  D.D. 


FORMERLY   BISHOP   OF   CLOYNB. 


WITH  PROLEGOMENA,  AND   WITH   ANNOTATIONS,  SELECT. 
TRANSLATED,  AND   ORIGINAL. 


BY 
CHARLES    P.    KRAUTH,   D.D., 

NORTON   PROFESSOR   OF   SYSTEMATIC   THEOLOGY   AND   CHURCH    POLITY   IN  THE   EVANGELICAL 
LUTHERAN   THEOLOGICAL   SEMINARY   IN   PHILADELPHIA;    PROFESSOR   OF  INTEL- 
LECTUAL AND   MOKAL  PHILOSOPHY,  AND   VICE-PROVOST   OF 
THE  UNIVERSITY   OF   PENNSYLVANIA. 


PHILADELPHIA: 

J.   B.   LIPPINCOTT    &    CO. 

1878. 


Entered  according  to  Act  of  Congress,  in  the  year  1873,  by 

J.    B.    LIPPINCOTT    &    CO., 
In  the  Office  of  the  Librarian  of  Congress  at  Washington. 


Lippijtoott'i   P  It  ESS, 

1'  11  1  I.  A  liKI.  I'll  I  A. 


CONTENTS. 


Prolegomena : — 

I.  Berkeley's  Life  and  Writings 5-17 

II.  The  Precursors  of  Berkeley 18-25 

III.  Summaries  of  Berkeley's  System  .......  25_35 

IV.  Berkeleyanism,  its  Friends,  Affinities,  and  Influence      .         .         .  35~42 
V.  Opponents  and  Objections 42~57 

VI.  Estimates  of  Berkeley,  his  Character,  Writings,  and  Influence        .  57-66 

VII.  Idealism  defined 66-70 

VIII.  Sceptical  Idealism  in  the  Development  of  Idealism  from  Berkeley 

to  the  Present :  Hume 70-72 

IX.  Critical  Idealism :  Kant 72-86 

X.  Subjective  Idealism :  Fichte 86-92 

XI.  Objective  Idealism :  Schelling 92-100 

Jacobi 100,  101 

XII.  Absolute  Idealism  :  Hegel 101-105 

XIII.  Theoretical  Idealism  :  Schopenhauer 105-122 

XIV.  The  Strength  and  Weakness  of  Idealism 122-142 

XV.  Characteristics  of  the  Present  Edition 142-144 

XVI.  Its  Objects  and  Uses 144-147 

Berkeley's    Treatise    Concerning    the    Principles    of    Human 
Knowledge  : — 

I.  Fraser's  Preface, — Berkeley's  Preface 151-172 

II.  Berkeley's  Introduction 173-191 

III.  Berkeley's  Principles     .........  193-281 

3 


M368ni2 


4  CONTENTS. 

PAGE 

Appendixes  : — 

A.  Berkeley's  rough  Draft  of  the  Introduction 285-316 

B.  Arthur  Collier 317-322 

C.  Theory  of  Vision  vindicated 323S27 

Annotations  of  Ueberweg,  with  Additions 329-4°7 

Index 4°9 


PROLEGOMENA. 


I.  Berkeley's  Life  and  Writings. 

§  i  :  Early  Life  and  Education. — George  Berkeley,  born  at 
Kilcrin  or  Dysert,  in  the  County  of  Kilkenny,  Ireland,  March  12, 
1684-1685,*  was  a  descendant  of  the  noble  English  house  of 
Berkeley.  The  commonly  accepted  statement  is  that  more  than 
twenty  years  before  his  birth  his  great-grandfather,  the  first  Lord 
Berkeley  of  Stratton,  who  had  been  ennobled  by  Charles  II., 
came  to  Ireland  as  Lord  Lieutenant,  and  settled  there,  as  it 
would  seem,  with  his  son,  the  grandfather  of  Berkeley.  In  fact, 
the  early  years  and  the  ancestry  of  Berkeley  are  shrouded  in 
mystery.  '  He  comes  forth  the  most  subtle  and  accomplished 
philosopher  of  his  time,  almost  from  darkness.' 

George  Berkeley,  at  the  age  of  fifteen,  entered  Trinity  College, 
Dublin,  March  21,  1700,  with  which  he  was  connected  until  1713. 
He  obtained  a  fellowship  in  1 707.  Peter  Browne,  subsequently 
Bishop  of  Cork,  was  the  Provost  of  Trinity.  Locke's  '  Essay 
concerning  Human  Understanding,'  and  the  writings  of  Bacon, 
Descartes,  Malebranche,  and  Newton,  were  diligently  studied  at 
that  time. 

§  2:  Early  Works. — In  1707  appeared  a  Latin  Dissertation 
by  Berkeley:  'Arithmetica  absque  Algebra  aut  Euclide  demon- 
strata  ;'  the  '  Essay  towards  a  New  Theory  of  Vision'  followed, 
1709;  the  'Principles  of  Human  Knowledge,'  1710;  Berkeley's 
next  work  was  the  '  Dialogues  between  Hylas  and  Philonous,' 
published  1713. 

*  This  sketch  embraces  the  entire  matter  of  Ueberweg's,  in  his  edition  of  the  Principles, 
but  corrected  and  very  much  enlarged  from  other  sources,  especially  from  Prof.  Fraser's 
'  Life  and  Letters  of  Berkeley.'     Works,  vol.  iv. 

5 


6  PROLEGOMENA. 

'In  the  two  writings  last  named,'  says  Ueberweg,  'he  presents 
his  philosophical  doctrine,  complete  in  each  of  them.  The  man- 
ner of  presentation,  however,  is  diverse.  In  the  "  Principles"  we 
have  a  systematic  development ;  in  the  "  Dialogues"  there  is 
a  personal  discussion  between  Philonous,  an  adherent  of  the 
doctrine  of  Berkeley,  and  Hylas,  an  opponent  of  it.  Hylas 
does  not  oppose  a  fixed,  thoroughly  developed  view  to  that  of 
Berkeley,  but,  proceeding  from  the  common  confusion  in  regard 
to  the  problem,  gradually  advances  to  a  more  scientific  apprehen- 
sion of  the  subject,  but  is  driven  from  one  position  to  another  by 
his  antagonist,  until  at  last  he  acknowledges  himself  beaten,  and 
only  asks  a  verbal  concession  to  the  received  mode  of  speaking, 
which  Philonous,  without  favouring  it,  concedes.  As  the  con- 
cession, however,  involves  a  twofold  use  of  the  word  "matter,"  to 
wit,  in  the  phenomenal  and  in  the  transcendental  sense,  it  is  open 
to  some  objection.  In  consequence  of  the  life  of  their  mode 
•  of  delineation,  the  "  Dialogues"  have  a  peculiar  charm  ;  but  the 
"  Principles"  present  the  doctrine  in  its  most  original  and  purely 
scientific  shape.'  Fraser  calls  the  Dialogues  'the  gem  of  British 
metaphysical  literature.' 

§  3  :  Travels. — The  publication  of  the  '  Dialogues'  followed 
upon  Berkeley's  visit  to  London,  17 13.  He  formed  an  intimate 
friendship  with  Swift,  Pope,  and  other  writers  of  the  highest  dis- 
tinction. Swift  introduced  Berkeley  to  his  kinsman  the  Earl  of 
Berkeley.  Atterbury,  having  heard  much  of  Berkeley,  wished 
to  see  him,  and  was  introduced  to  him  by  the  Earl.  When 
Berkeley  left  the  room  the  Earl  said  to  the  Bishop,  '  Does  my 
cousin  answer  your  lordship's  expectations?'  Atterbury,  lifting 
up  his  hands  in  astonishment,  replied,  '  So  much  understanding, 
so  much  knowledge,  so  much  innocence,  and  such  humility,  I  did 
not  think  had  been  the  portion  of  any  but  angels,  till  I  saw  this 
gentleman.' 

It  was  on  a  recommendation  by  Swift  to  the  Earl  of  Peterbo- 
rough that  Berkeley,  as  the  chaplain  and  secretary  of  that  noble- 
man, accompanied  him  on  his  journey  as  ambassador  through 
France  to  Italy  (Nov.,  1713,  to  August,  1714).  Soon  after  his 
return  to  London  he  had  a  severe  attack  of  sickness.  After  his 
recovery,  his  friend  Doctor  Arbuthnot  wrote  playfully  to  Swift: 


I.— BERKELEY'  S  LIFE   AND    WRITINGS.  7 

1  Poor  philosopher  Berkeley  has  now  the  idea  of  health,  which  was 
very  hard  to  produce  in  him  ;  for  he  had  an  idea  of  a  strange  fever 
upon  him,  so  strong  that  it  was  very  hard  to  destroy  it  by  intro- 
ducing a  contrary  one.'  Soon  after  Berkeley  visited  France  and 
Italy  a  second  time.  He  went  as  the  companion  and  tutor  of 
the  only  son  of  the  Bishop  of  Clogher. 

In  Paris — according  to  the  common  story — Berkeley  had  a 
disputation  with  Malebranche,  the  distinguished  metaphysician, 
most  frequently  spoken  of  in  our  day  in  connection  with  his 
doctrine  that  we  behold  all  things  in  God. 

§  4 :  Malebranche. — '  The  doctrine  of  Malebranche,'  says  Ueber- 
weg,  '  that  there  are  indeed  material  things  which  exist  without 
the  mind,  but  that  these  things  have  no  power  of  operating  upon 
the  mind,  but  are  represented  in  the  divine  mind,  and  that  we 
have  intuition  of  this  representation,  can  easily  lead  to  a  view 
which  goes  yet  further,  and  denies  that  material  things  exist 
at  all ;  for  as  they  can  effect  nothing,  to  suppose  that  they  exist  is 
to  suppose  that  God  has  created  them  wholly  without  an  object' 
Of  this  obvious  point  Berkeley  avails  himself  with  much  force. 

§  5  :  Arthur  Collier,  an  Oxford  scholar  (1680-1732),  had 
been  led  into  the  train  of  thought  suggested  by  Malebranche. 
This  was  mainly  due  to  the  influence  of  the  work  of  John  Norris: 
'Theory  of  the  Ideal  or  Intelligible  World,'  2  vols.,  1 701-4. 

Collier  had  reached  views  in  general  unison  with  Berkeley's 
as  early  as  1703.  These  he  had  expressed  privately,  and  had 
defended  in  an  unpublished  work,  '  On  the  Dependent  Existence 
of  the  Visible  World,'  which  is  dated  1708.  Three  years  after 
Berkeley's  '  Principles,'  Collier  appeared  as  an  author  in  his  '  Clavis 
Universalis,  or  a  New  Inquiry  after  Truth,  being  a  Demonstration 
of  the  Non-existence  and  Impossibility  of  an  External  World.' 
London,  17 1 3. 

A  full  account  of  Collier's  work,  with  citations  from  it,  will  be 
found  in  Appendix  B. 

It  is  certain  that  Berkeley  was  not  influenced  by  Collier ;  and 
there  is  no  reason  to  believe  that  Collier  was  influenced  by 
Berkeley.  So  far  as  the  speculation  of  the  two  writers  agrees, 
'the  agreement  may  be  referred  to  the  common  philosophical 
point  of  view  at  the  time.     The  scientific  world  was  preparing 


8  PROLEGOMENA. 

for  that  reconstruction  of  its  conception  of  what  sensible  things 
and  externality  mean,  which  has  since  clarified  and  simplified 
physical  research.  Collier  in  his  own  way  was  not  wanting  in 
force ;  but  he  expressed  his  acute  thoughts  in  awkward  English, 
with  the  pedantry  of  a  schoolman,  and  wanted  the  sentiment  and 
imagination  and  constant  recognition  of  the  relation  of  speculation 
to  human  action,  which  in  the  course  of  time  made  the  contem- 
porary writings  of  Berkeley  an  influence  that  has  left  its  mark 
upon  all  later  thought.  The  theory  of  sense-symbolism,  which 
connected  Berkeley  with  the  Baconian  movement,  and  also  with 
religion,  is  wanting  in  Collier,  whose  arid  reasonings  are  divorced 
from  the  living  interests  of  men.  The  starting-point  of  Berkeley 
was  more  in  the  current  philosophy  of  Locke ;  Collier  produced 
the  meditative  reasonings  of  a  recluse  student  of  Malebranche 
and  the  schoolmen.'1  'The  universal  sense-symbolism  of  Berke- 
ley, his  broad  recognition  of  the  distinction  between  physical  or 
symbolical  and  efficient  or  proper  causation,  and  his  large  philo- 
sophical insight,  are  all  wanting  in  the  narrow  but  acute  reason- 
ings of  Collier.  Berkeley's  philosophy,  owing  to  its  own  com- 
prehensiveness, not  less  than  to  the  humanity  of  his  sympathies 
and  the  beauty  of  his  style,  is  now  recognized  as  a  striking 
expression  or  solution  of  problems  of  modern  thought,  while 
Collier  is  condemned  to  the  obscurity  of  a  mere  reasoner  of  the 
schools.'2 

§  6 :  Returns  to  England  —  Sails  to  America. — Berkeley 
remained  in  Italy  until,  probably,  1720.  He  shows  in  his  Letters 
and  Journal  an  intense  interest  in  nature,  art,  and  popular 
manners. 

After  his  return  to  England,  he  spent  most  of  the  time  in 
London,  from  1721  to  1728.  His  mind  was  occupied  at  this  time 
with  a  plan  for  establishing  a  college  in  the  Bermuda  Islands.  It 
was  to  be  modelled  in  general  after  Trinity  College,  Dublin,  and 
its  grand  aim  was  to  be  the  extension  of  Christianity  and  civiliza- 
tion in  America.  The  king  was  greatly  interested  in  the  'pious 
work.'  Sir  Robert  Walpole  promised  twenty  thousand  pounds 
for  the  endowment  of  the  college. 

1  Fraser :  Life  and  Letters,  62,  63. 

9  Fraser  :  Preface  to  Dialogues.    Works,  i.  254. 


I.— BERKELEY'S   LIFE   AND    WRITINGS.  g 

Berkeley  was  Dean  of  Derry,  '  the  best  preferment'  in  Ireland, 
which  he  had  held  since  1724. 

In  September,  1728,  he  sailed  for  Rhode  Island.  He  had  been 
married  August  1st  of  the  same  year  to  Anne,  daughter  of 
John  Forster,  who  had  been  Chief  Justice  of  the  Common  Pleas 
and  Speaker  of  the  Irish  House  of  Commons.  The  Dean  and 
his  young  wife,  after  a  voyage  of  more  than  four  months,  landed 
at  Newport.  The  inspiration  of  the  prospect  of  planting  arts  and 
learning  in  America  prompted  the  verses  which  close  with  the 
prophetic  words : 

'  Westward  the  course  of  Empire  takes  its  way ; 

The  four  first  Acts  already  past, 
A  fifth  shall  close  the  Drama  with  the  day, 
Time's  noblest  offspring  is  the  last." 

§7:  Returns  from  America  —  Alciphron. — Berkeley  re- 
mained in  America  until  Walpole's  refusal  to  fulfil  his  promises, 
and  the  consequent  withholding  of  the  needed  funds,  compelled 
him  to  surrender  his  cherished  hopes  and  plans.  He  sailed  for 
England  in  the  end  of  1731,  and  early  in  1732  was  once  more  in 
London.  The  hours  of  waiting  in  Rhode  Island  had  not  been 
spent  in  idleness.  He  had  written  there  his  Alciphron,  in  which 
the  exquisite  scenery  of  Rhode  Island  is  the  drapery  of  the 
Socratic  Drama.  'Alciphron,  or  the  Minute  Philosopher,'  ap- 
peared in  March,  1732.  It  is  directed  against  the  'Free-thinkers.' 
It  was  aimed  especially  at  Shaftesbury,  Mandeville,  and  Collins, 
and  at  some  of  the  views  of  Bishop  Browne  on  theological  knowl- 
edge. It  is  the  largest  and  '  probably  the  most  popular  of  his 
works.  It  should  be  studied  in  the  light  of  the  history  of  English 
Deism  from  the  time  of  Hobbes.' 

Shaftesbury  (1671-1713)  was  the  author  of  'Characteristics 
of  Men,  Manners,  Opinions,  and  Times ;'  '  Inquiry  concerning 
Virtue  and  Merit ;'  '  The  Moralists,  a  Rhapsody.' 

Mandeville  (1670-1733)  wrote  the  'Fable  of  the  Bees,'  Lon- 
don, 1 7 14.  Its  aim  was  to  prove  'private  vices  public  benefits.' 
The  bee-hive  of  the  Fable  was  one  in  which 

1  Every  part  was  full  of  vice, 
Yet  the  whole  mass  a  paradise.' 

Anthony  Collins  had  published,  1713,  a  'Discourse  of  Free- 


I0  PROLEGOMENA. 

thinking,  occasioned  by  the  Rise  and  Growth  of  a  Sect  called 
Free-thinkers.'  In  this  Discourse  '  he  boldly  took  for  granted 
that  all  believers  in  supernatural  revelation  must  be  hostile  to  free 
inquiry.  The  exclusive  claim  to  free  inquiry  made  by  the  "Free- 
thinkers" aroused  the  indignation  of  Berkeley.'  In  the  Guardian 
at  the  time,  and  long  after  in  Alciphron,  '  he  appears  as  a  free- 
thinking  Anti-free-thinker.'  He  demonstrates  the  bond-thinking 
of  free-thinkers,  and  shows,  as  Wesley  expresses  it,  that,  as  a 
class,  '  free-thinkers  are  not  deep  thinkers.' 

Dr.  Peter  Browne,  in  his  *  Procedure  and  Limits  of  Human 
Understanding,'  had  argued  that  the  attributes  of  Deity  '  can  be 
known  to  us  only  in  a  secondary  or  analogical  signification 
of  the  terms  employed  to  represent  them.'  This  hypothesis 
Berkeley  contests  with  some  severity,  and  was  answered  by  the 
Bishop  about  a  year  after. 

The  title  'The  Minute  Philosopher'  was  suggested  by  a  sen- 
tence from  Cicero's  Cato  Major,  which  is  quoted  as  a  motto  of 
the  book:  'Sin  mortuus,  ut  quidam  minuti  philosophi  censent, 
nihil  sentiam,  non  vereor  ne  hunc  errorem  meum  mortui  phi- 
losophi irrideant.'  (If  at  death,  as  some  small  philosophers  think 
is  the  case,  my  sentient  being  shall  cease,  I  need  not  fear  that  the 
dead  philosophers  will  ridicule  this  error  of  mine.) 

Alciphron  contains  Dialogues  to  which  Fraser  assigns  a  very 
high  rank,  pronouncing  them  '  unrivalled  for  controversial  acute- 
ness  and  literary  beauty  in  modern  times.'  He  agrees  in  Hurd's 
judgment,  that  nothing  approaches  them  in  perfection  of  form  ex- 
cept Shaftesbury's  '  Moralists'  and  Addison's  '  Treatise  on  Medals.' 
They  '  are  better  fitted  than  any  (dialogues)  in  our  language  to 
enable  the  English  reader  to  realize  the  charm  of  Cicero  and 
Plato.* 

§  8  :  Becomes  Bishop. — Berkeley's  old  friend  Sherlock,  now  one 
of  the  chaplains  of  Queen  Caroline,  wife  of  George  II.,  placed 
in  her  hands  a  copy  of  Alciphron.  As  Princess  of  Wales,  she  had 
known  and  admired  Berkeley  before  his  voyage  to  America.  To 
her  friendship  was  due  in  large  part  that  mere  political  consid- 
erations were  overlooked,  and  that  'an  unworldly  social  idealist 
and  philosopher'  was  nominated  (March,  1734)  to  the  bishopric 
of  Clcyne,  in  Ireland.     In  the  spring  of  1735  he  entered  upon 


I.— BERKELEY' S   LIFE  AND    WRITINGS. 


I  I 


his  new  charge,  with  the  fidelity  and  devotion  which  characterized 
every  part  of  his  official  life. 

Berkeley  showed  an  interest  in  the  great  political  and  social 
problems  of  his  day.  In  17 12  he  published  three  sermons  vindi- 
cating the  principle  of  passive  obedience.  They  were  occasioned 
by  Locke's  treatises  on  government,  and  advocate  high  Tory 
principles.  They  contain  Berkeley's  moral  philosophy.  They 
gave  rise  to  the  report  that  he  was  a  Jacobite,  and  for  a  time 
stood  in  the  way  of  his  advancement.  In  1750  appeared  '  Maxims 
concerning  Patriotism.'  A  Utopian  romance,  '  Adventures  of 
Signor  Gaudentio  di  Lucca,'  1737,  embracing  many  suggestions 
in  regard  to  philanthropic  reforms,  has  been  attributed  to  Berke- 
ley, but  was  most  probably  the  work  of  Berington,  a  Catholic 
priest. 

§  9  :  The  Mathematical  Controversies. — Several  of  Berke- 
ley's writings  are  devoted  to  the  Mathematical  Philosophical 
Controversies,  arising  out  of  the  questions  concerning  the  infi- 
nitely little  and  the  infinitely  great.  'The  Analyst'  is  first  hinted 
at  in  January,  1733-34.  It  is  an  argiimentum  ad homincm.  'Force 
is  as  incomprehensible  as  grace!  '  Reasoners  who  can  accept 
mysteries,  and  even  what  seem  to  be  contradictions,  in  their  own 
province,  are  inconsistent  in  rejecting  religion  merely  because  it 
makes  a  similar  demand  upon  them.' 

The  problem  of  Fluxions  had  been  dwelt  upon  by  Berkeley  in 
the  Principles,  §  118  and  following.  The  Infinitesimal  Calculus, 
which  had  recently  been  discovered  by  Newton,  and  which  was 
rediscovered  at  a  later  period  and  completed  by  Leibnitz,  gave 
occasion  to  the  discussion.  The  new  mode  of  computation,  as  at 
first  presented,  had  its  weak  points.  These  were  exposed  by 
Berkeley ;  but  he  did  not  always  confine  himself  to  them.  He 
rejected  some  things  which  can  be  successfully  defended.  See 
n.  [no].  The  Analyst  gave  rise  to  'a  controversy  which  has 
left  its  mark  in  the  History  of  Mathematics,'  and  which  con- 
tributed to  the  elucidation  of  various  fundamental  notions  in  it. 

Gibson,  Bishop  of  London,  in  a  letter  to  Berkeley,  says: 
'  What  your  lordship  observes  is  very  true,  .  .  that  the  men  of 
science  (a  conceited  generation)  are  the  greatest  sticklers  against 
revealed    religion,  and    have  been  very  open   in   their   attacks 


I2  PROLEGOMENA. 

upon  it.  And  we  are  much  obliged  to  your  lordship  for 
retorting  their  arguments  upon  them,  and  finding  them  work 
in  their  own  quarters,  and  must  depend  upon  you  to  go  on 
to  humble  them,  if  they  do  not  yet  find  themselves  sufficiently 
humbled.'     See  notes  [107]  to  [1 10]. 

§  10:  Tar- water  and  Siris. — Berkeley  ventured  also  into  the 
sphere  of  Medicine.  His  attention  was  drawn  to  it  by  the  sick- 
ness and  suffering  of  the  poor  in  his  diocese,  1739-40.  His 
American  experience  suggested  the  medicinal  value  of  tar-water. 
The  most  lasting  effect  of  his  enthusiasm  for  tar-water  'has  been 
the  curious  and  beautiful  work  of  speculation  in  which  he  cele- 
brated the  virtues  of  the  new  medicine.' 

In  the  spring  of  1744  appeared  :  '  Philosophical  Reflexions  and 
Inquiries  concerning  the  Virtues  of  Tar-water,  and  divers  other 
subjects  connected  together  and  arising  one  from  another.'  The 
title,  '  Siris,'  and  the  words  '  a  chain  of,'  were  added  in  the  second 
edition. 

In  1752  appeared  :  '  Farther  Thoughts  on  Tar-water.' 

These  works  contain  a  fund  of  observations  in  natural  science 
and  of  philosophical  and  theological  speculation.  'Siris  is  prob- 
ably the  profoundest  English  philosophical  book  of  the  last  cen- 
tury. This  wonderful  little  book  far  transcends  the  unspccula- 
tive  and  unlearned  age  in  which  it  appeared,  and  shows  supposed 
novelties  that  minister  to  modern  conceit  to  be  as  old  as  the 
Neoplatonic  or  even  the  Pre-Socratic  age.  Ecclesiastical  life  and 
episcopal  office  had  not  spoiled  the  philosopher:  he  had  been 
perfected  by  suffering,  and  his  tone  is  more  unworldly  than 
ever.' '  Siris  was  Berkeley's  '  last  word  in  speculation,'  and 
Berkeley's  last  words  in  Siris  are :  '  He  that  would  make  a  real 
progress  in  knowledge  must  dedicate  his  age  as  well  as  youth, 
the  later  growth  as  well  as  first  fruits,  at  the  altar  of  truth.' 

§  1 1 :  Berkeley  at  Oxford — His  Death. — The  last  months 
of  Berkeley's  life  were  spent  in  retired  life  at  Oxford,  for  which 
he  had  for  years  been  yearning.  His  son  George  was  pursuing 
his  studies  there.  Berkeley  reached  Oxford  in  July,  1752.  On 
the  evening  of  Sunday  the  14th  of  January,  1753,  Berkeley,  whose 
health  had  long  been  feeble,  was  resting  on  a  couch,  surrounded 

1  Fraser:  Life,  297. 


/— BERKELEY' S   LIFE  AND    WRITINGS. 


13 


by  his  family.  His  wife  had  been  reading  aloud  the  fifteenth 
chapter  of  First  Corinthians,  and  he  had  been  making  remarks 
upon  the  passage.  A  little  while  after,  his  daughter  went  to  offer 
him  some  tea.  She  found  him  apparently  sleeping,  but  his  body 
was  already  cold  in  death. 

In  his  will  he  says :  '  I  do  humbly  recommend  my  soul  into 
the  hands  of  my  blessed  Redeemer,  by  whose  merits  and  inter- 
cession I  hope  for  mercy.' 

The  feature  of  it  which,  to  those  who  suppose  that  Idealism 
involves  a  neglect  of  all  practical  preventions,  will  be  most  sur- 
prising, is,  that  it  directs  extraordinary  precautions  to  be  taken 
against  premature  interment.  The  body  was  to  be  kept  undis- 
turbed '  five  days  above  ground  or  longer,'  if  unmistakable 
evidences  of  change  did  not  appear. 

§  12:  Berkeley's  Works. — Berkeley's  minor  writings  were 
published  in  October,  1752,  at  Dublin  and  London,  under 
the  title :  '  A  Miscellany  containing  several  Tracts  on  various 
subjects.' 

The  editions  of  Berkeley's  complete  works  are : 

1.  London  and  Dublin,  1784,  2  vols.  4to,  with  portrait  by 
Cooke. 

2.  1820,  3  vols.  8vo. 

3.  1837,  1  vol.  8vo. 

4.  1843,  2  vols.  8vo.  London.  Edited  by  Rev.  G.  N. 
Wright,  M.  A.,  editor  of  the  works  of  Reid  and  Stewart.  No 
one  of  these  editions  is  complete,  nor  in  any  sense  critical. 

5.  The  Works  of  George  Berkeley,  D.D.,  formerly  Bishop  of 
Cloyne.  Including  many  of  his  writings  hitherto  unpublished. 
With  Prefaces,  Annotations,  His  Life  and  Letters,  and  an  Ac- 
count of  his  Philosophy.  By  Alexander  Campbell  Fraser,  M.  A., 
Professor  of  Logic  and  Metaphysics  in  the  University  of  Edin- 
burgh.    In  Four  Volumes.     Oxford.     At  the  Clarendon  Press, 

MDCCCLXXI. 

This  is  the  standard  edition  of  Berkeley's  works,  and  is  in  every 
respect  a  masterpiece  of  editorial  taste,  judgment,  and  complete- 
ness. 

§  13  :  Editions  of  Separate  Philosophical  Works. — 
1.  New  Theory  of  Vision,  1709  (two  editions),  1732. 


I4  PROLEGOMENA. 

2.  Principles  of  Human  Knowledge.  Lond.,  1710,  1734,  1776, 
1820.     8vo. 

3.  The  Three  Dialogues.    Lond.,  171 3,  1725,  1734,  1776.    8vo. 

4.  The  Theory  of  Vision,  or  Visual  Language  Vindicated  and 
Explained,  1733,  i860  (with  annotations  by  Cowell). 

5.  Alciphron.  Lond.,  1732,  1752  (3d  edition),  8vo,  2  vols. 
From  the  fourth  London  edition,  New  Haven,  8vo,  1803.  With 
a  commendatory  note  by  President  Dwight,  who  styles  Berkeley 
'  one  of  the  first  philosophers  of  any  age.'  The  editor  is  in- 
debted to  Prof.  George  E.  Day,  of  New  Haven,  for  a  copy  of  this 
edition. 

6.  Siris.  Lond.,  1744  (three  editions),  1746,  1747,  1748, 
1752.     8vo. 

§  14:  Translations  into  French  and  German. — The  Three 
Dialogues  were  translated  into  French  by  the  Abbe  du  Gua  de 
Malves,  1750,  i2mo;  Alciphron  by  de  Joncourt,  2  vols.  8vo,  La 
Haye,  1734;  and  Siris  by  Boullier,  1748,  i2mo. 

The  Three  Dialogues  were  translated  from  the  French  trans- 
lation of  1750  by  J.  C.  Eschenbach,  Professor  of  Philosophy  at 
Rostock.  The  French  was  used  because  the  translator  could 
not  get  the  English  original.  The  German  translation  is  given 
in  the  'Sammlung' — a  collection  of  the  most  important  authors 
who  have  denied  the  actuality  of  their  own  bodies  and  of  the 
entire  corporeal  world.  Rostock,  1756,  8vo.  Eschenbach  has 
incorporated  Collier's  Key  in  his  volume,  and  has  added  notes 
and  an  Appendix  in  confutation  of  Idealism. 

In  1 78 1,  Leipzig,  appeared  the  first  volume  of  Berkeley's  'Phi- 
losophische  Werke,'  with  a  sketch  of  his  life  and  of  his  writings. 
This  volume  contains  the  Three  Dialogues. 

The  philosophical  part  of  Siris  has  never  been  translated  into 
German. 

§15:  Ueberweg's  Edition. — In  the  '  Philosophische  Biblio- 
thek' — Philosophical  Library,  or  Collection  of  the  Chief  Works 
on  Philosophy  of  Ancient  and  Modern  Times,  with  the  co-cpera- 
tion  of  distinguished  scholars;  edited,  translated  (when  the  works 
are  not  German),  with  annotations  and  biographical  notices,  by 
J.  H.  von  Kirchmann,  the  twelfth  volume  is  Berkeley's  Princi- 
ples of  Human  Knowledge. 


I.— BERKELEY'S   LIFE   AND    WRITINGS.  15 

It  was  translated  into  German,  with  notes  explanatory  and 
critical,  by  Dr.  Friedrich  Ueberweg,  ordinary  Professor  of  Phi- 
losophy in  the  University  of  Konigsberg.  Berlin,  1869.  L. 
Heimann,  Wilhelms-Strasse  No.  91. 

In  his  Preface,  which  we  give  entire,  Ueberweg  says  : 

'The  lively  interest  manifested  in  our  day  in  the  History  of 
Philosophy  has  led  to  the  present  work.  It  seemed  to  me  de- 
sirable to  bring  closer  to  the  knowledge  of  my  time,  by  means  of 
a  translation  with  explanatory  and  critical  notes,  the  chief  work 
of  a  thinker  like  George  Berkeley.  He  represents  with  decision, 
has  with  unsurpassed  clearness  established,  and  with  the  com- 
pletest  strictness  and  logical  sequence  developed,  a  philosophical 
theory  which  is  possible  and  is  relatively  warranted.  His  work 
is  one  of  the  classic  documents  of  modern  speculation.  Berke- 
ley's "Dialogues  between  Hylas  and  Philonous"  handle  in  a 
somewhat  more  popular  form  the  same  theme  that  is  presented 
in  the  "  Principles  of  Human  Knowledge."  The  Dialogues  were 
twice  translated  into  German  in  the  eighteenth  century,  but  the 
"Principles"  now  appear  for  the  first  time  in  German. 

'Berkeley's  fundamental  doctrine  is  that  of  absolute  immaterial- 
ism.  There  exist  no  material  substances,  no  bodies  subsisting  in 
and  for  themselves  —  subsisting  without  the  mind.  What  we  call 
bodies — and  to  which  we  must  refer  the  term  "  matter,"  if  it  is  to 
have  any  legitimate  meaning — are  complexes  of  "  ideas,"  that  is, 
of  images  (Gebilden),  which  can  exist  only  in  the  mind,  and  not 
without  it.  "  Nothing  properly  but  persons  or  conscious  things  I 
really  exist.  All  other  things  are  not  so  much  existences,  as 
manners  of  the  existence  (ideas)  of  persons."  This  of  course 
holds  good  of  our  own  bodies,  equally  with  all  other  forms  of 
matter :  that  these  latter  exist  without  the  body,  no  one  is  less 
inclined  than  Berkeley  to  deny.  "  Ideas" — in  the  broader  sense 
of  the  word — are  partly  furnished  through  sensuous  or  internal 
perception,  partly  formed  by  reproduction,  analysis,  and  combina- 
tion. The  former  class  of  ideas  is  produced  in  us  by  God.  They 
are  produced  in  a  certain  definite  order,  which  we  call  conformity 
with  the  laws  of  nature,  and  God  produces  them  not  by  means 
of  matter  existing  without  us,  but  without  means,  immediately. 

'  The  second  class  of  ideas  we  call  forth  in  ourselves  by  our  own 


IS  PROLEGOMENA. 

wills.  The  mind  is  active,  it  thinks  and  wills ;  but  corporeal 
things,  inasmuch  as  they  are  ideas  or  complexes  of  ideas,  exist 
only  in  the  mind,  as  objects  thought  by  it,  not  thinking,  not 
operative  objects. 

'This  doctrine  is  the  opposite  pole  to  Materialism,  and  may 
claim  a  philosophical  as  well  as  a  historical  interest  in  our  day, 
in  which  Materialism  has  put  forth  fresh  strength.  Berkeley's 
doctrine  has  in  our  own  day  found  distinguished  representatives 
in  Great  Britain.  The  views  of  several  of  the  most  eminent 
thinkers  in  England  and  Scotland  stand  in  close  affinity  with  it. 
The  edition  of  Berkeley's  complete  works  by  Professor  Fraser 
of  Edinburgh  attests  the  lively  interest  felt  in  his  views.  Though 
in  our  day  the  Berkeleyan  form  of  Idealism  is  unfamiliar,  yet  it 
stands  in  a  close  relation  to  the  various  tendencies  which  have 
arisen  among  us,  beginning  with  Kant,  and  which  condition  our 
present  philosophizing.  So  close  is  the  relation  that  any  one 
who  wishes  to  be  conversant  with  the  present  condition  even  of 
German  philosophy,  and  to  attain  a  solid  judgment  in  regard  to 
the  philosophical  discussions  now  pending,  is  compelled  to  take 
Berkeley's  views  into  consideration. 

'Berkeley's  "  Theory  of  Vision"  (1709)  appeared  about  a  year 
in  advance  of  the  "Treatise  concerning  the  Principles  of  Human 
Knowledge"  (1710).  The  "Theory,"  as  Berkeley  remarks  (Princi- 
ples, §  44),  does  not  embrace  all  the  aspects  of  his  later  doctrine. 
In  the  "  Theory  of  Vision"  Berkeley  asserted  that  those  "  ideas" 
which  are  peculiar  to  the  sense  of  sight,  those  which  are  perceived 
through  it  alone, — such  as  light  and  colours, — cannot  exist  with- 
out the  mind.  A  similar  view  had  been  maintained  by  Descartes 
and  Locke,  and  has  subsequently  been  almost  universally  accepted. 
But  in  the  "Theory  of  Vision"  Berkeley  does  not  yet  explicitly 
maintain  the  same  view  in  regard  also  to  the  '  ideas'  perceived 
through  touch.  He  endeavours  in  the  '  Theory,'  however,  to 
prove  that  distance  is  not  immediately  seen,  nor  is  it  inferred  from 
lines  and  angles,  but  from  perceptions  of  an  entirely  different 
sort.  This  theory  prepared  the  way  for  the  transition  to  the  more 
advanced  theory  of  the  "  Principles,"  that  distance  also,  and  in 
general  extension,  figure,  dimension,  position,  and  motion,  exist 
in  the  mind  alone,  exist  as  its  ideas. 


L— BERKELEY'S   LIFE   AND    WRITINGS.  ij 

'  The  perusal  of  Berkeley's  writings  tends  in  a  high  degree 
to  stimulate  independent  thinking.  From  the  general  philosoph- 
ical notions  (Begriffen)  which  tradition  is  wont  to  fix,  Berkeley 
invariably  falls  back  upon  the  concrete  intuitions  on  which  those 
notions  rest,  and  tests  the  notion  by  the  intuition.  This  is  the 
evident  secret  of  his  power.  Among  the  writings  of  modern 
philosophers  I  know  scarcely  any  which  are  so  free  from  the 
untested  adoption  of  traditional  abstractions,  so  independent 
and  bold  in  reconstruction,  such  classic  models  in  style,  as  the 
"  Meditations"  of  Descartes  and  the  "  Principles"  of  our  Berkeley. 
These  qualities  give  them  a  pre-eminent  adaptation  as  an  intro- 
duction to  philosophical  research. 

'  We  hardly  need  say  that  this  recognition  of  the  merits  of 
Berkeley  does  not  involve  an  acceptance  of  his  doctrine  on  our 
part.  We  have  added  critical  remarks  which  may  stimulate  the 
reader  to  independent  reflection  on  the  problems  discussed.  We 
have  also  given  some  explanations,  especially  of  the  historical 
references. 

'  Over  against  the  ordinary  presuppositions  it  is  the  aim  of  phi- 
losophy, in  part  to  correct  and  extend,  in  part  simply  to  clear  up 
and  confirm.  Philosophy  is  not  merely  to  strive  after  new  results, 
but  also  to  account  for  those  grounds  of  just  supposition,  scien- 
tifically tenable,  which  escape  our  consciousness  in  its  primary 
exercise  (zunachst).  In  our  sense-perception,  the  simple  opinion 
that  external  things  exist,  and  that  they  exist  there  and  in  the 
way,  where  and  how,  the  images  in  our  perception  (Wahrneh- 
mungsbilder)  are  present  to  our  mind, — this  opinion  in  a  certain 
respect  is  to  be  corrected,  in  another  respect  is  to  be  justified.  By 
reference  throughout  to  Berkeley's  doctrine,  both  these  can  be 
most  easily  carried  through  in  such  a  way  that  the  entire  circle  of 
the  problems  to  which  we  are  here  to  have  regard  is  brought  into 
full  light.  These  problems  belong  in  part  to  Psychology  and 
Theology,  in  part  to  Logic.  With  respect  to  Logic,  I  could 
desire  that  my  critical  observations  on  Berkeley  may  be  regarded 
as  an  essential  supplement  to  my  views  of  external  and  internal 
perception,  which  form  the  first  division  of  my  "  System  of  Logic." 
Bonn,  1857;  3d  ed.,  do.,  1868. 

'  K.ONIGSBERG,  Jan.  22,  1869." 

2 


1 8  PROLEGOMENA. 

II.  The  Precursors  of  Berkeley. 

§  i :  Bacon  (i 561-1626)  and  Berkeley. — 'It  is  in  the  writings 
of  Berkeley,'  says  Archer  Butler,  '  that  we  are  to  look  for  the  first 
exposition  of  those  acute  and  important  reasonings  which  may 
be  said  in  these  latter  days  to  have  reduced  the  broad  practical 
monitions  of  Lord  Bacon  to  their  metaphysical  principles.'1 

'  Berkeley's  theory  of  physical  causation  .  .  .  consummates 
Bacon,  and  opens  the  way  to  the  true  conception  of  physical 
induction.' 2 

Berkeley's  judgment,  that :  'As  the  natural  connexion  of  signs 
with  the  things  signified  is  regular  and  constant,  it  forms  a  sort  of 
rational  discourse,  and  is  therefore  the  immediate  effect  of  an  in- 
telligent cause,'  is  in  developed  harmony  with  '  Bacon's  con- 
ception of  the  interpretability  of  Nature  or  the  sensible  world.' 3 
The  whole  spirit  of  Berkeley  is,  however,  reactive  against  the 
speculative  superficiality  and  the  one-sided  practicalness  and 
materializing  tendency  of  the  Baconian  System. 

§2:  Hobbes  (1 588-1679). — Hobbes  and  Berkeley  stand  to- 
gether as  defenders  of  Nominalism.  It  is  almost  their  sole 
point  of  contact.  Hobbes  assumed,  in  his  explanation  of  intelli- 
gent man,  that  the  body  accounted  for  the  mind,  and  that  Matter 
is  the  deepest  thing  in  the  Universe.  Berkeley  believed  that 
Hobbes'  '  wild  imaginations — in  a  word,  the  whole  system  of 
Atheism — is  .  .  .  entirely  overthrown  ...  by  the  repugnancy 
included  in  supposing  the  whole,  or  any  part,  even  the  most  rude 
and  shapeless,  of  the  visible  world,  to  exist  without  a  mind.' 4  He 
saw  atheistical  principles  taking  deeper  root  in  consequence  of  the 
prevalence  of  false  philosophy:  'Pantheism,  Materialism,  Fatal- 
ism, are  nothing  but  Atheism  a  little  disguised.'  He  regarded 
with  horror  the  fact  'that  the  notions  of  Hobbes,'  and  others  of 
the  same  school,  '  are  relished  and  applauded.' s 

Berkeley  seemed  determined  to  a  surgery  of  extirpation  in  his 
treatment  of  the  malady  of  the  age.  He  felt  that  it  was  beyond 
poulticing,  and  he  proposed  to  remove  the  cancer  with  the  knife. 

1  Dublin  University  Magazine,  vol.  vii.  538  ;  quoted  in  Fraser's  B.'s  Life,  407. 

a  Fraser:  Life,  43.  3  Siris,  j3  254,  and  Fraser's  note.     See  [104]. 

4  Second  Dialogue  (Works,  i.  305).  5  Theory  of  Vision  Vindicated  (Works,  i.  374). 


II.— THE    PRECURSORS    OF  BERKELEY.  ]g 

As  prevalent  falsehood  abused  matter  to  the  overthrow  of  spirit, 
Berkeley  proposed  to  settle  the  warfare  by  taking  away  the  very 
material  of  war.  He  characterizes  '  unthinking  matter  as  that 
only  fortress  without  which  your  Epicureans,  Hobbe-ists,  and  the 
like,  have  not  even  the  shadow  of  a  pretence.' * 

§  3:  Descartes  (1596-1650)  and  Berkeley. — Berkeley  'in- 
augurated a  new  and  second  era  in  the  intellectual  revolution 
which  Descartes  set  agoing.'  Descartes  rests  upon  the  funda- 
mental position  of  Berkeley,  that  we  cognize  the  idea  alone.  He 
inferred  from  the  existence  of  the  idea,  in  perception,  a  substantial 
material  world  of  which  it  is  the  idea.  Berkeley  denies  the  in- 
ference. 

There  were  elements  in  the  developed  Cartesianism  which 
could  not  but  provoke  opposition  on  the  part  of  sound  thinkers. 
Descartes  did  not  actually  draw  some  of  the  extremest  inferences 
of  the  later  Cartesianism,  yet  his  views  easily,  if  not  necessarily, 
ran  out  into  those  of  his  school. 

In  Cartesianism  matter  is  but  the  unknown  occasion2  at  the 
presence  of  which  Ideas  are  excited  in  us  by  the  will  of  God. 
Matter,  in  the  Cartesian  system,  is  passive  and  inert.  Descartes 
assumed,  as  Berkeley  did,  that  external  substance  is  not  in  any 
proper  sense  the  cause  of  our  ideas.  Berkeley  improved  on  Des- 
cartes, therefore,  by  rejecting  what  on  Descartes'  hypothesis  was 
useless  and  encumbering.  Descartes  had  exploded  the  idea, 
once  recognized,  that  colors,  sounds,  and  the  rest  of  the  sensible 
secondary  qualities  or  accidents,  have  a  real  existence  without 
the  mind.  Berkeley,3  accepting  this,  went  on  to  show  that  the 
primary  ones — figure,  motion,  and  such  like, — cannot  exist  other- 
wise than  in  a  spirit  or  mind  which  perceives  them,  and  that  it 
follows  that  we  have  no  longer  any  reason  to  suppose  the  being 
of  matter,  taking  that  word  to  denote  an  'unthinking  substratum 
of  qualities  or  accidents  wherein  they  exist  without  the  mind.' 
Berkeley  clearly  saw  and  exposes  the  philosophical  absurdity  of 
the  Cartesian  conception  of  the  relation  of  the  external  world  to 
the  mind  of  man.4  '  The  modern  philosophers,  who,  though 
they  allow  matter  to  exist,  yet  will  have  God  alone  to  be  the  im- 
mediate, efficient  cause  of  all  things.'     '  Created  beings  are  there- 

'  Prin.,  g  23.  '  Prin.  H.  K.,  §  69.  3  Prin.,  g  73.  4  Prin.  H.  K.,  §  53. 


20  PROLEGOMENA. 

fore  made  to  no  manner  of  purpose,  since  God  might  have  done 
everything  as  well  without  them.' '  He  refers  to  Descartes  when 
he  speaks  of  those  who,  'after  all  their  laboring  and  struggle  of 
thought,  are  forced  to  own  that  we  cannot  attain  to  any  self- 
evident  or  demonstrative  knowledge  of  the  existence  of  sensible 
things.'  In  the  Hylas  and  Philonous2  he  alludes  to  Descartes: 
'  What  a  jest  it  is  for  a  philosopher  to  question  the  existence  of 
sensible  things  till  he  hath  it  proved  to  him  from  the  veracity 
of  God,  or  to  pretend  our  knowledge  on  this  point  falls  short  of 
intuition  or  demonstration.' 

§4:  Malebranche  (1638-1715)  and  Berkeley. — 'The  Pla- 
tonism,'  says  Fraser,  '  which  pervades  Malebranche  perhaps 
tended  to  encourage  the  Platonic  thought  and  varied  learning 
that  appeared  in  Berkeley's  later  writings.3  But  Berkeley  is  not  so 
much  at  home  in  the  divine  vision  of  the  French  metaphysician  as 
among  the  ideas  of  the  English  philosopher  (Locke).  The  mys- 
ticism of  the  "Search  for  Truth"  was  repelled  by  the  transparent 
clearness  of  Berkeley's  thought.  The  slender  hold  retained  by 
Malebranche  of  external  substance,  as  well  as  the  theory  of 
merely  occasional  causation  of  matter,  common  to  him  and  Des- 
cartes, naturally  attracted  Berkeley.' 

The  position  of  Malebranche,  as  Berkeley  himself  states  it,  is, 
that  matter  is  not  perceived  by  us,  but  is  perceived  by  God,  to 
whom  it  is  the  occasion  of  exciting  ideas  in  our  mind.  In  treat- 
ing of  the  views  of  Malebranche,  Berkeley  says,  '  If  it  pass  for  a 
good  argument  against  other  hypotheses  in  the  sciences,  that 
they  suppose  nature  or  the  divine  wisdom  to  make  something  in 
vain,  or  to  do  that  by  tedious,  round-about  methods  which  might 
have  been  performed  in  a  much  more  easy  and  compendious 
way,  what  shall  we  think  of  that  hypothesis  which  supposes  the 
world  made  in  vain'  ?  Ibid.  '  Few  men  think,  yet  all  liave 
opinions.  I  shall  not,  therefore,  be  surprised  if  some  men  im- 
agine that  I  run  into  the  enthusiasm  of  Malebranche,  though  in 
truth  I  am  very  remote  from  it.  He  builds  on  the  most  abstract, 
general  ideas,  which  I  entirely  disclaim.  He  asserts  an  absolute 
external  world,  which  I  deny.  He  maintains  that  we  are  de- 
ceived by  our  senses  and  know  not  the  real  natures  or  the  true 

>  Prin.,  §88.  »  p.  324.  3  Pref.,  p.  113. 


II.— THE    PRECURSORS    OF   BERKELEY.  2I 

forms  and  figures  of  extended  beings,  of  all  of  which  I  hold  the 
direct  contrary.  So  that  upon  the  whole  there  are  no  principles 
more  fundamentally  opposite  than  his  and  mine.' 

§  5  :  Spinoza  (163 2- 1677)  and  Berkeley. — An  approach  to 
Spinoza  may  seem  to  be  made  by  Berkeley's  removal  of  some 
elements  of  the  Cartesian  Dualism.  Relatively  to  this,  Berkeley 
may  be  called  a  generic  monist.  Descartes  maintained  two  genera 
or  kinds  of  substance,  spiritual  and  corporeal.  Berkeley  allowed 
but  one  kind  or  genus  of  substance,  to  wit:  spirit: — Divine  spirit 
and  Created  spirit.  To  him  all  the  phenomenal  is  so  far  sub- 
jective that  it  is  either  the  operation  of  mind,  or  operation  on 
mind,  which  is  also  of  course  in  its  result  again  the  operation  of 
mind,  for  the  passivity  of  mind  can  in  no  case  be  more  than  rela- 
tive. Its  passivity  is  but  a  conditioned  activity.  But  while 
Berkeley  maintained  one  genus  of  substance,  he  held  to  objective, 
real  species  within  it,  and  to  real  individuality  and  personality 
within  the  species.  The  Infinite  spirit  is  a  true,  individual  person, 
and  the  finite  spirits  are  true,  individual  persons.  No  philosoph- 
ical writer  more  thoroughly  than  Berkeley  insists  on  the  person- 
ality and  freedom  of  God,  the  personality  and  freedom  of  man. 
He  had,  as  we  have  seen,  no  sympathy  with  the  latent  Pantheism 
of  Malebranche's  vision  in  God,  which,  however  it  may  be  ex- 
plained, still  leaves  the  operations  of  the  human  mind  as  proper 
phenomena  of  the  Divine  mind,  and  effaces  the  true  individuality 
and  personality  of  man.  There  is  no  writer  among  our  English 
classics  whose  whole  moral  tendency  is  purer  than  Berkeley's, 
more  completely  sundered  from  the  ethical  destructivism  of 
Spinoza.  His  works  are  a  bulwark  of  the  highest  faiths,  hopes, 
and  aspirations  of  the  heart  of  man,  and  they  are  such,  in  part, 
because  of  their  distinct  assertion  of  the  personality  and  freedom 
of  God,  the  personality,  freedom,  and  accountability  of  man. 

§6:  Locke  (1632-1704)  and  Berkeley. — The  system  of 
Locke,  which  in  one  line  of  development  easily  runs  out  into 
materialism,  is  in  another  line  carried  out  with  equal  ease  into 
idealism.  To  this  extreme  tended  Locke's  depreciation  of  the 
accepted  idea  of  substance  ;  a  depreciation  the  danger  of  which  he 
himself  subsequently  saw  ;  he  ridiculed  the  distinction  expressed 
in  the  terms  'substance'  and  'accident'     He  says  (Hum.  Und., 


22  PROLEGOMEXA. 

II.  xiii.  19),  'They  who  first  ran  into  the  notion  of  accidents, 
as  a  sort  of  real  beings  that  needed  something  to  inhere  in, 
were  forced  to  find  out  the  word  "  substance"  to  support  them.' 
Berkeley's  theory  enlarged  and  gave  scientific  shape  to  Locke's 
inconsiderate  ridicule. 

Another  point  of  attachment  to  idealism  is  found  in  Locke's 
view  of  knowledge — his  answer  to  the  question,  '  What  do  we 
know?'  To  this  he  returns  the  reply  (iv.  i.  1),  'The  mind  hath 
no  other  immediate  object  but  its  own  ideas,  which  it  alone  does 
or  can  contemplate ;'  and  he  infers  that  our  knowledge  is  only 
conversant  about  them.  He  says  (iv.  ii.  1),  'All  our  knowledge 
consists  in  the  view  the  mind  has  of  its  own  ideas,  which  is  the 
utmost  light  and  greatest  certainty  we  with  our  faculties  and  in 
our  way  of  knowledge  are  capable  of  This  is  a  distinct  admis- 
sion that  we  have  no  immediate  proper  knowledge  of  the  external 
world.  'The  mind  knows  not  things  immediately,  but  only  by 
the  intervention  of  the  ideas  it  has  of  them.'  (iv.  iv.  3.)  This 
strictly  taken  means  that  we  know  only  our  ideas  and  infer  the 
existence  of  things.  He  goes  on  to  say,  'Our  knowledge  is 
therefore  real  only  so  far  as  there  is  a  conformity  between  our 
ideas  and  the  reality  of  things.'  He  ought  to  have  said,  to  be 
consistent  with  himself,  our  inferences  therefore  as  to  things  are 
correct  only  so  far  as  there  is  a  conformity  between  our  ideas  and 
the  reality  of  things. 

Locke  was  too  acute  to  fail  to  perceive  the  embarrassment  of 
his  position,  but  he  was  not  acute  enough  to  relieve  it,  for  in  fact 
it  cannot  be  relieved.  That  he  was  acute  enough  to  perceive  it 
is  shown  by  his  asking, '  But  what  shall  be  the  criterion,  how  shall 
the  mind,  when  it  perceives  nothing  but  its  own  ideas,  know  that 
they  agree  with  things  themselves?'  'This,'  he  says,  'though 
it  seems  not  to  want  in  difficulty,  yet  I  think  there  be  two  sorts 
of  ideas,  that  we  may  be  assured  agree  with  things.'    (iv.  iv.  3.) 

In  these  very  words  he  abandons  his  position  and  goes  into 
the  discussion  of  a  wholly  different  question.  He  raises  his 
question  in  what  Kant  would  call  the  sphere  of  the  critical  rea- 
son, and  returns  his  answer  in  the  sphere  of  the  practical  reason. 
His  question  is,  '  How  shall  I  know  f  His  answer  is,  '  I  have 
good  reason  to  believe.'     But,  philosophically  speaking,  we  can- 


II.— THE    PRECURSORS    OF   BERKELEY. 


'3 


not  know  what  we  believe,  nor  believe  what  we  know.  When 
I  speak  philosophically  and  say,  '  I  believe,'  I  grant  that  I  do  not 
know,  in  the  strict  sense  in  which  we  here  use  the  term. 

Locke  says  (iv.  iv.  8),  '  To  make  our  knowledge  real,  it  is 
requisite  that  our  ideas  answer  their  archetypes.'  (iv.  vi.  16), 
'  General  certainty  is  never  to  be  found  but  in  our  ideas ;  it  is 
the  contemplation  of  our  own  abstract  ideas  that  alone  is  able 
to  afford  us  general  knowledge.'  (iv.  vi.  u), 'The  knowledge 
we  have  of  our  own  being  we  have  by  intuition,  the  existence 
of  God  reason  clearly  makes  known  to  us ;  the  knowledge  of 
the  existence  of  any  other  thing  we  can  have  only  by  sensa- 
tion, for  there  being  no  necessary  connection  of  real  existence 
with  any  idea  a  man  has  in  his  memory,  nor  of  any  other 
existence  but  that  of  God,  with  the  existence  of  any  particular 
man,  no  particular  man  can  know  the  existence  of  any  other 
being  but  only  when  by  actually  operating  upon  him  it  makes 
itself  perceived  by  him  ;  for  having  the  idea  of  anything  in 
our  minds  no  more  proves  the  existence  of  that  thing  than 
the  picture  of  a  man  evidences  his  being  in  the  world,  or  the 
vision  of  a  dream  makes  thereby  a  true  history.'  Locke  admits 
in  so  many  words  '  the  notice  we  have  by  our  senses  of  the 
existence  of  things  without  us  is  not  altogether  so  certain  as  our 
intuitive  knowledge  or  the  deductions  of  reason  employed  about 
the  clear  abstract  ideas  of  our  own  minds,  yet  it  is  an  assurance 
that  deserves  the  name  of  knowledge.'  Here  Locke  marks  three 
gradations  of  intellectual  certainty  :  the  first  and  highest  grada- 
tion is  our  intuitive  knowledge,  the  second  and  lower  is  deduc- 
tions of  reason,  the  third  and  lowest  is  the  notice  our  senses  take 
of  things  without  us,  the  result  of  which  Locke  calls  assurance  ; 
in  a  word,  I.  Intuition,  II.  Reason,  III.  Faith.  Now,  as  the  first 
of  these  is  not  more  than  knowledge,  the  second  and  third  must 
be  less  than  knowledge,  because  they  are  less  than  the  first. 
Locke  feels  this,  and  hence  the  rhetorical  vagueness  '  it  is  an 
assurance  that  deserves  the  name  of  knowledge' — it  is  really  faith, 
not  knowledge.  He  says  (iv.  xi.  9)  of  this  last,  '  This  knowl- 
edge extends  so  far  as  the  present  testimony  of  our  senses  em- 
ployed about  particular  objects  that  do  then  affect  them,  and  no 
further ;  for  if  I  saw  such  a  collection  of  simple  ideas,  as  is  wont 


24  PROLEGOMENA. 

to  be  called  man,  existing  together  one  minute  since,  and  am 
now  alone,  I  cannot  be  certain  that  the  same  man  exists  now, 
since  there  is  no  necessary  connection  of  his  existence  a  minute 
since  with  his  existence  now ;  by  a  thousand  ways  he  may  cease 
to  be  since  I  had  the  testimony  of  my  senses  for  his  existence.' 
He  closes  the  paragraph  by  saying,  'Though  it  be  highly  proba- 
ble that  millions  of  men  do  now  exist,  yet  whilst  I  am  alone 
writing  this  I  have  not  the  certainty  of  it  which  we  strictly  call 
knowledge,  though  the  great  likelihood  of  it  puts  me  past  doubt ; 
but  this  is  but  probability,  not  knowledge.'  In  these  words  of 
Locke  there  is  a  distinct  assertion  of  the  principle  that  cognition 
and  belief  are  distinct,  that  no  amount  of  belief  is  strictly  equiv- 
alent to  knowledge,  and  that  knowledge  proper  is  limited  by  the 
present  testimony  of  our  senses,  so  far  as  anything  external  to 
us  is  involved.  This  is  not,  indeed,  Berkeley's  doctrine  that  the 
unperceived  is  non-existent ;  but  it  is  the  doctrine,  almost  as 
remote  from  popular  impression,  that  the  unperceived  is  unknown, 
— it  is  that  the  cognitive  esse  is  percipi,  and  in  a  new  shape  it 
involves  that,  on  Locke's  principles,  the  external  world  is  not  an 
object  of  knowledge,  but  an  assumption  of  faith.  In  some  sense 
Berkeley  developed  certain  parts  of  the  philosophy  of  Locke  ; 
in  others,  he  took  grounds  against  it. 

§7:  Burthogge  (1694). —  Richard  Burthogge's  Essay  upon 
Reason  and  the  Nature  of  Spirits,  1694,  is  quoted  by  Prof. 
Fraser1  as  presenting  '  dim  anticipations  both  of  Berkeley  and 
of  Kant.'  Burthogge  says,  '  Few,  if  any,  of  the  ideas  which  we 
have  of  things  are  properly  pictures,  our  conceptions  of  things 
no  more  resembling  them  in  strict  propriety  than  our  words  do 
our  conceptions. . .  Things  . . .  are  in  all  respects  the  very  same  to 
the  mind  or  understanding  that  colours  are  to  the  eye.  .  .  Things 
are  nothing  to  us  but  as  they  are  known  by  us;  .  .  .  they  are  not 
in  our  faculties,  either  in  their  own  reality  or  by  way  of  a  true 
resemblance  or  representation. .  .  Every  cogitative  faculty,  though 
it  is  not  the  sole  cause  of  its  own  immediate  (apparent)  object, 
yet  has  a  share  in  making  it.  .  .  In  sum,  the  immediate  objects  of 
cogitation  .  .  .  are  cntia  cogitatiouis,  all  phenomena ;  appearances 
that  do  no  more  exist  without  our  faculties  in  the  things  them- 

1  Life  and  Letters,  44. 


III.— SUMMARIES    OF   BERKELEY'S   SYSTEM.    2$ 

selves  than  the  images  that  are  seen  in  water,  or  behind  a  glass, 
do  really  exist  in  those  places  where  they  seem  to  be. .  .  In  truth, 
neither  accident  nor  substance  hath  any  being  but  only  in  the 
mind,  and  by  the  virtue  of  cogitation  or  thought.' f 

III.  Summaries  of  Berkeley's  System. 

§  I  :  In  common  with  every  great  thinker  of  every  age,  Berke- 
ley has  been  misunderstood  and  misrepresented  in  various  ways. 
Men  of  various  schools  have  been  unconsciously  biased  in  their 
judgment  of  Berkeley's  views  by  their  own. 

Where  there  has  been  no  misrepresentation,  there  has  been  a 
difference  in  the  proportion  and  prominence  assigned  by  different 
writers  to  different  parts. 

It  will  therefore  be  both  interesting  and  useful  to  present  a 
number  of  summaries  from  distinguished  writers  of  different 
schools.  They  will  have  value  as  testimony  also,  where  differ- 
ences of  opinion  may  still  exist  as  to  Berkeley's  meaning. 

§2:  Reid  (1710-1796). — 'Berkeley  maintains,  and  thinks  he 
has  demonstrated,  by  a  variety  of  arguments,  grounded  on  prin- 
ciples of  philosophy  universally  received,  that  there  is  no  such 
thing  as  matter  in  the  universe  ;  that  sun  and  moon,  earth  and 
sea,  our  own  bodies  and  those  of  our  friends,  are  nothing  but 
ideas  in  the  minds  of  those  who  think  of  them,  and  that  they 
have  no  existence  when  they  are  not  the  objects  of  thought; 
that  all  that  is  in  the  universe  may  be  reduced  to  two  categories, 
to  wit,  minds,  and  ideas  in  the  mind.'2 

§3:  Kant  (1 724-1 804).  —  'Material  idealism  is  the  theory 
which  maintains  that  the  existence  of  objects  in  space  exterior 
to  us  is  either  dubious  and  incapable  of  proof,  or  false  and  im- 
possible. The  former  is  the  problematic  idealism  of  Descartes, 
who  holds  that  there  is  but  one  empirical  assertion  which  is 
beyond  doubt,  to  wit,  I  am  ;  the  second  is  the  dogmatic  idealism 
of  Berkeley,  who  maintains  that  space,  with  all  the  things  to 
which  it  adheres,  as  an  inseparable  condition,  is  in  itself  im- 
possible, and  that  by  consequence  the  things  in  space  are  mere 

1  Chaps,  iii.  and  v.,  quoted  in  Life  and  Letters,  44.  Burthogge's  Work  is  in  the  Phila- 
delphia Library. 

8  Works  (Hamilton),  281. 


26  PRO  LEGO  MEN  A. 

imaginings.  It  is  impossible  to  escape  from  dogmatic  idealism  if 
we  look  upon  space  as  a  quality  of  things  in  themselves ;  for  in 
that  case  it  is,  in  common  with  everything  which  it  conditions, 
a  non-entity.'1  It  is  acknowledged  that  Kant  does  not  state 
Berkeley's  view  accurately. 

§4:  Platner  (1744-1818). — 'I  do  not  know  of  any  dogmatic 
idealism  but  that  of  Berkeley,  of  which  with  complete  injus- 
tice Kant  says  that  it  regards  the  difference  between  a  dream 
and  a  reality  as  indemonstrable.  Berkeley  certainly  supposes 
something  real  to  be  the  object  of  our  sense-cognition:  to  wit, 
the  material  world  in  the  idea  of  God,  and  through  the  power  of 
God  really  operating  upon  us,  as  in  the  system  of  Spinoza.  Ex- 
tension is  nothing  but  God's  idea  of  extension,  formed  by  the 
power  of  God.  In  other  words,  Berkeley  reasons  on  the  assump- 
tion that  the  ideal  of  the  material  world  is  in  God.  As  he  does 
not  see  how  a  material  world  can  exist  without  this  ideal,  or  be 
distinct  from  it,  he  infers  that  what  we  call  the  material  world, 
and  consider  as  such,  is  the  divine  ideal  of  it,  which  floats  before 
us,  and  by  means  of  the  divine  power  operates  upon  us.  It  is 
consequently  a  true  object,  and  not  a  creature  of  our  imagina- 
tion (Vorstellungs-Vermogens);  no  fancy,  no  dream,  but  some- 
thing thoroughly  real ;  and  in  this  object  everything  is  precisely 
as  it  is  in  our  conception  (Vorstellung).  For  Berkeley  says  with 
truth  that  on  every  mode  of  explanation  but  his  own  even  the 
primary  qualities  must  be  explained  as  phenomenon ;  while  he 
rejects  this  explanation  and  says  expressly  that  the  senses  thor- 
oughly represent  (vorbilden)  that  which  is  without  them.  This 
metaphysician  concedes  consequently  to  the  sense-cognition  a 
more  unlimited  objective  truth  than  has  perhaps  ever  been 
ascribed  to  it.  This  follows  also  as  a  matter  of  course  from  his 
system.  See,  for  example,  how  he  derides  the  philosophers  who 
deduce  colours,  cold,  warmth,  from  the  primary  qualities  which 
are  wholly  different  from  them  :2  "  I  am  of  a  vulgar  cast,  simple 
enough  to  believe  my  senses  and  leave  things  as  I  find  them.  It 
is  my  opinion  that  colours  and  other  sensible  qualities  are  of  the 
objects.     I  cannot  for  my  life  help  thinking  that  snow  is  white 

1  Krit.  d.  rein.  Vernunft,  herausg.  v.  V.  Kirchmann.     Drittc  Aufl.,  1872,  pp.  235,  236. 

2  Dialogues  between  Hylas  and  Philonous. 


III.— SUMMARIES    OF  BERKELEY'S   SYSTEM. 


V 


and  fire  hot ;  and  as  I  am  no  sceptic  with  regard  to  the  nature 
of  things,  so  neither  am  I  as  to  their  existence.' " 1 

§  5  :  Hillebrand  (1819). — '  Berkeley  was  the  founder  of  what 
may  properly  be  called  the  dogmatico-psychological  idealism. 
The  line  of  thought  in  his  doctrine  is  in  substance  as  follows :  All 
cognition  begins  with  the  ideas  (Vorstellungen).  These  ideas 
must  be  either  purely  subjective,  or  there  must  be  real  objects 
correspondent  with  them  without  the  mind.  The  latter  is  im- 
possible ;  for  otherwise  the  external  objects  must  possess  the 
qualities  of  mind,  inasmuch  as  an  idea  cannot  be  absolutely  sepa- 
rated from  its  object,  but  the  separation  itself  is  again  idea.  But 
such  a  supposition  must  be  absurd.  Experience  further  teaches 
us  that  one  and  the  same  object  operates  differently  upon  different 
subjects.  If  now  the  object  as  such  were  really  existent  without 
the  concipient  subject,  it  must  be  self-contradictory  in  its  quali- 
ties, which  it  is  unphilosophical  to  maintain.  Nothing  remains, 
therefore,  but  to  suppose  that  the  entire  external  world  in  space 
is  empty  appearance  without  reality ;  that  it  rests  only  on  sub- 
jective ideas ;  that  these  alone  are  truly  real.  As,  however,  the 
subjective  ideas  are  not  produced  by  our  mind  itself,  there  must 
be  another  Being  from  whom  they  originate.  This  Being  can  be 
a  spirit  only,  as  there  is  no  existence  but  the  spiritual.  The  mani- 
fold character  and  order  in  the  subjective  perceptions  (there  are 
no  abstract  ideas),  and  the  mode  in  which  they  reach  us,  justifies 
the  conclusion  that  this  spirit  must  possess  the  supremest  and 
noblest  attributes — must  be  the  Deity  himself.'2 

§  6  :  Tennemann(i76i-i8i9). — '  With  extraordinary  acuteness 
Berkeley  exposed  the  difficulties  of  external  experience,  the  ob- 
scurity of  the  notions  of  substance,  accidents,  and  extension; 
showed  that  by  our  senses  we  can  perceive  nothing  but  sensible 
qualities,  and  can  by  no  means  perceive  the  existence  and  sub- 
stantiality of  a  sensible  object,  and  that  the  supposition  that  there 
is  a  corporeal  world  distinct  from  and  independent  of  our  con- 
ceptions is  an  illusion.  There  is,  therefore,  nothing  but  spirits. 
Man  perceives  nothing  but  his  own  sensations  and  conceptions. 
All  these,  however,  he  does  not  himself  originate;  and  as  nothing 

1  Ernst  Platner,  Philosophische  Aphorismen,  1793,  i.  409,  410. 
3  Propaedeutik  der  Philosophic     Heidelberg,  1819,  £  452. 


28  PROLEGOMENA. 

but  spirits  exist,  they  must  be  imparted  by  a  spirit.  Their  mani- 
foldness  and  conformity  with  law,  in  independence  of  our  will, 
shows  that  they  are  imparted  by  an  infinitely  perfect  spirit,  God. 
Though  he  be  dependent  for  his  cognition  on  God,  yet  man,  by 
his  practical  freedom,  is  the  author  of  his  own  errors  and  evil 
acts.'1 

§7:  Hegel  (1770-1831). — 'Idealism  declares  that  self-con- 
sciousness, or  the  assurance  of  self,  comprehends  all  reality  and 
truth.  The  extremest  form  of  this  idealism  asserts  that  self- 
consciousness  as  individual  or  formal  cannot  advance  beyond 
the  assertion,  All  objects  are  our  conceptions.  This  subjective 
idealism  meets  us  in  Berkeley,  and  in  another  shape  in  Hume. 
This  idealism,  before  which  all  external  reality  vanishes,  was  pre- 
ceded by  the  position  occupied  by  Locke,  and  grows  directly  out 
of  it.  Berkeley  represents  an  idealism  which  approached  very 
closely  to  that  of  Malebranche.  Over  against  the  Metaphysic  of 
the  Understanding  stands  forth  the  view  that  all  the  existent  and 
its  determinations  are  a  thing  of  sensation,  and  wrought  into 
shape  by  consciousness.  Berkeley's  fundamental  thought  there- 
fore is,  "  The  being  of  all,  which  we  call  things,  is  alone  their  being 
perceived;"  that  is,  what  we  know  is  our  own  determinations.'2 

§8:  Krug  (1770- 1 842). — 'Berkeley  endeavors  to  show  that 
through  the  senses  we  perceive  nothing  but  a  sensible  appear- 
ance, and  by  no  means  the  existence  or  substantiality  of  an  actual 
thing,  and  that  consequently  the  supposition  of  a  corporeal  world 
independent  of  us  is  a  pure  illusion.  Only  spirits  exist,  and  the 
mind  of  man,  strictly  speaking,  perceives  nothing  but  its  own 
conceptions  or  ideas.  These  it  does  not  itself  bring  forth,  but  God, 
the  infinitely  perfect  Spirit,  imparts  them  to  it ;  nevertheless  man, 
by  the  absolute  freedom  of  his  will,  remains  the  author  of  his 
own  good  and  evil  actions.3 

§  9:  Rothenflue  (1846). — 'The  principles  and  reasonings  of 
Berkeley  may  be  reduced  to  the  following  propositions  : 

'  I.  All  properties  which  we  ascribe  or  refer  to  external  things, 
such  as  extension,  color,  form,  &c,  are  purely  subjective  sensations; 

*  Grundriss  d.  Gesch.  d.  Philosophic  ste  Aufl.  v.  Wendt,  1829,  {J  348. 

8  Gesch.  d.  Philosophic     Herausg.  v.  Michelet.     Berlin,  1844,  3c  Theil,  441,  442. 

3  W.  T.  Krug:   Allg.  Handw.  d.  philosoph.  Wissensehaften.    Zweite  Aufl.,  1832,  i.  326. 


III.— SUMMARIES    OF  BERKELEY  S   SYSTEM.    29 

the  objective  reality  corresponding  with  which  cannot  be  proved, 
for  they  are  variously  perceived  by  various  subjects ;  but  as  the 
same  object  cannot  have  contradictory  properties,  those  sensa- 
tions are  purely  subjective. 

'  II.  If  we  separate  or  detach  the  sensible  properties  of  a  thing 
from  the  thing  itself,  that  thing  will  no  longer  be  perceptible  by 
the  senses ;  therefore,  according  to  empiricism,  it  does  not  exist. 
Hence  we  can  neither  know  that  the  properties  of  things,  nor  the 
external  things  themselves,  exist.  Take  for  example  something 
which  is  extended ;  extension  in  so  far  as  it  is  the  perceived 
property  of  things  is  a  purely  subjective  sensation,  from  which 
we  can  draw  no  conclusion  establishing  its  objective  reality.  But 
the  thing  extended,  if  extension  be  cut  off  from  it,  is  no  longer 
perceptible  by  the  senses,  therefore  it  does  not  exist :  hence  we 
cannot  attribute  objective  reality  either  to  the  properties  of  things 
or  to  the  things  themselves  (according  to  empiricism). 

'  III.  Nor  can  it  be  said  that  the  sensations  associated  with  out- 
ward things  are,  as  it  were,  images  through  which  we  have  cog- 
nizance of  the  external  things.  For  we  are  not  able  from  a 
likeness  to  have  knowledge  of  its  prototype  original,  unless  we 
already  have  "  a  priori,"  through  memory  or  reason,  a  notion  of 
that  original ;  but  the  senses  teach  us  nothing  of  any  relation 
of  images  to  things,  and  memory  and  reason,  according  to  em- 
piricism, are  not  sources  of  knowledge. 

'  IV.  Inasmuch  as  our  sensations  are  mutable,  but  the  objects  of 
them  immutable,  the  sensations  cannot  be  images  of  the  objects. 

'  V.  Therefore  we  have  cognizance  of  nought  except  of  our  own 
purely  subjective  ideas. 

'  VI.  But  the  cause  of  those  ideas  is  not  our  own  mind,  inas- 
much as  they  do  not  depend  upon  its  free  will ;  the  mind  is 
related  to  them  passively ;  hence  they  come  from  a  spirit  dis- 
tinct from  the  mind,  and  their  infinite  variety  and  mutual  har- 
mony show  that  they  come  from  an  infinite  and  perfect  spirit, 
i.e.,  God :  hence, 

'VII.  As  every  idea  of  an  outward  world  arises  in  us  imme- 
diately from  the  will  and  power  of  God,  we  are  entirely  depend- 
ent in  our  cognitions  on  the  divine  will. 

'  VIII.  In  action,  however,  man  is  free,  i.  e.,  has  the  power  of 


3o  PRO  LEGO  MEN  A. 

self-determination ;  for,  although  the  potency  itself  is  from  God, 
the  exercise  of  it  is  given  to  man :  hence, 

1 IX.  The  physical  reason  of  action  is  in  God,  but  the  moral 
reason  is  in  man ;  hence  sin  is  not  to  be  attributed  to  God,  but 
to  man,  in  whose  free  will  lies  the  proximate  reason  of  all  his 
acts.'1 

§  10:  Nichol  (1854). — '  It  is  necessary  to  a  right  understand- 
ing of  Berkeley's  speculations  that  one  recall  the  false  concep- 
tions certainly  prevailing  at  his  time  regarding  the  mode  or 
manner  in  which  we  know ;  we  allude  to  the  Theory  of  the  Idea. 
It  was  thought  that  the  idea  through  which  we  know,  and  the 
thing  that  we  know  through  it,  are  perfectly  distinct.  The  idea 
of  an  object  was  fancied  a  sort  of  image  of  the  object  capable  of 
being  perceived  by  the  mind  :  just  as  the  mind,  in  seeing,  discerns 
not  the  object  but  the  image  on  the  retina.  Adopting  this  to  the 
fullest  extent  in  respect  of  all  that  knowledge  which  we  call  the 
knowledge  of  external  things,  Berkeley  yet  held  that  knowledge 
of  the  mind  itself  and  of  its  operations  comes  at  once  and  without 
the  interposition  of  any  medium — through  a  simple  act  of  internal 
perception  :  from  which  foundation  his  strict  logic  led  to  the 
following  singular  superstructure.  What  are  termed  external 
objects  being  seen  not  in  themselves  but  through  or  by  ideas, 
what  right  have  we  to  imagine  the  existence  of  these  objects  at 
all?  Supposing  them  real,  they  are  confessedly  not  discernible 
by  the  human  mind  ;  why  then  assume  their  existence  ?  True 
knowledge,  on  the  other  hand,  comes  to  us  directly  respecting  the 
mind :  is  not  mind  and  its  phenomena  therefore — spiritual  entities 
— the  sole  reality  in  the  universe?'2 

§11:  Brockhaus  (1864). — '  The  actual,  he  maintained,  is  spirit 
alone;  the  corporeal  world  is  but  an  appearance,  which  arises 
out  of  our  conceptions  ;  the  involuntary  nature  of  this  appearance 
is  the  result  of  original  conceptions,  which  are  wrought  by  the 
Spirit  of  spirits,  God  Himself.'3 

§  12:  Schwegler(i857). — '  Our  sense-perceptions,'  says  Berke- 

1  Institut.  Philos.  Theoreticae,  1846,  vol.  iii.  271-273. 

3  Prof.  John  P.  Nichol,  LL.D.,  of  the  University  of  Glasgow  :  Cyclop,  of  Univ.  Biog- 
raphy, 1854. 

3  Brockhaus :  Real-Encyclop.     Elfte  Aufl.,  vol.  ii.,  1864. 


III.— SUMMARIES    OF  BERKELEY'S   SYSTEM.      31 

ley,  '  are  something  thoroughly  subjective.  If  we  believe  that  we 
have  perceptions  or  cognitions  of  external  objects,  we  are  entirely 
in  error :  what  we  have  and  cognize  are  our  own  perceptions.  It 
is,  for  example,  clear  that  we  see  neither  the  distance,  the 
magnitude,  nor  the  form  of  objects  by  means  of  the  visual  sensa- 
tions; we  only  infer  them,  because  we  have  had  the  experience 
that  a  certain  visual  sensation  is  attended  by  certain  sensations 
of  touch.  That  which  we  see  is  only  colour,  the  clear,  the  dim, 
&c,  and  it  is  consequently  totally  false  to  say  that  it  is  one  and 
the  same  thing  which  we  see  and  feel.  Consequently,  even  in 
the  case  of  those  very  sensations  to  which  we  by  pre-eminence 
attribute  an  objective  character,  we  do  not  go  outside  of  our- 
selves. Strictly  speaking,  the  objects  of  our  understanding  are 
only  our  own  affections;  all  ideas  are  consequently  only  our  own 
sensations.  As  little  as  sensations  can  exist  without  the  sentient 
being,  so  little  can  an  idea  have  existence  without  him  who  has  it. 
What  are  called  things  exist  consequently  only  in  our  conception; 
their  being  is  simply  being  perceived.  It  is  a  fundamental  error  of 
most  philosophers,  that  they  suppose  corporeal  things  to  exist 
without  the  concipient  spirit,  and  do  not  discern  that  the  things 
are  only  something  mental.  How  can  material  things  educe  what 
is  so  utterly  diverse  from  them  as  the  sensations  and  conceptions? 
Consequently  there  exists  no  material  external  world  ;  there  exist 
only  spirits,  that  is,  thinking  beings,  whose  nature  consists  in 
conceiving  and  willing.  But  whence  then  do  we  cfbtain  our 
sense-perceptions,  which  come  to  us  without  our  help,  which  are 
consequently  not  the  product  of  our  will,  as  the  images  of  our 
fancy  are  ?  We  obtain  them  from  a  spirit  superior  to  us  (for  only 
a  spirit  can  bring  forth  conceptions  in  us), — that  is,  from  God.  God 
brings  forth  the  ideas  in  us,  or  gives  them  to  us  ;  as  it  is,  however, 
a  contradiction  that  a  Being  should  impart  ideas  which  itself  has 
none,  the  ideas  we  obtain  from  God  exist  in  God.  We  may  call 
these  ideas  in  God,  archetypes  (original  images) ;  in  ourselves, 
ectypes  (derivative  images,  copies).  This  view  does  not  involve, 
says  Berkeley,  the  denial  that  there  is  a  reality  of  the  objects  of 
our  conception,  a  reality  independent  of  our  conception:  it  is 
only  denied  that  they  exist  anywhere  other  than  in  our  under- 
standing.    Instead,  therefore,  of  speaking  of  a  Nature  in  which, 


3^ 


PROLEGOMENA. 


for  example,  the  Sun  is  Cause  of  warmth,  &c,  we  must,  if 
we  would  be  strictly  accurate,  express  ourselves  thus  :  God 
announces  to  us,  by  the  sensation  of  the  eye,  that  we  are  about 
to  feel  a  sensation  of  warmth.  By  Nature,  therefore,  we  under- 
stand only  the  succession  or  connection  of  ideas ;  by  Laws  of 
Nature  we  mean  the  constant  order  in  which  ideas  attend  or 
follow  each  other,  that  is,  the  Laws  of  the  Association  of  Ideas. 
This  thorough  pure  Idealism,  which  is  the  complete  denial  of 
matter,  is,  according  to  Berkeley,  the  surest  mode  of  escaping 
Materialism  and  Atheism.' * 

§  13:  Fraser(i86i). — 'He  held,  with  his  predecessors,  that  mind 
has  no  objective  knowledge  of  a  world  of  matter;  he  held,  with 
them,  that  in  this  respect  the  mind  is  conscious  of  nothing  but 
ideas;  he  held,  with  them,  that  these  ideas  must  have  a  cause; 
he  held,  with  them,  that  these  ideas  were  not  generated  from 
within,  but  were  determined  from  without.  With  them,  he 
held  that  the  external  cause  of  our  ideas  could  not  be  matter ; 
and,  with  them,  he  held  that  the  external  cause  was  God.  But  if 
God  were  the  cause  of  our  ideas,  why  gratuitously  suppose  the 
existence  of  an  unknown  world  of  matter  ?  The  world  of  con- 
sciousness was  known.  It  was  a  series  of  conceptions  which  the 
mind  was  stimulated  by  the  Deity  to  form.  It  was  a  dream, 
such  as  that  with  which  the  Hebrew  prophets  were  inspired.  It 
was  an  apocalyptic  vision.     It  was  a  perpetual  trance.'2 

§  14:  Scholten3  (1868). — 'The  other  extreme'  (the  first  was 
materialism)  '  into  which  the  empiricism  of  Locke  ran  out,  was 
that  of  one-sided  idealism,  as  it  is  represented  in  England  by 
Berkeley.  Starting  with  Locke  from  the  principle  nihil  est  in 
intellectu,  quod  non  ante  fuerit  in  sensu,  he  contested  the  right 
of  the  empiricists  to  infer  the  existence  of  a  material  external 
world  from  the  reception  of  sense-impressions. 

'The  senses  make  us  acquainted  with  nothing  more  than  our 
own  perceptions,  and,  in  connection  with  the  internal  sense  or 
reflection,  with  nothing  more  than  our  own  ideas.  From  the 
touch,  sight,  smell,  and  taste,  for  example,  of  an  apple,  we  are 

1  Gesch.  d.  Philosophic     Dritte  Aufl.  v.  Kostlin,  1857,  g  34. 
9  North  British  Review,  vol.  xxxiv.  459  (1861). 

3  Gesch.  d.  Religion  u.  Philosophic  Ein  Leitfaden.  Aus  dem  Hollandischen  .  .  .  von 
Redepenning,  Elberfeld,  1868. 


III.— SUMMARIES    OF  BERKELEY'S   SYSTEM.     33 

not  justified  in  the  conclusion  that  it  has  objective  being.  The 
only  thing  that  can  be  established  is  that  man,  by  means  of  his 
different  organs  of  sense,  perceives  in  himself  a  union  of  impres- 
sions which,  in  order  to  distinguish  them  from  other  more  or 
less  complicated  perceptions,  he  is  accustomed  to  call  an  apple. 
It  follows  as  a  consequence  that  no  material  objects  exist  without 
us.  What  is  there  is  the  self-percipient  subject  alone.  What  we  call 
nature  is  nothing  more  than  the  collection  of  our  own  perceptions. 
The  universe  is  therefore  entirely  spirit.  Nevertheless,  the  fact 
that  our  perceptions  rise  independently  of  our  will,  cohere  most 
closely,  are  linked  into  unity,  and  so  far  transcend  all  that  we  could 
bring  into  being  by  our  reflective  faculty,  this  fact  demonstrates 
the  existence  of  a  most  wise  Supreme  Being,  the  perfect  Spirit. 
Thus,  then,  as  in  the  case  of  the  French  sensualists,  the  earlier 
dualistic  view  of  the  world  had  gone  over  into  Monism,  by  denial 
of  the  existence  of  spirit ;  in  Berkeley's  system  the  antithesis  be- 
tween spirit  and  matter  was  set  aside,  by  surrendering  the  objectivity 
of  the  visible  tvorld,  or  matter! 

§15:  Ueberweg  (1872).  —  'Berkeley  was  the  founder  of  a 
universal  immaterialism  (idealism  or  phsenomenalism).  He  held 
that  the  existence  of  a  corporeal  world,  having  a  being  in  itself,  is 
not  only  not  strictly  demonstrable, — and  so  far  Augustine  and  even 
Locke  had  gone, — but  is  in  fact  a  false  assumption.  There  exist 
only  spirits  and  their  functions  (ideas  and  acts  of  will).  There  are 
no  abstract  ideas ;  there  is,  for  example,  no  conception  of  exten- 
sion without  an  extended  body,  a  definite  magnitude,  &c.  An 
individual  conception  becomes  general,  as  it  represents  all  other 
individual  conceptions  of  the  same  kind,  as,  for  example,  a  single 
straight  line  in  a  geometrical  demonstration  represents  all  other 
lines  of  the  same  kind.  That  our  thinking  exists,  we  are  imme- 
diately sure  ;  that  bodies  distinct  from  our  ideas  exist,  we  infer  ; 
but  this  conclusion  is  fallacious — it  has  nothing  which  compels 
assent,  and  is  confuted  by  the  impossibility  of  explaining  the  co- 
working  of  completely  heterogeneous  substances.  The  esse  of 
unthinking  things  is  percipi.  God  calls  forth  the  conceptions  in 
us  in  a  well-ordered  manner.  What  we  call  the  Laws  of  Nature 
is  in  fact  the  order  in  the  succession  of  our  ideas.' l 

1  Gesch.  d.  Philosoph.  d.  Neuzeit,  Dritte  Aufl.,  1872,  ioo,  101. 


34 


PROLEGOMENA. 


§  16:  Vogel  (1873). — 'The  objects  of  human  knowledge  are 
either  the  ideas  impressed  upon  the  senses,  or  ideas  attained  by- 
observing  the  soul  in  its  activity  and  passivity,  or,  finally,  ideas 
reached  by  memory  and  imagination.  Besides  these  ideas  exists 
what  I  call  spirit,  soul,  or  myself,  and  which  is  completely  dis- 
tinct from  all  those  ideas.  This  spirit  perceives  those  ideas,  and 
the  existence  of  an  idea  consists  solely  in  its  being  perceived  (esse 
percipi).  But  our  conceptions  and  feelings  exist  only  in  ourselves  ; 
we  perceive  consequently  only  our  own  ideas  or  sensations,  not 
the  objects  of  sense-perception  themselves.  As  now  the  whole 
choir  of  heaven  and  the  plenitude  of  earthly  objects — in  brief,  all 
things  which  compose  the  great  frame  of  the  world — have  no 
subsistence  without  the  mind,  it  follows  that  there  is  no  other  sub- 
stance than  mind,  or  that  which  perceives.  That  what  are  called 
secondary  qualities,  such  as  colours  and  sounds,  exist  only  in  us, 
is  generally  conceded ;  but  the  so-called  primary  qualities,  such 
as  extension,  figure,  movement,  rest,  which  are  asserted  to  be 
images  of  matter,  can  have  no  independent  existence,  as  an  idea 
can  only  be  like  an  idea. 

'The  notion  of  a  corporeal  substance  involves  a  self-contradic- 
tion. So  also  the  notions  great  and  little,  swift  and  slow,  or 
notions  of  numbers,  are  only  relative  notions,  pure  mental  ab- 
stractions. But  were  it  granted  that  corporeal  substance  exists, 
we  cannot  have  cognizance  of  it  either  by  our  senses  or  by 
thoughts.  The  senses  do  not  teach  us  that  things  exist  without 
the  mind;  we  are  shut  up  therefore  to  the  supposition  that  we 
have  cognition  of  them  through  thought.  But  can  we  not  think 
of  trees  existing  in  a  park,  or  books  standing  in  a  library,  when 
no  one  perceives  them  ?  Certainly  we  can.  To  do  this  is  merely 
to  form  in  our  mind  certain  ideas  (trees,  books),  and  at  the  same 
time  to  omit  forming  the  idea  of  some  one  who  perceives  them. 
Meanwhile,  however,  we  ourselves  are  thinking  of  those  objects. 
To  these  considerations  is  to  be  added,  that  no  activity  or  power 
is  immanent  in  the  things  or  ideas;  so  that  they  can  originate  no 
changes  ;  but  if  they  cannot  do  this,  they  are  not  the  cause  of  our 
sensations.  This  cause  must  rather  be  either  corporeal  active 
substance  or  a  spirit.  A  spirit  is  a  simple,  active  being,  which  is 
named  understanding,  as  it  perceives  ideas,  or  will,  as  it  originates 


IV.—BERKELEYANISM:    ITS   INFLUENCE.         35 

them.  No  idea  of  spirit  can  be  formed,  as  all  ideas  are  passive, 
and  cannot  present  us  images  of  that  which  is  active.  We  have 
furthermore  the  faculty  of  calling  forth  in  ourselves  certain  ideas 
at  will ;  but  there  is  another  class  of  ideas  which  press  upon  us 
from  without,  of  which  our  will  is  not  the  source, — press  upon 
us,  in  fact,  in  accordance  with  well-defined  rules,  what  are  called 
Lcnvs  of  Nature.  There  must  consequently  be  another  will  or 
spirit  which  originates  them,  and  this  spirit  is  God.  The  ideas 
impressed  by  the  Author  of  nature  on  our  senses  are  called  actual 
things,  but  those  which  are  evoked  by  our  own  imagination  are 
ideas  in  the  narrower  sense,  or  images  of  things.  The  sense- 
ideas  have  indeed  more  reality, — they  are  more  forcible,  more 
orderly,  are  less  dependent  on  the  percipient  spirit,  as  they  are 
evoked  by  the  will  of  another — God.  God  is  one  only,  eternal, 
infinitely  wise,  good  and  perfect ;  he  works  all  in  all,  and  through 
him  all  subsists  ;  he  upholds  all  things  by  the  word  of  his  power, 
and  maintains  the  relation  between  spirits  whereby  they  have 
the  faculty  of  knowing  the  existence  one  of  another.  For  per- 
ceiving the  different  movements,  changes,  Unkings  of  ideas,  I 
draw  from  them  the  inference  that  there  are  distinct,  individual, 
active  beings  like  myself  who  stand  in  connection  with  those 
movements  and  participate  in  bringing  them  forth. 

'  The  object  of  human  knowledge  can  be  only  spirits,  ideas,  and 
their  relations  in  all  their  species.  The  source  of  all  errors  Berkeley 
finds  in  the  supposition  of  the  eternal  existence  of  objects  of 
sense,  and  in  the  doctrine  of  abstract  ideas.'1 

IV.  Berkeleyanism:  its  friends,  affinities,  and  influence. 

§  1  :  Influence. — Berkeley's  position  in  the  history  of  Philos- 
ophy is  a  commanding  one.  By  direct  or  indirect  influence,  by 
development,  or  by  opposition,  he  has  borne  part  in  all  the  specu- 
lative thinking  since  his  day.  The  removal  of  Berkeley  would 
take  away  an  essential  link  in  the  chain  of  modern  philosophy. 
Without  Berkeley,  as  Hamann  long  ago  observed,  we  should 
not  have  had  Hume,  without  Hume  we  should  not  have  had 
Kant,  without   Kant  the    gigantic  structure  of  the  speculation 

1  Philosoph.  Repetitorium,  1873,  92_95- 


36  PROLEGOMENA. 

which  ends  in  the  school  of  Hegel  would  not  have  been  reared, 
and  without  this  progressive  line  of  thinkers  we  should  not  have 
had  the  noble  antagonism  of  witnesses  to  other  forms  of  thought, 
essential  to  the  highest  development  of  intellectual  man.  With- 
out Berkeley  we  should  neither  have  had  the  developed  phi- 
losophy of  Germany,  nor  the  developed  '  Common  Sense'  of 
Scotland.  '  Berkeley's  doctrine,'  says  Ueberweg,1  '  has  never  had 
a  large  number  of  adherents,  but  it  has  had  no  trifling  influence 
on  the  further  development  of  Philosophy.' 

§  2  :  First  reception. — '  It  is  difficult  at  this  distance  of  time  to 
ascertain  the  immediate  influence  upon  philosophical  opinion'  of 
Berkeley's  new  conception  of  the  material  world.  It  is  'said  to 
have  made  some  influential  converts  in  England.'  Swift  speaks  of 
him  in  a  letter,  1724,  as  '  founder  of  a  sect  called  the  Immaterial' 
ists,'  and  adds,  '  Dr.  Smalridge  (Bishop  of  Bristol)  and  many 
other  eminent  persons  were  his  proselytes.'  '  But  even  the  edu- 
cated mind  was  not  then  ripe  for  the  due  appreciation  of  a  doc- 
trine so  paradoxical  in  its  sound.  More  than  twenty  years  were  to 
elapse  before  it  found  an  intellectual  audience  in  David  Hume, 
and  other  Scotchmen  and  Americans.'2 

§  3  :  Johnson. — The  first  place  in  the  Berkeleyan  roll  of  honour 
is  due  to  Dr.  Samuel  Johnson  (1696-1772),  the  Episcopal  mis- 
sionary at  Stratford,  Connecticut,  Berkeley's  American  friend  and 
disciple,  who  was  on  terms  of  personal  intimacy  with  him  while  he 
resided  in  Rhode  Island.  '  The  Pri?iciples  of  Human  Knowledge* 
had  early  fallen  into  his  hands.  His  intimacy  with  Berkeley 
finished  the  work  of  conviction.  His  '  Elementa  Philosophical 
printed  by  Franklin,  1752,  as  a  text-book  for  the  University  of 
Pennsylvania,  was  dedicated  to  Berkeley.  It  consists  of  two 
treatises — Noctica,  or  TJdngs  relating  to  the  Mind  or  Understand- 
ing ;  and  Ethica,  or  Things  relating  to  the  Moral  Behaviour.  It  is 
thoroughly  Berkeleyan  in  its  main  features,  though  'the  part  of 
the  Noetica  which  deals  with  the  pure  Intellect  and  its  notions, 
and  with  intuitive  Intellectual  Light,  is  more  akin  to  Plato  and 
Malebranche,  and   even   Kant,  than  to  Berkeley's  early  philo- 

1  B.'s  Leben  u.  Schriften,  in  his  translation  of  the  Principles.  See  also  his  Preface,  given 
in  Prolegom.,  I.,  §  16. 

3  Fraser :  Life  and  Letters,  62. 


IV.— BERKELEY ANISM:    ITS  INFLUENCE.         37 

sophical  works.'1  Johnson  was  'one  of  the  most  learned  scholars 
and  acute  thinkers  of  his  time  in  America.'2 

§  4:  Jonathan  Edwards  (1703- 175 8). — The  second  illustrious 
name  also  belongs  to  America.  Jonathan  Edwards,  the  prince  of 
the  New  England  theological  metaphysicians,  was  a  pupil  of 
Johnson  at  Yale  College.  He  was  a  defender  of  Berkeley's 
conception  of  the  material  world.  He  nowhere  names  Berkeley, 
and  there  is  no  evidence  that  they  ever  met.  Edwards  says, 
'  When  I  say  the  Material  Universe  exists  only  in  the  mind,  I 
mean  that  it  is  absolutely  dependent  on  the  conception  of  the 
mind  for  its  existence ;  and  does  not  exist  as  Spirits  do,  whose 
existence  does  not  consist  in,  nor  in  dependence  on,  the  concep- 
tions of  other  minds.  .  .  .  All  existence  is  mental  .  .  .  the  ex- 
istence of  all  exterior  things  is  ideal.'  'That  which  truly  is  the 
substance  of  all  bodies  is  the  infinitely  exact  and  precise  and  per- 
fectly stable  Idea  in  God's  mind,  together  with  his  stable  Will, 
that  the  same  shall  gradually  be  communicated  to  us,  and  to  other 
minds,  according  to  fixed  and  exact  established  methods  and 
laws.'  Fraser  says,  '  If  he  thus  agrees  with  Berkeley  in  his 
account  of  sensible  things,  they  separate  in  their  theory  of  causation 
and  free-will.  Free  agency,  which  is  involved  in  the  Dualism  of 
Berkeley,  is  argued  against  by  Edwards,  whose  speculative  the- 
ology or  philosophy  is  hardly  to  be  distinguished  from  that  of 
Spinoza.  Berkeleyism  is  essentially  a  philosophy  of  causation.'3 
The  influence  of  Edwards  possibly  connects  itself  with  the  fact 
that  'the  fanciful  theory  of  Bishop  Berkeley,  as  a  kind  of  philo- 
sophical day-dream,  maintained  its  prevalence  for  a  season'  at 
Princeton. 4 

§  5  :  Berkeley  in  our  own  Day. — Nor  is  there  wanting  in  our 
own  day  interest  in  Berkeley's  views,  and  sympathy  in  various 
degrees  with  them.  '  I  am  not  without  hope,'  says  Fraser,5 
'  that  the  reappearance  of  Berkeley  in  the  modern  philosophical 
world,  in  these  latter  years  of  the  nineteenth  century,  under  the 
auspices  of  the  great  University  with  which  death  has  associated 

1  Fraser  :  Berkeley's  Life  and  Letters,  176.  2  Ibid.,  174. 

3  Berkeley's  Life  and  Letters,  182,  404,  405.     See  also  p.  382. 

*  Dr.  Beaseley  (Provost  of  the  University  of  Pennsylvania) :  A  Search  of  Truth.  Dedi- 
cation to  Hobart,  ii. 

S  Preface  :  Berkeley's  Works,  I.,  xvi. 


38  PROLEGOMENA. 

him,  may  be  the  occasion  of  a  candid  consideration  of  this  good 
philosopher's  explanation  of  the  meaning  of  human  existence, 
and  of  a  fresh  impulse  to  philosophy  in  Europe  and  America. 
There  are  signs  which  encourage  this  hope,  in  a  retrospect  of  the 
history  of  recent  opinion  and  metaphysical  literature  in  England. 
The  return  to  the  deeper  questions  in  metaphysics,  inaugu- 
rated by  Coleridge  and  Hamilton  more  than  forty  years  since,  in 
conjunction  with  the  increased  inclination  in  the  interval  to  dis- 
cuss first  principles  in  theology  and  in  the  physical  sciences,  in- 
cluding physiology,  is  more  favourable  to  the  entertainment  of 
the  thoughts  which  occupied  so  much  of  Berkeley's  life,  and  per- 
haps to  harmony  between  science  and  faith,  than  the  state  of 
things  in  almost  any  former  period  of  the  history  of  this  country. 
There  are  besides  definite  signs  of  an  inclination  to  reconsider 
Berkeley  in  particular,  and  to  draw  from  him  what  may  be  avail- 
able for  amending  our  conception  of  the  nature  of  the  existence 
we  are  participating  in  among  the  phenomena  of  sense ;  or  at 
least  for  assisting  us  before  we  finish  our  course  to  inquire  what 
this  sense-conscious  life  through  which  we  are  now  passing  really 
means.'  'Many,'  says  Dr.  McCosh,  'are  turning  toward  it  with 
longing.'1 

§  6 :  Ferrier. — Among  the  illustrious  thinkers  of  recent  date 
who  have  been  admirers  of  Berkeley,  we  may  mention  Ferrier. 
He  gives  in  his  adhesion  in  language  such  as  this:  'The  specu- 
lations of  this  philosopher  [Berkeley],  whether  we  consider  the 
beauty  and  clearness  of  his  style,  or  the  depth  of  his  insight,  have 
done  better  service  to  the  cause  of  metaphysical  science  than  the 
lucubrations  of  all  other  modern  thinkers  put  together.'  'Among 
all  philosophers,  ancient  or  modern,  we  are  acquainted  with  none 
who  present  fewer  vulnerable  points  than  Bishop  Berkeley.  His 
language,  it  is  true,  has  sometimes  the  appearance  of  paradox; 
but  there  is  nothing  paradoxical  in  his  thoughts,  and  time  has 
proved  the  adamantine  solidity  of  his  principles.  With  less 
sophistry  than  the  simplest  and  with  more  subtlety  than  the 
acutest  of  his  contemporaries,  the  very  perfection  of  his  powers 
prevented  him  from  being  appreciated  by  the  age  in  which  he 
lived.'      '  The   subsequent   progress    of  philosophy  shows   how 

1  Presbyter.  Quarterly  and  Princeton  Review,  Jan.  1873. 


IV.— BERKELEY ANISM:    ITS   INFLUENCE. 


39 


much  the  science  of  man  is  indebted  to  his  researches.  He  cer- 
tainly was  the  first  to  stamp  the  indelible  impress  of  his  power- 
ful understanding  on  those  principles  of  our  nature  which  since 
his  time  have  brightened  into  imperishable  truths  in  the  light  of 
genuine  speculation.'1  'Berkeley  accomplished  the  very  task 
which,  fifty  or  sixty  years  afterwards,  Reid  laboured  at  in  vain. 
He  taught  a  doctrine  of  intuitive,  as  distinguished  from  a  doc- 
trine of  representative,  perception ;  and  he  taught  it  on  the  only 
grounds  on  which  such  a  doctrine  can  be  maintained.' 

'  The  ingenious  and  acute  metaphysical  works  of  the  late  Pro- 
fessor Ferrier  .  .  .  unfold  a  system  which  differs  in  some  im- 
portant respects  from  that  of  Berkeley,  being  constructed  from 
the  ontological,  and  not,  like  his,  from  the  psychological  point 
of  view.  With  more  form  of  demonstration,  Ferrier  leaves  in 
the  background  the  sense-symbolism  and  intuition  of  efficient 
causality,  which  are  essential  to  the  externality  and  dualism  of 
Berkeley.' 2 

§  7  :  Professor  Grote. — '  The  strikingly  candid  speculations 
of  the  late  Professor  Grote  of  Cambridge,  which  contain  some  of 
the  most  interesting  English  contributions  to  the  higher  philoso- 
phy of  this  generation,  have  also  a  tendency  to  Berkeley's  point 
of  view.' 3 

Professor  John  Grote  (not  to  be  confounded  with  George 
Grote,  the  historian  of  Greece  and  biographer  of  Plato  and  Aris- 
totle) had  published  (1865)  the  Exploratio  Philosopliica :  Rough 
Notes  on  Modern  Intellectual  Science.  Part  I.  His  death  in  1866 
left  the  second  part  in  a  fragmentary  condition. 

§  8:  Mansel. —  'Dean  Mansel's  learned  and  closely-reasoned 
works  in  philosophy,  besides  reviving  metaphysical  discussion 
in  England,  have  occasionally  approached  the  speculation  of 
Berkeley,  bringing  valuable  critical  light.'  4 

§  9:  Simon. — '  The  assiduous  zeal  and  subtlety  of  Mr.  Collyns 
Simon,  his  book  On  the  Nature  and  Elements  of  the  Material 
World,  and  his  various  essays  since,  have  drawn  attention  to  the 
subject  not  only  in  these  islands  but  also  in  Germany.'5 

1  Lectures  and  Philosophical  Remains,  ii.,  292,293.    2  Fraser:  Berkeley's  Works,  vol.  i., 
Pref.,  xvii. 
1  Fraser:   Berkeley's  Works,  vol.  i.,  Pref.,  xvii.  4  Fraser:  Pref.,  xvii. 

5   Fraser  :   Berkeley's  Works,  vol.  i.,  Pref.,  xvii. 


40  PROLEGOMENA. 

The  second  part  of  the  title  of  Mr.  Thomas  Collyns  Simon's 
book  is  Universal  Immaterialism,  fully  explained  and  newly  dem- 
onstrated. London,  1847  (1862).  It  is  accompanied  by  a  pros- 
pectus of  the  terms  upon  which  a  prize  of  one  hundred  pounds 
is  offered  for  a  conclusive  disproof  of  Universal  Immaterialism. 

He  had  a  correspondence  in  1852-53  with  Sir  William  Ham- 
ilton, in  which  he  quotes  Sir  William  as  saying  that  he  has  seen 
nothing  in  Berkeley  irreconcilable  with  his  own  views.1  Mr. 
Simon  has  written  several  dissertations  for  periodicals.2 

A  discussion  between  Simon  and  Ueberweg  followed  the  trans- 
lation of  Berkeley's  Principles.3  Mr.  Simon  has  also  discussed, 
from  the  Berkeleyan  point  of  view,  Mill's  Examination  of  Hamil- 
ton's Philosophy.4 

§  10:  Mill. — John  Stuart  Mill  ably  defended  Berkeley's  The- 
ory of  Vision,  of  which  he  says  that  it  '  has  remained,  almost 
from  its  first  promulgation,  one  of  the  least  disputed  doctrines 
in  the  most  disputed  and  most  disputable  of  all  sciences,  the 
science  of  man.  This  is  the  more  remarkable,  as  no  doctrine  in 
mental  philosophy  is  more  at  variance  with  first  appearances, 
more  contradictory  to  the  natural  prejudices  of  mankind.  Yet 
this  apparent  paradox  was  no  sooner  published  than  it  took  its 
place,  almost  without  contestation,  among  established  opinions. 
The  warfare  which  has  since  distracted  the  world  of  metaphysics 
has  swept  past  this  insulated  position  without  disturbing  it;  and 
while  so  many  of  the  other  conclusions  of  the  analytical  school 
of  mental  philosophy,  the  school  of  Hobbes  and  Locke,  have  been 
repudiated  with  violence  by  the  antagonist  school,  that  of  Com- 
mon Sense,  or  innate  principles,  this  one  doctrine  has  been  recog- 
nized and  upheld  by  the  leading  thinkers  of  both  schools  alike.'5 

'  Some  chapters  in  Mr.  J.  S.  Mill's  Examination  of  Sir  W.  Ham- 
ilton's Philosophy,  and  passages  in  his  other  writings,  show  how 
much  in  the  new  conception  of  the  sensible  world  is  appreciated 
by  a  fair  and  able  thinker  of  phenomenalist  tendencies.'6 

1  Veitch's  Memoir  of  Hamilton,  344-349. 

3  Among  these  may  be  mentioned  '  Berkeley's  Doctrine  on  the  Nature  of  Matter'  in  the 
Journal  of  Speculative  Philosophy,  iii.,  4  Dec.  1869.    Is  Thought  the  Thinker?  lb.,  p.  375. 

3  Ueberweg's  Letter  to  Simon,  Fichte's  Z.  f.  Ph.,  1869.  Simon's  Answer,  ib.,  1870.  A 
brief  closing  word  by  Ueberweg,  ib.,  1871. 

*  Hamilton  versus  Mill,  3  parts,  Edinburgh,  1866-68. 

5  Westminster  Review,  xxviii  318.  6  Fraser:  Berkeley's  Works,  i.,  Prof.,  xvii. 


IV.—BERKELEYANISM:    ITS   INFLUENCE.         41 

§  11:  Stirling.  —  'Dr.  J.  H.  Stirling,  by  devoting  reflection 
to  fresh  aspects  of  questions  which  Berkeley  raised  by  implica- 
tion, has  prepared  some  for  looking  at  the  perennial  problem  with 
a  fresh  eye.'1 

§  12:  Dublin  University. — 'Nor  must  Berkeley's  own  Uni- 
versity be  forgotten,  where  philosophy  is  now  cultivated  by  men 
who  are  not  unworthy  of  its  fame,  and  who,  either  as  expositors 
or  as  adverse  critics,  have  not  forgotten  its  greatest  names  in 
metaphysics.'2 

§  13:  Fraser. — The  admirable  and  only  complete  edition  of 
Berkeley's  Works,  followed  by  his  Life  and  Letters,  we  owe  to 
Alexander  Campbell  Fraser,  M.A.,  Professor  of  Logic  and  Meta- 
physics in  the  University  of  Edinburgh.  Professor  Fraser  regards 
Berkeley  as  one  of  the  greatest  philosophers  of  Great  Britain. 
He  says  that  his  '  own  love  for  philosophy  was  first  engaged  by 
Berkeley  in  the  morning  of  life,'  and  that  he  '  regards  his  writings 
as  among  the  best  in  English  literature  for  a  refined  education 
of  the  heart  and  intellect.'  Berkeley  was  'the  greatest  metaphy- 
sician in  his  own  age.'  '  The  intellectual  influence  which  partly 
originated  in  him  has  since  been  silently  modifying  all  the  deeper 
thought  of  the  time  in  physics  and  in  metaphysical  philosophy. 
Is  an  unknowing  and  unknown  something  called  matter,  or  is  in- 
telligence, the  supreme  reality?  and  are  men  the  transient  results 
of  material  organization,  or  are  they  immortal  beings  ?  This  is 
Berkeley's  implied  question.  His  answer  to  it,  although  in  his 
own  works  it  has  not  been  thought  out  by  him  into  its  primary 
principles,  or  sufficiently  guarded  in  some  parts,  nevertheless  marks 
the  beginning  of  the  second  great  period  in  modern  thought, 
that  in  which  we  are  living.  The  answer  was  virtually  reversed 
in  Hume,  whose  exclusive  phenomenalism,  reproduced  in  the 
positivism  of  the  nineteenth  century,  led  to  the  Scotch  conserva- 
tive psychology,  and  to  the  great  German  speculation  which  Kant 
inaugurated.'3 

§  14 :  Germany. — '  I  am  inclined  to  believe,'  says  Fraser,  '  that 
the  present  state  of  German  speculation  is  not  unfavourable  to  a 
more  ample  and  appreciative  consideration  of  Berkeley  than  he 

1  Fraser:  Berkeley's  Works, i.,  Pref.,  xviii.     2  Fraser:  Berkeley's  Works,  i.,  Pref.,xviii. 
3  Berkeley's  Works,  i.,  Pref.,  viii. 


42  PROLEGOMENA. 

has  hitherto  received  in  the  occasional  allusions  made  by  the 
philosophers  and  historians  of  philosophy  of  the  chief  specula- 
tive nation  of  Europe.'  He  then  speaks  of  Ueberweg's  annotated 
version  of  the  Principles,  and  adds,  '  This  translation  has,  I  un- 
derstand, circulated  widely  in  that  country.  It  has  been  partly 
the  occasion  of  recent  discussions  on  Berkeley's  philosophy  in 
some  of  the  German  periodicals.'1 

§15:  America.  —  Among  the  recent  American  admirers  of 
Berkeley's  system  may  be  mentioned  Rowland  G.  Hazard,  author 
of  a  work  on  the  Will  (1864)  and  of  one  on  Causation  (1869). 

'  Berkeley's  remarkable  relations  to  America,  and  the  adoption 
of  distinctive  parts  of  his  philosophy  by  two  of  his  eminent 
American  contemporaries,  Samuel  Johnson  and  Jonathan  Ed- 
wards, should  secure  for  him  a  hearing  in  that  great  country, 
whose  advancement  since  he  lived  in  it  has  almost  realized  the 
dream  even  of  his  benevolent  imagination.'2 

V.  Opponents  and  Objections. 

§  1  :  Ridicule. — The  favourite  weapon  against  Berkeleyanism 
from  the  beginning  has  been  ridicule ;  '  Coxcombs  vanquish 
Berkeley  with  a  grin.'  There  is  but  one  point  to  all  the  jest- 
ing, and  the  variation  of  form  is  not  very  marked.  Arbuthnot's 
joke  is  the  first  on  record.3  Swift  is  said  to  have  left  Berkeley 
standing  at  the  door  in  the  rain,  on  the  ground  that  if  his 
philosophy  were  true  he  could  as  easily  enter  with  the  door 
shut  as  open. 

Dr.  Johnson's  confutation  by  kicking  a  large  stone,  '  striking 
his  foot  with  mighty  force  against  it,'  as  Boswell  happily  phrases 
it,  is  one  for  which  Ferrier  says  '  Berkeley  would  have  hugged 
him.'  It  embodied  the  popular  common  sense  unreservedly,  and 
so  was  superior  to  the  philosophy  which  accepts  that  common 
sense  but  half  way.  There  is  as  much  argument  and  more 
wit  in  a  less-quoted  anecdote.  When  a  gentleman  who  had 
been  defending  Berkeley's  view  was  about  going  away,  Johnson 
said,  '  Pray,  sir,  don't  leave  us,  for  we  may  perhaps  forget  to 
think  of  you,  and  then  you  will  cease  to  exist' 

1  Berkeley's  Works,  i.,  Prcf.,  xviii.  "  Fraser :  Berkeley's  Works,  i.,  Pref.,  xviii. 

3  See  Prolegomena,  I. 


V.— OPPONENTS  AND    OBJECTIONS.  43 

Byron  linked  a  well-worn  college  pun  with  a  versification  of 
Hume's  estimate  : 

'  When  Bishop  Berkeley  said,  "  There  was  no  matter," 
And  proved  it,  'twas  no  matter  what  he  said. 
They  say  his  system  'tis  in  vain  to  batter, 
Too  subtle  for  the  airiest  human  head: 
And  yet  who  can  believe  it?' 

Sydney  Smith  says,  '  Bishop  Berkeley  destroyed  the  world  in 
one  volume  octavo,  and  nothing  remained  after  his  time  but  mind, 
which  experienced  a  similar  fate  from  the  hand  of  Mr.  Hume  in 

1737' 

It  is  not  to  the  credit  of  the  metaphysicians  who  have  combated 
Berkeley  that  so  much  they  have  written  is  but  a  prosy  elabora- 
tion of  the  jocose  misrepresentation  of  his  views. 

Had  Burke  carried  out  his  purpose  of  anwering  Berkeley,  the 
world  would  have  had  a  brilliant  book, — a  brilliant  success  or  a 
brilliant  failure. 

§  2:  Samuel  Clarke  (1675-1729)  declined  to  discuss  Berke- 
ley's principles  in  regard  to  the  existence  of  matter.  '  As  Clarke,' 
says  Stewart,  'in  common  with  his  antagonist,  regarded  the  prin- 
ciples of  the  ideal  theory  as  incontrovertible,  it  was  perfectly 
impossible  for  him,  with  all  his  acuteness,  to  detect  the  flaw  to 
which  Berkeley's  paradox  owed  its  plausibility.'1  Not  only  so, 
but  Clarke  approaches  at  times  very  closely  to  the  Berkeleyan 
construction  of  the  relation  of  the  universe  to  mind:  'All  things 
that  are  done  are  done  either  immediately  by  God  himself  or  by 
created  intelligent  beings,  Matter  being"  evidently  not  capable  of  any 
laws  or  powers  whatsoever,  any  more  than  it  is  capable  of  intel- 
ligence, excepting  only  this  one  negative  power,  that  every  part 
of  it  will  of  itself  always  and  necessarily  continue  in  that  state, 
whether  of  rest  or  motion,  wherein  it  at  present  is.  So  that  all 
those  things  which  we  commonly  say  are  the  effects  of  the  nat- 
ural powers  of  matter  and  laws  of  motion,  of  gravitation,  attrac- 
tion, or  the  like,  are  indeed  (if  we  will  speak  strictly  and  prop- 
erly) the  effects  of  God's  acting  upon  matter  continually  and  every 
moment,  either  immediately  by  himself  or  mediately  by  some 
created  intelligent  beings.  .  .  .  Consequently  there  is  no  such  thing 

1  Works,  iii.  53,  v.  4,  18. 


44  PROLEGOMENA. 

as  what  we  commonly  call  the  course  of  nature  or  the  power  of 
nature.  The  course  of  nature,  truly  and  properly  speaking,  is 
nothing  else  but  the  will  of  God  producing  certain  effects  in  a 
continued,  regular,  constant,  and  uniform  manner,  which  course 
or  manner  of  acting  being  in  every  moment  perfectly  arbitrary, 
is  as  easy  to  be  a/tcred  at  any  time  as  to  be  preserved.' x 

§3:  Andrew  Baxter  (1687-1750),  in  his  'Inquiry  into  the 
Nature  of  the  Human  Soul,'  has  a  section  (2d  ed.,  pp.  256- 
344)  entitled  '  Dean  Berkeley's  Scheme  against  the  Existence 
of  Matter  and  a  Material  World  examined  and  shown  inconclu- 
sive.' It  is  the  first  extended  review  of  Berkeley.  Warburton 
says  of  the  Inquiry,  '  He  who  would  see  the  justest  and  precisest 
notions  of  God  and  the  soul  may  read  this  book,  one  of  the  most 
finished  of  the  kind,  in  my  humble  opinion,  that  the  present 
times,  greatly  advanced  in  true  philosophy,  have  produced.'2 
Stewart  pronounces  this  'splendid  eulogy'  as  beyond  the  merit 
of  the  Inquiry,  though  he  acknowledges  'that  it  displays  consid- 
erable ingenuity  as  well  as  learning.'3 

Fraser  says  of  the  Inquiry, '  Its  comparative  bulk  is  almost  the 
only  circumstance  which  entitles  Baxter's  work  to  consideration. 
...  At  the  best,  he  is  ingenious  and  acute  in  the  construction  of 
a  man  of  straw.'  The  truth  in  regard  to  Baxter  is  perhaps  mid- 
way between  these  estimates.  His  examination  of  Berkeley's 
scheme  is  fully  equal  to  the  best  of  the  later  replies  in  the  Scotch 
school,  and  in  fact  anticipates  nearly  everything  that  is  important 
in  them.  'We  perceive,  besides  our  sensations  themselves,  the 
objects  of  them;  or  we  perceive  objects  existing  from  without,  by 
the  mediation  of  sensation  or  motion  produced,  since  we  are 
conscious  not  only  of  sensation  excited,  but  that  it  is  excited  by 
some  cause  beside  ourself. .  .  .  This  cause  we  call  Matter.'4  'Our 
ideas  cannot  exist  without  the  mind,  but  their  objects  may,  and  do. 
And  they  are  still  sensible  objects,  though  they  fall  not  under  the 
senses  at  all  times  and  in  all  places.'  .  .  .  '  The  perception  of  a 
picture  shows  not  only  that  the  soul  is  immaterial,  but  that  it  is 
united  to  a  material  sensory,  where  the  picture  is  impressed, 
and  to  which  it  applies  for  the  perception  of  it,  or  that  matter 

1  Works,  fol.  ed.,  ii.  697.  a  Divine  Legation,  1st  ed.,  395. 

3  Works,  i.  429,  430.  <  Inquiry,  2d  ed.,  1738,  ii.  290,  294. 


V.— OPPONENTS   AND    OBJECTIONS.  45 

exists.'  The  argument  of  Baxter  frequently  appeals  to  the  prin- 
ciple of  '  common  sense,'  as  it  is  generally  understood  in  the 
Scotch  school.  He  speaks  of '  plain  truths,'  '  truths  so  plain  that 
a  man  cannot  cast  doubt  upon  them  without  committing  much 
violence  to  his  reason,'  '  plain  and  well-meaning  men,'  '  an  argu- 
ment to  overturn  common  sense.'1  He  charges  on  Berkeley  a 
confusion  of  classification  :  '  figure  and  motion  are  nicely  shuffled 
in  with  colour  and  sound,  though  they  are  qualities  of  a  different 
kind;  and  in  the  last,  that  extended  moveable  substance  is  supposed 
to  be  a  species  of  idea,  .  .  in  which  case  Dr.  Berkeley  is  very  safe 
in  his  argument.' 

§4:  Reid  (1710-1795). — 'Dr.  Reid  acknowledges  the  Berke- 
leyan  system  to  be  a  logical  consequence  of  the  opinions  univer- 
sally admitted  by  the  learned  at  the  time  when  Berkeley  wrote.'2 
'  That  from  those  data  (which  had  been  received,  during  a  long 
succession  of  ages,  as  incontrovertible  articles  of  faith)  both 
Berkeley  and  Hume  have  reasoned  with  unexceptionable  fair- 
ness, as  well  as  incomparable  acuteness,  he  acknowledges  in 
every  page  of  his  works.'3 

'  I  once  believed,'  says  Reid,  '  the  doctrine  of  ideas  so  firmly  as 
to  embrace  the  whole  of  Berkeley's  system  along  with  it.'4 
Berkeley's  view  as  epitomized  by  Reid  is  this:  'If  we  have  any 
knowledge  of  a  material  world,  it  must  be  by  the  senses ;  but  by 
the  senses  we  have  no  knowledge  but  of  our  sensations  only ;  and 
our  sensations,  which  are  attributes  of  mind,  can  have  no  resem- 
blance to  any  qualities  of  a  thing  which  is  inanimate.'5 

'  Finding  other  consequences  to  follow  from  it,'  says  Reid, 
'  which  gave  me  more  uneasiness  than  the  want  of  a  material 
world,  it  came  into  my  mind  more  than  forty  years  ago  to  put 
the  question,  What  evidence  have  I  for  this  doctrine  that  all 
the  objects  of  my  knowledge  are  ideas  in  my  own  mind  ?'  '  The 
belief  in  a  material  world  .  .  .  declines  the  tribunal  of  reason  and 
laughs  at  all  the  artillery  of  the  logician.  It  retains  its  sovereign 
authority  in  spite  of  all  the  edicts  of  philosophy,  and  reason  itself 

1  Inquiry,  2d  ed.,  1738,  ii.  344. 

2  Dugald  Stewart:  Elem.  Phil,  of  Hum.  Mind,  chap,  i.,  sec.  3. 

3  Dugald  Stewart :  Essays.    Works,  v.  90.  4  Works  (Hamilton),  283. 
S  Intel.  Powers,  Essay  II.,  chap.  xi. 


46  PRO  LEGO  MEN  A. 

must  stoop  to  its  orders.'  '  If  Reason  will  not  be  the  servant 
of  Common  Sense,  she  must  be  her  slave.'1 

§5:  Henry  Home,  of  Kames  (1696-1782),  supposes  'the 
foundation  of  this  terrible  doctrine — the  ideal  system — to  be  no 
better  than  a  shallow  metaphysical  argument,  namely,  "  That  no 
being  can  act  but  where  it  is,  and  consequently  that  it  cannot  act 
upon  any  subject  at  a  distance."  '  This  proposition  Lord  Kames 
pronounces  false.  '  Is  there  anything  more  simple  or  more  com- 
mon than  the  acting  upon  subjects  at  a  distance  by  intermediate 
means  ?  When  I  see  a  tree  .  .  .  the  object  perceived  is  the  tree 
itself,  not  the  rays  of  light,  not  the  picture.  In  this  manner  dis- 
tant objects  are  perceived  without  any  action  of  the  object  upon 
the  mind  or  of  the  mind  upon  the  object. .  .  .  The  air  put  in  mo- 
tion .  .  .  makes  an  impression  upon  the  drum  of  the  ear;  but  this 
impression  is  not  what  I  hear, — it  is  the  thunder  itself,  by  means 
of  that  impression.'2  No  burlesque  could  equal  the  unconscious 
richness  of  this  argument. 

§6:  Voltaire  (1694-1778)  says,  'According  to  this  doctor 
(Berkeley),  ten  thousand  men  killed  by  ten  thousand  cannon- 
shots  are  in  reality  nothing  more  than  ten  thousand  apprehen- 
sions of  our  understanding.'  .  .  .Voltaire  answers  Berkeley's  argu- 
ment from  the  relativity  of  size  thus  :  '  He  had  only  to  take  any 
measure,  and  say,  of  whatever  extent  this  body  may  appear  to  me 
to  be,  it  extends  to  so  many  of  these  measures.'  '  Extent  is  not  a 
sensation.  When  this  lighted  coal  goes  out,  I  am  no  longer  warm; 
when  the  air  is  no  longer  struck,  I  cease  to  hear;  when  this  rose 
withers,  I  no  longer  smell  it;  but  the  coal,  the  air,  and  the  rose 
have  extent  without  me.  Berkeley's  paradox  is  not  worth  refuting.' 
'  It  is  worth  knowing  how  Berkeley  was  drawn  into  this  paradox. 
A  long  while  ago  I  had  some  conversation  with  him,  and  he  told 
me  that  his  opinion  originated  in  our  being  unable  to  conceive 
what  the  subject  of  this  extension  is  ;  and  certainly  in  his  book 
he  triumphs  when  he  asks  Hylas  what  this  subject,  this  sub- 
stratum, this  substance   is  ?  .  .  .  But  the   subject  does    not  the 

1  Works,  127.  See  '  Reid  and  the  Philosophy  of  Common  Sense,'  Ferrier's  Lectures 
.  .  and  Remains,  1866,  vol.  ii.,  407-459. 

a  Elements  of  Criticism,  chap.  xxv.  Appendix.  Note.  The  first  edition  appeared 
in  1762. 


V.— OPPONENTS    AND    OBJECTIONS.  47 

less  exist,  for  it  has  essential  properties  of  which  it  cannot  be 
deprived.'  " 

§  7  :  Diderot  (1713-1784).  '  The  author  of  the  Essay  on  the 
Origin  of  Human  Knowledge  (Condillac)  judiciously  remarks 
that  whether  we  lift  ourselves  to  the  very  heavens  or  go  down 
into  the  abyss,  we  never  go  out  of  ourselves,  and  it  is  nothing 
but  our  own  thinking  which  we  perceive ;  but  this  is  the  very 
point  reached  in  the  first  Dialogue  of  Berkeley,  and  is  the  very 
foundation  of  his  entire  system — extravagant  system,  which,  it 
seems  to  me,  could  have  its  birth  alone  among  the  blind — a  sys- 
tem which,  to  the  disgrace  of  the  mind  of  man  and  of  philosophy, 
is  of  all  systems  the  most  difficult  to  refute,  yet  is  the  most  ab- 
surd of  all.' 2  On  this  Stewart,  with  his  characteristic  candour, 
says,  '  If  the  fundamental  principle  ascribed  by  Diderot  to 
Berkeley  be  admitted,  it  will  be  found,  I  apprehend,  not  merely 
difficult,  but  altogether  impossible,  to  resist  his  conclusion.'3 

§8:  Beattie  (1735-1803),  in  his  very  untruthful  Essay  on 
Truth,  handles  Berkeley  with  his  characteristic  display  of  shal- 
lowness and  egotism.  '  Berkeley's  pretended  proof  of  the  non- 
existence of  matter,  at  which  common  sense  stood  aghast  for 
many  years,  has  no  better  foundation  than  the  ambiguous  use  of 
a  word.'  '  This  (Berkeley's)  argument  .  .  .  proves  that  to  be  false 
which  every  man  must  necessarily  believe  every  moment  of  his 
life  to  be  true,  and  that  to  be  true  which  no  man  since  the  founda- 
tion of  the  world  was  ever  capable  of  believing  for  a  single  mo- 
ment.' This  argument,  reduced  out  of  its  paraphrase,  simply 
means — you  lie  !  Beattie  states  Berkeley's  view  as  involving 
'  that  the  sun,  moon,  and  stars,  and  ocean,  and  tempest,  thunder 
and  lightning,  mountains,  rivers,  and  cities,  have  no  existence 
but  as  ideas  or  thoughts  in  my  mind,  and  independent  on  me 
and  my  faculties  do  not  exist  at  all,  and  could  not  exist  if  /  were 
to  be  annihilated  ;  that  food  and  burning  and  pain  which  I  feel, 
and  the  recollection  of  pain  that  is  past,  and  the  idea  of  pain  which 
I  never  felt,  are  in  the  same  sense  ideas  and  perceptions  in  my 
mind,  and  nothing  else,  .  .  .  and  thus  I  have  no  evidence  that 

1  Philosophical  Dictionary,  London.     Art.  Body. 

2  Lettre  sur  les  Aveugles,  quoted  by  Stewart,  v.  66. 

3  Do.  do. 


48  PROLEGOMENA. 

any  being  exists  in  nature  but  myself.'1  All  this  is  directly  the 
reverse  of  Berkeley's  real  views.  Beattie,  however,  grants  that 
Berkeley  did  not  foresee  the  consequences  of  his  doctrines  :  '  His 
intentions  were  irreproachable,  and  his  conduct,  as  a  man  and  a 
Christian,  did  honour  to  human  nature.'2  A  portrait  of  Beattie, 
with  allegorical  accessories,  was  painted  by  Sir  Joshua  Reynolds 
in  1773,  in  which  Truth  (as  Beattie,  we  presume)  was  represented 
trampling  on  Infidelity  and  Scepticism,  in  the  shapes  of  Voltaire 
and  Hume. 

Dr.  Beattie  thus  defines  the  common  sense  to  which  he  appeals: 
'  The  term  common  sense  hath  .  .  .  been  used  to  signify  that  power 
of  the  mind  which  perceives  truth  or  commands  belief,  not  by 
progressive  argumentation,  but  by  an  instantaneous,  instinctive, 
and  irresistible  impulse,  derived  neither  from  education  nor  from 
habit,  but  from  nature,  acting  independently  on  our  will  when- 
ever its  object  is  presented,  according  to  an  established  law,  and 
tliercfore  properly  called  a  sense,  and  acting  in  a  similar  manner 
upon  all,  or  at  least  upon  a  great  majority  of  mankind,  and  there- 
fore properly  called  common  sense.1  Beattie  distinguishes  common 
sense  from  reason,  as  Reid  does,  and  appeals  from  reason  to  it. 
Hamilton,  after  a  fashion,  vindicates  Beattie's  definition  of  com- 
mon sense,  and  apologizes  for  his  identification  of  reason  with 
reasoning  in  common  with  the  great  majority  of  philosophers, 
and,  with  enough  reservations  to  leave  very  little  of  the  definition, 
insists  that  there  is  more  in  it  to  be  praised  than  to  be  censured.3 

§  9  :  James  Oswald,  in  his  'Appeal  to  Common  Sense  in  Behalf 
of  Religion' (1766-1772),  charged  mankind  in  general,  and  learned 
men  in  particular,  with  neglecting  or  despising  common  sense. 
The  result  of  the  rarity  of  the  use  of  common  sense  was  the 
neglect  of  the  obvious  and  useful,  and  the  fruitless  pursuit  of 
speculative  niceties.  This  had  been  the  error  of  the  earliest 
philosophy,  and  continued  to  be  the  fatal  mistake  of  the  latest. 
Locke  denied  innate  ideas.  His  system  runs  out  into  materialism 
and  fatalism.  Clarke  and  others  wasted  time  and  talents  in  a 
philosophical  demonstration  of  the  existence  of  a  God,  an  exist- 
ence which  the  merest  glance  at  nature  put  beyond  all  doubt. 

«  Essay,  6th  ed.  London,  1778,  132,  140,  232.  •  Do.  442. 

3  Hamilton's  Reid's  Works,  792. 


V.— OPPONENTS    AND    OBJECTIONS.  49 

Berkeley  and  his  school  considered  man  as  a  mere  intelligence, 
and  scarcely  noticed  his  sentient  bodily  nature.  The  common 
calamity  was  want  of  common  sense,  and  the  sole  panacea  needed 
for  its  cure  was  the  neglected  thing  of  virtue,  common  sense 
itself,  as  possessed  by  Oswald  and  all  who  agreed  with  him. 
'  The  declamatory,  insulting  style  of  Dr.  Oswald  has  met  with 
general  disapprobation.'1 

§  10:  Dugald  Stewart  (1753-1828)  says  of  Berkeley's  argu- 
ments against  the  existence  of  the  material  world,  'They  amount 
to  little  more  than  an  ingenious  and  elegant  development  of  some 
principles  of  Malebranche,  pushed  to  certain  paradoxical  but 
obvious  consequences,  of  which  Malebranche,  though  unwilling 
to  avow  them,  appears  fully  to  have  been  aware.  These  conse- 
quences, too,  had  been  previously  pointed  out  by  Mr.  Norris,  a 
very  learned  divine  of  the  Church  of  England,  whose  name  has 
unaccountably  failed  in  obtaining  that  distinction  to  which  his 
acuteness  as  a  logician,  and  his  boldness  as  a  theorist,  justly  en- 
title him.' 2  Stewart's  statement  of  the  Berkeleyan  question  is  as 
follows  :  'As  our  sensations  have  no  resemblance  to  the  qualities 
of  matter,  it  has  puzzled  philosophers  to  explain  in  what  manner 
our  notions  of  primary  qualities  are  acquired.  It  is  the  difficulty 
that  has  given  rise  to  the  modern  scepticism  concerning  the  non- 
existence of  matter.  According  to  the  ancient  theory  of  percep- 
tion, sensible  qualities  are  perceived  by  means  of  images  or  spe- 
cies propagated  from  external  objects  to  the  mind  by  the  organs 
of  sense.  These  .  .  .  ideas  were  supposed  to  be  resemblances  of 
the  sensible  qualities.  .  .  .  This  hypothesis  is  now  commonly  dis- 
tinguished as  the  ideal  theory.  On  the  principles  of  this  theory 
Berkeley  demonstrated  that  the  existence  of  matter  is  impossi- 
ble ;  for,  if  we  have  no  knowledge  of  anything  which  does  not 
resemble  our  ideas  or  sensations,  it  follows  that  we  have  no 
knowledge  of  anything  whose  existence  is  independent  of  our 
perceptions.  If  the  ideal  theory  be  admitted,  the  foregoing  argu- 
ment against  the  existence  of  matter  is  conclusive!*  Stewart's 
argument  against  Berkeleyanism  is  that  the  ideal  theory  is  '  unsup- 
ported by  evidence,  and  is  even  inconceivable.     That  we  have 

1  Ethical  Questions,  by  T.  Cogan,  1817,  p.  177. 

»  Works  (Hamilton),  i.  349.  3  Works,  ii.  18,  19. 

4 


So 


PROLEGOMENA. 


notions  of  external  qualities  perfectly  unlike  to  our  sensations,  or 
to  anything  of  which  we  are  immediately  conscious,  is  a  fact ; 
nor  ought  we  to  dispute  the  reality  of  what  we  perceive  because 
we  cannot  reconcile  this  fact  with  our  received  philosophical  sys- 
tems.'1 Stewart's  estimate  of  Reid  is  this:  '  Dr.  Reid,  who  first 
called  the  ideal  theory  in  question,  offers  no  argument  to  prove 
that  the  material  world  exists,  but  considers  our  belief  of  it  as  an 
ultimate  fact  in  our  nature.  It  rests  on  the  same  foundation  with 
our  belief  in  the  reality  of  our  sensations,  which  no  man  has  dis- 
puted.'2 '  Till  the  refutation  of  the  ideal  theory  in  Reid's  Inquiry, 
the  partisans  of  Berkeley's  system  remained  complete  masters  of 

the  controversial  field Many  answers  to  it  were  attempted,  . . . 

the  evidence  of  the  conclusion  .  .  .  supporting  the  premises,  and 
not  the  premises  the  conclusion.'3  Stewart  notices  that  Berkeley 
confidently  appeals  to  the  common  sense,  the  popular  belief,  to 
sustain  him,  as  the  Scotch  school  appeal  to  it  to  sustain  them.4 

In  explaining  the  frequency  of  his  recurrence  to  the  'paradox 
of  Hume  and  Berkeley,'  Stewart  says,  'It  is  not  that  I  regard 
this  theory  oi  idealism,  when  considered  by  itself,  an  error  of  any 
serious  moment.' s  As  between  Berkeley's  attempt  to  disprove 
and  Descartes'  to  prove  the  existence  of  the  material  world, 
Stewart  says,  '  Both  undertakings  were  equally  unphilosophical ; 
for  to  argue  in  favour  oi  any  of  the  fundamental  laws  of  human 
belief  is  not  less  absurd  than  to  call  them  in  question.  In  this 
argument,  however,  it  must  be  granted  that  Berkeley  had  the 
advantage ;  the  conclusion  which  he  formed  being  unavoidable, 
if  the  common  principles  be  admitted  on  which  they  both  pro- 
ceeded.' 6  The  scepticism  concerning  the  existence  of  the  mate- 
rial world  is  one,  says  Stewart,  '  which  I  am  inclined  to  think 
most  persons  have  occasionally  experienced  in  their  early  years.' 

§  ii  :  Buhle  ( 1 763-1 821). — 'The  principal  arguments  against 
the  Berkeleyan  idealism  are  the  following  :  I.  From  the  argument 
that  all  our  cognition  rests  on  our  subjective  sensations  and  con- 
ceptions, nothing  more  follows  than  that  all  cognition  as  such  is 
subjective  ;  it  cannot  be  inferred  from  this  that  there  is  no  objective 
actuality  of  external  things,  which  are  the  real  causes  of  cognition. 

«  Works,  19.  ■  Do.  do.  3  Do.  iii.  52. 

4  Works,  54.  5  Do.,  v.  85.  6  Do.,  88. 


V.— OPPONENTS   AND    OBJECTIONS.  5I 

These  may  exist  in  themselves,  though  it  be  impossible  to  know 
them  in  themselves. 

'  2.  The  reciprocal  relation  of  the  external  things  and  of  our 
faculty  of  cognition  is  unknown ;  that  is,  we  cannot  see  how  the 
external  things  beget  the  ideas  of  themselves,  but  the  mode  in 
which  the  infinite  spirit  imparts  ideas  to  the  finite  is  equally 
incomprehensible. 

'3.  The  Berkeleyan  idealism  cannot  account  for  the  alternations 
in  psychological  conditions,  for  example,  of  waking,  sleeping,  and 
dreaming  ;  nor  explain  the  difference  between  mere  imaginings 
and  the  conceptions  of  objects  actually  present,  between  accidental 
and  necessary  conceptions,  or  how  the  emotions  of  pain  and  of 
regret  arise.  What  Berkeley  has  said  in  explanation  of  the  dis- 
tinction between  fancies  and  actual  perceptions  is  entirely  insuf- 
ficient and  unsatisfactory. 

'4.  The  system  is  incompatible  with  human  freedom.  Berke- 
ley, indeed,  held  the  doctrine  of  freedom,  and  needed  it  to  vindi- 
cate his  system  against  some  of  the  most  important  objections 
to  it  which  had  suggested  themselves  to  his  own  mind  or  had 
been  started  by  others.  But  as  freedom  can  never  exert  itself 
without  ideas,  and  God  begets  all  ideas  which  relate  to  external 
objects,  human  action  must  always  be  under  determinism. 

'5.  The  consciousness  of  right  and  duty  involves  the  existence 
of  a  sphere  of  rational  beings  external  to  us,  to  which  the  laws 
of  duty  have  a  reference.  Hence  the  common  sound  under- 
standing of  men  and  natural  feeling  directly  protest  against  the 
Berkeleyan  view.'1 

§  12:  Tennemann  (1761-1819). — 'The  reasoning  of  Berkeley 
has  great  plausibility,  and,  if  we  do  not  distinguish  phenomena 
from  things  in  themselves,  cannot  be  confuted.  Nevertheless, 
consciousness  revolts  against  the  result,  and  resists  the  inference, 
even  if  the  premises  cannot  be  confuted.  As  such  doctrines, 
however  well-grounded  they  may  be,  can  accomplish  nothing 
over  against  the  judgment  of  the  common  understanding,  it  is 
not  to  be  wondered  at  that  the  idealism  of  Berkeley  excited  less 
sensation  than  might  otherwise  have  been  expected.     To  this 

1  Geschichte  d.  neuern  Philosophic,  1803,  v.  129,  and  Lehrb.  d.  Gesch.  d.  Philosophic, 
1802,  vfi.,  364. 


52 


PROLEGOMENA. 


may  be  added,  that  while  Berkeley  in  his  youth  was  regarded  as 
a  great  genius,  in  after  time  he  was  looked  upon  more  and  more 
as  an  oddity,  to  whose  whimseys  and  crotchets  the  majority  of 
scholars  felt  little  disposition  to  give  attention.' ' 

§  13:  Hegel  (1770-1831). — 'The  want  of  logical  sequence  in 
this  system  compels  it  to  resort  again  to  God  as  a  drain  (die 
Gosse) ;  to  Him  is  committed  the  solution  of  the  contradiction. 
In  brief,  in  this  idealism  the  ordinary  sensuous  view  of  the  uni- 
verse and  the  insulation  of  the  actual,  as  also  the  system  of 
thoughts,  of  notionless  judgments,  remain  exactly  where  they 
were  before ;  it  changes  nothing  at  all  in  the  contents  but  that 
abstract  form,  to  say  that  all  are  but  perceptions.  An  idealism 
like  this  involves  no  more  than  the  antithesis  of  consciousness 
and  of  its  object,  and  leaves  wholly  untouched  the  extension  of 
the  conceptions  (Vorstellungen)  and  the  antitheses  of  the  empir- 
ical and  manifold  contents.  If  it  be  asked  what  is  the  True  of 
these  perceptions  and  conceptions,  as  it  was  before  asked  what  is 
the  True  of  these  things,  it  furnishes  no  answer.  It  is  pretty 
much  a  matter  of  indifference  whether  our  view  involves  things 
or  perceptions,  if  the  self-consciousness  remains  filled  up  with 
the  finitudes  of  the  present  life ;  it  receives  its  contents  in  the 
ordinary  way,  and  is  of  the  ordinary  sort.  It  reels  round  in  its 
isolation  in  the  conceptions  of  the  entirely  empirical  existence, 
without  being  able  to  cognize  and  to  grasp  anything  of  the  con- 
tents ;  or,  in  other  words,  in  this  formal  idealism  reason  has  no 
proper  contents.'2 

§  14:  Erdmann  (1842). — 'Berkeley  contradicts  himself  in  his 
notion  of  God.  God  is  conceived  of  as  spirit,  and  as  He  im- 
parts ideas  to  other  spirits,  He  must  himself  have  ideas  (as  we 
have).  If,  on  the  other  hand,  He  is  supposed  to  have  ideas  in  a 
wholly  different  way  from  that  in  which  we  have  them,  He  must 
have  ideas  without  sensation,  &c.  If  we  hold  fast  to  this  view, 
it  follows  He  has  no  sensuous  ideas,  and  can  consequently  give 
none.  Furthermore,  it  is  hard  to  attach  a  definite  meaning  to 
the  expression  wholly  different  ideas  from  those  we  have.     No 

1  Geschichte  d.  Philosophic  1819,  vol.  xi.  415. 

■  Vorlesungen  u.  d.  Geschichte  d.  Philosophic     Herausgcg.  v.  Michelet,  Dritte  Theil, 
zw.  Aufl.,  1844,  iii.  444,  445. 


V.— OPPONENTS   AND    OBJECTIONS.  53 

effort  avails  to  remove  the  contradiction  that  God  is  a  spirit  (and 
is  consequently  like  us),  and  yet  wholly  different  from  us  (and 
consequently  no  spirit).  In  this  contradiction  Berkeley  has  in- 
volved himself  in  supposing  at  the  same  time  self-active  indi- 
vidual beings,  and  a  God  to  whom  they  are  supposed  to  be 
passively  related.'1 

§  15  :  Dr.  Thomas  Brown  (1 778-1 820)  devotes  two  lectures  to 
'  Dr.  Reid's  supposed  Confutation  of  the  Ideal  System.'  'So  far 
is  Dr.  Reid  from  having  the  merit  of  confuting  the  universal  or 
even  general  illusion  of  philosophers  with  respect  to  ideas  in 
the  mind  as  images  or  separate  things  distinct  from  the  percep- 
tion itself,  that  his  own  opinions  as  to  perception,  on  this  point 
at  least,  are  precisely  the  same  as  those  which  generally  prevailed 
before.'  To  Dr.  Reid  '  the  highest  praise  is  usually  given  ...  as 
if  he  had  truly  established  by  argument  the  existence  of  a  mate- 
rial world.  ...  I  do  not  discover  in  his  reasonings  on  the  subject 
any  ground  for  the  praise  which  has  been  given.  The  evidence 
for  a  system  of  external  things — at  least  the  sort  of  evidence  for 
which  he  contends — was  not  merely  the  same,  but  was  felt  also 
to  be  precisely  the  same,  before  he  wrote  as  afterwards.  Nay,  I 
may  add  that  the  force  of  the  evidence  (if  that  term  can  be  justly 
applied  to  this  species  of  belief)  was  admitted  in  its  fullest  extent 
by  the  very  sceptic  against  whom  chiefly  his  arguments  were 
directed.'  He  then  shows,  as  Hamilton  subsequently  did,  that 
Reid's  position  strengthens  '  the  force  of  the  scepticism  as  to  the 
existence  of  matter.'  '  The  sceptical  argument,  as  a  mere  play  of 
reasoning,  admits  of  no  reply.'  Quoting  Reid's  words  that  '  the 
belief  of  a  material  world  .  .  .  declines  the  tribunal  of  reason,' 
Brown  says,  ■  Surely,  if  it  decline  the  tribunal  of  reason,  it  is  not 
by  reasoning  that  it  is  to  be  supported,  even  though  the  reasoner 
should  have  the  great  talents  which  Dr.  Reid  unquestionably 
possessed.  .  .  .  The  sceptic  and  the  orthodox  philosopher  of  Dr. 
Reid's  school  .  .  .  come  precisely  to  the  same  conclusion, .  .  .  that 
the  existence  of  a  system  of  things,  such  as  we  understand  when 
we  speak  of  an  external  world,  cannot  be  proved  by  argument. . . . 
There  is  no  argument  of  mere  reasoning  that  can  prove  the  exist- 

»  Leibnitz  u.  d.  Entwickel.  d.  Idealismus  vor  Kant,  1842  (Gesch.  d.  Philos.,  B.  ii., 
Abth.  ii.) :  219,  220. 


54 


PROLEGOMENA. 


ence  of  an  external  world  ;  it  is  absolutely  impossible  for  us  not 
to  believe  in  the  existence  of  an  external  world.'1 

§  16  :  Dr.  Frederick  Beasley  (1777-1845),  in  his  'Search  of 
Truth  in  the  Science  of  the  Human  Mind,'  discusses  the  '  theory  of 
Bishop  Berkeley,'  specially  with  the  aim  of  showing  that  it  does 
not  legitimately  arise  from  Locke's  system,  but  can  be  successfully 
controverted  on  Locke's  principles.  Dr.  Beasley  controverts 
Reid's  position  on  these  points,  but  in  the  main  coincides  with 
the  Scotch  school  in  the  structure  of  his  argument:  'The  senses 
are  the  proper  and  sole  judges  in  the  case.  We  can  give  no  reason 
.  .  .  why  we  believe  in  the  certainty  of  intuitive  truths,  but  that 
such  are  the  laws  of  our  constitutions.'2 

§17:    DlCTIONNAIRE    DES    SCIENCES    PhILOSOPHIQUES    (1844). 

'  If  the  doctrine  of  Berkeley  be  adopted,  I  have  no  guarantee  that 
beings  like  myself  exist  exterior  to  me,  and  I  remain  alone  in  the 
universe,  or  rather,  with  my  mind  and  its  ideas,  I  constitute  the 
universe  for  my  solitary  self.  My  mind  and  its  ideas  are  the 
only  things  which,  in  a  consistent  idealism,  can  escape  negation 
and  doubt.  Berkeley  has  not  formally  avowed  this  conclusion ; 
but  it  fixes  itself  irresistibly  on  his  doctrine.'3 

§  18  :  The  Rev.  George  Jamieson  (1859),  in  his  'Essentials  of 
Philosophy,'4  devotes  the  Introduction  to  '  the  logical  proof  of  an 
external  world,'  and  an  Appendix  to  '  Berkeley's  Principles  of 
Human  Knowledge.'  He  says,  '  It  is  allowed  that  no  logical 
proof  of  an  external  world  has  as  yet  been  achieved,  and  philos- 
ophers at  this  day  confess  the  impotency  which  has  hitherto 
attended  all  the  speculations  of  logic  in  this  field  of  investiga- 
tion.' The  author  therefore  feels  that  he  proposes  '  to  set  forth  a 
plea  to  which  no  philosopher  has  successfully  established  a  claim.' 
Mr.  Jamieson's  logical  proof  presents  these  points  :  '  I.  There  is 
such  a  phenomenon  as  consciousness.  2.  Consciousness  must 
be  the  phenomenon  of  a  substantial  element — intellect.  3.  There 
is  no  cognisable  phenomenon  of  intellect  which  is  not  presented 
under  the  category  of  consciousness  ;  we  have  no  evidence  but 


1  Lectures  on  the  Philosophy  of  the  Human  Mind.    4  vols.     Edinb.,  1820.     Lectures 
xxvi.  and  xxvii. 
«  A  Search,  &c.    Philada.,  1822.    B.  ii.,  chap.  v. 
3  Paris,  1844,  vol.  i.  319,  320.  *  Edinburgh,  1859. 


V.— OPPONENTS   AND    OBJECTIONS.  55 

what  is  resolvable  into  that  of  consciousness.  4.  Consciousness 
is  from  time  to  time  suspended  in  sleeping.  5.  The  suspension 
of  consciousness  does  not  interfere  with  the  existence  of  intellect, 
regarded  as  a  substantial  reality.  6.  Intellect,  as  the  subject  of 
suspended  consciousness,  must,  in  order  to  the  restoration  of  con- 
sciousness, of  necessity  either  arouse  itself  into  conscious  activity 
or  be  aroused  by  something  out  of  itself.  7.  The  influence  out 
of  itself,  by  which  intellect  is  aroused  to  consciousness,  can  be 
ascribed  to  ideas  only,  with  which  alone  intellect  is  immediately 
conversant.  That  intellect  is  conscious  only  of  ideas  is  the  im- 
perative dictum  of  philosophy,  the  universal  law  of  our  reason. 
Ideas  are  the  objects  of  all  intellect's  thinking.  We  know  of  no 
other  objects  of  consciousness.  It  has  nothing  else  that  we  know 
to  be  conscious  of.  8.  Ideas  must  needs  be  conditioned  forms 
emanating  from  and  representative  of  the  facts  of  an  external 
world.  9.  The  conditions  of  the  external  world,  with  their  forms, 
must  be  what  they  are  directly  represented  to  our  consciousness 
by  the  ideas  descriptive  of  the  same.  "  If,"  to  use  the  words  of 
Kant,  who  embraced  the  view  of  Berkeley  to  this  extent,  "  the 
things  we  see  are  not  what  they  are  taken  for,"  then,  upon  the 
principles  of  irresistible  logic,  "  the  root  of  our  nature  is  a  lie,"  let 
Sir  William  Hamilton  and  his  followers  say  what  they  may  to 
the  contrary.  .  .  .  There  can  be  no  trusting  to  our  cognition  if  we 
perceive  things  differently  from  what  they  actually  are.' 

§  19:  Dr.  Jas.  M'Cosh,  in  treating  of  primitive  cognitions  con 
cerning  body,  holds,  as  involved  in  this  intuitive  knowledge,  that, 
'  1,  we  know  the  object  as  existing  or  having  being;  2, as  having 
an  existence  independent  of  the  contemplative  mind ;  3,  as  in- 
volving a  knowledge  of  outness  or  externality.  We  know  the 
object  perceived,  be  it  the  organism  or  the  object  affecting  the 
organism,  as  not  in  the  mind,  as  out  of  the  mind.  Thetee  convic- 
tions set  aside  all  forms  of  idealism  in  sense-perception.'  '  Berke- 
ley is  wrong  in  maintaining  that  we  can  perceive  nothing  more 
than  ideas  in  our  own  minds.  .  .  .  He  errs  in  not  unfolding  how 
much  is  comprised  in  the  object  as  perceived  by  us;  we  perceive 
body  as  having  being,  power,  and  existence  without  us  and  inde- 
pendent of  us.  .  .  .  Berkeley  was  misled  throughout  by  following 
the  Lockeian  doctrines  that  the  mind  perceives  immediately  only 


56  PROLEGOMENA. 

its  own  ideas,  and  that  substance  is  to  be  taken  merely  as  the 
support  or  substratum  of  qualities.'1 

§  20:  Sir  William  Hamilton  (1 788-1 856)  maintains  that  on  his 
own  principles  Reid  reaches  a  doctrine  which  '  even  supplies  a 
basis  for  an  idealism  like  that  of  Fichte.'  Just  as  Reid  '  brings 
the  matter  to  a  short  issue '  in  a  doctrine  which  he  thinks  shows 
that  the  '  ideal  system  is  a  rope  of  sand,'  Hamilton  says, '  Nothing 
is  easier  than  to  show  that,  so  far  from  refuting  idealism,  this  doc- 
trine affords  it  the  best  of  all  possible  foundations.  .  .  .  Reid  (and 
herein  he  is  followed  by  Mr.  Stewart)  .  .  .  asserts  the  very  posi- 
tions on  which  this  (the  simpler  and  more  refined)  idealism  estab- 
lishes its  conclusions.  . . .  The  doctrine  of  our  Scottish  philosophers  is, 
in  fact ',  the  very  groundwork  on  which  the  egoistical  idea/ism  reposes. 
The  argument . .  .from  common  sense  in  their  hands  is  unavailing; 
for  if  it  be  good  against  the  conclusions  of  the  idealist,  it  is  good 
against  the  premises  which  they  afford  him.'2 

'  The  general  approximation  of  thorough-going  realism  and 
thorough-going  idealism  .  .  .  may  at  first  sight  be  startling.  On 
reflection,  however,  their  radical  affinity  will  prove  well  grounded. 
Both  build  upon  the  same  fundamental  fact,  that  the  extended 
object  immediately  perceived  is  identical  with  the  extended  object 
actually  existing;  for  the  truth  of  this  fact  both  can  appeal  to  the 
common  sense  of  mankind  ;  and  to  the  common  sense  of  man- 
kind Berkeley  did  appeal  not  less  confidently,  and  perhaps  more 
logically,  than  Reid.'3 

Hamilton  held  that  'Natural  realism  and  absolute  idealism  are 
the  only  systems  worthy  of  a  philosopher ;  for  as  they  alone  have 
any  foundation  in  consciousness,  so  they  alone  have  any  consist- 
ency with  themselves.'  Natural  realism  is  Hamilton's  own  view, 
and  of  this  view  Hamilton's  successor  asks, '  What  is  the  nature 
of  the  natural  realism  by  which  the  ghost  of  absolute  idealism  is 
to  be  exorcised?'  His  answer  is,  'As  matter  of  consciousness, 
it  is  a  figment ;  as  matter  of  consciousness,  a  dream.'  That  the 
Scotch  philosophy  has  not  satisfied  the  entire  Scotch  mind,  is 
confessed  in  the  sad  words  in  which  Fraser  closes  the  brilliant 

1  The  Intuitions  of  the  Mind.    New  York,  1866  :  109,  147,  148.    See  also  Dr.  M'Cosh  on 
Berkeley's  Philosophy:  Presbyterian  Quarterly  and  Princeton  Review,  Jan.,  1873. 
*  Hamilton's  edition  of  Reid,  128, 129.    See  what  is  quoted  from  Brown.    Prolegomena. 
3  Note  C,  Reid's  Works,  817. 


VL— ESTIMATES    OF    BERKELEY. 


57 


review  from  which  we  quote:  'The  only  conviction  which  the 
student  of  the  history  of  human  speculation  can  regard  as  neces- 
sary is  the  conviction  of  our  hopeless  ignorance  of  all  the  mys- 
teries of  existence.  Truth,  like  the  Deity,  is  hid  in  darkness. 
It  is  not  that  we  are  unable  to  divine  the  mysteries  of  the  soul 
and  God ;  the  simplest  phenomenon  of  sense  defies  our  wit.  Of 
the  future  destinies  of  philosophy  it  is  in  vain  to  speak.  Phe- 
nomena we  can  observe ;  their  laws  we  are  able  to  ascertain ; 
existence  is  beyond  our  ken.  The  riddle  of  the  Sphynx  has 
never  yet  been  read ;  the  veil  of  Isis  has  never  yet  been  drawn ; 
the  hieroglyphics  of  the  universe  are  yet  undeciphered.' * 

VI.  Estimates  of  Berkeley — his  Character,  Writings,  and 
Influence. 

§  I  :  Swift  (1667-1745). — '  He  is  an  absolute  philosopher  with 
regard  to  money,  titles,  and  power.  ...  He  most  exorbitantly  pro- 
poseth  a  whole  hundred  pounds  a  year  for  himself.  .  .  .  His  heart 
will  break  if  his  deanery  be  not  taken  from  him.  One  of  the 
first  men  in  this  kingdom  for  learning  and  virtue.' 2 

Swift  is  said  to  have  introduced  Berkeley  to  Earl  Berkeley 
with  the  words,  '  My  lord,  here  is  a  young  gentleman  of  your 
family.  I  can  assure  your  lordship  it  is  a  much  greater  honour 
to  you  to  be  related  to  him,  than  to  him  to  be  related  to  you.' 
'  Berkeley,'  he  says  in  the  Journal,  to  Stella,  '  is  a  very  ingenious 
man  and  great  philosopher.' 3 

§  2:  Warburton  (1698-1779). — 'He  is  indeed  a  great  man, 
and  the  only  visionary  I  ever  knew  that  was.'4 

§  3  :  Blackwell(i70I-i737),  who  was  to  have  been  one  of  the 
professors  in  the  Bermuda  University,  says,  '  I  scarce  remember 
to  have  conversed  with  him  on  that  art,  liberal  or  mechanic,  of 
which  he  knew  not  more  than  the  ordinary  practitioners.  With 
the  widest  views,  he  descended  into  a  minute  detail,  and  be- 
grudged neither  pains  nor  expense  for  the  means  of  information. 
...  I  admire  the  extensive  genius  of  the  man.  .  .  .  Many  such 

1  North  British  Review,  xxxiv.  479. 

*  Letter  to  Lord  Carteret,  in  Fraser's  Life,  102.  See  Christian  Examiner,  July,  1838,  313. 

3  Fraser  :  Life,  vi,  54. 

4  Letters.     London,  1809.     See  article  in  Retrospective  Review,  vol.  xi.  (1825)  239. 


58  PROLEGOMENA. 

spirits  in  our  country  would  quickly  make  learning  wear  another 
face.'1 

§4:  Hume  (1711-1766). — 'Most  of  the  writings  of  that  very 
ingenious  author  (Berkeley)  form  the  best  lessons  of  scepticism 
which  are  to  be  found  either  among  the  ancient  or  modern  phi- 
losophers, Bayle  not  excepted.  That  all  his  arguments,  though 
otherwise  intended,  are  in  reality  merely  sceptical,  appears  from 
this :  that  they  admit  of  no  answer  and  produce  no  conviction. 
Their  only  effect  is  to  cause  that  momentary  amazement  and 
irresolution  and  confusion  which  is  the  result  of  scepticism.'3 

§  5  :  Johnson  (j 709-1784). — '  Berkeley  was  a  profound  scholar, 
as  well  as  a  man  of  fine  imagination.'3 

§6:  Adam  Smith  (1723-1790)  says  of  the  '  New  Theory  of 
Vision'  that  it  is  '  one  of  the  finest  examples  of  philosophical 
analysis  that  is  to  be  found  in  our  own  or  any  other  language.' 

§7:  Tiedemann  (1748-1803). — '  His  noble  and  great  heart 
glowed  with  zeal  for  the  good  and  for  the  promotion  of  the  wel- 
fare of  mankind.  ...  He  left  behind  him  the  renown  of  a  man 
devoid  of  selfishness,  of  one  full  of  ardour  for  the  interest  not 
alone  of  his  native  land,  but  of  the  human  race,  strict  in  the  per- 
formance of  the  duties  of  his  see,  and  full  of  magnanimity.  .  .  . 
Few  have  equalled  him  in  acuteness  and  profundity.  .  .  .  He  has 
filled  up  an  important  break  in  human  thought.  ...  To  attempt 
to  thunder  down  idealism  by  a  dictum  of  the  popular  under- 
standing is  unphilosophical,  not  to  say  irrational.  .  .  .  Berkeley 
merits  the  warmest  gratitude  of  all  genuine  philosophers.'4 

§  8  :  Platner  (i 744-181 8). — '  Berkeley  was  the  first  to  render 
idealism  demonstrative  and  to  show  that  the  Deity  does  not 
deceive  us,  though  matter  does  not  exist.'5 

§9:  Reid  (1710-1796). — 'Supposing  this  principle  [that  all 
the  objects  of  our  knowledge  are  ideas]  to  be  true,  Berkeley's 
system  is  impregnable.  No  demonstration  can  be  more  evident 
than  his  reasoning  from  it.'  '  He  is  acknowledged  universally  to 
have  great  merit  as  an  excellent  writer  and  a  very  acute  and  clear 

1  Memoirs  of  the  Court  of  Augustus,  ii.  277. 

■  Boays.     Note  N.  3  Boswell,  New  York,  1850,  i.  173. 

4  Geist  d.  spekulativen  Philosophic,  1797,  vol.  vi.  621,  623,  624. 

5  Aphorismen,  i.  413. 


VI.— ES  TIM  A  TES    OF   BERK  EL  E  Y. 


59 


reasoner  on  the  most  abstract  subjects,  not  to  speak  of  his  vir- 
tues as  a  man,  which  were  very  conspicuous.'  'The  new  phi- 
losophy had  been  making  gradual  approaches  towards  Berkeley's 
opinion,  and  whatever  others  might  do,  the  philosophers  had  no 
right  to  look  upon  it  as  absurd  or  unworthy  of  a  fair  examina- 
tion. Several  authors  attempted  to  answer  his  arguments,  but 
with  little  success,  and  others  acknowledged  that  they  could 
neither  answer  them  nor  assent  to  them.'  '  The  "  Theory  of 
Vision"  .  .  .  contains  very  important  discoveries  and  marks  of 
great  genius.'  '  He  possessed  uncommon  penetration  and  judg- 
ment.' '  The  principle  laid  down  in  the  first  sentence  of  his 
Principles  of  Knowledge  .  .  .  has  always  been  acknowledged  by 

philosophers This  is  the  foundation  on  which  the  whole  system 

rests.  If  this  be  true,  then  indeed  the  existence  of  a  material 
world  must  be  a  dream.'1 

§10:  Dugald  Stewart  (1753-1828). — '  Possessed  of  a  mind 
which  was  fully  equal  to  that  of  Locke  in  logical  acuteness  and 
invention,  and  in  learning,  fancy,  and  taste  far  its  superior, 
Berkeley  was  singularly  fitted  to  promote  that  reunion  of  phi- 
losophy and  the  fine  arts  which  is  so  essential  to  the  prosperity 
of  both.  .  .  .  Pope's  admiration  of  him  seems  to  have  risen  to 
a  sort  of  enthusiasm.  .  .  .  On  his  moral  qualities  he  has  bestowed 
the  highest  and  most  unqualified  eulogy  to  be  found  in  his 
writings : 

'  "  To  Berkeley  every  virtue  under  heaven." 

'  With  these  intellectual  and  moral  endowments,  admired  and 
blazoned  as  they  were  by  the  most  distinguished  wits  of  his  age, 
it  is  not  surprising  that  Berkeley  should  have  given  a  popularity 
and  fashion  to  metaphysical  pursuits  which  they  had  never  be- 
fore acquired  in  England.  Nor  was  this  popularity  diminished 
by  the  boldness  of  some  of  his  paradoxes.  The  solid  additions, 
however,  made  by  Berkeley  to  the  stock  of  human  knowledge, 
were  important  and  brilliant.  .  .  .  His  New  Theory  of  Vision  [is] 
a  work  abounding  with  ideas  so  different  from  those  commonly 
received,  and  at  the  same  time  so  profound  and  refined,  that  it 
was  regarded,  by  all  but  a  few  accustomed  to  deep  metaphysical 

«  Works  (Hamilton),  i.  280,  281,  283. 


60  PROLEGOMENA. 

reflection,  rather  in  the  light  of  a  philosophical  romance  than  of 
a  sober  inquiry  after  truth.  Such,  however,  has  been  since  the 
progress  and  diffusion  of  this  sort  of  knowledge,  that  the  leading 
and  most  abstracted  doctrines  contained  in  it  form  now  an  essen- 
tial part  of  every  elementary  treatise  of  optics,  and  are  adopted 
by  the  most  superficial  smatterers  in  science  as  fundamental 
articles  of  their  faith.'1 

'The  Minute  Philosopher,'  Stewart  says,  'is  a  book  which 
(notwithstanding  a  few  paradoxical  passages  connected  with  the 
author's  system  of  idealism)  may  be  safely  recommended  as  one 
of  the  most  instructive  as  well  as  entertaining  works  of  which 
English  philosophy  has  to  boast.'2 

Speaking  of  other  works  of  Berkeley,  Stewart  says, '  The  illus- 
trations exhibit  a  singular  combination  of  logical  subtlety  and  of 
poetical  invention;  and  the  style,  while  it  everywhere  abounds 
with  the  rich  yet  sober  colouring  of  the  author's  fancy,  is  per- 
haps superior  in  point  of  purity  and  of  grammatical  correctness 
to  any  English  composition  of  an  earlier  date.' 

Of  Berkeley's  system  Stewart  says,  '  Considered  in  contrast 
with  that  theory  of  materialism  which  the  excellent  author  was 
anxious  to  supplant,  it  possessed  important  advantages  not  only 
in  its  tendency  but  in  its  scientific  consistency,  and  it  afforded  a 
proof,  wherever  it  met  with  a  favourable  reception,  of  an  under- 
standing superior  to  those  casual  associations  which,  in  the  appre- 
hensions of  most  men,  blend  indissolubly  the  phenomena  of 
thought  with  the  objects  of  external  perception.  It  is  recorded 
as  a  saying  of  Turgot  .  .  .  that  "  he  who  had  never  doubted  of  the 
existence  of  matter  might  be  assured  he  had  no  turn  for  meta- 
physical disquisitions.'"3 

§  ii  :  Mackintosh,  Sir  James  (i 765-1 832). — Sir  James  Mack- 
intosh, in  the  very  act  of  characterizing  the  '  paradoxes '  of 
Berkeley  as  '  unfruitful,'  mentions,  admiringly,  '  the  unspeakable 
charm  of  that  transparent  diction  which  clothed'  them.  'His 
immaterialism  is  chiefly  valuable  as  a  touchstone  of  metaphysical 
sagacity, — showing  those  to  be  altogether  without  it,  who,  like 
Johnson  and  Beattie,  believed  that  his  speculations  were  scep- 

1  Dissertation.     Works  (Hamilton),  i.  338-340.  ■  Do.,  vi.  355. 

3  Account  of  Life  and  Writings  of  Reid,  sect,  i,  Works,  x.  255,  256. 


VI.— ESTIMATES    OF   BERKELEY.  6 1 

tical,  that  they  implied  any  distrust  in  the  senses,  or  that  they 
had  the  smallest  tendency  to  disturb  reasoning  or  alter  conduct. 
Ancient  learning,  exact  science,  polished  society,  modern  litera- 
ture, and  the  fine  arts,  contributed  to  adorn  and  enrich  the  mind 
of  this  accomplished  man.' 

'  Of  the  exquisite  grace  and  beauty  of  his  diction  no  man 
accustomed  to  English  composition  can  need  to  be  informed. 
His  works  are,  beyond  dispute,  the  finest  models  of  philosophical 
style  since  Cicero.  Perhaps  they  surpass  those  of  the  orator  in 
the  wonderful  art  by  which  the  fullest  light  is  thrown  on  the  most 
minute  and  evanescent  parts  of  the  most  subtile  of  human  con- 
ceptions. Perhaps  he  also  surpassed  Cicero  in  the  charm  of 
simplicity.' 

The  judgments  of  William  Archer  Butler  and  of  Ferrier  have 
been  given  in  another  connection.1 

§  12:  The  Edinburgh  Review  (July,  1872). — 'Berkeley  be- 
comes an  important  link  in  the  history  of  philosophy.  He  may 
be  justly  said  to  have  contributed,  indirectly  indeed,  but  power- 
fully, towards  a  more  complete  and  scientific  theory  of  knowl- 
edge. As  connected  historically  with  Descartes  and  Locke  on 
the  one  hand,  with  Hume  and  Kant  on  the  other,  as  well  as  with 
the  modern  schools  of  realistic  idealism  and  extreme  sensation- 
alism, he  well  deserves  to  occupy  a  niche  of  his  own  in  the  his- 
tory of  philosophy,  and  his  writings  must  be  carefully  studied  in 
order  to  follow  intelligently  its  modern  development.' 

§  13:  Lewes  (1871). — 'There  are  few  men  of  whom  England 
has  better  reason  to  be  proud  than  of  George  Berkeley,  Bishop 
of  Cloyne.  To  extraordinary  merits  as  a  writer  and  thinker  he 
united  the  most  exquisite  purity  and  generosity  of  character ;  and 
it  is  still  a  mooted  point  whether  he  was  greater  in  head  or  heart.' 2 

§  14:  Dr.  McCosh. — 'Some  of  his  works  are  worthy  of  being 
placed  alongside  of  those  of  Plato.'  '  His  style  is  acknowledged 
on  all  hands  to  be  graceful  and  attractive.'  '  Taken  apart  from 
his  speculations,  .  .  .  the  general  influence  of  his  writings  is  in- 
spiring and  ennobling,  carrying  us  above  the  damp  earth  into  the 
empyrean,  where  we  breathe  a  pure  and  delicious  atmosphere.' 
'  There  are  numbers  in  these  days  heart-sick  of  the  unbending 

1  Prolegomena,  IV.  a  History  of  Philosophy,  4th  ed.,  1871,  ii.  293. 


62  PROLEGOMENA. 

laws  of  physics  and  the  pretentious  categories  of  metaphysics, 
and  willing  to  lose  themselves  in  the  "  woods  and  wilds  "  of  the 
ideal  philosophy.  The  present  state  and  wants  of  certain  schools 
of  philosophy  tend  in  the  same  direction.  It  is  a  curious  though 
by  no  means  an  inexplicable  circumstance  that  not  a  few  of  those 
trained  by  the  teaching  and  writing  of  Hamilton,  especially  those 
who  have  also  felt  the  influence  of  Mill,  are  to  be  found,  if  we 
can  catch  them  anywhere,  on  the  borders  of  Berkeley's  upland  of 
mist  and  sunshine.  Hamilton  himself  always  spoke  of  Berkeley 
in  a  more  appreciative  tone  than  most  of  his  predecessors  in  the 
Scotch  school  had  done.  His  more  discerning  pupils  have  felt 
that  their  great  master  has  left  them  in  a  somewhat  unsatisfac- 
tory position:  a  professing  realist,  he  is  in  fact  the  great  relativist, 
and  he  ends  by  declaring  that  man  can  know  nothing  of  the 
nature  of  things.  Those  who  feel  that  they  have  no  comfortable 
standing  in  such  a  quivering  quagmire  look  with  fond  eye  towards 
Berkeley,  who,  in  taking  away  gross  matter,  leaves  them  substan- 
tial mind.'  '  I  should  rejoice  to  find  students  of  philosophy  be- 
taking themselves  to  the  works  of  Berkeley;  but  they  will  be 
miserably  disappointed  if  they  expect  to  find  there  a  foundation 
on  which  to  build  a  solid  fabric.  Let  them  follow  him  into  the 
labyrinth  into  which  he  conducts  them,  but  let  them  take  a  thread 
to  guide  them  back  into  the  light  of  day.'1 

§  15:  Ritter  (1791-1869).— 'The  grand  merit  of  Berkeley 
was,  beyond  doubt,  in  the  rigid  consequences  which,  in  the 
development  of  his  immaterialism,  he  deduced  from  the  sensual- 
istic  system.  The  results  which  he  reached  in  this  way  were 
similar  to  those  of  the  ancient  sceptics  :  that  our  senses  enable 
us  to  know  only  phenomena,  the  signs  of  things,  not  things 
themselves.  In  objective  tendency  this  principle  was  supported 
by  the  prevalent  dualism,  which  conceded  to  material  nature  only 
inertness  and  passivity.  Only  the  more  sharply  did  dualism  now 
present  itself,  when  substantiality,  the  sole  thing  which  it  had  been 
allowed  to  have  in  common  with  spirit,  was  denied  it.  That 
Berkeley  maintained  the  substantiality  of  spirit,  shows  his  affinity 
with  Leibnitz's  mode  of  thought.'2 

"  Berkeley's  Philosophy,  Presbyterian  Quarterly  and  Princeton  Review,  Jan.  1873,  x-3°. 
'  Geschichte  d.  neuern  Philosophic  1853,  v°l-  >v-  2%4- 


VI.— ESTIMATES    OF    BERKELEY.  63 

§  16  :  Ueberweg  (d.  1871)  puts  a  different  estimate  from  that  of 
the  Scotch  school  on  Berkeley.  He  does  not  decline  argument, 
as  the  Scotch  school  does,  and  considers  the  position  of  that 
school  as  to  '  immediate  perception'  an  untenable  fiction.  He 
admits  in  general  the  postulate  of  Berkeley's  argument,  and  yet 
endeavours  to  show  that  it  does  not  justify  Berkeley's  conclusion. 
In  this  Ueberweg's  strictures  stand  alone,  that  he  maintains  that 
inferential  idealism  is  not  justified  by  the  premises  which,  in 
common  with  the  mass  of  philosophical  thinking,  it  occupies. 
He  accepts  a  challenge  which  in  some  shape  nearly  all  writers 
against  idealism  have  declined.  He  argues  the  question.  He 
denies  that  philosophy  may  waive  the  question  or  appeal  against 
Berkeley  to  so  vague  a  thing  as  '  common  sense.'  He  shows 
an  appreciation  of  Berkeley's  real  greatness  and  power,  which 
adds  greatly  to  the  force  and  value  of  his  strictures.  Coming, 
as  he  does,  from  the  survey  of  all  the  forms  of  philosophical 
thought,  doing  justice  to  all,  becoming  the  partisan  of  none,  the 
sobriety,  sound  judgment,  and  clearness  of  his  annotations  on 
Berkeley  give  them  the  highest  value.  His  estimate  of  Berkeley 
is  already  given  in  the  Preface  to  his  translation  of  the  Principles.1 
He  thus  estimates  the  relation  of  Berkeley  to  other  thinkers  : 

'  Hume  attached  himself  closely  in  certain  respects  to  him,  but 
ran  out  into  a  scepticism  completely  the  reverse  of  Berkeley's 
religious  tendency.  Reid  and  the  other  philosophers  of  the  Scotch 
school  have  battled  against  Hume's  scepticism  and  Berkeley's 
idealism.  The  Scotch  school  have  denied  what  is  assumed  by 
Berkeley,  in  common  with  the  Aristotelians  and  Cartesians,  that 
only  subjective  images  or  "  ideas"  are  immediately  in  our  con- 
sciousness, and  that  consequently  external  things,  if  known  at 
all,  can  be  known  only  by  means  of  their  representation  through 
"  ideas."  Reid's  theory,  however,  of  an  immediate  conscious- 
ness of  the  external  things — the  doctrine  of  a  direct  presentation 
of  them — is  an  untenable  fiction.  Kant,  in  his  doctrine  of  the 
phenomenal  world,  approximates  Berkeleyanism,  but  removes 
himself  from  it  in  this  sphere  by  his  theory  that  the  material  of 
the  senses  is  shaped  by  a  priori  forms,  and  comes  into  complete 

1  Prolegomena,  I.  See  his  Article  :  1st  Berkeley's  Lehre  wissenschaftlich  unwider- 
legbar?     (Fichte's  Zeitschrift,  55  Band,  1869,  63-84.) 


64  PROLEGOMENA. 

antagonism  to  Berkeley  by  his  recognition  of  things  in  them- 
selves.'1 Ueberweg  considers  Hamilton's  doctrine  of  relativity 
an  approach  to  Berkeley's  view.2  The  pctitio  principii  in  some 
points,  which  Ueberweg  charges  upon  Berkeley,  is  denied  and 
retroverted  by  Fraser.3 

§  17:  Stirling  (1868). — 'In  the  present  disintegration  of  re- 
ligion around  us,  the  idealism  of  Berkeley,  of  Carlyle,  and  of 
Emerson  has  been  to  many  a  man  the  focus  of  a  creed,  of  a 
fervent  and  sincere  and  influential  faith.  It  is  this  that  makes 
Berkeley  and  idealism  in  general  so  interesting  now.  Berkeley 
indeed  is,  in  every  point  of  view,  a  grand  and  great  historical 
figure.  Grand  and  great  in  himself, — one  of  the  purest  and  most 
beautiful  souls  that  ever  lived, — he  is  grand  and  great  also  in  his 
consequences.  Hamann,  an  authority  of  weight,  declares  that 
"  without  Berkeley  there  had  been  no  Hume,  as  without  Hume 
no  Kant ;"  and  this  is  pretty  well  the  truth.  To  the  impulse  of 
Berkeley  largely,  then,  it  is  that  we  owe  the  German  philosophy. 
And  great  as  is  the  service,  it  is  to  the  majority  of  English  and 
American  thinkers  much  less  great  than  that  which  they  owe  to 
Berkeley  himself,  either  directly  or  indirectly  (through  Carlyle  and 
Emerson),  especially  in  the  religious  reference  already  alluded  to. 
When  we  add  to  these  considerations  that  also  of  Berkeley's 
mastery  of  expression,  and  of  his  general  fascination  as  a  writer, 
it  is  impossible  to  think  of  him  .  .  .  without  that  veneration  with 
which  the  ancients  regarded  their  Plato,  their  Democritus,  and 
their  Eleatic  Parmenides,  of  which  last,  perhaps,  the  sublimity, 
purity,  and  earnestness  of  character  approach  nearest  to  those  of 
the  character  of  Berkeley.  Apart  even  from  the  influence  of  his 
earlier  writings,  there  attaches  now  ...  a  peculiar  value  to  his 
expressions  relative  to  the  philosophies  of  the  ancients  in  his 
Siris.  ...  In  all  these  references  Berkeley  will  be  found  peculiarly 
admirable  for  the  spirit  of  candour  and  love  which  he  manifests. 
For  systems,  flippantly  characterized  nowadays  as  pantheistic  or 
atheistic,  ...  he  grudges  not,  in  the  sweetness  of  his  own  simple, 
sincere  nature,  to  vindicate  Theism.  Altogether  one  gets  to  admire 
Berkeley  almost  more  here  than  elsewhere.    The  learning,  the  can- 

1  Berkeley's  Prinzipien,  XIII. 

"  Grundriss  d.  Gesch.  d.  Philos.,  3d  ed.,  1871,  iii.  364.  3  Life,  370. 


VI.— ESTIMATES    OF  BERKELEY.  65 

dour,  and  the  depth  of  reflection,  are  all  alike  striking.  As  com- 
pared with  Hume  in  especial,  it  is  here  that  Berkeley  is  superior, 
and  thai  not  only  with  reference  to  the  learning,  but  with  reference 
to  the  spirit  of  faith  and  gravity,  as  opposed  to  the  spirit  of  doubt 
and  levity.  The  most  valuable  ingredient  in  Berkeley  is,  after 
all,  that  he  is  a  Christian.'1 

§  18:  Fraser. —  'The  great  glory  of  Irish  philosophy  is 
Berkeley.  ...  To  the  present  day  the  memory  of  the  mild  meta- 
physician is  as  dear  to  his  countrymen  as  that  of  their  most 
turbulent  orators  and  statesmen.  Nor  is  the  instinct  of  the 
nation  wrong.  He  was  one  of  the  first  eminent  Anglo-Hiber- 
nians that  were  not  ashamed  of  the  name  of  Irishman.  He  was 
one  of  the  first  Irish  Protestants  who  would  honestly  tolerate  a 
"  Papist."  He  was,  perhaps,  the  first  Irishman  who  had  the 
courage  to  tell  his  countrymen  their  faults.  He  was  the  first  to 
denounce  the  race  of  patriots.  The  character  of  this  great  and 
good  man,  indeed,  is  not  the  exclusive  property  of  his  country; 
it  is  the  common  glory  of  the  human  race.  His  life  was  one  of 
ideal  purity.  The  metaphysician  of  idealism  was  an  ideal  man. 
He  was  as  nearly  a  realization  of  the  conception  of  the  Stoic 
sage  as  the  imperfection  of  humanity  permits. 

'The  range  of  his  intellectual  accomplishments  was  almost  as 
wonderful  as  his  virtue  was  unique.  In  his  "Analyst"  he  was 
the  first  to  point  out  that  logical  inconsistency  in  the  modern 
calculus  which  Carnot  attempted  to  explain  by  a  compensation 
of  errors,  which  Lagrange  endeavoured  to  obviate  by  his  calcu- 
lus of  functions,  and  which  Euler  and  D'Alembert  could  only 
evade  by  pointing  out  the  constant  conformity  of  the  conception 
with  ascertained  results.  The  "Querist,"  to  use  the  language  of 
Sir  James  Mackintosh,  "  contains  more  hints,  then  original,  still 
unapplied  in  legislation  and  political  economy,  than  are  to  be 
found  in  any  equal  space."  In  his  "Minute  Philosopher,"  mod- 
elled on  the  Dialogues  of  Plato,  he  catches  the  manner  of  his 
master ;  and,  while  tracking  the  free  thought  of  the  day  through 
its  various  evolutions,  exhibits  an  exquisite  elegance  of  diction 
that  is  unsurpassed  in  the  literature  of  philosophy.  It  is  in  ab- 
stract philosophy,  however,  that  we  are  to  seek  his  glory.     His 

1  Annotations  on  Schwegler,  1868,  420-422. 

s 


66  PROLEGOMENA. 

"Theory  of  Vision,"  his  "Principles  of  Human  Knowledge,"  his 
"Dialogues  between  Hylas  and  Philonous,"  and  his  "Siris,"  en- 
title him  as  a  metaphysician  to  be  ranked  with  Locke  and  Hume  ; 
and  their  publication  vindicated  the  claim  of  Ireland  to  an 
equality  with  England  and  with  Scotland  in  the  glories  of  meta- 
physical research. 

:  Berkeley's  idealism,  in  fact,  is  an  epoch  in  the  history  of 
modern  speculation.'1 

VII.  Idealism  defined. 

§  i  :  Idealism,  the  general  system  of  which  Berkeley  is  an 
exponent,  is,  on  the  whole,  with  reference  to  the  part  it  has  played 
in  the  history  of  human  thought,  the  greatest  of  systems.  In  its 
most  generic  sense,  it  has  been  and  is  now  the  system  of  the 
great  mass  of  thinkers. 

Berkeley  therefore,  were  there  no  other  reason,  is  worthy  of  study 
as  one  of  the  great  masters  in  one  part  of  a  great  school  of  phi- 
losophical thinking.  He  represents  with  distinguished  majesty 
and  grace  one  grand  division  of  idealism.  For  idealism  is  not 
a  narrow  province  of  philosophy,  but  at  least  in  its  mainland  a 
hemisphere  of  it,  and  with  islands  of  coincidence  stretching 
over  philosophy's  whole  globe.  Like  England,  its  drum-beat 
follows  the  sunrise  till  it  circles  the  world. 

Those  who  imagine  that  idealism,  in  the  broad  sense  of  the 
word,  is  a  feeble  thing,  or  the  mere  refuge  of  a  few  paradoxical 
minds,  either  do  not  know  its  nature  and  meaning  or  are  igno- 
rant of  its  history.  In  its  principle  of  cognition  it  is  so  strong  as 
to  have  carried  nearly  the  entire  body  of  thinkers  with  it.  On 
this  they  have  agreed ;  it  is  on  the  inferences  from  it  they  have 
divided.  Generic  idealism  is  the  predominant  system  of  the 
world,  and  specific  idealism  has  an  immense  body  of  able  sup- 
porters. To  see  clearly  the  nature  of  this  distinction,  it  may  be 
useful  to  recall  some  of  the  various  definitions  of  idealism  and 
idealists. 

§  2  :  Wolff  (1679- 1 7  54). — 'Idealists  is  the  name  given  to  those 
who  grant  no  more  than  an  ideal  existence  of  bodies,  an  exist- 

«  North  British  Review,  vol.  xxxiv.  (1861)  454,  455. 


VI L— IDEALISM   DEFINED.  67 

ence  in  our  minds,  and  therefore  deny  a  real  existence  of  the 
world  and  of  bodies.'1 

§3:  Platner  (1744-1818). — 'Idealism  shows,  1,  from  the 
inconceivableness  of  material  substances,  2,  from  the  origin  of 
what  are  called  the  primary  qualities  of  matter,  that  nothing 
non-spiritual  or  material,  external  to  the  mind  in  which  these 
conceptions  are,  and  embracing  the  matter  for  them,  has  any 
existence ;  consequently  these  conceptions  are  either  the  result  of 
our  imaginative  faculty  or  are  aroused  by  the  operation  of  an 
infinite  spirit.'2 

§4:  Frederick  Schlegel  (1772-1829). — 'The  essence  of 
idealism  consists  in  holding  the  spiritual  alone  as  actual  and  truly 
real,  in  entirely  denying  to  bodies  and  matter  existence  and  reality, 
in  explaining  them  as  mere  appearance  and  illusion,  or  at  least 
transmuting  and  resolving  them  into  spirit.  The  question  at 
once  meets  us  here,  What,  then,  in  antithesis  to  matter  is  the 
proper  essence  of  spirit  ?  To  which  the  reply  is,  Freedom, 
activity,  living  mobility;  as  substantial  permanence,  unchangea- 
bleness,  and  dead  repose  are  the  essence  of  corporeal  materialism. 
This  is  the  distinctive  point  in  which  idealism  directly  contradicts 
both  materialism  and  realism.  The  view  taken  of  the  notion  of 
substance  properly  determines  whether  a  system  be  idealistic  or 
not,  for  in  true  idealism  this  notion  is  completely  set  aside  and 
annihilated.'3 

§  5:  Willich  (1798). — '  Idealism  is  .  .  .  that  system  of  philos- 
ophy in  which  the  external  reality  of  certain  intuitive  representa- 
tions is  disputed  or  doubted,  and  space  as  well  as  external  objects 
are  asserted  to  be  mere  fancies.'4 

§6:  Lossius  (1743-18 13). — 'Idealism  is  the  assertion  that 
matter  is  only  an  ideal  seeming,  and  that  spiritual  essences  are 
the  only  real  things  in  the  world.'5 

§  7  :  Krug  ( 1 770-1 842). — '  Idealism  is  that  system  of  philoso- 
phy which  considers  the  real  (the  existent  or  actual)  as  a  mere 
ideal.  In  this  system  it  is  held  that  there  is  no  actual  object 
corresponding  to  our  conceptions  of  the  external  world,  but  that 

1  Psychologia  Rationalis,  1734,  1779,  §  36. 

2  Aphorismen,  1793,  i.  §  756.  3  Philosoph.  Vorlesungen,  i. 
*  Willich :  Glossary,  in  Elements  of  the  Critical  Philosophy,  London,  1798. 
5  Lossius:  Philosoph.  Real-Lexicon.     Erfurt,  1803,  ii.  607. 


68  PROLEGOMENA. 

we  ourselves  objectify — regard  as  something  objective — those 
conceptions,  and  consequently  first  transmute  the  ideal  into  a  real, 
as  we  are  of  necessity  self-conscious  of  those  conceptions.'1 

§8:  Tennemann  (1761-1819). — 'Rationalism,  in  the  broader 
sense,  proceeds  sometimes  from  knowledge,  sometimes  (as  in 
Jacobi's  system)  from  faith,  and  either  explains  our  conception 
and  cognition  by  the  existence  of  objects  or  explains  the  existence 
of  objects  from  our  conception  and  cognition.  The  former  sys- 
tem is  Realism,  which  makes  the  existence  of  objects  the  original; 
the  latter  is  Idealism,  which  makes  the  conception  the  original.'2 

§9:  Duval  Jouve  (1847).  —  'Idealism  is  the  name  given  to 
the  philosophical  doctrines  which  consider  the  idea  either  as  the 
principle  of  cognition  or  as  the  principle  alike  of  cognition  and 
of  being.'3 

§10:  Pierer  (1859). — 'Idealism,  the  philosophical  system, 
which,  positing  the  ideal  as  original,  the  real  as  derivative,  either 
regards  things  as  mere  conceptions  of  the  reflecting,  actual  sub- 
ject, or  looks  upon  the  existence  of  the  world  of  sense  as  at  least 
problematical  and  incapable  of  demonstration.'4 

§  11  :  Brockhaus  (1866). — 'Idealism,  in  antithesis  to  realism, 
is  that  philosophical  view  which  maintains  not  only  that  the  spir- 
itual or  ideal  being  is  the  original,  but  that  it  is  the  sole  actuality, 
so  that  we  can  concede  to  the  objects  of  the  senses  no  more  than 
the  character  of  a  phenomenal  world  educed  by  ideal  activities.'5 

§  12  :  Other  Definitions. — Idealism  has  been  further  defined 
as  '  the  philosophical  view  which  regards  what  is  thought  as 
alone  the  actually  existent,  in  opposition  to  realism  ;'  'schemes  of 
philosophy  which  teach  that  we  are  concerned  only  with  ideas 
and  are  ignorant  of  everything  else;'  'the  doctrine  that  in  exter- 
nal perceptions  the  objects  immediately  known  are  ideas.'6 

'  Idealism,  in  antithesis  to  realism,  is  the  philosophic  view 
which  regards  the  objects  of  sense  only  as  products  of  the 
conception,  and   considers   the   thinking  subject,   or  the  thing 

1  Krug  :  Encycl.  Phil.  Lex.,  ii.  496,  2d  ed.,  Leipz.,  1833. 

*  Tennemann  :  Grundriss  d.  Ges.  d.  Philos.,  5th  Aufl.  von  A.  Wendt,  j5  58. 
3  Duval  Jouve,  in  Dictionnaire  d.  Sciences  Philosoph.,  Par.,  1847,  iii.  180. 

*  Pierer's  Universal  Lexicon,  1859,  viii.  774. 

5  Brockhaus:  Real-Encyklopaedie,  nth  ed.,  1866,  viii.  204. 
'  General  und  Universal  Lexicon,  1869,  ii.  604. 


VII.— IDEALISM   DEFINED.  69 

thought,  as  the  truly  existent ;'  '  the  designation  of  many  and 
different  systems  of  philosophy,  which  only  agree  in  the  common 
principle  from  which  they  originate.  The  principle  is  the  op- 
position of  the  ideal  and  the  real, — that  is,  of  ideas  and  things, 
the  contrariety  of  mind  and  body,  or  of  spirit  and  matter ;'  '  that 
scheme  .  .  .  which,  carried  to  its  legitimate  results,  .  .  .  regards  all 
external  phenomena  as  having  no  existence  apart  from  a  thinking 
subject.' ' 

§  13:  Hamilton  (1788-1856). — 'If  the  testimony  of  conscious- 
ness be  referred  to  the  co-originality  and  reciprocal  independence 
of  the  subject  and  object,  two  schemes  are  determined,  according 
as  the  one  or  other  of  the  terms  is  placed  as  the  original  and 
genetic.  Is  the  object  educed  from  the  subject,  Idealism  ;  is  the 
subject  educed  from  the  object,  Materialism  is  the  result'  '  There 
is  one  scheme  which,  .  .  .  with  the  complete  idealist,  regarding 
the  object  of  consciousness  in  perception  as  only  a  modification 
of  the  percipient  subject,  or  at  least  a  phenomenon  numerically 
distinct  from  the  object  it  represents,  endeavours  to  stop  short  of 
the  negation  of  an  external  world,  the  reality  of  which,  and  the 
knowledge  of  whose  reality,  it  seeks  by  various  hypotheses  to 
establish  and  explain.  This  scheme,  which  we  would  term  Cos- 
mothetic  Idealism,  Hypothetical  Realism,  or  Hypotlietical  Dualism, 
although  the  most  inconsequent  of  all  systems,  has  been  embraced 
under  various  forms  by  the  immense  majority  of  philosophers.'2 

§  14:  Schopenhauer  (1788-1860). — We  close  with  Schopen- 
hauer's definition :  '  The  fundamental  view  of  idealism  is  this  : 
that  everything  which  has  an  existence  for  cognition,  and  conse- 
quently all  that  is  perceived,  the  entire  universe,  extending  itself 
in  space  and  time,  and  linked  by  the  principle  of  the  sufficient 
reason,  is  merely  object  in  relation  to  the  subject,  the  perception 
of  the  percipient  (the  intuition  of  the  intuitant);  it  is  conception, 
consequently  its  existence  is  not  absolute  and  unconditional,  but 
only  relative  and  conditional ;  in  brief,  is  not  a  thing  in  itself,  but 
is  mere  phenomenon.'3 

§  15  :  The  diversity  in  these  definitions  arises  very  much  from 

1  Meyer's  Hand-Lexikon,  1872.  Cyclopaedia  of  Society  for  Diffusion  of  Useful  Knowl- 
edge, 1838,  vol.  xii.     Encyclopaedia  Britannica,  xii.  356.  , 

2  Sir  William  Hamilton  (1830)  :  Discussions.     New  York,  Harper  &  Bros.,  1868,  61. 

3  Schopenhauer,  Lexicon,  v.  Frauenstadt,  1871,  i.  342. 


70  PRO  LEGO  MEN  A. 

their  confounding  in  various  ways  the  essential  principle  of  Ideal- 
ism and  the  processes  by  which  it  is  reached,  or  with  the  inferences 
which  are  deduced  from  it.  Conflicting  modes  of  arguing  it 
may  exist,  and  conflicting  inferences  be  drawn  from  it ;  but  the 
essential  and  common  feature  of  idealism  is  that  it  holds  that 
the  final  cognitions,  the  only  cognitions,  in  the  absolute  or  philo- 
sophical sense,  are  those  which  the  mind  has  of  its  own  states. 
If  it  admit  that  we  may  in  any  sense  apply  the  term  cognitions 
more  widely  than  this,  it  holds  that  such  cognitions  are  relative 
merely,  and  that  they  are  to  be  vindicated  even  as  relative  cog- 
nitions only  by  showing  that  they  are  of  necessity  involved  in 
the  absolute  cognition,  the  cognition  given  in  self-consciousness. 
However  reached  or  however  developed,  any  system  is  so  far 
idealistic  which  holds  '  that  the  mind  is  conscious  or  immediately 
cognisant  of  nothing  beyond  its  subjective  states.'  * 

VIII.    Sceptical  Idealism  in  the  development  of  Idealism 
from  Berkeley  to  the  present :  Hume. 

§  i :  Sceptical  Idealism,  or  Idealistic  Scepticism,  is  the  sys- 
tem of  Hume  (1711-1776). 

The  great  aim  of  Berkeley  had  been  a  religious  one.  It  was 
his  design  to  check  scepticism ;  but  the  actual  result  of  his  system, 
as  it  was  developed  in  a  special  direction  by  Hume,  was  the  pro- 
motion of  scepticism  in  the  subtlest  and  ablest  form  in  which  it 
has  ever  been  presented.  The  clearness  of  Hume's  thinking,  and 
the  luminous  beauty  of  his  style,  gave  a  popularity  to  his  specu- 
lations which  has  rarely  been  enjoyed  by  great  thinkers.  As 
trophies  of  intellectual  power  his  philosophical  writings  are 
incomparably  beyond  his  history.  The  chief  of  these  are 
his  '  Enquiry  concerning  Human  Understanding,'  '  Enquiry  con- 
cerning the  Principle  of  Morals,'  and  the  'Natural  History  of 
Religion.' 

David  Hume  proceeded  from  the  empiricism  of  Locke  as  a 
general  basis ;  but  associating  with  it  the  speculations  of  Berke- 
ley, whom  he  greatly  admired,  he  denies  to  human  knowledge 
all  objective  certainty,  on  the  ground  that  it  is  impossible  to  go 
beyond  ideas  so  as  to  reach  the  essence  of  things. 

1  Hamilton's  statement  of  Dr.  Brown's  view  :  Discussion  62. 


VIII.— SCEPTICAL    IDEALISM:  HUME.  yi 

His  system  may  be  stated  in  the  following  propositions : 

1st.  Our  perceptions  are  either  impressions  or  ideas, — either 
impressions  or  sensations  of  that  which  we  hear,  see,  touch,  or 
are  cogitations, — i.e.  ideas  strictly  so  called.  These  ideas,  inasmuch 
as  they  are  combined  solely  from  our  sensations  or  impressions, 
are  themselves  no  more  than  feebler  sensations  or  impressions, 
and,  therefore,  are  even  less  certain  than  the  sensations.  But  the 
sensations  themselves  are  necessarily  uncertain,  because  reason 
(arguing  from  the  ground  of  empiricism)  supplies  no  means  of 
knowing  that  these  sensations  or  impressions  are  conformed  to 
objects,  or  indeed  have  any  object  at  all. 

2d.  Hence  every  cognition  is  destitute  of  objective  truth. 

3d.  For  our  ideas  or  judgments  are  referred  either,  1st,  to  a 
physical  order,  and  ideas  or  judgments  of  this  class  rest  upon  the 
notion  of  cause;  or,  2d,  they  are  referred  to  a  moral  order,  and 
ideas  or  judgments  of  this  class  rest  upon  the  notion  of  liberty 
and  virtue;  or,  3d,  they  have  regard  to  a  moral  and  physical 
order,  so  as  to  explain  the  origin  and  unity  of  it ;  and  the  ideas 
and  judgments  of  this  third  class  involve  the  notion  of  a  uni- 
versal principle  of  all  Being  or  Entities,  that  is,  a  God. 

But  all  these  fundamental  notions  objectively  regarded  are 
mere  hypotheses  or  artificial  ideas.  Hume  takes  up  the  three 
classes  and  endeavours  to  show  that  this  is  true  of  them  all. 
First,  of  the  notions  which  are  referred  to  a  physical  order,  he 
argues  that  here  experience  merely  teaches  us  the  relations  of 
simultaneousness  and  of  succession.  Thus  experience  shows 
that  B  co-exists  with  A  or  succeeds  A ;  but  from  the  fact  that 
B  co-exists  with  A  to  draw  the  conclusion  that  the  one  depends 
upon  the  other  is  impossible,  or  from  the  fact  that  B  succeeds 
A  to  draw  the  conclusion  that  A  is  the  cause  of  B  is  impossible. 
Hence  (from  the  empirical  method),  we  can  have  no  notion 
objectively  real  of  a  cause.  But  without  the  notion  of  cause 
there  are  no  notions  which  can  be  referred  to  a  physical  order, 
inasmuch  as  without  this  notion  we  explain  no  phenomena,  nor 
can  we  be  certain  of  the  existence  of  bodies,  for  we  judge  that 
they  exist  because  we  think  them  to  be  the  causes  of  our  sensa- 
tions. Second,  as  to  the  notions  referred  to  the  moral  order, 
Hume  argues  that  from  experience  no  man  can  have  any  other 


72  PROLEGOMENA. 

motive  for  his  acts  than  egoism,  selfishness  or  self-love.  But  the 
notion  of  virtue  is  distinct  from  egoism.  Hence'  the  notion  of 
virtue  (on  the  ground  of  empiricism)  is  pure  hypothesis.  2d. 
We  indeed  perceive  that  we  will,  but  how  we  will  we  do  not 
perceive.  Hence  the  notion  of  moral  liberty  is  merely  artificial, 
and  in  fact  self-contradictory,  for  free  choice  cannot  exist  without 
motive ;  but  motive  cannot  produce  ultimate  decision  unless  it 
be  connected  with  stronger  impressions  which  necessitate  the 
willing. 

Third,  the  notion  of  a  universal  principle  or  God  is  clearly  im- 
possible to  man,  for  we  can  only  reach  such  a  notion  by  ascending 
from  sensation  through  the  notion  of  cause,  from  the  whole,  as 
an  effect,  to  God  as  the  cause  of  the  whole, — but  the  notion  of 
cause  is  without  foundation.  This  doctrine  Hume  applies  to 
ethics, — to  the  question  of  retribution  in  another  life,  to  the  im- 
mortality of  the  soul,  to  religion  in  general,  and  to  morality. 
All  these,  as  resting  on  mere  hypotheses,  he  treats  in  the  same 
way,  and  thus  out  of  an  empiricism  which  proposed  to  lay  a  sure 
foundation  for  human  belief  he  developed  a  universal  scepticism.1 

IX.  Critical  Idealism  :  Kant. 
Critical  or  Transcendental  (hypothetical)  Idealism,  the 
system  of  Kant  (i  724-1 804).  We  know  things  only  as  they 
appear  to  us,  not  as  they  are  in  themselves.  Things  as  we  know 
them  are  mental  representations  in  us,  and  time  and  space  are 
forms  of  our  intuiting.  There  are  two  sources  whence  we  derive 
cognition.  I.  The  unfathomable  thing  in  itself,  which  furnishes 
the  matter  for  our  mental  representations ;  2.  the  subjective 
forms  of  our  thinking,  or  the  categories.  Both  must  be  united 
to  make  experience  possible.  '  Of  the  two  elements  whose 
relation  and  harmony  compose  science, — on  one  side  the  human 
mind,  the  subject,  and  on  the  other  things,  beings,  the  object, — 
Kant  proposes  to  suppress  the  second,  and  to  reduce  science  to 
the  first.  To  eliminate  the  objective  forever,  as  absolutely  in- 
accessible, and  to  resolve  all  into  the  subjective,  this  is  his  end 
and  here  are  the  great  lines  of  his  enterprise.' a     '  Kant's  system 

»  Rothenflue,  Institutiones  Philosophise  Theoreticre,  1846,  iii.  273-275. 
»  Saisset,  Essay  on  Religious  Philosophy,  1863,  vol.  i.  275. 


IX.— CRITICAL    IDEALISM:    KANT.  73 

is  to  be  designated  as  Idealism  in  a  completely  general  sense  and 
in  all  its  parts,  for  alike  the  ground  of  phenomena  and  the  law 
of  conduct  it  sought  in  the  mind  of  man  and  in  its  laws,  innate, 
independent  of  experience.'1 

When  we  look  at  the  end  of  the  epoch  terminating  with  Hume, 
it  is  very  clear  that  a  reformation  was  pressingly  necessary.  The 
scepticism  of  Hume,  rising  in  the  empiricism  of  Locke,  threatened 
not  only  all  that  was  thought  to  be  known  in  regard  to  morals 
and  religion,  but  subverted  the  very  principles  of  reason,  the 
foundation  of  all  cognitions,  and  thus  made  all  science,  all  real 
knowledge,  impossible.  It  had  become  obvious  that,  whatever 
might  be  the  speculative  force  of  this  tendency,  it  involved  such 
enormous  practical  evils  that  there  must  be  somewhere  in  it  a 
latent  fallacy, — either  the  premises  were  incorrect  or  the  reason- 
ings upon  them  unwarranted.  It  was  clearly  necessary  to  sub- 
ject the  intellect  of  man  and  its  operations  to  a  new  examination, 
that  knowledge  might  be  built  upon  a  more  solid  foundation. 
The  great  master  in  this  work  was  Kant.  He  performed  this 
work  in  such  a  way  that,  as  his  transcendental  idealism  was 
developed  and  supported  by  his  general  system,  a  number 
of  later  writers  endeavored  to  find  the  ultimate  principle,  i.e.  the 
absolute,  some  in  the  Ego  or  subjective  understanding,  others  in 
the  non-Ego  or  in  nature,  some  in  the  identity  of  the  Ego  and 
non-Ego.  The  first  of  these  developed  into  the  system  of  sub- 
jective idealism,  the  second  into  that  of  objective  idealism. 
Germany  was  the  chief  arena  of  these  speculations.  It  will  be 
seen  that  in  this  epoch  the  evolution  of  philosophy  presents 
the  three  results:  1st.  Transcendental  Idealism ;  2d.  Subjective 
Idealism;  3d.  Objective  Idealism,  one  form  of  which  is  the  doctrine 
of  absolute  Identity. 

Emmanuel  Kant  has  been  considered,  by  some  not  incom- 
petent judges,  the  most  profound  thinker  with  whom  the  history 
of  the  human  mind  has  acquainted  us.  Intelligent  men  who  are 
not  his  disciples  yet  acknowledge  him  to  be  one  of  the  greatest 
and  most  influential  metaphysicians.  Of  Scotch  descent  on  his 
father's  side,  and  German  on  his  mother's,  he  largely  combined 
and  harmonized  the  best  traits  of  the  great  metaphysicians  of 

1  Zeller,  Geschichte  d.  deutsch.  Philosophic,  1873,  S12- 


74  PROLEGOMENA. 

both  nationalities.  He  was  thoroughly  educated,  and  early  dis- 
played remarkable  powers.  He  began  at  the  age  of  thirty  to 
teach  philosophy  and  mathematics  in  the  university  of  his  native 
place.  Originally  his  philosophical  teachings  were  in  accordance, 
in  the  main,  with  those  of  his  immediate  predecessors,  who  were 
disciples  of  Wolff,  the  systematizer  of  Leibnitz.  It  was  the 
writings  of  Hume  which  first  awakened  him  to  the  defects  of  the 
shallow  dogmatism  into  which  the  system  of  Wolff  had  run. 
Hume's  denial  of  all  universal  and  necessary  cognition,  because 
none  such  is  furnished  by  experience,  and  none,  therefore,  can 
have  objective  reality,  aroused  Kant  to  the  refutation  of  Hume, 
and  led  him  to  subject  the  entire  faculty  of  cognition  to  a  critical 
examination.     He  proposed  to  himself  three  questions  : 

ist.  What  am  I  able  to  know? 

2d.  What  ought  I  to  do  ? 

3d.  What  may  I  hope  for? 

The  first  of  these  raises  the  metaphysical  question;  the  second, 
the  ethical;  the  third,  the  religious. 

He  maintains  that  these  questions  cannot  be  answered  except 
by  showing,  by  critical  process,  that  reason,  taken  universally,  is 
the  faculty  of  cognition  a  priori.  To  perform  this  work  he  pro- 
posed to  treat  of  three  great  departments : 

ist.  To  present  a  critique  of  pure  theoretic  reason  or  of  tran- 
scendental reason, — that  is,  of  a  reason  which  transcends  and  goes 
above  mere  empirical  experience.1 

2d.  The  critique  of  practical  reason.2 

3d.  The  critique  of  judgment.3 

Under  the  critique  of  pure  reasoning  Kant  discusses — 

A.  The  nature  of  our  cognition. 

B.  The  divisions  of  the  cognitive  faculty. 

C.  The  inferences  from  the  critique  of  pure  reasoning. 

A.  (a.)  Of  the  nature  of  our  cognition.  All  our  cognition  is  either 
pure,  i.e.  a  priori,  or  is  empirical,  i.e.  a  posteriori.     The  pure  or 

1  Kritik  der  reinen  Vernunft.  1781.     2d  edit.,  1787. 
3  Kritik  der  praktischen  Vernunft,  1788. 
3  Kritik  der  Urtheilskraft,  1793. 
Werke:  1.  Rosenkranz  u.  Schubart,  Leipzig,  1838-1842.     12  vols. 

2.  Hartenstein,  1838,  1839.     10  vols.     New  edit.,  8  vols.,  1867-1869. 

3.  Von  Kirchmann  (Philosoph.  Bibliothek),  1868,  seq. 


IX.— CRITICAL    IDEALISM:    KANT.  y$ 

a  priori  cognition  grasps  what  is  necessary  and  universal.  Of 
this  nature  is  mathematical  cognition ;  as,  for  example,  that  all 
the  radii  of  a  circle  are  equal.  The  empirical  or  a  posteriori 
cognition  lays  hold  of  something  which  is  single,  for — 

(b.)  The  judgments  which  involve  cognitions  are  either  analytic 
or  synthetic.  Analytic  judgments  are  those  in  which  the  predi- 
cate is  involved  in  the  concept  of  the  subject:  e.g.  a  circle  is 
round.  The  synthetic  judgments  are  those  in  which  the  predi- 
cate is  not  contained  in  the  concept  of  the  subject:  e.g.  bodies 
are  heavy. 

(e.)  Analytic  judgments  as  such  are  also  a  priori  judgments, 
inasmuch  as  they  enounce  something  universal  and  necessary; 
but  synthetic  judgments  are  partly  a  posteriori,  partly  a  priori: 
a  posteriori  in  as  far  as  we  know  by  experience  that  the  predi- 
cate agrees  with  the  subject,  and  a  priori  in  as  far  as  they  are 
universal. 

(d.)  Inasmuch  as  synthetic  judgments  meet  us  in  all  theoretical 
sciences,  and  as  we  cannot  learn  their  universality  by  experience, 
the  question  arises  how  synthetic  judgments  are  possible  a 
priori  ? 

(<?.)  In  answering  this  question,  Kant  reasons  in  the  following 
manner:  Synthetic  judgments  a  priori  do  not  wholly  come 
from  the  object  or  from  experience,  therefore  at  the  very  least 
they  must  come  in  part  from  the  subject, — the  thinking  mind. 
Hence  he  teaches  that  our  cognitions  consist  as  it  were  of  two 
elements,  one  of  which  pertains  to  the  sense,  and  the  other  to 
the  understanding.  That  which  pertains  to  the  sense  he  called 
the  matter  or  material  of  our  cognitions,  and  that  which  pertains 
to  the  understanding  he  called  the  form  of  our  cognitions.  The 
forms,  therefore,  are  that  something  in  the  mind  through  which 
it  conceives,  in  a  certain  determinate  mode,  the  matter  furnished 
through  the  senses. 

B.  In  order  to  detect  what  are  those  mental  forms,  Kant  sub- 
jected the  cognitive  faculty  of  the  human  mind  to  an  analysis 
which  produced  these  results  : — 

The  whole  cognitive  faculty  consists  of 

(a.)  The  sensitive  faculty  (Sinnlichkeit). 

(b.)  The  understanding  (Verstand). 


76  PROLEGOMENA. 

(c.)  The  reason  (Vernunft). 

The  first  of  these  is  a  power  purely  passive — a  receptivity  of 
impressions.  The  two  latter  are  active  power  involving  spon- 
taneity. 

(a.)  The  sensitive  faculty  (sensualitas)  embraces  both  internal 
and  external  experience.  Its  object  is  that  outside  of  us  and 
that  within  us,  of  which  we  have  experience.  It  receives  im- 
pressions, representations,  of  objects,  which  representations  the 
mind  looks  upon,  has  intuitions  of.  Hence  Kant  calls  the  repre- 
sentations which  are  afforded  by  the  sensitive  faculty 'intuitions' 
(Anschauungen).  In  these  intuitions  we  must  distinguish  between 
the  material  and  the  form.  The  material  is  that  which  is  supplied 
by  the  sense  or  sensitive  faculty;  but  the  mind  in  its  intuition  of 
this,  its  looking  on  this,  is  bound  by  certain  necessary  conditions; 
for  we  see  that  the  mind  is  not  able  to  have  intuition  of  the 
objects  furnished  by  the  sense,  except — ist,  as  outside  of  the  mind 
itself,  i.e.  as  posited  in  space ;  or,  2d,  as  successive,  i.e.  in  time ; 
or,  3d,  as  both  in  time  and  space.  Hence  space  and  time  are 
necessary  conditions  of  all  sensitive  intuition.  Space  is  a  form  of 
the  external  sense ;  time  is  a  form  of  both  external  and  internal 
sense.  Now  these  forms  are  not  (ist)  empirical,  i.e.  derived  from 
the  object,  although  they  are  prerequisites  to  all  empirical  in- 
tuition. Nor  are  they  (2d)  abstract,  because  to  the  perception 
of  time  or  space  particular  individual  objects  are  already  pre- 
supposed. Hence  they  are  (3d)  'a  priori'  or  'transcendental,' 
i.e.  transcending  all  experience,  for  even  though  I  should  think 
that  there  were  no  sensible  objects,  yet  I  cannot  think  of  there 
being  no  time  or  space;  therefore  space  and  time  are  forms  or 
necessary  conditions  of  the  sensitive  faculty. 

(d.)  The  understanding  (intellectus)  conjoins  the  intuitions  of 
the  sensitive  faculty  into  the  unity  of  consciousness,  and  thus 
forms  conceptions  (i.e.  implicit  judgments)  and  judgments  proper: 
for  intuition  is  not  identical  with  conception.  For  example,  when 
we  look  at  a  house  we  receive  various  impressions  from  various 
parts  of  the  object,  but  we  do  not  properly  have  the  conception 
of  a  house  until  the  understanding  unites  the  various  intuitions 
of  those  impressions  into  unity  of  consciousness.  Intuitions, 
therefore,  are  the  material  of  concepts,  and   concepts  are  the 


IX.— CRITICAL    IDEALISM:    KANT.  77 

material  of  judgments.  But  in  addition  to  the  material  of  judg- 
ments the  forms  are  also  necessary,  which  by  being  applied  to 
the  material  properly  constitute  the  judgment  strictly  so  called. 

What  then  are  the  forms  of  the  understanding  which  are 
necessary  to  form  the  judgment  strictly  so  called?  From  an 
analysis  of  all  our  judgments  Kant  reached  the  conclusion  that 
all  our  judgments  are  to  be  referred  to  either  (1st)  quantity,  or 
(2d)  to  quality,  or  (3d)  to  relation,  or  (4th)  to  modality. 

1st.  To  quantity.  Whatever  we  conceive  of,  we  conceive  of 
either  as  one  or  many  or  all,  so  that  every  judgment  of  ours  is 
either  singular  as  referring  to  one,  or  particular  in  respect  to  many, 
or  universal  as  joining  the  whole. 

2d.  As  to  quality.  Every  human  judgment  is  either  (1st) 
affirmative,  or  (2d)  negative,  or  (3d)  indeterminate  or  indefinite. 
An  indefinite  judgment  is  one  in  which  the  negation  does  not 
affect  the  copula,  but  either  the  predicate  or  subject. 

3d.  Relation.  In  every  judgment  the  predicate  is  attributed 
to  the  subject  either  absolutely  or  hypothetically,  or  in  such  a 
way  as  not  to  indicate  what  predicate  is  attributed  :  e.g.  a  body  is 
either  liquid  or  solid.  Hence  every  judgment  is  either  catego- 
rical, corresponding  with  absoluteness,  or  hypothetical,  corre- 
sponding with  the  hypothetical,  or  disjunctive,  corresponding 
with  the  indefinite. 

Finally,  4th.  Modality.  For  the  judgment  is  either  problem- 
atic, or  assertory,  or  necessary,  or,  as  it  is  sometimes  called, 
apodeictic.  Take  this  statement,  '  If  a  body  be  heavy,  if  the  sup- 
port be  removed  it  will  fall :  but  a  body  is  heavy ;  therefore,  the 
support  being  taken  away,  it  will  fall'  Then  the  major  is  a 
problematic  judgment,  because  in  it  weight  and  gravity  are 
regarded  only  as  possible ;  the  second  is  assertory ;  the  third  or 
conclusion  is  necessary  or  apodeictic.  Hence  the  forms,  or,  as 
Kant  calls  them,  the  categories,  of  the  understanding  are : 

1st.  Quantity;  under  which  are  Unity,  Plurality,  and  Totality. 

2d.  Quality;  under  which  are  Reality,  Negation,  and  Limita- 
tion. 

3d.  Relation ;  under  which  are  Substance,  Causality,  Simul- 
taneity (otherwise  characterized  as  action  or  reaction,  or  recip- 
rocity and  reciprocation). 


78  PRO  LEGO  ME  NA. 

4th.  Modality;  under  which  are  Possibility,  Existence,  Necessity. 

Everyone  of  our  judgments  is  necessarily  conditioned  in  some 
way  by  these  four  forms.  Thus  the  judgment  'Bodies  are 
heavy,'  according  to  the  1st  form,  is  universal;  2d,  as  to 
quality,  it  is  affirmative;  according  to  relation  the  judgment 
is  categorical.  According  to  modality  it  is  assertory.  Hence 
the  understanding,  that  it  may  be  able  to  judge,  and  even 
that  it  may  be  able  to  conceive,  has  of  necessity  implanted 
or  innate  in  it  those  forms  as  laws  without  which  it  is  impossi- 
ble to  form  a  judgment  or  even  a  conception.  But  these  forms, 
in  virtue  of  the  fact  that  they  are  transcendental  or  univer- 
sally applicable  to  objects  of  every  kind,  cannot  be  empirical, 
i.e.  drawn  from  experience,  but  on  the  contrary  are  prerequisite, 
in  order  that  the  understanding,  out  of  the  material  furnished  by 
the  sense,  may  form  a  concept  and  judgment;  hence  they  are 
forms  inherent  in  the  mind  a  priori.  They  are  purely  subjective, 
and,  considered  in  themselves,  void  of  all  objectivity. 

(c.)  Reason  (ratio),  as  it  is  a  faculty  of  arguing  and  inferring, — 
a  faculty  of  ratiocination, — in  its  own  nature  tends,  by  the  con- 
junction of  judgments  in  the  process  of  reasoning,  to  rise  from 
the  conditioned  to  the  absolute.  Every  process  of  reasoning  is 
so  constituted  as  that  the  premises  contain  the  condition  which 
involves  and  necessitates  the  conclusion;  hence  it  follows  that 
such  premises  as  are  themselves  conditioned  are  also  conclusions 
to  other  premises ;  hence  it  is  the  function  of  reason,  by  its 
own  proper  processes, — i.e.  rational  processes, — to  seek  premises 
which  are  an  absolute  condition, — i.e.  which  do  not  involve  or 
presuppose  another  condition. 

There  are  three  species  of  reasoning  (ratiocinorum) :  1st, 
Categorical;    2d,  Hypothetical;    3d,  Disjunctive. 

1st.  The  Categorical  or  Absolute  is  in  accordance  with  the  prin- 
ciple of  inherence,  and  takes  place  when  the  understanding  sup- 
plies the  reason  with  judgments  in  which  the  predicate  is  conceived 
of  as  inhering  in  the  subject. 

2d.  The  Hypothetical  is  in  accordance  with  the  principle  of 
causality,  when  the  predicate  is  conceived  of  as  agreeing  with  the 
subject  under  some  particular  condition. 

3d.   The  Disjunctive  is  in  accordance  with  the  principle  of  com- 


IX.— CRITICAL    IDEALISM:    KANT. 


79 


munity,  or  mutual  dependence,  when  either  one  of  the  predicates 
is  conceived  as  agreeing  with  the  subject  so  as  that  the  predicate 
is  considered  as  a  part  of  some  particular  whole  or  totality. 
Hence,  reason,  through  the  medium  of  categorical  processes  of 
ratiocination,  reaches  to  the  idea  of  the  absolute  subject  which  is 
not  the  predicate  of  another  subject.  By  the  medium  of  hypo- 
thetical ratiocination  it  reaches  the  idea  of  the  absolute  cause 
which  is  not  caused  by  another  cause.  By  the  medium  of  the 
disjunctive  it  reaches  the  idea  of  absolute  totality,  which  cannot 
be  a  part  of  another  totality.  Hence,  the  reason  has  three 
ideas : 

1st,  of  Absolute  Being ;  2d,  of  Ultimate  Principle  ;  3d,  of  Abso- 
lute Totality. 

1st.  Absolute  Being,  when  it  considers  it  as  objective,  lays  the 
basis  of  Ontology;  when  it  is  subjective,  it  lays  the  basis  of 
Rational  Psychology. 

2d.  The  Ultimate  Principle  of  all  Essence  or  Being — i.e.  God 
— lays  the  foundation  of  Rational  Theology. 

3d.  The  idea  of  Absolute  Totality — i.e.  of  the  universe — fur- 
nishes the  object  or  lays  the  foundation  of  rational  cosmology, 
and  these  three  are  the  elements  of  all  metaphysic. 

But  these  ideas,  although  they  have  a  regulative  validity, — i.e. 
give  law  to  our  own  thoughts, — furnish  nothing  objectively;  for 

C.  The  Critique  of  Pure  Reasoning  teaches  that  all  cognition 
arises  by  means  of  impressions  made  by  the  objects  on  the  sense 
or  sensitive  faculty.  So  that  this  sense  or  sensitive  faculty  adds 
at  the  same  from  itself  the  form  either  of  space  or  of  time,  or  of 
both,  in  order  that  it  may  have  a  representation.  [This  follows 
from  B  a.~] 

(a.)  Hence  the  concepts  of  the  understanding  concerning 
objects  of  which  there  can  be  no  experience  have  no  objective 
reality,  but  are  mere  forms  of  the  mind.  For  the  understanding 
forms  these  concepts  from  the  representations  given  by  the  sen- 
sitive faculty.  [This  follows  from  B  &]  But  there  are  no  repre- 
sentations objectively,  without  experience ;  therefore  the  concepts 
also  are  nothing  objectively  without  experience. 

(b.)  Of  the  objects,  also,  of  which  we  have  experience, — of 
quantity,  quality,  and  relation  or  modality, — we  know  nothing 


80  PRO  LEGO  MEN  A. 

objectively  real ;  for  these,  as  forms  of  the  understanding,  are 
added  by  the  subject  to  the  intuition  of  the  object,  but  are  not 
known  to  be  really  in  the  object. 

(c.)  Hence,  also,  the  ideas  of  pure  reason,  as  something  con- 
cerning which  no  experience  is  possible,  are  not  objectively  real; 
at  least,  are  not  certainly  demonstrable  as  such.  Hence  only 
those  things  are  known  by  us  as  objectively  real  which  are 
offered  to  our  experience,  and  these  themselves  are  to  us  =  ;tr, — 
i.e.  to  an  unknown  quantity,  of  which  we  know  nothing  except 
that  it  exists.  For  of  an  object  devoid  of  the  forms  of  the  sen- 
sitive faculty  and  the  understanding  we  know  nothing,  except 
its  existence.  But  those  forms  are  not  in  the  object,  but  are 
added  to  the  subject;  so  that  every  cognition  objectively  real  in- 
volves the  coalescence,  as  it  were,  of  a  twofold  element,  the  one 
element  empirical,  or  a  posteriori,  the  other  formal,  or  a  priori, 
which  comes  from  the  understanding.  Hence,  to  the  question 
how  synthetic  judgments  are  possible  a  priori,  the  answer  must 
be  given  that  the  reason  can  reach  no  synthetic  judgment  with 
apodeictic  or  absolute  certainty,  inasmuch  as  the  predicate  not 
involved  within  the  idea  itself  is,  without  foundation,  attributed 
to  the  object  itself  as  something  in  it,  when,  in  fact,  it  is  added 
by  the  mind  itself,  the  mind  necessarily  operating  under  forms 
innate  to  it.  Therefore  we  know  nothing  concerning  the  exten- 
sion, figure,  and  other  attributes  even  of  the  objects  which  are 
perceived  by  the  sensitive  faculty,  because  they  are  mere  forms 
furnished  by  the  sensitive  faculty;  nor  can  we  know  anything  of 
the  substance,  reality,  or  other  qualities  of  the  same  objects,  be- 
cause these  are  mere  forms  of  the  understanding ;  much  less  are 
we  able  to  draw  any  conclusion  concerning  liberty,  the  immor- 
tality of  the  soul,  and  the  existence  of  God,  concerning  which 
no  experience  is  absolutely  possible.  Hence  the  arguments  for 
and  against  these  truths  have  no  objective  reality,  but  are  a  mere 
play  of  the  mind,  and  are  antinomies — i.e.  self-contradictions — 
which  seem  supported  by  reason.  Hence,  metaphysics  proper, 
or  the  cognition  objectively  real  of  things  not  subject  to  the 
senses  and  of  universals,  is  impossible. 

If  the  philosophy  of  Kant  had  stopped  here,  it  would  have 
seemed  to  have  had  a  most  impotent  conclusion.     Kant  himself 


IX.— CRITICAL    IDEALISM:    KANT.  8 1 

clearly  perceived  this,  and,  that  he  might  avoid  a  result  from 
which  he  shrank,  endeavoured  to  build  up  with  one  hand  the 
edifice  which  he  had  overthrown  with  the  other.  His  Critique 
of  Practical  Reason  has  been  called  the  life-boat  which  he  threw 
out  to  save  the  victims  of  the  wreck  of  the  Critique  of  Pure 
Reason.  He  distinguishes  in  man  the  practical  reason  from  the 
theoretic  reason ;  he  says  that  man  is  not  merely  a  rational 
being,  having  cognition  by  theoretic  reasoning,  but  also  a  moral 
being,  directed  in  his  actions  by  practical  reasoning.  In  the  de- 
velopment of  this  consists  the  second  part  of  Kant's  system. 

II.  Critique  of  Practical  Reason.  This  has  been  defined  by 
others  as  reason  operating  in  the  sphere  of  ethics,  as  the  prac- 
tico-legislative  reason.  Kant  himself  states  the  point  involved 
thus:  'Theoretic  reason  has  as  its  object  this  question,  What  am 
I  able  to  know  ?  Practical  reason  has  this  question,  What  is  it 
my  duty  to  do?  and  What  is  it  lawful  for  me  to  hope?  And  as 
reason  in  general  by  the  very  law  of  its  nature  seeks  unity,  the 
practical  reason  also  here  seeks  some  absolute  principle.'  Now 
just  as  it  is  in  theoretical  principles,  so  also  is  it  in  practical 
principles,  i.e.  in  the  things  that  influence  and  determine  the  will: 
we  are  to  distinguish  between  two  elements, —  1st,  the  material 
element,  and  2d,  the  formal  element.  1st.  The  material  element 
is  everything  which  acts  empirically  on  the  sensitive  faculty  and 
affects  the  will  through  the  medium  of  the  emotions  and  passions. 
2d.  The  formal  element  is  that  which  is  referred,  not  to  the 
sensitive  faculty,  but  to  reason.  Hence  the  material  element,  as 
that  which  has  its  foundation  in  self-love,  and  hence  is  always 
something  merely  subjective,  is  not  universal  nor  absolutely 
necessary.  Hence  it  cannot  constitute  the  absolute  principle  of 
morality.  Hence  it  follows  that  only  (2d)  the  formal  element, 
as  that  which  withdraws  itself  from  every  object  of  sensitive 
appetite  or  desire,  and  prescribes  only  that  to  which,  by  the 
power  of  his  reason,  every  rational  being  is  absolutely  bound, 
can  supply  the  absolute  principle  of  morality.  That  principle  thus 
supplied  is  this :  So  act  that  the  rule  of  thy  will  might  be  the 
principle  of  universal  law.  This  principle  manifests  itself  to  man 
through  his  moral  consciousness,  i.e.  his  conscience  (and  con- 
science through  experience),  in  what  Kant  calls  the  form  of  the 

6 


82  PROLEGOMENA. 

'Categorical  Imperative' — imperative,  i.e.  giving  command;  cate- 
gorical, that  is,  absolute.  By  'Categorical  Imperative'  he  means 
the  absolute  prescription  of  reason  through  consciousness  or  con- 
science; it  is  categorical  or  absolute,  because  without  exception 
it  prescribes  the  doing  of  good  for  its  own  sake,  without  any  regard 
to  the  material  motive.  Hence  that  alone  is  to  be  considered  pure 
virtue  which  is  to  be  determined  autonomically  by  the  moral 
law,  that  which  is  not  only  conformed  to  the  moral  law,  but 
which  is  moved  only  by  love  of  the  moral  law,  and  without  any 
extrinsic  motive;  since  otherwise  the  will  never  would  be  pure, 
but  always  affected  by  the  passions  [pathologically]. 

But  this  principle  involves  three  subordinate  principles,  three 
theoretic  principles  as  postulates,  i.e.  as  truths  whose  objective 
reality  cannot  be  theoretically  proved,  to  wit:  1st,  the  postulate 
of  Liberty;  2d,  the  postulate  of  the  Immortality  of  the  Soul;  3d, 
the  postulate  of  the  existence  of  God.  Without  these  the  absolute 
principle  of  ethics  cannot  be  conceived.  For  1st,  that  principle 
commands  us  to  do  good  solely  from  love  of  the  law ;  but  this 
cannot  be  done  without  liberty, — freedom  of  the  will;  for  without 
liberty,  a  self-determining  freedom  of  will,  man  cannot  be  deter- 
mined in  his  actions,  except  by  some  principle  which  is  extrinsic 
and  is  operative  in  the  sensitive  faculty.  Hence  the  principle  of 
ethics  involves  the  liberty  of  man.  2d.  This  principle  commands 
man  that  he  should  establish  a  perfect  harmony  between  his  pur- 
poses and  the  moral  law,  in  which  harmony,  holiness,  or  ideal 
virtue,  consists.  Hence  man  ought  constantly  to  tend  to  this 
ideal;  but  that  ideal,  inasmuch  as  he  is  subject  to  the  influence  of 
the  sensitive  faculty  which  draws  him  back  from  virtue,  he  is 
not  able  completely  to  attain.  Hence  he  ought  to  approach  it 
continually  by  a  progress  which  never  ceases,  and  which  is 
unlimited;  but  this  he  cannot  do  unless  his  soul  be  immortal. 
Hence  this  principle  of  absolute  morality  involves  the  immor- 
tality of  the  soul.  3d.  Virtue  is  man's  supreme  end;  for  if  happi- 
ness were  his  supreme  end,  liberty  would  not  be  necessary  to  it, 
but  instinct  would  be  sufficient.  Nevertheless  man  has  an  in- 
vincible desire  of  happiness,  but  he  is  not  able  to  establish  a 
harmony  between  virtue  and  happiness  ;  because,  though  he  is  free 
relatively  to  virtue,  yet  relatively  to  happiness  he  is  dependent 


IX.— CRITICAL    IDEALISM:    KANT.  83 

on  nature,  which  itself  does  not  in  fact  establish  this  harmony ; 
hence  the  completion,  the  consummation  of  this  harmony  sup- 
poses a  Being  independent  of  nature, — a  Being  who  can  produce 
this  harmony  and  wills  to  produce  it,  and  must  consequently  be 
endowed  with  understanding  and  will;  but  such  a  being  is  God. 
The  absolute  principle  of  morality  involves  the  existence  of  God. 

Practical  reason  involves  these  three  postulates;  but  these 
postulates  are  objectively  real,  for  the  practical  reasoning,  de- 
termining to  action,  commands  effects  which  are  objectively  real. 
But  it  is  absurd  to  suppose  that  real  effects  are  produced  by 
unreal  principles:  if  the  effects  are  objectively  real  the  principles 
must  be  objectively  real. 

III.  Critique  of  the  Judgment.  Theoretical  reason  and  practical 
reason  present  laws  opposite  in  character  to  each  other.  The 
theoretical  reason  supplies  the  laws  of  nature  or  necessity,  the 
practical  reason  supplies  the  laws  of  liberty.  These  two  classes 
of  laws  would  forever  have  remained  separated,  if  man  did  not 
possess  the  faculty  of  judging,  or  judgment.  (This  term  'judg- 
ment,' it  will  at  once  be  seen,  is  used  by  Kant  in  a  sense  peculiar 
to  his  system.)  That  faculty,  judgment,  applies  the  laws  of 
liberty  to  nature  in  accordance  with  the  principles  of  agreement 
of  means  with  an  end ;  of  the  agreement  which  exists  in  the 
actions  of  free  beings,  and  which  we  ought  necessarily  also  to 
transfer  to  the  acts  of  nature  in  order  to  make  it  possible  to  con- 
ceive of  a  union  of  nature  with  liberty,  which  liberty  operates 
in  nature  and  through  it.  This  principle  of  judgment,  however, 
by  no  means  teaches  what  the  laws  of  nature  are  in  themselves, 
or  objectively,  but  simply  supplies  a  subjective  rule,  which  shows 
in  what  way  we  should  reason  concerning  the  things  of  nature. 

The  judgment  has  two  modes, — the  aesthetic  and  the  teleolo- 
gic.  The  judgment  is  aesthetic  when  it  considers  an  agreement 
of  means  with  their  end  in  the  forms  of  things  in  such  a  way  as 
to  produce  the  sense  of  pleasure.  The  judgment  is  teleologic 
when  it  considers  this  agreement  in  a  purely  logical  respect,  i.e. 
simply  with  reference  to  obtaining  a  knowledge  of  things,  without 
having  any  regard  to  the  pleasures  of  feeling  or  of  sense. 

Hence  the  critique  of  the  aesthetic  judgment  is  a  theory  of  the 
beautiful  and  the  sublime,  both  of  which  are  merely  subjective. 


84  PRO  LEGO  MEN  A. 

The  beautiful  involves  a  consciousness  of  power  possessed  by  the 
imagination,  representing  a  great  variety  of  things  which  can  be 
easily  reduced  to  one  conception  of  the  understanding;  hence  it 
is  a  sense  of  the  agreement  of  those  faculties  with  each  other,  and, 
as  this  involves  a  sense  of  our  power,  it  is  conjoined  with  satis- 
faction. The  sublime,  on  the  contrary,  involves  a  consciousness 
of  lack  of  power,  of  inability  to  grasp  through  the  imagination 
the  ideas  presented  by  the  reason.  This  feeling  of  discord  and 
difference  between  these  faculties  is,  on  the  one  side,  attended  by 
an  emotion  of  sadness,  because  it  reminds  us  of  our  weakness ; 
on  the  other  hand  it  exalts  us,  because  through  our  reason  we 
perceive  that  we  are  superior  to  the  things  of  sense,  however  great 
they  may  be. 

The  critique  of  the  teleologic  judgment  comprehends  the 
theory  of  nature, — a  theory  which,  by  applying  the  principle  of 
final  causes  or  of  the  relation  of  means  to  an  end,  not  to  the 
forms  of  things,  but  to  their  constitution  or  nature,  looks  upon 
entities  as  organized  to  attain  the  special  end  of  each,  and,  re- 
garding those  special  ends  as  subordinate  to  some  supreme  and 
universal  end,  thus  reaches  the  religious  ideas  whose  objective 
reality  is  shown  by  the  practical  reason. 

Carrying  out  these  principles,  Kant  wrote  a  number  of  works, 
especially  on  ethics  and  jus,  on  anthropology  and  the  doctrine  of 
religion  as  within  the  bounds  of  pure  reason,  in  which  the  tran- 
scendental idealism  of  his  Critique  is  carried  through.1  It  has  been 
said  that  there  is  a  parallel  between  Descartes  and  Kant  in  their 
inability  to  connect  their  philosophical  results  with  their  philo- 
sophical principles.  Descartes  began  with  consciousness  as  the 
sole  source  of  knowledge  proper,  but  went  out  from  this  position 
to  attempt  to  establish  the  objective  reality  of  God  by  means  of  the 
notion  of  God  reached  through  the  speculations  of  reason.  In 
a  similar  manner  Kant,  it  is  said,  first  destroys  the  entire  relations 
of  our  speculations  with  external  reality,  and  confines  himself  to 
the  sphere  of  purely  subjective  ideas,  out  of  which  he  attempts  in 
vain  to  break  in  his  Critique  of  the  Practical  Reason.     For  in 

"  Die  Religion  innerhalb  der  Graenzen  der  reinen  Vernunft,  1793.  Metaphysische  An- 
fangsgriinde  der  Rechtslehre  der  Tugendlehre  ;  and  under  the  common  title,  Metaphysik 
der  Sitten.     Anthropologic  in  pragmatischer  Hinsicht. 


IX.— CRITICAL    IDEALISM:    KANT.  85 

attributing  a  validity  to  the  practical  reason  which  he  denies  to 
the  theoretical  reason,  he  falls  into  a  manifest  self-contradiction, 
inasmuch  as  the  practical  reason  necessarily  rests  upon  the  ideas 
furnished  by  the  theoretic  reason.  If  I  cannot  trust  my  in- 
tellectual convictions,  why  should  I  trust  my  moral  convictions  ? 
If  my  mind  is  forced  to  work  under  laws  which  may  have  no 
validity  to  other  beings  than  man,  why  may  not  my  moral  sense 
be  equally  subject  to  forms  which  are  not  valid  objectively?  The 
innate  moral  conviction  of  duty  is  not  stronger  than  the  innate 
intellectual  conviction  that  there  is  an  objective  world  of  sub- 
stance, and  if  our  conviction  of  the  reliableness  of  the  one  set 
of  impressions  is  removed  we  shall  find  it  hard  to  rest  in  the 
certainty  of  the  other.  Kant's  distinction  between  the  theoretic 
and  the  practical  reason  is  really  very  much  of  a  piece  with  the 
old  scholastic  system  which  allowed  that  a  thing  might  be  philo- 
sophically false  and  theologically  true.  If  the  practical  reason 
is  valid  for  proof  of  what  Kant  admits  that  it  proves,  it  is  fairly 
retrospective,  and  holds  good  also  as  a  proof  of  the  objective 
reality  of  those  things  which  the  pure  reason  instinctively  accepts 
as  real.  The  ultimate  consequence  drawn  from  the  doctrine  of 
Kant  is  that  we  do  not  know  things  as  they  are  in  themselves, 
but  as  they  appear  to  us  in  accordance  with  the  constitution  of 
our  minds ;  that  consequently  our  cognition  is  confined  within 
the  sphere  of  experience ;  and  this  cognition  itself  Kant  asserts 
(illogically)  to  be  objectively  real.  The  logic  of  Kant's  system 
undoubtedly  demonstrates  that  things  which  are  not  the  objects 
of  sense  are  not  the  objects  of  science  or  knowledge,  but  of  faith. 
Hence  as  a  speculative  system  the  critique  of  Kant  is  properly 
styled  'transcendental  idealism,'  inasmuch  as  it  teaches  that  every- 
thing which  transcends  experience,  or  anything  as  far  as  it  tran- 
scends experience,  is  merely  subjectively  ideal. 

It  is  acknowledged,  however,  by  those  who  have  least  sym- 
pathy with  his  system  that  it  is  one  of  consummate  ability,  and 
that  many  of  its  processes  and  results  are  of  the  highest  value. 
Kant  has  left  an  impress  on  the  thinking  of  the  world  which 
will  abide  while  the  world  stands;  no  system  of  the  future, 
properly  philosophical,  can  entirely  avoid  being  in  some  measure 
a  development  of  Kant's  views  or  an  antagonistic  force  to  them. 


86  PROLEGOMENA. 

The  philosophical  systems  of  Germany,  France,  and  England 
since  Kant  have  all  revealed  his  influence.  The  speculations 
of  Kant  have  confessedly  settled  one  great  point,  to  wit,  that  all 
cognition,  although  it  begins  with  experience,  does  not  arise  from 
experience  alone,  but  that  in  addition  to  the  empirical  element  it 
is  requisite  there  should  be  also  an  intellectual  element,  in  order 
to  the  existence  of  true  cognition. 

The  doctrine  of  Kant  was  confessedly  understood  at  the  begin- 
ning by  very  few;  it  was  neither  understood,  nor  misunderstood, 
in  the  same  way.  Winning  its  way  to  attention  very  slowly,  it 
finally  attracted  universal  notice.  No  system  has  been  more 
earnestly  praised  or  more  completely  condemned.  Apart  from 
its  matter,  its  method  and  style  were  objects  of  complaint.  Its 
terminology  was  objected  to  as  unnecessarily  abstract  and  ob- 
scure. Herder,  who  greatly  admired  Kant,  nevertheless  wrote 
his  Metacritica  to  show  that  the  Critique  of  Pure  Reason  is  a 
thing  of  mist,  of  chaos,  of  confusion.1 

X.  Subjective    Idealism:  Fichte. 

Subjective  Idealism,  the  system  of  Fichte  (1762-18 14),  the 
identity  of  thinking  and  being,  of  the  subjective  and  objective  in 
the  Ego.  The  completely  unknown  'thing  in  itself,'  of  Kant,  is 
thrown  aside,  the  sole  source  of  cognition  and  of  being  is  the 
subject,  the  mind :  the  Ego  posits  itself  and  the  non-Ego.  The 
'  most  absolute'  principle  is,  the  Ego  is  equal  to  the  Ego,  A  =  A. 

From  this  follows  that  the  non-Ego  is  not  equal  to  the  Ego,  and 
that  the  Ego  is  not  equal  to  the  non-Ego ;  but  the  Ego  is  equal  to 
the  non-Ego,  and  the  non-Ego  is  equal  to  the  Ego.  The  thesis 
and  antithesis  are  reduced  in  the  synthesis.  The  Ego  posits  itself 
as  limited  by  the  non-Ego, and  thus  becomes  cognitive;  or  the  Ego 
posits  the  non-Ego  as  limited  by  the  Ego,  and  becomes  active. 

The  idealistic  character  underlying  Kant's  system  was  con- 
fessed in  two  ways  by  its  admirers.  Those  who  were  not  willing 
to  accept  idealism  endeavoured  to  strengthen  or  rather  to  mend 
the  system  at  this  point  of  weakness.  Those  who  were  not 
averse  to  idealism  soon  availed  themselves  of  the  results  of  the 
Kantian  philosophy.  In  the  former  class  may  be  mentioned 
•  Rothenflue,  Instltutiones.    Synopsis  Hlstorise  Philosophise,  1846,  iii.  276-290. 


X.—SUBJECTIVE    IDEALISM:    FICHTE.  87 

Karl  Leonhard  Reinhold.  In  his  work  on  the  Theory  of  the 
Representative  Faculty,1 — his  Elementary  Philosophy, — he  en- 
deavoured, from  the  very  concept  of  representation  itself,  to 
establish  the  objective  reality  of  things.  His  train  of  thought 
was  this:  Every  representation  includes  in  itself  the  representing 
subject,  the  represented  object,  and  the  act  of  representation; 
hence  the  represented  object  must  be  something  objectively  real. 
But  this  proof  was  of  no  value,  for  it  could  not  relieve  the  doubt 
whether  the  represented  object  is  founded  in  the  subject-mind,  or 
is  an  object  distinct  from  the  mind.  This  was  shown  so  forcibly 
by  Schulze  in  his  Aenesidemus  that  Reinhold  abandoned  his  own 
theory. 

Of  the  second  class  there  speedily  arose  writers  who  en- 
deavoured to  interpret  the  doubtful  and  to  develop  the  imperfect 
idealism  in  the  system. 

Beck,  professor  at  Halle,  showed  that  idealism  is  an  essential 
element  in  the  critical  philosophy:  for,  according  to  the  critical 
philosophy,  a  thing  in  itself  is  nothing  else  than  the  primitive 
synthesis  or  combination  of  all  that  is  determinate  pertaining  to 
the  essence  of  the  thing,  a  synthesis  formed  by  the  mind  itself.2 

Fichte's  Doctrine  of  Science  appeared  between  the  first  volume 
and  the  last  of  Beck.  In  this,  removing  from  the  system  of  Kant 
all  objective  reality,  he  substituted  for  that  system  a  pure  subjec- 
tivity. Hence  his  doctrine  is  styled  Subjective  Idealism.  It  has 
been  said  of  Fichte  that  '  his  life  stirs  us  like  a  trumpet.  He 
combines  the  penetration  of  the  philosopher  with  the  fire  of  a 
prophet  and  the  thunder  of  an  orator ;  and  over  all  his  life  lies 
the  beauty  of  a  stainless  purity.' 

He  conceived  of  philosophy  as  'the  science  of  science' — 'the 
knowledge  of  knowledge.'  One  of  his  chief  works  is  called  the 
'  Doctrine  of  Science,'  1795.  He  transformed  the  transcendental 
idealism  of  Kant  into  the  doctrine  of  absolute  subjectivity.  Kant 
had  endeavoured  to  avoid  absolute  idealism  by  granting  intuitions 

1  Versuch  einer  neuen  Theorie  der  menschlichen  Vorstellungsvermoegens. 

2  Einzig  moeglicher  Standpunkt,  aus  welchem  die  kritische  Philosophic  beurtheilt  werden 
muss,  1796.  The  first  two  volumes  of  the  Erlauternd.  Auszug  aus  den  kritischen  Schriften 
des  .  .  .  Kant,  of  which  this  is  the  third  volume,  appeared  in  1793.  Beck  showed  very 
easily  that  his  views  were  the  legitimate  consequence  of  Kant's,  but  he  failed  to  prove  that 
this  was  what  Kant  meant.     See  Zeller,  Gesch.  d.  deutsch.  Philosophic,  596. 


88  PRO  LEGO  MEN  A. 

of  the  sensitive  faculty  with  which  corresponded  real  objects  dis- 
tinct from  the  mind;  but  as  this  involved  logical  absurdity  on  the 
premises  of  Kant,  Fichte  pressed  his  principles  to  that  absolute 
idealism  which  seemed  to  follow  logically  from  them.  The 
notions  of  Pure  Reason,  or  universal  notions,  according  to  Kant, 
cannot  be  called  objectively  real,  moreover,  because  their  object- 
ive reality  cannot  be  proven;  but  it  is  equally  impossible  on 
Kant's  principles  to  demonstrate  the  objective  reality  of  the 
intuitions  of  the  sensitive  faculty, — hence  these  also  ought  to  be 
considered  as  mere  subjective  phenomena.  Reasoning  therefore 
logically  on  the  principles  of  Kant,  Fichte  maintains  that  all  real- 
ities are  nothing  but  creations  of  the  Ego,  and  that  all  existence 
is  nothing  but  thought  itself.1 

His  philosophy  may  be  reduced  very  briefly  to  these  divisions: 
i.  Philosophy  as  a  science  of  science  or  doctrine  of  science 
ought  of  necessity  to  proceed  from  a  supreme  principle  which  is 
per  se  certain. 

2.  But  there  is  no  principle  which  is  certain  per  se  except  one 
in  which  the  object  or  predicate  coincides  with  or  is  identified 
with  the  subject,  as,  for  example,  A  =  A. 

3.  Since,  however,  the  Ego  has  in  itself  both  the  A  which  it 
judges  to  be  =  A,  and  the  form  according  to  which  it  judges,  we 
may  substitute  for  the  principle  A  =  A  this,  the  Ego  =  the 
Ego. 

4.  But  this  principle,  by  positing  the  Ego,  judges.  But  to 
judge  is  to  act.  Hence  the  Ego  posits  itself  in  an  absolute  mode 
through  the  act  of  activity  or  of  spontaneity  essential  to  itself. 
For  the  Ego  is  reason  active  and  at  the  same  time  convinced  of 
its  own  activity.  [By  the  word  posit  Fichte  means  to  put  or 
place  to  the  consciousness, — to  make  that  which  is  posited 
become  a  fact  of  consciousness.] 

5.  But  to  the  Ego  is  equally  essential  reflection,  through  which 
it  acquires  self-consciousness,  consciousness  of  self. 

6.  But  the  possibility  of  reflection  is  founded  in  appulsc 
(Anstoss),  opposition,  antithesis,  contrast;  which  antithesis  cannot 
be  explained  by  theoretic  reason,  and  hence  is  postulated.     For 

»  Ueber  den  Begriff  der  Wissenschaftslehre.  Grundlage  der  gesammten  Wissensehafts- 
lehre. 


X.—SUBJECTIVE    IDEALISM:    EI  CUTE.  89 

through  this  alone  the  Ego  becomes  conscious  of  itself,  so  that 
it  first  posits  itself  as  subject,  and  then  opposes  to  itself  that 
appulse,  that  antithesis,  as  object. 

7.  Thus,  however,  the  Ego-Object  appears  in  a  certain  respect 
as  non-Ego  in  the  presence  of  the  Ego-Subject. 

8.  The  Ego  thus  determining  itself  through  the  non-Ego  limits 
its  own  activity,  and,  though  itself  primarily  absolute  and  infinite, 
becomes  or  renders  itself  finite  and  divisible. 

9.  To  wit :  the  Ego  positing  itself  as  determined  by  the  non- 
Ego  is  in  a  certain  sense  and  so  far  passive;  and  the  Ego 
positing  itself  as  the  determining  non-Ego  is  active ;  and  this 
mutual  action  and  reaction  between  the  Ego  and  the  non-Ego  is 
the  condition  of  all  representation  (Vorstellens).  This  represen- 
tation is  called  cogitation  or  thought  if  the  Ego  is  conceived  of 
as  active,  but  is  called  sensation  if  the  Ego  is  conceived  of  as 
passive. 

Reasoning  in  the  same  manner,  he  explains  the  other  faculties 
of  the  mind  or  the  Ego,  and  establishes  in  them  a  twofold  reality, 
— to  wit,  of  the  soul  and  of  the  outer  world,  as  also  of  liberty  and 
necessity. 

As  the  fundamental  positions  of  Fichte's  philosophy  seem  to 
have  peculiar  difficulties  to  English  readers,  we  will  present  them 
in  a  somewhat  different  manner,  following  the  luminous  exposition 
of  them  by  Scholten  : 

1.  The  Ego  or  the  subject  is  the  sole  spring  of  all  human 
cognition.  Philosophy  starts  from  the  Ego.  That  the  Ego  is,  is 
an  incontrovertible  fact  of  consciousness. 

2.  The  Ego  posits  itself  (Ego  =  Ego).  This  Ego  or  subject, 
in  conformity  with  the  ordinary  empirical  consciousness,  counter- 
posits  to  itself  an  object  as  non-Ego.     (Non-Ego  is  not  =  Ego.) 

3.  This  object  or  non-Ego  cannot,  however,  be  regarded  as  in 
truth  non-Ego  without  robbing  the  Ego  of  its  contents,  of  that 
which  is  involved  in  it,  and  thus  setting  aside  the  actual  being  of 
the  Ego  itself. 

4.  As  this  cannot  be  conceded,  inasmuch  as  the  being  of  the 
Ego  is  grounded  in  the  Ego  itself,  it  follows  that  the  non-Ego 
which  is  posited  by  the  Ego  as  object  is,  strictly  speaking,  nothing 
else  than  the  Ego  itself.     (Non-Ego  =  Ego.) 


9o 


PRO  LEG  0  ME  X  A. 


5.  The  contradiction  which  presents  itself  in  this  can  only  be 
solved  by  the  supposition  that  the  Ego  itself  posits  the  non- 
Ego. 

6.  That  the  Ego  posits  this  particular  non-Ego  in  each  case, 
and  not  another,  points  to  and  involves  a  necessary  though  in- 
explicable self-limitation  of  the  Ego,  whereby  equally,  on  the  one 
side,  the  Ego  is  determined  as  passive  by  the  non-Ego,  and,  con- 
versely, the  non-Ego  is  determined  as  active  power  by  the  Ego. 

7.  Hereby  then  the  external  world,  the  objective,  the  non-Ego, 
becomes  purely  idealistically  a  subjective  though  not  arbitrary 
product  of  the  Ego  or  thinking  subject.  The  non-Ego  not 
merely  as  Phenomenon,  but  also  as  Njfoumenon,  is  robbed  of  all 
reality  outside  of  the  Ego.  The  objective,  that  which  is  perceived 
in  the  forms  of  space  and  time,  has  no  existence  in  itself  inde- 
pendently of  the  Ego, — that  is,  of  the  thinking  subject. 

8.  This  Ego  is  not,  however,  even  in  the  first  period  of  the 
Fichtean  philosophy,  the  individual  empirical  Ego  of  one  partic- 
ular man,  but  the  personality  (the  Egoity,  Ichheit),  the  universal 
Ego  (the  pure  Ego).  .  .  .  Everything  which  in  the  ordinary  con- 
ception is  thought  of  as  object,  over  against  man  as  subject,  is  a 
self-revelation  or  self-objectivating,  not  of  his  Ego,  but  of  the 
universal  Ego,  or  of  the  universal  thinking,  which,  operating  in  all 
individuals  in  accordance  with  the  same  laws,  counter-posits  the 
same  non-Ego.1 

II.  1.  For,  if  the  intelligent  Ego  is  determined  by  the  non- 
Ego,  and  is  so  far  limited  and  in  some  measure  dependent,  the 
practical  Ego,  on  the  contrary,  is  absolute  and  free,  and  hence 
unlimited  and  the  only  true  reality. 

2.  The  practical  Ego  is  conjoined  with  the  intelligent  Ego 
because  the  former  is  related  to  the  latter  as  the  cause  is  related 
to  the  effect. 

3.  To  wit:  the  absolute  Ego,  as  free,  has  causality  which  re- 
veals itself  through  the  effort  of  actuating  itself  as  cause. 

4.  But  that  effort,  of  necessity,  has  a  certain  determinate  quan- 
tity of  activity,  because  it  always  exerts  itself  to  become  the 
cause  of  some  determinate  thing,  which,  as  determinate,  must  be 

*  Geschichte  der  Relig.  u.  Philosophic     Aus  dem  Hollandischen  v.  Redepenning,  1868, 

154,  155- 


X.— SUBJECTIVE    IDEALISM:    EI  CUTE.  91 

limited  :  hence  the  activity  of  the  Ego,  which  in  itself  and  in  its 
own  proper  force  is  infinite,  is  in  act  always  limited. 

5.  But  this  limitation  cannot  take  place  except  through  the 
counter-effort  or  resistance  by  which  it  comes  to  pass  that  the 
effort  of  the  Ego  is  thrown  back  upon  the  Ego  itself,  and  thus 
the  Ego  opposes  a  counter-effort  or  resistance  to  its  own  effort; 
from  which  arises  the  non-Ego,  by  which  Fichte  means  that 
appulse  or  opposition  in  the  Ego  itself. 

6.  Hence  the  Ego  acts  upon  the  non-Ego,  thus  posited,  by 
determining  it  in  as  far  as  the  Ego  is  causality;  but  the  non-Ego 
reacts  upon  the  Ego  and  relatively  to  it,  and  this  reaction  be- 
comes causality. 

7.  Hence  arises  that  mutual  action  between  the  Ego  and  the 
non-Ego  which  we  call  the  world  (xod/io?),  by  which  it  comes  to 
pass  that  the  Ego  (as  intelligent  or  understanding)  is  on  the  one 
side  dependent  on  the  world  or  xofffiog,  while  on  the  other  side 
the  Ego  (as  practical)  is  absolutely  free. 

III.  1.  But,  although  the  Ego  be  absolutely  free,  it  neverthe- 
less perceives  itself  bound  by  the  conception  of  duty, — a  concep- 
tion which  manifests  itself  in  the  manner  of  an  Imperative,  and 
impels  to  the  equipoise,  co-ordination,  or  harmony  of  the  Ego 
and  the  non-Ego, — i.e.  to  what  Fichte  calls  'the  realization  of 
the  moral  order  in  the  world.'1 

2.  This  moral  order  of  the  world,  in  which  every  duty  is 
founded,  and  to  the  realization  of  which  the  practical  Ego  puts 
forth  its  effort,  is  the  divinity,  the  essential  being  of  which  is, 
consequently,  the  sole  object  of  faith. 

'3.  Whoever  realizes  for  himself  and  as  his  own  this  order,  in 
that  measure  approximates  to  the  divinity  and  walks  in  that  true 
life  which  is  of  God.  But  he  who  hinders  or  disturbs  this  moral 
order  in  his  own  case,  sunders  himself  from  the  divinity. 

4.  Hence  virtue  consists  in  the  perfect  harmony  of  knowledge 
and  action,  in  order  to  the  free  realization  of  this  moral  order. 
These  views  are  developed  in  Fichte's  work  '  On  the  Ground  of 
our  Faith  in  the  Divine  Government  of  the  World. 

The  views  here  presented  received  important  modification  in 
what  is  called  the  second  period  of  Fichte.     His  nature  was  too 

1  Zur  Realisirung  der  moralischen  Weltordnung. 


92  PROLEGOMENA. 

essentially  religious  to  rest  in  the  dreary  abstraction  which  sub- 
stituted a  moral  order  for  a  personal  Deity.  That  position  seemed 
to  be  equivalent  to  atheism.  It  might  preserve  the  name  of  Deity, 
but  it  denied  the  thing.  In  the  later  thinking  of  Fichte,  he  brings 
out,  with  far  greater  clearness,  that  the  Ego  is  not  the  limited 
human  consciousness,  but  is  God,  the  primeval  original  con- 
sciousness,— what  he  calls  the  absolute  subject-object  (the  Eternal 
One),  the  eternal  universal  reason,  whose  life  reveals  itself  in  the 
infinite  multiplicity  of  relations.  This  God,  thus  defined,  he  re- 
gards as  the  ultimate  reason  of  all, — that  is,  of  all  essential  being.1 
God  is  the  infinite  thinking,  the  sum  of  whose  eternal  thoughts 
is  the  universe.  Jacobi  happily  characterized  Fichte's  doctrine 
as  an  inverted — an  idealistic — Spinozism.2 

Fichte,  although  greatly  influential  on  the  later  thinking,  can 
hardly  be  said  to  have  established  a  school,  though  he  had  a 
number  of  devoted  admirers.  One  reason,  doubtless,  of  his  es- 
tablishing no  distinct  school  was  that  his  system  was  met  by  the 
elaborate  system  of  Schelling,  who  endeavoured  to  meet  the  de- 
fects of  both  the  transcendental  and  the  subjective  idealism  by 
fusing  them  into  the  system  of  Absolute  Identity. 

XI.  Objective  Idealism  :  Schelling. 

Objective  Idealism,  the  system  of  Schelling  (1775-1854): 
the  system  of  Identity, — the  identity  of  thinking  and  being 
even  independently  of  the  Ego.  In  the  Absolute,  the  object,  or 
non-Ego,  and  the  subject,  or  Ego,  are  identical.  '  Nature  sleeps 
in  the  plant,  dreams  in  the  animal,  wakes  in  man.'  Transcen- 
dental philosophy  is  the  history  of  consciousness.  Ideas  are  medi- 
ators between  God  and  things.  The  Universe  is  the  self-revelation 
of  the  Absolute  Subject.  Nature  is  visible  Spirit;  Spirit  is  in- 
visible Nature.  In  Nature  there  is  a  self-objectivating  and  revela- 
tion of  the  Spirit,  of  whom  it  may  be  said  that  he  not  only  tliinks 

1  Rothenflue,  iii.  291-294. 

2  Scholtens,  158.  The  English  reader  will  find  of  great  value  in  attaining  a  knowledge 
of  Fichte:  1.  The  Science  of  Knowledge,  by  J.  G.  Fichte.  Translated  from  the  (hi in. 111 
by  A.  E.  Kroeger.  Philadelphia:  J.  B.  Lippincott  &  Co.,  1868.  2.  The  Science  "I" 
Right,  by  J.  G.  Fichte.  Translated  from  the  German  by  A.  E.  Kroeger.  Philadelphia: 
J.  B.  Lippincott  &  Co.,  1869.  For  an  estimate  of  Hchte's  life  and  character,  see  Zeller, 
599- 


XL—OBJECTIVE    IDEALISM:    SCHELLLNG.       93 

himself,  but  in  Nature  also  actualizes  himself.  The  Universe  or 
the  Absolute  is  an  Organism,  which  stretches  forth  from  one 
formative  principle  into  the  evolutions  of  a  graduated  unfolding. 
This  supreme  Principle,  this  organizing  Idea,  the  Ego  of  Fichte, 
is  called  by  Schelling  the  Soul  of  the  world.1 

Schelling  at  first  occupied  the  position  of  Idealism  as  main- 
tained by  Fichte,  but  subsequently  rejected  it  as  unsatisfactory  to 
reason,  and  laid  down  as  the  basis  of  a  new  system  that  the 
primary  principle  of  all  essence  or  real  being  and  of  cognition  is 
in  the  Absolute,  considered  as  the  complete  identity  of  the  sub- 
jective and  objective.  Fichte,  as  we  have  seen,  laid  down  as  the 
principle  of  all  being  and  cognition  the  subjective  Ego.  Schel- 
ling showed,  with  equal  right,  that  the  objective  non-Ego,  or 
Nature,  could  be  laid  down  as  the  principle  of  being  and  cogni- 
tion. This  had  been  laid  down  by  Spinoza,  who  had  inverted 
the  process  of  Fichte.  As  Fichte  deduced  or  constructed  the 
whole  non-Ego,  or  Nature,  out  of  his  own  subjective  Ego,  Spi- 
noza had  deduced  the  Ego  from  the  objectively  real, — the  non- 
Ego,  or  Nature.  But,  according  to  Schelling,  both  Ego  and 
non-Ego  are  relative,  and  hence  ought  to  be  referred  to  a  prin- 
ciple above  and  beyond  both ;  and  this  principle,  he  held,  was 
supplied  in  the  system  of  absolute  identity,  according  to  which 
all  essence  and  cognition,  all  matter  and  spirit,  are  identified  in 
the  Absolute  as  their  ultimate  reason.  But  this  absolute  identity 
of  the  subjective  and  objective  in  philosophy  is  not  susceptible 
of  proof  in  the  strict  sense, — i.e.  it  cannot  be  known  mediately 
or  by  process  of  reasoning,  inasmuch  as  it  is  itself  the  principle, 
the  beginning  of  all  knowledge,  and  that  which  begins  cannot 
follow.  But  it  can  be  proved  that  without  it  all  knowledge  is 
impossible,  inasmuch  as  the  conformity  of  knowledge  to  the 
object  known,  which  is  essentially  prerequisite  to  all  knowledge, 
cannot  be  conceived  of  unless  the  absolute  identity  of  the  sub- 
ject knowing  and  of  the  object  known  be  presupposed.  Hence, 
according  to  Schelling,  the  absolute  identity  or  absolute  indiffer- 
ence— i.e.  the  equivalence  or  perfect  unity — of  what  are  called 
different  things  is  the  principle,  the  unity,  the  centre  of  all 
science,  as  it  is  the  centre  of  all  existence;  and  immediate  per- 

1  Scholten,  161. 


94 


PROLEGOMENA. 


ception,  or  the  pure  intuition  of  reason,  is  the  sole  organ  or 
medium  by  which  man  can  reach  the  spring  of  all  truth.  The 
views  of  Schelling  are  developed  in  his  Sketch  of  the  Philosophy 
of  Nature,  in  his  System  of  Transcendental  Idealism,  in  hiswork 
on  the  Relation  of  the  Real  and  the  Ideal  in  Nature,  his  Annals  of 
Medicine  as  a  Science,  and  in  a  Collection  of  his  smaller  writings.1 
His  system  may  be  stated  under  two  general  heads : 

1.  I.  Philosophy  is  the  science  of  the  Absolute,  as  the  com- 
plete identity  both  of  the  subjective  and  the  objective,  or  the 
indifference  or  equivalence  of  things  which  are  called  different, 
in  which  difference  or  identity  the  essence  of  the  Absolute  {i.e.  of 
God)  consists. 

2.  Hence  the  Absolute  is  neither  the  Infinite  nor  the  Finite, — 
neither  essence  nor  cognition,  neither  subject  nor  object, — but  it 
is  that  in  which  all  opposition  between  cognition  and  essence, 
between  the  spirit  and  nature,  between  the  ideal  and  the  real, 
and,  in  fine,  all  difference,  is  removed,  and  the  absolute  identity, 
the  absolute  indifference,  or  equivalence  and  unity,  is  constituted, 
which  is  at  the  same  time  all  that  is,  or  is  the  whole, — the  all. 

3.  Hence  this  absolute  identity  alone  truly  is  or  has  essence: 
outside  of  it  nothing  actually  is. 

4.  Hence  this  absolute  identity  is  the  one  only  substance,  and 
this  substance  is  God. 

II.  1.  For  God  primarily  posits  or  affirms  his  own  essential 
existence.  His  proper  self  and  existence  once  posited,  God,  in 
virtue  of  the  idea  alone,  is  the  absolute  identity  of  the  universe. 

2.  To  wit :  God,  positing  himself,  posits  himself  in  ways  infi- 
nitely manifold, — i.e.  produces  a  diversity  of  entities  which  are 
nothing  but  modes  or  forms  of  existence  of  the  one  absolute 
identity.  This  production  or  outgoing  or  emanation  is  some- 
times revealed,  according  to  Schelling,  as  a  differentiation  or 
dualization  (Entzweiung,  Differenzirung)  of  the  Absolute;  some- 
times as  a  manifestation  of  himself;  sometimes  as  a  defection  of 
the  Finite  from  the  Infinite, — that  is,  of  ideas  from  God, — which 
is  virtually  a  self-defection  on  the  part  of  God.     The  theory  of 

1  Entwurf  der  Naturphilosophie.  System  des  transzendentalen  Idcalismus.  Ueber 
das  Verhaeltniss  des  Realen  und  Idealen  in  der  Xatur.  Jalirbiicher  der  Medi/in  als 
Wissenschaft.     Sammlung  kleinerer  philosophiselien  Schriften. 


XL—OBJECTIVE    IDEALISM:    SCHELLING.       95 

dualization  is  given  in  his  work,  'Exposition  of  the  True  Relation 
of  the  Philosophy  of  Nature  to  the  Improved  Fichtean  Doctrine.' 
The  later  views  are  presented  in  his  '  Philosophy  and  Religion.'1 

3.  Hence  existences  or  entities  are  both  finite  and  distinct 
only  as  they  are  regarded  either  as  individual  or  as  mutually 
correlated. 

4.  But  in  God  all  things  are  equal  and  infinite,  because  to  him 
and  in  him  they  are  identical. 

5.  Hence  in  the  whole  universe — in  the  real  world  as  well  as 
in  the  ideal  world — there  is  essentially  but  one  and  the  same 
power  which  manifests  or  evolves  itself:  in  the  real  world  with 
the  preponderance  or  excess  of  reality,  in  the  ideal  world  with 
the  preponderance  or  excess  of  ideality  (to  which  he  applies  the 
terms  duplicity  and  polarity),  and,  through  the  totality,  again 
conjoins  them  with  itself.  Hence  the  fundamental  position  of 
Schelling :  Identity  in  triplicity  is  the  law  of  evolution.  This 
may  be  called  Philosophical  Trinitarianism. 

6.  Hence  anything  whatsoever  is  nothing  else  than  the  quan- 
titative difference  of  subjectivity  and  objectivity,  or  of  ideality 
and  reality,  and  hence  is  not  itself  the  essence  of  the  Absolute, 
for  that  lies  in  identity,  but  is  only  a  determinate  form  of  the 
essence  of  absolute  identity. 

7.  A  quantitative  difference  of  this  kind,  so  far  as  anything  or 
any  determinate  form  of  the  essence  is  placed  in  opposition  with 
the  absolute  essence,  is  called  power. 

8.  Hence  in  no  single  thing  can  there  be  absolute  subjectivity 
or  absolute  objectivity,  but  only  the  identity  of  both  with  the 
preponderance  of  reality  or  of  ideality  in  the  particular  case. 

9.  But  the  Absolute  posits  itself  as  the  whole  of  the  essence 
and  the  whole  of  cognition,  as  nature  and  as  spirit :  in  the 
former,  with  the  relative  preponderance  or  excess  of  the  objective 
or  of  reality ;  in  the  latter,  with  the  relative  preponderance  or 
excess  of  the  subjective  or  of  ideality;  so  that  in  each  is  con- 
tained, entire  and  undivided,  the  absolute  identity,  only  that  in 
natuie  it  is  under  the  form  of  the  essence  or  reality;  in  spirit, 
under  the  form  of  cognition  or  of  consciousness,  i.e.  of  ideality. 

1  Darlegung  des  wahren  Verhaeltnisses  der  Naturphilosophie  zu  der  verbesserten 
Fichtes'chen  Lehre.     Philosophic  und  Religion. 


g6  PROLEGOMENA. 

10.  Thus,  both  the  ideal  and  the  real  appear  in  corporeal  nature 
under  the  form  of  reality, — the  ideal  as  light,  the  real  as  matter, 
whose  extension  is  a  manifestation  of  reality  as  of  gravity.  In 
the  spirit  each  appears  under  the  form  of  ideality  :  to  wit,  the 
ideal  as  free  or  unimpeded  activity,  the  real  as  restricted  or  con- 
fined activity. 

11.  But  first,  in  corporeal  nature,  one  of  the  two  potencies, 
either  matter  or  light,  predominates,  or  both  are  in  equilibrium. 
If  matter  predominates,  the  life  of  things  is  in  extension  or  in 
space;  if  light  predominates,  the  life  of  things  is  in  motion  or  in 
time;  if  they  are  in  equilibrium,  the  life  of  things  is  organic,  i.e. 
is  the  unity  of  matter  and  of  light.  Secondly,  in  the  spirit  or  in 
the  ideal  world  there  is  either  an  excess  or  preponderance  of 
restricted  activity  upon  the  free,  or,  in  other  words,  of  necessity 
upon  liberty :  and  this  is  knowledge  or  science,  whose  end  is  truth ; 
or  there  is  an  excess  or  preponderance  of  free  activity  upon  the 
restricted,  or,  in  other  words,  of  liberty  upon  necessity :  and  this 
is  morality,  whose  end  is  the  good  ;  or,  finally,  there  is  an  equi- 
librium between  the  two  :  and  this  is  art,  whose  product  is  beauty. 

The  scheme  of  the  philosophy  of  Schelling  may  be  reduced  to 
a  tabular  view,  thus  : 

The  Absolute  Being,  God,  or  the  Whole,  to  -a*,  manifests 
himself  in  nature,  or  as  absolute  indifference  in  himself  differen- 
tiates himself  in  nature, — 

as  relatively  real,  as  relatively  ideal, 

under  the  following  potencies  : 


l,]         f  Matter.  Truth,     |         f  Science, 

r       "j    Motion.  Good,      r        ]    Morality. 

>         \  Organism.  Beautv.  '         *-  Art. 


Gravitation, 

Light,  f       \   Motion.  Good,      j        ~\    Morality.     Religion. 

Life,  i         I  Organism.  Beauty,  '        l  Art. 


According  to  the  philosophy  of  Schelling,  God  alone  exists, 
and  all  things  which  do  exist  are  but  the  phenomenal  manifesta- 
tions of  the  one  sole  Absolute;  they  are  equal  to  him  in  nature, 
and  really  identical  with  him.  The  absolute  whole  of  being  is 
really  identical  with  God.  His  illustration  is,  '  for  as  one  and  the 
same  electric  fluid  manifests  the  opposite  effects  of  attraction  and 
repulsion  at  the  two  poles,  so  the  primary  and  absolute  unity  in 
nature  and  intelligence,  as  it  were  at  two  poles,  continually  puts 
forth  effort  to  differentiate  itself  through  a  series  of  evolutions, 


XL—OBJECTIVE   IDEALISM:    SCHELLING.       97 

out  of  which  arise  all  the  phenomena  of  the  physical  and  intel- 
lectual world.'  In  this  way  the  universal  becomes  individual, 
and  by  the  opposite  tendency  the  individual  endeavors  to  become 
universal  by  returning  to  the  point  of  indifference  or  non-differ- 
ence :  to  wit,  that  point  at  which,  the  phenomenal  merging  itself 
again  in  the  Absolute,  the  difference  between  phenomenal  being 
and  non-being  ceases.  Hence  philosophy,  according  to  Schelling, 
is  the  science  of  God  and  of  his  manifestation,  nature.  Hence 
philosophy  necessarily  comprehends  the  study  of  nature,  as  that 
in  which,  under  a  sensible  form,  is  manifested  or  revealed  God, 
the  eternal  or  absolute  being,  the  knowledge  of  which,  philosophy 
searches  for.  Hence  philosophy  is  coincident  with  poetry  and 
with  religion,  inasmuch  as  all  three  tend  to  the  single  point  of 
attaining  to  the  Absolute.  Philosophy  does  this  by  intuition, 
poetry  by  description,  religion  by  meditation  and  adoration. 

These  views  help  to  solve  the  seeming  mystery,  that  the  phi- 
losophy of  Schelling  gave  a  powerful  impulse  toward  the  natural 
sciences,  and,  furthermore,  that  the  positivism  which  repudiates  all 
speculation  really  is  the  offspring  of  this  most  attenuated  specu- 
lation. Schelling's  system  of  Absolute  Identity  is  a  wonderful 
co-ordination  and  evolution  of  former  thinking.  It  combines  the 
ideas  of  Plotinus  (205-270),  of  Bruno,  (d.  1600),  and  especially 
of  Spinoza  (1632-1677).  It  gratifies  in  the  highest  degree  the 
love  of  unity;  it  considers  the  whole  universe  as  an  immense 
epic  without  proper  beginning  and  without  definite  end.  In  this 
vast  poem  the  ages  are  as  cantos  of  books, — the  single  beings 
like  single  words,  which  separated  have  no  meaning,  but  have 
their  complete  sense  when  regarded  in  their  due  place  in  the 
vast  poem  of  identification  with  the  Absolute. 

Schelling  went  forth  from  the  narrow  bounds  which  Kant  had 
placed  to  human  knowledge.  Kant  had  almost  affirmed  that  we 
could  know  nothing.  Schelling  opened  the  knowledge  of  the 
whole.  Nature,  which  Fichte  had  represented  as  a  sterile  nega- 
tion, Schelling  endows  with  soul  and  life ;  and  while  he  does  not 
explain  its  phenomena,  he  paints  them  with  a  vivid  enthusiasm, 
like  that  of  Plato  and  of  the  Oriental  thinkers.  This,  beyond 
doubt,  is  the  chief  reason  why  Schelling  at  once  obtained  so 
large  a  number  of  followers.     With  the  appearance  of  unity  he 

7 


gS  PROLEGOMENA. 

confounds  the  understanding  ;  with  his  brilliant  and  often  poetical 
style,  his  images  and  parallels  drawn  from  nature,  he  captivates 
the  imagination.  These  qualities  had  the  greater  potency  in 
consequence  of  the  characteristics  of  his  time.  The  dry  and 
oftentimes  barren  criticism  of  Kant,  and  the  scarcely  less  dry 
idealism  of  Fichte,  only  relieved  in  its  dryness  by  what  seemed, 
to  the  popular  mind  at  least,  its  impiety  and  its  thorough-going 
egoism, — both  systems,  alike  in  their  inability  to  satisfy  either 
the  speculative  intellect  or  the  common  sense  of  men,  were 
dividing  the  supremacy  in  German  thinking.  Contrasted  with 
these  systems,  the  theory  of  Absolute  Identity  had  much  that 
was  fascinating.  Its  simplicity  of  parts,  its  apparent  facility  in 
explaining  everything,  its  modes  of  construing  nature,  the  many 
novel  and  exceedingly  beautiful  thoughts  associated  with  it, 
gave  it  immense  popularity. 

But  its  triumph  was  of  short  duration ;  its  defects  and  contra- 
dictions were  palpable.  The  reason,  escaping  from  the  charm,  at 
once  detected  these,  and  the  author's  system  scarcely  outlived 
him.  Against  the  system  various  objections,  theoretical  and  prac- 
tical, have  been  urged.  Theoretically  it  has  been  charged  not 
only  with  lack  of  foundation,  but  with  positive  absurdity.  For, 
first  of  all,  the  entire  theory  rests  upon  an  hypothesis  confessedly 
assumed  and  really  absurd,  to  wit,  that  because  no  beings  are  con- 
ceivable without  the  idea  of  an  Absolute,  it  follows  that  all  beings 
are  to  be  identified  with  the  Absolute  in  its  essence.  Christian 
theism  grants  the  former  and  denies  the  latter.  It  is  theoretically 
just  as  preposterous  as  to  say  that  because  we  cannot  conceive 
of  the  existence  of  a  watch  without  the  idea  of  a  watchmaker, 
the  watch  is  identical  in  its  essence  with  its  maker. 

Schelling's  conception  of  the  nature  of  God  in  that  cloudy  idea 
of  Absolute  Identity  and  Original  Indifference  is  very  little  more 
than  a  tricking  out  with  fresh  phrases  the  Brahma  and  the  Brahm 
of  the  Hindoos  roused,  from  his  deep  slumber.  According  to 
the  Vedas  and  the  Vedantas  (the  theological  summary  of  the 
Vedas),  Brahm  alone  exists,  and  the  phenomena  of  the  universe 
are  only  modifications  of  Brahm  as  Brahma.  Thus,  according  to 
Schelling,  God  alone  exists,  and  this  God  is  the  absolute  identity 
of  all  things.     As  in  the  Hindoo  system,  Brahm  aroused  from 


XI.— OBJECTIVE   IDEALISM:    SCHELLING.       99 

slumber  becomes,  of  an  indeterminate  being,  a  determinate  in- 
telligence, so  Schelling's  God  from  the  primal  absolute  indiffer- 
ence becomes  'Intelligence;' from  the  non-intelligent,  from  nature 
in  God,  from  chaos,  comes  forth  divinity  as  intelligence.1  The 
God  who  is  primarily  implicit,  in  time  becomes  explicit,  or  the 
folded  becomes  the  unfolded.  But  the  question  arises,  Why  does 
God  unfold  himself?  What  reason  of  evolution  is  there  in  him? 
The  Absolute,  as  such,  would  seem  to  have  equally  at  all  times 
the  reason  of  evolution.  In  attempting  to  meet  this  difficulty, 
Schelling  can  make  no  better  answer  than  this,  that  the  self- 
evolution  of  God  is  the  result  of  a  certain  fatality  incapable  of 
explanation.  But  that  which  evolves  itself  under  a  fatality  is  not 
the  Absolute,  but  is  dependent.  According  to  Schelling,  all  the 
evolutions  in  the  world,  and  consequently  all  history,  are  but  a 
diversification  of  necessary  positings  or  evolutions  of  God.  In 
his  dissertation  on  freedom  he  calls  this  necessity  of  evolution 
'  an  act  morally  necessary/  which  in  his  system  can  have  no  in- 
telligible meaning,  for  the  word  moral  as  an  attribute  of  neces- 
sary makes  it  cease  to  be  absolute  in  Schelling's  sense.  Morality 
and  freedom  are  inseparable,  and  that  which  is  necessitated  by 
fatality  is  ipso  facto  not  morally  necessary. 

In  pure  despair  of  harmonizing  facts  to  his  theory,  he  attempts  /vyjl 
to  account  for  the  existence  of  evil  by  a  sort  of  mythical  repre- 
sentation,  by  what  he  calls  the  defection  or  apostasy  of  ideas 
from  the  Absolute.  This  raises  the  question  how  anything  can 
fall  away  from  the  Absolute  when  there  is  nothing  beside  the 
Absolute.  Evil  must  be  the  falling  away  of  the  Absolute  from 
itself. 

The  God  of  Schelling,  except  that  he  is  represented  in  a  con- 
stant process  of  becoming,  differs  little,  as  we  have  seen,  from  the 
God  of  Hindoo  mythology,  in  which  we  have  Brahm  as  passive, 
Brahma  as  active.  In  Schelling's  views  of  God  evolving  (as  active) 
and  the  evolutions  or  phenomena  themselves  (God  as  passive), 
he  contradicts  himself  completely;  for  whatever  pertains  to  God 
as  passive  is  to  be  considered  as  one  of  these  evolutions  of  God, 
consequently  man  is  one  of  these;  but  Schelling  affirms  that  man 
can,  by  his  intellectual  intuition,  grasp  the  Absolute :  i.  e.  passive 

1  Ueber  das  Wesen  der  menschlichen  Freiheit. 


IOo  PROLEGOMENA. 

evolutions  of  God — to  wit,  men — would  at  the  same  time  be  active 
(capacious  of  the  intuition  of  the  Absolute).  Hence  his  system 
lacks  that  logical  consistency  which  marks  the  Hindoo  view.  In 
that  system  we  are  supposed  to  be  under  an  illusion  like  that  of 
protracted  dreams.  This  Schelling  does  not  admit.  To  admit 
this  would  have  been  to  renounce  all  scientific  cognition;  while  it 
was  Schelling's  peculiar  glory  to  assert  that  on  his  system  abso- 
lute cognition  of  the  Absolute  was  reached. 

Quite  as  serious  are  the  practical  objections  to  the  system  of 
Schelling.  It  lies  open  to  all  the  difficulties  which  are  valid 
against  the  system  of  Pantheism.  No  morality  is  possible  with- 
out liberty,  and  Schelling  puts  even  his  Absolute  under  Fate. 
Consequently  Schelling  denies  in  terms  that  there  is  liberty  in 
the  proper  sense,  and  asserts  that  good  is  possible  only  by  a  sort 
of  divine  magic.  It  is  hardly  necessary  to  say  that  the  system  is 
in  conflict  not  only  with  the  common  sense  of  the  illiterate,  but 
equally  so  with  the  solid  thinking  of  the  cultivated  and  judicious. 
Qualified  by  the  religious  temperament,  it  loses  itself  in  mysti- 
cism, opens  the  way  to  fanaticism,  to  superstition,  to  all  the 
insanities  of  disordered  imagination.  It  has,  in  fact,  been  laid 
hold  of  by  schools  of  the  most  conflicting  extravagances  in  sup- 
port of  their  notions.1 

Among  the  ablest  of  the  opponents  of  this  system  was  Jacobi 
(1743-1819).  He  held  that  all  purely  speculative  philosophy  is 
incapable  of  reaching  a  satisfactory  system ;  that  the  dogmatic 
tendency,  working  itself  out  by  way  of  demonstration,  conducted 
to  fatalism  and  pantheism;  that  the  critical  system  led  to  destruc- 
tion of  all  religious  faith.  Hence  he  brought  back  all  philoso- 
phical knowledge  or  science  to  Belief,  or  the  immediate  notion, 
as  its  principle. 

I.  He  affirmed  that  every  demonstration  implied  something 
already  demonstrated,  and  by  consequence  ended  in  this,  that 
there  must  be  something  back  of  all,  not  demonstrable,  but  which 
is  immediately  known,  and  this  primary  and  consequently  im- 
mediate notion  is  called  Faith,  or  Belief. 

II.  For  through  sense  and  through  reason  in  man,  and  having 
man  for  their  object,  is  distinguished  a  twofold  world,  a  visible 

1  See  Zeller,  Gesch.  d.  deutscben  Philosoph.,  649,  697. 


XII.— ABSOLUTE   IDEALISM:    HEGEL.  IOi 

and  an  invisible  world,  the  existence  of  which  can  be  equally 
proved  with  the  existence  of  the  reason  and  of  sense  themselves. 

III.  For  the  exterior  visible  world  is  manifested  to  sense 
through  sensation.  Hence  all  cognition  here  begins  through 
faith  in  the  veracity  of  sensation  and  the  truth  of  its  results.  But 
the  invisible  or  intellectual  world,  the  intelligible  world  or  world 
of  understanding,  is  manifested  to  reason  through  the  internal, 
the  inmost  sense,  or  consciousness.  Hence  concerning  God  and 
divine  things  we  have  not  a  knowledge  or  notion  through  pro- 
cesses of  reasoning,  but  have  only  Faith,  or  immediate  perception 
of  the  manifestation  of  the  divine  through  the  internal  sense,  or 
consciousness. 

IV.  Hence  philosophy  is  able  to  evolve  this  Faith,  but  not  to 
render  a  reason  for  it. 

V.  Wherefore  Faith  in  God,  and  in  the  manifestation  of  God 
through  reason,  is  the  principle  and  essence  of  all  philosophy. 
Jacobi  held,  with  Descartes,  that,  humbling  as  it  may  be  to  human 
pride,  we  are  driven  at  last  to  acknowledge  that  our  conviction 
of  the  reality  of  the  things  of  which  we  seem  to  be  conscious 
rests  upon  the  veracity  of  God.  Reason  is  compelled  to  take 
refuge  in  Faith.  The  intellect  without  the  moral  nature — the 
head  without  the  heart — leaves  man  essentially  pagan.1 

XII.  Absolute  Idealism:  Hegel. 

Absolute  Idealism,  the  system  of  Hegel  (1770-1831):  think- 
ing is  the  immanent  origin  of  the  Notion,  and  is  the  only  actual 
and  true, — Schelling's  results  reached  and  vindicated  by  Fichte's 
general  method, — the  strictly  dialectic.  The  non-Ego  is  sub- 
ordinated to  the  absolute  Ego,  but  is  an  essential  momentum,  an 
operative,  impulsive  element  or  force  of  the  Absolute,  in  which 
the  Absolute  works  itself  out.  All  philosophy  falls  into — 1.  Logic, 
the  science  of  the  pure  notions  of  reason,  the  science  of  the  Idea 
in  and  for  itself;  in  other  words,  the  laws  of  thought,  in  accord- 
ance with  which  the  unfolding  or  process  of  the  universe  takes 
place:  2.  the  philosophy  of  Nature,  as  the  science  of  the  Idea  in 
its  alterity;  that  is,  the  science  of  the  unfolding  of  the  Cosmos 

1  Schriften  iiber  Spinosa  und  gegen  Mendelssohn.     David  Hume,  iiber  den  Glauben, 
Oder :  Idealismus  und  Realismus. 


102  FR0LEG0MENA. 

considered  as  Nature :  and  3.  the  philosophy  of  the  Spirit,  the 
science  of  the  Idea  reverting  out  of  its  alterity  into  itself,  or  the 
science  of  the  Absolute,  as,  out  of  the  process  of  Nature,  through 
successive  phases  of  development,  in  the  spheres  of  art,  religion, 
and  science  in  mankind,  it  becomes  actual  self-conscious  spirit. 
The  spirit  is  subjective,  objective,  absolute.  Nature  is  a  process 
whose  ground  is  the  concept,  logic,  or,  in  other  words,  the  abso- 
lute thinking. 

The  relation  of  the  philosophy  of  Hegel  (1770-1831)  to  that 
of  Schelling  is  first  that  of  coincidence,  and  next  that  of  diversity. 
He  coincides  with  Schelling  in  the  presupposition  of  an  absolute 
identity  between  knowing  and  being,  thought  and  actuality,  the 
subjective  and  the  objective.  But  at  an  early  period  he  deserted 
the  theory  of  Intellectual  Intuition,  which  Schelling  considered 
as  the  sole  organ  of  science,  and  contended  that  the  notion  of  the 
Absolute  is  to  be  reached  through  the  medium  of  reasoning. 
Hence  the  Absolute  cannot  be  laid  down  as  a  principle  from 
which  all  the  rest  proceed,  but,  on  the  contrary,  the  Absolute  is 
the  final  conclusion  to  which  reason  attains  by  working  out  from 
the  indefinite  being  (Sein,  esse).  According  to  Hegel,  philosophy 
is  the  science  of  reason,  as  reason  is  conscious  of  itself  as  the 
entire  being  (Sein).  The  object  of  philosophy  is  the  idea  which 
is  identified  with  reason.  This  idea,  according  to  Hegel,  can  be 
considered  in  three  ways : 

I.  As  in  itself  and  for  itself,  as  self-being, — i.e.  as  the  pure  Idea; 
and  this  is  the  object  of  Logic,  which  Hegel  defines  to  be  the 
science  of  the  pure  Idea  (der  reinen  Idee), — i.e.  'of  the  Idea  in  the 
abstract  element  of  thinking.' 

Logic,  which  Hegel  builds  on  the  Trilogie  already  applied  by 
Fichte,  Thesis,  Antithesis,  and  Synthesis,  embraces — i.  The  doctrine 
of  Being  (Sein):  1.  Quantity;  2.  Quality;  3.  Measure,  ii.  The 
doctrine  of  Essence  (Wesen):  1.  the  Essence  as  Ground  of  Exist- 
ence ;  2.  the  Phenomenon  ;  3.  the  Actuality,  iii.  The  doctrine  of 
the  Notion  (Begriff) :  1.  Subjective  Notion ;  a.  Notion  as  such  ;  b. 
Judgment;  c.  Inference,  as  the  unity  of  both  ;  2.  Objectivity;  3. 
Idea,  as  the  absolute  unity  of  Notion  and  Objectivity. 

II.  Or  it  may  be  considered  as  opposed  to  itself  in  'other- 
being,'  alterity,  objectively  or  in  other, — i.e.  in  its  outward  muni- 


XII.— ABSOLUTE    IDEALISM:    HEGEL. 


103 


festation  as  existing  out  of  itself  in  nature.  And  this,  he  says,  is 
the  object  of  Somatology,  or  the  Philosophy  of  Nature.  This 
divides  itself  into — i.  Mechanics ;  ii.  Physics ;  iii.  Organics. 

III.  Or  the  idea  may  be  considered  as  reverting  or  returning 
from  '  other  being,'  alterity,  into  itself,  or  the  '  self-being.'  And 
this  reverting  from  'other-being'  to  'self-being'  is  the  object  of 
Pneumatology,  or  the  philosophy  of  Spirit.  From  the  position 
that  the  idea  is  the  same  as  reason,  and  that  reason  is  the  entire 
being,  he  infers  that  the  idea  is  identical  with  nature  and  the 
mind,  and  that  it  is  the  thing  essentially  which  is  represented 
through  it,  and  hence  that  philosophy  is  reason  itself,  having 
cognition  of  itself  as  the  identity  of  mind  and  nature, — that  is, 
what  is  reason  is  nature,  what  is  nature  is  reason.  The  laws  of 
thought  are  the  internal  logic  of  the  universe. 

Spirit  is — i.  Subjective  in  the  form  of  relation  to  itself,  and,  as 
such,  object  of — 1.  Anthropology;  2.  Phenomenology;  a.  Con- 
sciousness ;  b.  Self-consciousness  ;  c.  Reason  ;  3.  Psychology,  ii. 
Objective, — the  absolute  idea,  having  being  in  itself,  manifests 
itself  in — a.  Jus;  b.  Ethics;  c.  Morality,  iii.  Absolute, — the  unity 
of  the  subjective  and  objective  Spirit.  It  forms  the  highest 
sphere, — Religion.  It  reveals  itself  in — 1.  Art;  2.  Religion; 
3.  Philosophy. 

The  philosophy  of  Hegel  may  be  characterized  as  in  general 
the  reaching  and  ripening  of  Schelling's  results  by  Fichte's 
method.     More  particularly,  its  features  are  these : 

First.  Its  principle  which  lays  down  the  positive  conception 
of  spirit,  in  antithesis  to  Schelling's  vague  indifference  of  the 
subjective  and  objective.     And 

Second.  The  method  of  its  dialectic.  This  had  been  anticipated 
in  a  negative  form  by  Kant  in  the  antinomies  of  his  Critique  of 
Pure  Reason;  but  Hegel  has  developed  it  in  a  positive  manner,  in 
which  Fichte  was  his  forerunner. 

Hegel  has  greatly  benefited  Logic  by  thoroughly  carrying 
through  a  principle  which  had  been  proposed  by  Kant,  to  wit, 
that  there  is  an  inseparable  interpenetration  of  Logic  and  Meta- 
physics. In  this  way  Hegel  has  united  into  one  great  system  all 
the  laws  of  thought,  categories,  forms  of  conception,  and  methods. 
His  system  is  one  in  which  every  department  of  knowledge  in  all 


104  PROLEGOMENA. 

its  theories  finds  its  place,  so  that  its  compass,  limits,  value,  signifi- 
cance, method,  and  connection  with  all  the  others,  are  marked  and 
proven.  It  was  this  encyclopaedic  character  which  did  much  in  giv- 
ing the  philosophy  of  Hegel  precedence  over  all  the  rival  schools. 
His  influence  has  been  felt  in  every  direction  ;  peculiarly  so  in  the 
Philosophy  of  Religion.  Three  great  schools  have  been,  in  a 
general  sense,  followers  of  Hegel.  They  are  known  as  the  Right, 
the  Centre,  and  the  Left.  The  Right  wing  is  the  Supernaturalistic 
or  Orthodox  School;  the  Left  is  the  Rationalistic;  the  Centre  is 
a  mediating,  mystic  School  which  attempts  to  rise  above  the 
Supernatural  and  the  Rationalistic  into  a  region  which  is  freed 
from  these  differences  by  leaving  them  beneath  it. 

The  general  sentiment  had  been  that  the  speculations  of  Hegel 
were  favourable  to  religion;  but  four  years  after  his  death  the 
appearance  of  the  work  of  Strauss,  which  was  Hegelian  in  its 
philosophy,  proved  very  clearly  that  if  orthodoxy  could  use 
Hegel  it  could  not  monopolize  him. 

Hegel  has  indeed  expressed  himself  very  beautifully  in  regard 
to  religion.  It  is  only  necessary  to  separate  some  of  his  utter- 
ances from  their  connections  to  have  what  seems  profoundly 
religious.  He  says,  '  Religion  is  the  realm  in  which  all  the 
enigmas  of  life  are  resolved,  all  the  contradictions  of  thought 
harmonized,  all  the  sorrows  of  the  affections  allayed,  the  realm 
of  eternal  truth  and  of  eternal  peace.  Through  it  flows  the  true 
Lethe  from  which  the  soul  drinks  forgetfulness  of  all  its  ills.  The 
mists  of  time  vanish  before  the  unfading  brightness.  In  the  con- 
sciousness of  God,  the  spirit  is  freed  from  the  forms  of  the  finite. 
It  is  a  consciousness  of  absolute  freedom  and  of  absolute  truth.' 

What  this  religion  is  has  been  well  stated  thus:  'The  panthe- 
ism of  Hegel  is  not  a  real  pantheism,  but  a  logical  pantheism. 
All  that  is  is  but  the  manifestation  of  God  in  the  movement  of 
thought.  In  his  system  God  is  everything  and  is  nothing.  He 
is  nothing,  for  he  has  no  consciousness  of  himself,  except  in  the 
soul  of  man.  He  is  everything,  for  he  is  the  universal  sole  sub- 
stance which  underlies  all  consciousness  and  all  existence.'  With 
Hegel1  the  proper  development  of  modern  systems  is  usually 

1  System  der  Wissenschaft.  Phoenomenologie  des  Geistes.  Wissenschaft  der  Logik. 
Encyclopaedic  des  philosophischen  Wissenschaften  im  Grundrisse. 


XIII.— THEORETICAL    IDEALISM.  105 

regarded  as  terminating.  He  seems  to  have  reached  the  last 
possible  point.  Speculation,  moving  as  we  have  seen  under  cer- 
tain impulses  communicated  from  Locke's  system,  has  gone 
through  the  theological  idealism  of  Berkeley  to  the  subjective 
idealism  of  Fichte,  to  the  absolute  identity  of  Schelling  and  Hegel. 
'  To  construct  scientifically  the  totality  of  the  actual  out  of  the 
Absolute,  and  from  the  position  of  the  Absolute,  was  a  problem  on 
whose  solution  Hegel  wrought  with  amazing  power  and  tension 
of  thought,  and  thus  became  the  creator  of  a  system  which  must 
be  regarded  as  the  most  perfect  form  of  German  idealism,  as  the 
ripest  fruit  of  the  development  through  which  it  has  run  since 
Kant.  This  development  closes  in  Hegel,  as  the  Socratic  school 
closes  in  Aristotle.'1 

XIII.  Theoretical  Idealism:  Schopenhauer. 

I.  Theoretical  Idealism  is  the  name  given  by  Erdmann  to 
the  system  of  Arthur  Schopenhauer  (1 788-1 860).  In  this  ex- 
traordinary man  the  Orient  and  the  Occident  combine  their  influ- 
ences, so  that  he  presents  the  anomalous  appearance  of  a  Hindoo 
thinker  in  the  intellectual  garb  of  Europe.  He  is  the  Brahmin 
of  our  modern  metaphysics.  This  cast  was  given  him  in  the 
study  of  the  Indian  antiquities,  to  which  he  was  directed  by  the 
Orientalist  Majer.  He  had  the  large  culture  produced  by  travel- 
ling in  France,  England,  and  Italy,  and  by  a  thorough  acquaint- 
ance with  French  and  English  literature.  He  had  as  teachers  or 
as  friends  some  of  the  most  illustrious  men  of  his  day.  But  the 
greatest  mover  of  his  intellectual  life  was  Kant. 

II.  Schopenhauer  and  Kant:  Schopenhauer  had  been  ad- 
vised by  his  preceptor,  Schulze,  to  confine  himself,  in  his  earliest 
philosophic  studies,  to  Plato  and  Kant,  and  not  until  he  had  mas- 
tered these  to  take  up  others,  especially  neither  Aristotle  nor 
Spinoza, — advice  which  he  never  regretted  having  strictly  fol- 
lowed. Schopenhauer  often  declares  that  he  is  thankful  to  Kant 
above  all  other  philosophers  ;  that  subsequent  to  Kant  none  but 
his  own  system  had  a  claim  to  be  considered  really  philosoph- 
ical, as  between  himself  and  Kant  nothing  had  been  accomplished, 

1  Zeller,  Gesch.  d.  deutsch.  Phil.,  775. 


106  PROLEGOMENA. 

pseudo-philosophy  had  been  supreme,  and  that  he  had  completed 
what  Kant  had  begun.1 

Schopenhauer  and  Herbart  speak  in  the  same  general  way  of 
their  relation  to  Kant,  but  in  exactly  opposite  aspects.  Herbart 
clung  to  the  realistic  element  in  Kant,  Schopenhauer  to  his  sub- 
jective and  idealistic  elements.  What  to  the  one  was  the  weak- 
ness of  Kant's  system  was  to  the  other  its  strength.2 

III.  Schopenhauer's  estimate  of  Kant  is  a  very  high  one : 
'Kant's  almost  superhuman  merit  lies  therefore  in  this,  that  he 
distinguishes  the  thing  in  itself  from  the  phenomenon,  and  shows 
that  the  phenomenon  alone  is  the  object  of  cognition  ;  so  that  it 
amounts  to  the  same  thing  whether  we  style  it  object  or  phe- 
nomenon, that  is,  conception  (Vorstellung).  The  objectionable 
feature  in  Kant  is  that  he  unnecessarily  multiplies  the  number  of 
the  connections  through  which  the  Object  is  formed.  This,  how- 
ever, is  not  the  case  with  the  Transcendental  ^Esthetics,  which, 
in  its  results  as  well  as  in  the  manner  of  its  execution,  is  one  of 
the  greatest  masterpieces,  and  in  itself  sufficient  to  immortalize 
the  name  of  Kant,  as  its  principles  embrace  unanswerable  truth.'3 
'This  cannot  be  said,  however,  of  the  Transcendental  Analytic. 
Among  its  twelve  Categories  there  is  one  which  is  a  downright 
absurdity, — the  Category  of  Reciprocation,  which  is  a  monster, 
like  Spinoza's  causa  sui.  But,  beside  this,  the  whole  twelve, 
strictly  taken,  can  be  reduced  to  a  solitary  one, — Causality, — the 
only  one,  consequently,  which  Kant  ever  brings  to  exemplifi- 
cation.'4 

IV.  General  Views. — The  world  is  only  my  conception,  my 
mental  representation  (Vorstellung).  The  thing  in  itself  is  Will, 
which  presents  itself  in  things  as  phenomenon.  It  is  the  essence 
of  the  phenomena.  Without  a  subject  there  can  be  no  object. 
Were  there  no  one  to  perceive  things,  there  could  be  nothing 
perceived.  'The  antithesis  between  the  ideal  and  the  reed  is 
equivalent  to  the  antithesis  between  phenomenon  (mental  repre- 
sentation— Vorstellung)  and  the  thing  in  itself!  'The  dividing 
line  between  the  real  and  the  ideal  is  so  run  that  the  whole  intui- 

«  Kritik  der  Kant.  Philosophic  469.     Welt  als  Wille,  2  Th.  291. 

*  Erdnuum,  F.ntwickelung  d.  deutsch.  Speculation,  s.  Kant,  ii.  334. 

3  Kritik  der  Kantischen  Philosophic,  492.  *  Do.,  501,  502. 


XIII.— THEORETICAL    IDEALISM. 


107 


tional  world — the  world  presenting  itself  objectively,  including 
our  own  bodies,  together  with  space,  time,  and  causality,  involv- 
ing, therefore,  the  Extended  of  Spinoza  and  the  Matter  of  Locke, 
— all  this,  as  mental  representation  (conception — Vorstellung), 
belongs  to  the  Ideal,  while  nothing  remains  as  Real  but  the  Will.' 
'After  men  had,  for  thousands  of  years,  regarded  the  universe 
of  our  intuitions  as  real, — that  is,  as  existing  independently  of 
the  concipient  subject, — Idealism  brought  to  consciousness  the 
fact  that,  boundless  and  massive  as  the  universe  is,  it  hangs  on  a 
solitary  thread, — the  thread  of  the  consciousness  at  the  time  in 
which  it  exists.'  '  It  is  a  mistake  to  suppose  that  Idealism  denies 
the  empirical  reality  of  the  external  world.  The  genuine  Idealism 
is  not  the  empirical,  but  the  transcendental!  '  In  all  transcen- 
dental Ideality  the  objective  world  retains  empirical  reality.  The 
object  is  not,  indeed,  the  thing  in  itself,  but  it  is,  as  empirical 
object,  real.  In  fact,  space  is  only  in  my  head;  but,  empirically, 
my  head  is  in  space.'  '  The  absolute  Idealism,  holding  the  ob- 
jective world  to  be  a  mere  phantom,  a  spectre  of  the  brain,  is 
theoretic  Egoism!  '  Idealism  is  not  to  be  confounded  with  Spirit- 
ualism, for  Spiritualism,  with  its  antithesis,  Materialism,  belongs 
to  Realism,  and  is,  consequently,  opposite  to  Idealism!  'What 
is  mental  representation  (vorstellung — conception)?  A  very 
complicated  physiological  process  in  the  brain  of  an  animal,  the 
result  of  which  is  the  consciousness  of  an  image  there.'  '  Every 
object  is  conditioned  by  the  Subject,  and  exists  only  for  the  Sub- 
ject, and  is  the  Conception  of  the  Subject.  Object  and  Concep- 
tion are  not  different,  but  are  one  and  the  same  thing.'  '  The 
being  in  and  for  itself  of  everything  must  of  necessity  be  a  sub- 
jective one.' x 

V.  Idealism,  Ancient. — '  Idealism,  or  the  view  that  the  world 
is  but  phenomenon,  reveals  itself  not  only  in  Plato's  affirmation 
of  the  nullity  of  sensuous  things,  but  in  the  fact,  also,  that  it  is 
the  original  doctrine,  and  that  the  Hindoo  religion,  which  is 
worthy  of  the  supremest  regard,  as  it  is  the  oldest  religion  and 
the  one  received  by  the  majority  of  the  race,  avows  it  in  its  doc- 
trine that  things  are  but  illusion,  and  that  their  existence  is  guilt. 

1  See  Schopenhauer- Lexikon,  von  Frauenstadt,  Leipzig,  1871 ;  art.  Aussenwelt,  Ding 
an  Sich,  Ideal  und  Real,  Idealismus,  Vorstellung. 


108  PRO  LEGO  MEN  A. 

With  the  predominance  of  Judaism,  which  is  thoroughly  real- 
istic, Realism  in  philosophy  also  pervaded  the  Christian  world, 
as  if  Judaism  were  Reason.'1 

VI.  Idealism,  Modern,  History  of  its  Development. — '  It 
was  reserved  for  modern  philosophy  again  to  return  to  the  true 
view,  and  here  the  first  merit  belongs  to  Descartes,  who  is  with 
justice  regarded  as  the  founder  of  modern  philosophy,  for  he 
began  with  self-consciousness,  and  thus  gave  a  thoroughly  sub- 
jective turn  to  philosophy.  A  very  important  advance  was  made 
in  this  direction  by  Locke,  who  vindicated  for  the  subject,  by  his 
notion  of  secondary  qualities,  a  part  of  that  which  Realism  had 
ascribed  to  the  object.  In  this  tendency  Berkeley  went  still  fur- 
ther. His  chief  merit  is  that  he  gave  up  the  undue  distinction 
between  Conception  (Vorstellung)  and  the  object  of  Conception. 
Finally,  with  Kant  begins  a  new  period.  Not  only,  with  Locke, 
did  he  deny  as  things  in  themselves  what  pertains  to  the  senses, 
but  he  also  showed  that  what  pertains  to  the  intuitive  under- 
standing is  not  things  in  themselves,  but  forms  lying  in  the 
subject,  and  decisively  established  the  fact  that  all  objects  are 
but  phenomena, — that  is,  are  Conceptions  (Vorstellungen).  Locke 
had  denied  that  colour  is  in  the  objects,  and  rightly  determined 
it  to  be  mere  sensation  of  the  Subject,  yet  granted  that  exten- 
sion belongs  to  the  objects.  Kant,  whose  Critique  of  Pure 
Reason  is  a  continuation  of  Locke's  philosophy,  shows  that 
extension — that  is,  space — is  only  in  the  subject,  and  hence 
enounces  the  proposition,  thoroughly  correct,  that  if  there  were 
no  cognizing  subject  there  would  be  no  objects  and  no  world. 
This  is  a  proposition  which,  strictly  taken,  is  tautological,  as  an 
object  in  itse/f— that  is,  not  an  object  to  a  subject — is  a  contra- 
diction.'2 

VII.  The  Contemporary  Systems  contrasted. — 'As  the  sen- 
sations are  subjective,  and  the  form  of  causality,  whereby  they 
come  to  be  the  perceived  object,  is  subjective,  it  is  clear  that 
Realism,  which  makes  the  (unconceived)  things  the  causes  of  the 
conceptions,  and  (Fichte's)  "  Doctrine  of  Science,"  which  makes 
the  subject  the  cause  of  the  objects,  involve  a  preposterous  doc- 

1  Vierfache  Wurzel,  §  19. 

•  Welt  als  Wille,  2d  B.,  83.     Vierfache  Wurzel,  ad  edit.,  \  16. 


XIII.—  THE  ORETICAL    IDEAL  ISM. 


109 


trine.  Just  as  preposterous,  finally,  is  the  system  of  Identity 
(Schelling  and  Hegel),  which  is  a  fusion  of  the  other  two.'1 
'  The  truth  is,  that  represented  (conceived)  Objects — that  is,  Phe- 
nomena— must  submit  to  the  law  of  Causality,  for  without  that 
law  Objects  are  impossible.  It  is  the  condition  of  Object-to';/^-. 
It  is  a  matter  of  course  that  what  holds  good  of  all  phenomena 
holds  equally  good  of  our  own  body,  which,  as  Kant  has  cor- 
rectly shown,  is  only  phenomenon,  and  which  we  may  name  the 
most  immediate  object.'2 

VIII.  Causality  and  Final  Cause. — Only  in  the  case  of  Phe- 
nomena can  we  speak  of  Causality.  In  this  sphere,  however,  we 
must  go  back  from  effects  to  causes,  though  an  ultimate  cause  is 
not  thinkable.  In  spite  of  the  unanswerable  proofs  by  which 
Kant  has  annihilated  all  speculative  theology,  there  are  still 
many  who  use  the  absurd  expression  'Ultimate  Cause,'  and  non- 
sensically talk  of  a  cause  which  is  not  also  effect.  They  think 
they  are  talking  in  the  interest  of  religion,  confounding  Religion 
and  Theism,  whereas,  in  fact,  Theism  is  merely  Judaism  ;  and  in 
Buddhist  lands,  which  are  decidedly  atheistic  and  pantheistic, 
Kant's  Critique  of  Reason,  the  most  serious  attack  ever  made 
upon  Theism,  would  be  regarded  as  an  edifying  tract,  written 
against  the  heretics,  in  defence  of  the  orthodox  Idealism.3 

IX.  Man  and  the  Animals. — It  is  rightly  acknowledged  that 
reason  distinguishes  man  from  the  animal,  and  this  distinction  is 
wrongly  made  as  great  as  possible.  The  Orient  has  not  this 
unamiable  pride;  only  in  the  Occident,  which  has  bleached  man, 
and  to  which  the  old-time  primal  religions  of  his  home  could  not 
follow  him, — only  in  this  Occident,  man  no  longer  recognizes  his 
brothers,  but  calls  them  beasts.  All  animals,  even  the  most  im- 
perfect, have  understanding;4  for  they  all  know  objects,  and  this 
knowledge,  as  motive,  determines  their  movements.  The  under- 
standing distinguishes  animals  from  plants,  as  reason  distinguishes 
men  from  the  animals.  The  mark  which  distinguishes  the  animal 
from  the  plant  is  that  its  motion  does  not  depend  on  mechanical, 
chemical,  or  physiological  causes,  but  is  really  voluntary,  pro- 
duced by  an  object  known,  which  is  the  motive  of  that  move- 

1  Welt  als  Wille,  g§  5,  7.  *  Do.  §  6.  Vierfache  Wurzel,  g  22. 

3  Vierfache  Wurzel,  §  34.  *  Welt  als  Wille,  §  6. 


HO  PROLEGOMENA. 

merit.1  The  animals  have  intuitive,  but  not  abstract,  knowledge  ; 
they  apprehend  the  immediate  causal  connection,  and  the  higher 
animals  can  carry  it  through  several  links  of  the  chain;  but  they 
do  not  in  the  strict  sense  think,  for  they  lack  notions,  that  is,  the 
abstract  conceptions.2  We  cannot  deny  an  analogue  of  morality 
to  the  animals  if  we  contrast  the  diverse  animal  characters  which 
meet  our  view.  Contrast,  for  example,  the  dog  and  the  elephant 
with  the  cat,  the  hyena,  and  the  crocodile.  This  empirical  char- 
acter may  very  well  be  the  exhibition  of  an  intelligible  one.3  The 
life  of  animals  is  a  clear  exemplification  of  the  nullity  and  the 
suffering  of  life.  It  is  the  nature  of  animals,  more  than  of  man,  to 
be  satisfied  with  mere  existence.  They  give  themselves  up  to 
the  present ;  they  are  the  present  personified,  and  heartless  man 
robs  them  of  their  little  all.  The  bird,  organized  to  sweep  over 
a  hemisphere,  he  mews  up  in  a  narrow  space;  and  on  his  most 
faithful  friend,  the  dog,  endowed  with  such  rare  intelligence,  man 
fastens  the  chain.4 

X.  Metaphysics,  Nature  of. — '  Philosophy,  or  Metaphysics, 
as  the  doctrine  of  Consciousness  and  of  what  is  involved  in  it,  as 
a  matter  of  course  does  not  enter  into  the  circle  of  the  other 
sciences.  As  it  does  not  follow  the  Principle  of  the  Ground,  but 
considers  this  Principle  itself,  which,  in  the  nature  of  the  case,  does 
not  allow  of  being  grounded  by  demonstration,  we  may  say  that 
Philosophy  takes  up  things  where  the  Sciences  leave  them. 
Hence  it  considers  things  in  a  manner  wholly  different  from  that 
of  the  Sciences.  It  does  not  ask  whence  the  world  is,  nor  where- 
fore it  is,  but  what  it  is.  It  does  not  ground  and  demonstrate 
in  the  way  in  which  the  Sciences  do,  but  that  which  first  of  all 
is  given  as  feeling  it  seeks,  that  it  may  exalt  it  to  knowledge, 
and  may  picture  in  abstract  the  essence  of  the  world,  so  as  to 
render  itself  a  repetition  and  mirroring  of  the  world  in  abstract 
notions.'5  '  Hence  it  follows  inevitably  that  there  can  be  no  other 
Philosophy  than  a  Philosophy  of  Reflection.  Any  other  is  mere 
twaddle.     Metaphysics  embraces,  therefore,  all  the  cognitions  a 

1  Sehen  und  Farben,  3d  edit.,  18  seq. 

■  Welt  als  Wille,  3d  edit.,  ii.  62-66.     Ethik,  2d  edit.,  33,  34. 

8  Memorabilien,  314,  315.  *  l'arerga,  2d  edit.,  318,  403. 

5  Welt  als  Wille,  §  15. 


XII L— THEORETICAL    IDEALISM.  m 

priori  which  relate  to  time,  space,  and  matter,  and  forms  the  tacit 
presuppositions  of  the  Sciences.1 ' 

'  Hence  Metaphysics  is  idealistic  through  and  through,  and 
the  proposition,  The  World  is  nothing  but  Conception,  is  synony- 
mous with  Kant's  assertion,  The  World  is  phenomenon,  and  is 
identical  with  the  proposition,  The  World  is  subject  to  the  Princi- 
ple of  the  Ground.'2 

XI.  The  World  not  a  Dream. — Were  we  simply  to  abide  by 
the  results  thus  far  reached,  this  world  would  be  little  more  than 
a  dream  conformed  to  laws.  Kant  shows  a  way  out  of  this  in 
teaching  us  to  distinguish  the  In-itself  from  the  phenomena. 
(When  he  forgets  this,  and  for  example  places  objectivity  simply 
in  conformity  with  law,  he  coincides  entirely  with  Leibnitz, 
who  had  maintained  that  the  actual  phenomena  are  distinguished 
from  those  in  dreams  only  by  their  strict  conformity  to  law.) 
The  question  now  rises,  if  the  world  to  this  point  offers  only 
relations,  is  merely  Conception,  is  it  nothing  more  ?  is  it  an  in- 
substantial dream,  or  is  it  something  more?  and  if  it  be,  what  is 
it?3  The  response  to  this  question  Schopenhauer  considers  the 
most  marked  step  in  his  system,  by  which  it  removes  itself, 
more  than  by  any  other,  from  Kant.4  First  of  all,  nothing  is 
given  but  what  has  already  been  considered,  that  is,  Conscious- 
ness. To  this  our  own  body  is  object,  like  all  other  objects,  only 
more  intimate,  more  immediate:  as  our  body,  however,  is  in  time 
and  in  space,  and  is  material,  we  have  an  objective  knowledge 
of  it,  or,  what  is  the  same  thing,  it,  with  all  its  circumstances, 
movements,  and  such  like,  is  Phenomenon. 

But  the  observation  we  make  that  our  bodily  movements  follow 
not  simply  on  causes  and  excitations,  but  on  motives  also,  shows 
clearly  that  in  these  movements,  in  addition  to  their  being 
objective  changes,  something  else  articulates  itself,  of  which  the 
Subject  is  conscious  in  a  purely  immediate  manner.  This  some- 
thing is  Will? 

XII.  Will,  the  World  is. — 'I  am  conscious  of  my  Will  in  a 
manner  wholly  different  from  that  in  which  I  am  conscious  of 
Objects,  even  of  my  own  body,  and  hence  I  have  not  an  objective 

*  Welt  als  Wille,  2  Th.  51.  '  Do.,  ffl  1-16.  3  Do.,  g  17. 

4  Do.,  2  Th.  193.  s  Welt  als  Wille,  ?  15. 


112  PROLEGOMENA. 

but  an  immediate  cognition  of  my  Will.  Of  my  body,  to  wit,  I 
am  conscious  under  the  three  forms  of  Space,  Time,  and  Causality 
(Matter).  The  cognition  of  my  own  Volition  is  free  from  two 
of  these  forms.  It  is  true  that  in  cognizing  my  Will  it  appears 
to  me  under  the  form  of  Time,  as  a  train  of  acts,  and  so  far  my 
cognition  is  not  exhaustive;  yet  it  is  so  much  more  intimate  and 
immediate  than  my  consciousness  of  my  other  objective  being, 
that  Kant's  doctrine  of  the  incognizableness  of  the  thing  in  itself 
must  be  so  far  modified  as  that  the  Subject  is  conscious  in  its 
material  being  of  its  phenomenon ;  and,  on  the  other  hand,  is  in 
its  Will  conscious  of  its  In-itself.1  Kant  himself  seems  to  have 
had  a  surmise  of  the  fact  that  when  the  Subject  is  conscious  of 
his  Volition  he  cognizes  more  than  the  mere  phenomenon ;  for 
when  he  speaks  of  things  in  themselves  there  are  at  once  sug- 
gested to  him  practical  determinations,  that  is,  determinations  of 
Will.  In  the  knowledge  of  our  Volition  we  have  a  cognition 
with  which  no  other  can  be  compared,  which  is  neither  a  priori 
nor  a  posteriori  is  neither  a  physical  nor  a  logical  truth,  but  is 
the  philosophical  truth  by  pre-eminence.2 

'  To  the  position  that  the  Will  is  the  proper  In-itself  of  man 
is  opposed  the  prejudice  that  knowledge  is  the  primary,  and  that 
Volition  is  a  mere  accident  of  the  Intellect.  To  meet  this  preju- 
dice, attention  must  be  directed  to  the  fact  that  the  Will  has  the 
proper  primacy  in  self-consciousness,  for  that  which  is  recognized 
in  self-consciousness,  our  effort,  our  fear,  our  pleasure  and  dis- 
pleasure, is  aroused  or  repressed  Volition.  The  Will  is,  there- 
fore, what  is  properly  substantial  in  us ;  the  Intellect  is  the 
secondary,  the  accessory;  whence  it  is  that  we  come  only  in 
a  supplementary  way  to  know  our  Volition  (our  Character), 
Hence  also  our  Volition  constitutes  the  identity  of  person.  Con- 
sequently every  man  has,  in  himself,  the  experience  that  he  is 
Phenomenon,  that  is,  Conception ;  and  that  he  is  an  In-itself 
transcending  the  phenomenon,  that  is,  he  is  Will.  If  now  we 
would  avoid  theoretic  Egoism,  the  view  that  ourself  alone  is  in 
existence,  a  view  which  it  is  hard  to  believe  any  one  in  his  senses 
has  ever  seriously  held,  we  must  concede  that  as  our  phenomenal 
Ego  is  related  to  the  world  of  phenomena,  so  precisely  our  In- 

'  Welt  als  Wille,  2  Th.  aoo  seq.  «  Do.,  ?  18,  a  Th.  199. 


XIII.— THEORETICAL    IDEALISM. 


"3 


itself  is  related  to  that  which  it  is  in  itself.  This  train  of  reason- 
ing leads  to  the  proposition  to  which  Schopenhauer  devotes  the 
Second  Book  of  his  chief  work,  to  wit,  The  World  is  Will. 

XIII.  Will  defined. — The  word  Will  is  here  to  be  taken  in  a 
broader  sense  than  the  ordinary  one ;  for  we  are  not  to  confine  it 
to  conscious  will,  but  are  to  understand  by  it  what  unfolds  itself 
in  nature  in  various  gradations,  and  reveals  itself  in  its  supremest 
form  in  conscious  human  volition,  which  gives  it  its  name  as  a 
denommatio  a  potiori,  a  term  for  the  genus  derived  from  what  is 
its  pre-eminent  species.  This  extension  of  the  meaning  is  justi- 
fied by  the  fact  that  there  is  an  identity  of  essence  with  Will  in 
every  striving  and  operative  power  in  nature.  Force  is  a  sort  of 
willing.  The  In-itself  is  the  Will,  that  is,  that  which  is  not  object 
(conception),  and  which,  in  order  to  think  it,  must  be  compared 
with  and  named  after  that  which  has  most  completely  stripped 
off  the  forms  of  objectivity,  and  that  is  the  human  Will.1 

It  lies  in  the  nature  of  the  case  that  the  predicates  which  be- 
long to  the  phenomena  must  be  denied  of  the  Will.  The  Will 
as  universality  and  unity,  exalted  above  all  multiplicity,  must  be 
thought  of  as  the  one  which  is  all,  the  iv  xal  xav. 

XIV.  Universality  of  the  Recognition  of  the  World  as 
Will. — The  true,  not  the  mere  phenomenal  in  the  world  is 
therefore  nothing  but  this  One  Will,  which  reveals  itself  as  the 
pressure  of  waters  to  the  Deep,  the  turning  of  the  magnet  to  the 
North,  the  longing  of  the  iron  for  the  magnet.2 

In  perfect  independence  of  this  system,  the  greatest  investi- 
gators of  nature  have  gradually  begun  to  recognize  the  Will  as 
the  proper  agent  in  nature.  This  is  true  of  Brandis,  Meckel, 
Burdach,  when  they  speak  of  plants ;  it  is  true  of  the  comparative 
anatomists  when  they  explain  the  structure  of  the  animal  by  its 
character  and  inclinations  ;  it  is  true  of  the  physicians  when 
they  speak  of  the  healing  power  of  nature;  it  is  true  of  the 
astronomers  when  they  construe  gravitation  as  a  mode  of  willing.5 

Were  the  world  conception  only,  it  would  justify  the  attempt 
to  reduce  everything  to  the  simplest  relations  a  priori,  that  is,  the 
arithmetical  relations,  and  to  construe  everything  into  one  huge 

*  Welt  als  Wille,  g§  17-29.  *  Do.,  \  24. 

3  Ueber  den  Willen  in  der  Natur. 

8 


114  PROLEGOMENA. 

sum  in  arithmetic,  as  Fichte's  Doctrine  of  Science  seems  to  have 
accomplished  it, — merely  seems.  As  primarily  in  my  own  body 
this  double  side  comes  to  my  consciousness,  that  my  body  is 
phenomenon,  and  that  it  is  the  thing  in  itself,  to  wit,  Will,  it 
becomes  my  key  to  this  double  cognition  of  the  entire  world. 
According  to  the  view  we  have  now  reached,  the  world  is 
nothing  but  the  objectivation  of  One  Will ;  and  Spinoza  is  right 
when,  speaking  of  freedom,  he  says  that  if  a  stone  were  con- 
scious it  would  speak  of  its  falling  as  its  Will.  As  the  character 
of  man  consists  in  his  Will,  so  is  it  with  the  quality  of  things 
which  make  up  their  character.1  Kant  was  right  when,  following 
Priestley,  he  regarded  the  essence  of  matter  as  forces.2 

XV.  The  Brain. — The  brain  is  an  organ  in  which  the  supremest 
objectivation  of  the  will  reveals  itself.  With  this  organ  alone, 
at  a  single  stroke,  the  world,  as  conception,  comes  forth  with  all 
its  forms,  object  and  subject,  time,  space,  multiplicity,  causality. 
The  brain,  with  all  its  conceptions,  whether  they  be  merely  intui- 
tive, as  in  the  animal  brain,  or  abstract,  as  in  man,  is  in  the  main 
no  more  than  an  instrument  of  the  Will.  In  the  objective  mode 
of  looking  at  the  matter,  the  brain  is  the  efflorescence  of  the 
organism.  Not  until  the  organism  reaches  its  highest  perfection 
and  complication  have  we  the  brain  appearing  in  its  greatest 
development.  The  brain,  with  its  attachments,  the  nerves  and 
spinal  marrow,  is  a  mere  fruit,  a  product,  of  the  rest  of  the  organ- 
ism,— is,  in  fact,  a  parasite  of  it,  in  as  far  as  it  does  not  directly 
interlock  into  its  mechanism,  but  serves  the  aim  of  self-preserva- 
tion only  as  it  regulates  the  relations  of  the  organism  to  the 
external  world.  Tiedemann  was  perhaps  the  first  who  compared 
the  cerebral  nervous  system  to  a  parasite.  The  comparison  is 
striking,  so  far  as  the  brain,  with  its  attachments,  the  nerves  and 
spinal  marrow,  is  as  it  were  planted  into  the  organism,  and 
nourished  by  it,  without  itself  directly  contributing  anything  to 
the  economy.  Hence  life  can  exist  without  brain,  as  in  the  case 
of  brainless  abortions,  and  of  tortoises,  which  can  live  for  three 
weeks  without  their  hearts,  if  the  medulla  oblongata,  which  is 
an  organ  of  respiration,  is  left.  A  hen  from  which  Flourens  had 
removed  the  entire  brain  lived  ten  months,  and  did  well.     Even 

»  Welt  als  Wille,  g  27.  «  Do.,  \  27.     Ueber  den  Willen  in  der  Natur,  87. 


XIII.— THEORETICAL    IDEALISM. 


115 


in  the  case  of  man  the  destruction  of  the  brain  brings  on  death 
not  directly,  but  first  through  the  lungs,  then  through  the  heart. 
The  brain,  with  its  function  of  knowing,  is  nothing  but  a  vedette 
stationed  by  the  Will,  which  looks  out  from  its  watch-tower;  the 
heart,  through  the  window  of  the  senses,  gives  warning  of  dan- 
gers, and  gives  notice  of  the  approach  of  what  is  useful,  that  the 
Will  may  decide  itself  by  its  reports.1 

XVI.  The  Senses. — It  is  a  decided  error  that  we  come  to  ob- 
jects through  the  senses.  The  senses  only  impart  sensations, 
that  is,  subjective  conditions.  The  very  sensations  which  we 
are  quickest  in  referring  to  objects — the  sensations  of  light  and 
colours — are  but  actions  of  our  retina.  In  the  retina,  therefore, 
there  is  actual  polarity,  not,  as  Goethe  supposes,  in  the  physical 
conditions  of  our  sensation.  It  is  the  activity  of  our  eye  which 
is  quantitatively  and  qualitatively  divisible,  not,  as  the  Newtonians 
suppose,  the  light  itself.  Thus  this  activity  begets  the  three,  or 
the  infinitely  many,  pairs  of  colours,  in  which  the  one  is  always 
the  complement  to  the  other  for  the  full  activity  of  the  eye.2  The 
specific  diversity  of  perception  in  each  of  the  five  senses  has  its 
cause  not  in  the  nervous  system  itself,  but  only  in  the  way  in 
which  it  is  affected.  Hence  we  may  regard  every  sensation  as 
a  modification  of  touch,  or  of  the  capacity  of  feeling  which  is 
spread  over  the  entire  body.  For  the  substance  of  the  nerves 
(apart  from  the  sympathetic  system)  is  one  and  the  same 
throughout  the  body.  The  mode  in  which  it  is  affected  is  deter- 
mined partly  by  the  nature  of  the  agent  (light,  sound,  aroma), 
partly  by  the  apparatus  through  which  it  offers  itself  to  the  im- 
pression of  this  agent.3 

XVII.  The  Ideal  and  the  Real  not  identical. — Their  diver- 
sity is  the  topic  which,  since  Descartes,  has  most  occupied  the 
philosophical  world.  Kant  has  established  this  diversity  with  such 
force  that  they  who  speak  of  the  identity  of  the  two  are  mere 
wind-bags.  Philosophy  has  a  transcendental  (ideologic)  and  a 
physiological  side.  On  the  former  side  it  is  idealism,  on  the 
latter  realism.  It  amounts  to  the  same  thing  whether  we  say 
(idealistically)  the  world  is  conception,  or  (realistically)  it  is  brain- 

•  Weltals  Wille,  3d  ed.,  ii.  273.     Ueber  den  Willen  in  Natur,  3d  ed.,  23,  24. 
2  Ueber  das  Sehen  und  die  Farben,  $$  5,  6.  3  Do.,  3d  ed.,  9. 


Il6  PROLEGOMENA. 

function.  It  is  the  same  in  effect  whether  we  had  said  (idealistic- 
ally)  Locke  took  the  side  of  the  senses,  Kant  that  of  the  under- 
standing, or  whether  we  now  say  (realistically)  Locke  has  shown 
that  what  belongs  to  the  organ  of  sense,  Kant  that  what  belongs 
to  the  brain,  does  not  belong  to  the  things  themselves.1 

XVIII.  Music  stands  completely  out  of  the  circle  of  the  other 
arts.  While  they  by  the  presentation  of  single  things  excite  the 
knowledge  of  ideas,  music  objectivates  the  entire  will;  and  while 
other  arts  speak  of  the  shadow,  it  speaks  of  the  substance.  In 
it,  therefore,  the  essential  being  of  the  world  repeats  itself:  in  the 
fundamental  bass,  inorganic,  massive  nature;  in  the  principal 
voices  singing  the  air,  the  thoughtful  life  and  effort  of  man:  the 
ripieno  voices  repeat  what  remains,  which,  from  the  crystal  to  the 
animal,  gathers  to  a  whole  its  self-sustained  consciousness.  Music, 
like  philosophy,  is  the  complete  and  just  repetition,  the  expression, 
of  the  world.  It  is,  to  parody  the  familiar  words  of  Leibnitz,  un- 
conscious metaphysics.  Music  is  the  melody  of  which  the  world 
is  the  words.  We  may  as  well  call  the  world  incorporated  music 
as  incorporated  will. 

XIX.  Theism  and  Polytheism. — Faith  in  God  (Theism)  has  its 
root  in  Egoism.  It  is  not  the  product  of  cognition,  but  of  will. 
Necessity,  the  constant  fearing  and  hoping,  brings  man  to  the 
hypostatizing  of  personal  Being,  that  he  may  have  some  one  to 
pray  to.  At  the  beginning  there  were  various  gods,  but  in  later 
time  the  necessity  of  bringing  consistency,  order,  and  unity  into 
knowledge  led  to  the  subordination  of  them  to  one,  or  the  reduc- 
tion of  them  to  one.  As  polytheism  is  the  personification  of  the 
particular  parts  and  powers  of  nature,  monotheism  is  the  personi- 
fication of  all  nature, — at  a  single  stroke. 

XX.  Buddhism. — It  is  the  resorption  into  the  primal  spirit  of 
the  Nirvana  of  the  Buddhists,  which  is  desired  by  all  those  in 
whom  the  Will  has  turned  and  denied  itself,  and  to  whom  the  real 
world,  with  all  its  suns  and  galaxies,  is  nothing.2  Buddhism,  in 
view  of  its  having  more  adherents  than  any  other  system,  and 
of  its  admirable  internal  character  and  truth,  is  to  be  regarded  as 
the  principal  religion  on  earth.  Buddhism  is  strictly  idealistic  and 
pessimistic,  and  decidedly  and  in  express  terms  atheistic,  which 

•  Ueber  den  Willen  in  der  Natur,  91.  '  Welt  als  Wille,  g  71. 


XII L— THEORETICAL    IDEALISM.  uy 

shows  how  mistaken  those  are  who  make  Religion  and  Theism 
pure  synonyms.  A  special  disadvantage  of  Christianity  is  that 
in  the  main  matter  ...  it  revolves  around  a  single  event,  and 
makes  the  destiny  of  the  world  depend  on  it.  A  religion  which 
makes  a  solitary  event  its  foundation  rests  on  a  very  weak  foun- 
dation. How  wise,  on  the  other  hand,  is  it  in  Buddhism  to 
accept  the  thousand  Buddhas!  The  moral  system  of  Christianity 
is  inferior  to  that  of  Buddhism  and  Brahminism,  in  that  it  does 
not  have  regard  to  the  animals.  Buddhism  has  the  most  perfect 
harmony  with  Schopenhauer's  philosophy,  in  its  idealism,  atheism, 
and  pessimism, — and  in  its  considering  physical  evil  as  the  result 
of  moral  defect, — in  the  doctrine  that  nature  is  to  be  redeemed 
by  man.  The  Buddhist  antithesis  of  Sansara  and  Nirvana  cor- 
responds with  Schopenhauer's  affirmation  and  negation  of  the 
Will  to  live.  Sansara  is  the  world  of  perpetual  re-births,  of 
pleasure  and  longing,  of  the  illusion  of  the  senses  and  of  shifting 
forms,  of  infancy  and  prime,  of  old  age,  sickness,  and  death. 
Nirvana,  the  Quenching,  is  redemption  from  all  this,  and  marks 
what  enters  after  the  negation  of  the  sinful  Will.1 

XXI.  The  One  and  All.  Pantheism. — The  doctrine  of  the  One 
and  All,  the  Zv  xm  xav, — that  is,  that  the  inner  essence  of  all  things 
is  one  and  the  same, — was,  subsequently  to  the  Eleati,  thoroughly 
taught  by  Scotus  Erigena,  Iordano  Bruno,  and  Spinoza.  Schelling 
has  revived  the  doctrine,  and  it  has  been  generally  grasped  in  our 
time.  But  what  this  One  is,  and  how  it  comes  to  present  itself  as 
the  Many,  is  a  problem  whose  solution  I  have  been  the  first  to 
present.  From  the  earliest  times  man  has  been  spoken  of  as  a 
Microcosm.  I  have  inverted  the  proposition,  and  have  shown 
that  the  world  is  a  Makranthropos,  in  that  Will  and  Conception 
exhaust  the  world's  being,  as  they  exhaust  man's.  With  the 
modern  Pantheists  I  hold  indeed  the  Zv  xa\  xav,  that  the  One  is 
also  the  All,  but  I  do  not  hold  their  77av  Mo-, — that  God  is  the  All. 
My  views  as  distinguished  from  theirs  involve  these  points: 

i.  Their  dkos  is  an  x,  an  unknown  quantity;  my  '  Will,'  on  the 
contrary,  is  most  accurately  known. 

2.  Their  Bkoq,  their  God,  manifests  himself  animi  causa,  to 
unfold  his  glory,  and  to  cause  himself  to  be  admired;  with  me 

1  Frauenstadt,  Schopenhauer-Lexikon,  art.  Buddhaismus. 


H8  PROLEGOMENA. 

the  Will,  by  its  objectivation,  comes,  in  what  way  soever,  to 
self-knowledge,  whereby  its  turning,  its  redemption,  becomes 
possible. 

3.  I  proceed  from  self-consciousness. 

4.  While  Pantheism  is  Optimism,  and  hence  the  world  is  re- 
garded as  the  total  possibility  of  all  being,  with  me  the  world 
also  has  space  for  the  negation  of  the  Will. 

5.  To  the  Pantheists  the  intuitional  world  is  an  unexplained 
manifestation  of  God;  to  me,  on  the  contrary,  it  is  a  conception 
per  aeeidens,  inasmuch  as  the  Intellect  is  primarily  only  a  medium 
for  the  more  perfect  phenomena  of  Will,  and  subsequently,  in  a 
perfectly  definable  way,  rises  to  objective  intuition. 

Pantheism  is  a  misnomer,  for  the  word  God  means  a  personal 
Creator,  whom  true  philosophy  denies.  Spinoza  represented  his 
system  as  Pantheism,  that  is,  called  his  substance  God,  only  to 
escape  the  fate  of  Bruno  and  Vanini.1  Pantheism  presupposes 
the  existence  of  Theism.  The  idea  would  never  originally  come 
into  any  mind,  or  a  mind  free  from  prejudice,  to  look  upon  this 
world  as  a  God. 

XXII.  Spinoza  and  his  Disciples. — Spinoza  himself  stood  far 
above  the  modern  distortions  of  his  system.  His  blunder  is  his 
Optimism,  that  'Behold,  it  was  very  good,'  which  stuck  to  him 
as  a  Jew,  so  that  he  calls  his  substance  God,  and  makes  of  it  a 
Jehovah  who  lacks  nothing  but  personality.  Hence  his  Ethics  is 
weak,  often  revolting.  With  me,  the  essence  of  the  world  is 
rather  the  crucified  One, — crucified  Saviour,  or  crucified  Male- 
factor, as  he  himself  determined  it, — and  my  Ethics  harmonizes 
with  the  Christian,  and  with  the  Brahminical  and  Buddhistic- 
Those,  finally,  who  in  their  fear  of  fatalism  substitute  for  it  the 
going  forth  of  the  world  from  a  free  act  of  will  (as  Jacobi  does) 
forget  that  there  is  a  third  view,  the  one  I  offer  :  the  Act  of  Will, 
out  of  which  the  world  springs  forth,  is  our  own.  This  Will  is 
free,  for  the  Principle  of  the  Ground,  from  which,  above  all,  neces- 
sity derives  its  significance,  is  the  mere  form  of  its  phenomenon.2 

XXIII.  Pessimism. — Optimism  regards  the  phenomena  as  the 
true,  this  world  as  the  best.  This  view  is  impious;  it  is  heathen- 
ish in  the  worst  sense  of  the  word.     It  presents  itself  in  Judaism 

»  Welt  als  Wille,  ?§  17-29.  a  Do.,  vol.,  ii.  63^-640. 


XI II.—  THE  ORETICAL    IDEAL  ISM. 


II9 


with  its  '  Behold,  it  was  very  good,'  and  most  glaringly  in  Islam, 
the  newest,  and  therefore  the  worst,  religion.  In  direct  opposition 
to  this  view,  the  oldest  and  truest  religion — which,  in  view  of  its 
possessing  these  qualities,  we  may  call  Pessimism — regards  all 
being  as  guilt  and  as  misfortune.  The  only  true  and  profound 
thing  in  Judaism  is  its  dogma  of  the  Fall.  This  is  the  only  point 
at  which  real  Christianity  coheres  with  Judaism.  Hence  Chris- 
tianity rightly  teaches  original  sin,  and  properly  uses  the  words 
world  and  evil  as  synonyms.1 

'In  fact,  it  is  mockery  to  speak  of  that  as  the  "best  world" 
in  which  life  is  but  the  alternation  of  pain  and  weariness,  where 
the  happiest  has  no  moments  more  blissful  than  those  of  slum- 
ber, and  the  hopeless  no  moment  more  wretched  than  the 
moment  of  waking.  Because  Life  is  guilt,  it  is  punished  with 
Death.  How  much  nearer  the  truth  on  this  point  does  Hume 
stand  than  Leibnitz,  whose  Optimism  has  no  other  merit  than 
that  of  having  occasioned  Voltaire's  CandideP* 

XXIV.  Death  and  Life. — To  say  I  shall  pass  away,  but  the 
world  will  continue  to  run  its  course,  is  not,  strictly  speaking, 
correct.  We  should  rather  say,  The  world  (which  I  see)  shall 
pass  away,  but  I  (my  true  being)  am  eternal.  The  death  of  the 
individual  is  for  the  race  what  falling  asleep  is  to  the  individual, 
and  hence  the  life  of  the  race  seems  like  an  oscillation,  the  vibra- 
tions of  which  are  produced  by  the  passing  away  of  the  persons 
that  have  lived  and  the  entrance  of  the  new.  The  primary  aimj 
of  all  religions  and  philosophical  systems  is  to  furnish  an  anti- 
dote to  the  certainty  of  death.  When  a  man  dies  a  world  per- 
ishes,— the  world  which  he  bore  in  his  head.  The  more  intelli- 
gent the  head,  the  more  clear,  significant,  and  comprehensive  was 
its  world,  the  more  terrible  is  its  destruction.  With  the  animal 
perishes  only  a  poor  rhapsody,  or  sketch  of  a  world.  The  cause 
of  old  age  and  death  is  not  a  physical  one ;  it  is  metaphysical. 
From  the  cessation  of  the  organic  life  of  an  individual  we  are 
no  more  to  infer  that  the  force  which  actuated  that  life  is  annihi- 
lated than  we  are  to  infer  that  the  spinning-girl  is  dead  because 
her  wheel  stands  still.  We  know  well  what  we  lose  by  death, 
but  we  know  not  what  we  gain.     A  comfort  which  can  always 

1  Welt  als  Wille,  g  63.  '  Do.,  vol.  ii.  ch.  46. 


I2o  PROLEGOMENA. 

be  grasped  by  every  one  is:  Death  is  as  natural  as  life.  The  indi- 
viduality of  the  most  of  men  is  so  pitiful  that  they  lose  nothing 
in  losing  it.  The  only  thing  in  them  of  value  is  the  common 
humanity,  and  that  will  never  pass  away.  In  fact,  every  indi- 
viduality is  at  bottom  only  a  special  error, — something  which 
had  better  not  be, — hence,  something  which  ought  not  to  be, — 
and  that  is  the  reason  we  cease  to  be.  Death,  even  more  than 
sorrow,  has  the  power  to  hallow.  Every  death  is  in  some  sense 
an  apotheosis,  and  hence  the  dead  body  of  the  lowliest  of  the 
race  cannot  be  looked  upon  without  reverence.  What  the  bad 
man  most  fears  is  certain  to  come  to  him, — that  is,  death.  It  is 
just  as  certain  to  the  good  man,  but  to  him  it  is  welcome.  The 
fear  of  death  is  independent  of  all  knowledge.  The  animal  has 
it,  though  it  knows  nothing  of  death.  Everything  that  is  born 
brings  this  fear  with  it  into  the  world. 

XXV.  Estimates  of  Schopenhauer. — Imperfect  as  is  this  pre- 
sentation of  Schopenhauer's  views,  we  think  that  the  reader  can- 
not fail  to  be  struck  with  their  wonderful  brilliancy.  Herbart, 
who  is  of  so  different  a  school,  in  speaking  of  the  great  men 
who  have  developed  the  system  of  Kant,  pronounces  '  Fichte 
the  profoundest,  Schelling  the  most  comprehensive,  but  Schopen- 
hauer the  most  lucid,  the  most  versatile,  the  most  attractive.' 
He  says  that  it  is  an  extremely  rare  thing  to  find  an  extended 
acquaintance  with  literature  so  variously  and  felicitously  used  to 
render  luminous  the  objects  of  speculation  as  in  Schopenhauer's 
'  World  as  Will,'  through  whose  seven  hundred  pages  scarcely  a 
sentence  reveals  the  decline  of  the  life  which  glows  through  it. 
The  image,  clouded  with  such  obscurities  in  Fichte  and  Schel- 
ling, is  clearly  mirrored  in  Schopenhauer,  whose  book,  because 
of  its  clearness,  is  best  adapted  to  show  that  '  this  most  recent, 
idealistic  Spinozistic  philosophy,  in  whatever  way  it  shifts,  in 
whatever  form  it  reveals  itself,  is  and  remains  alike  erroneous.'1 

The  general  estimate  of  Schopenhauer  which  Zeller  has 
given  makes  any  other  unnecessary  :  '  Schopenhauer  does  not 
merely  take  an  exalted  position  in  philosophical  literature  as  a 
writer,  but  was  a  man  of  extraordinary  intellectual  endowments, 
of  many-sided  culture,  and  adapted,  in  a  decided  measure,  for 

1  Herbart's  Review,  1819,  in  his  Works,  xii.  369. 


X III.— THEORETICAL  IDEALISM.  I2i 

philosophical  investigation,  by  the  acuteness  of  his  thinking,  the 
force  of  his  intuition.  That  it  was„nevertheless,  in  common  with 
Beneke,  his  destiny  long  to  remain  little  known,  that  not  until 
toward  the  end  of  his  life,  and  subsequently,  he  attracted  any 
general  or  appreciative  notice,  is  to  be  accounted  for  in  part  by 
the  character  of  his  philosophy  and  its  antagonism  to  the  pre- 
vailing modes  of  thought,  but  is  due  in  no  little  measure  to  his 
personal  peculiarities  and  conduct.  High  as  was  his  scientific 
aspiration,  lively  as  was  his  feeling  for  the  beautiful,  cultivated 
as  was  his  taste,  and  strong  as  was  the  ideal  impulse  of  his  na- 
ture, it  is  no  less  true  that,  on  the  other  side,  his  sensuality  was 
indomitable,  his  self-esteem  .  and  self-laudation  boundless,  his 
vanity  pitiful,  his  ambition  consuming,  and  his  selfishness  illimit- 
able. Incapable  of  drawing  out  of  himself,  and  lifting  himself 
by  science  above  his  personal  infirmities,  he  carried  over  into  his 
system  all  the  whimseys  of  his  capricious  nature.  Every  defence 
and  every  success  of  a  contemporary  system  he  regarded  as  an 
attempt  on  the  life  of  his  own  renown,  and  this  aroused  his  im- 
placable hatred,  which  poured  itself  out  in  passionate  invectives. 
Instead  of  continuing  patiently  to  labour  for  the  position  which  he 
felt  entitled  to  claim,  he  withdrew  himself  into  a  corner  and  pouted. 
'Schopenhauer's  philosophy  is  the  idealistic  counterpart  of 
Herbart's  Realism.  Both  proceed  primarily  from  Kant;  both 
passed  through  Fichte's  school,  the  one  in  Jena,  the  other  in 
Berlin  ;  both  were  as  little  satisfied  with  him  as  with  Schelling 
and  Hegel,  and  desired  to  construct  a  new  system  on  a  Kantian 
basis,  to  draw  out  more  correctly  the  consequences  of  Kant's 
Criticism.  But  in  their  apprehension  of  Kant,  and  in  their  judg- 
ment of  what  was  needed  to  improve  him,  they  sundered  from 
each  other  in  exactly  opposite  directions.  What  the  one  extolled 
as  his  highest  merit  the  other  regarded  as  his  greatest  weakness. 
Herbart,  to  avoid  Fichte's  Idealism,  turned  back  to  Leibnitz  and 
Wolff.  Schopenhauer,  little  as  he  was  willing  to  confess  it,  and 
with  all  the  malevolence  and  depreciation  with  which  he  judged 
Fichte,  did  no  more  than  go  back  to  Fichte  to  improve  and 
complete  his  Idealism.  As  Herbart's  Realism  went  over  into 
Idealism,  so  Schopenhauer's  Idealism  went  over  into  a  hard 
Realism,  a  materialistic  Pantheism. 


122  PROLEGOMENA. 

'  .  .  .  A  system  which  runs  into  such  gross  contradictions  may 
certainly  embrace  many  fruitful  thoughts,  many  valuable  obser- 
vations,— and  we  willingly  concede  that  Schopenhauer's  system 
is  not  wanting  in  these ;  but  as  a  whole,  as  a  system  it  is,  in  its 
most  favourable  aspect,  no  more  than  a  brilliant  paradox.' x 


XIV.  The  Strength  and  Weakness  of  Idealism. 

It  is  impossible  to  understand  the  weakness  of  a  system  without 
understanding  its  strength.  The  strength  and  weakness  of  Ideal- 
ism connect  themselves  with  the  same  facts  and  principles,  so  that 
they  can  readily  be  grouped  in  pains  and  reduced  to  parallels. 

I.  It  rests  on  generally  recognized  principles  in  regard  to  con- 
sciousness [1I7].  Its  definition  of  consciousness  is  the  one  most 
widely  received :  the  mind's  recognition  of  its  own  conditions. 
It  maintains  that  the  cognitions  of  consciousness  are  absolute  and 
infallible,  and  that  nothing  but  these  is,  in  their  degree,  knowledge. 
In  all  these  postulates  the  great  mass  of  thinkers  agree  with 
Idealism.  The  foundation  of  Idealism  is  the  common  foundation 
of  nearly  all  the  developed  philosophical  thinking  of  all  schools. 
Idealism  declares  that  while  consciousness  is  infallible,  our  inter- 
pretations of  it,  on  which  we  base  inferences,  may  be  incorrect;  and 
nearly  all  thinkers  of  all  schools  agree  with  Idealism  here.  No 
inference,  or  class  of  inferences,  in  which  a  mistake  ever  occurs 
is  a  basis  of  positive  knowledge.  Hence,  says  Idealism,  only 
that  which  is  directly  in  consciousness  is  positively  known,  and 
nothing  is  directly  in  consciousness  but  the  mind's  own  states. 
Therefore  we  know  nothing  more  [II8].  So  completely  has  this 
general  conviction  taken  possession  of  the  philosophical  mind, 
that  even  antagonists  of  Idealism,  who  would  cut  it  up  by  the 
roots  if  they  could  cut  this  up,  have  not  pretended  that  it  could  be 
done.  Dependent  on  and  involved  in  its  postulate  regarding  con- 
sciousness, is  the  idealistic  postulate,  '  An  idea  can  be  like  no- 
thing but  an  idea;'  that  is,  the  mental  image  cannot  be  like  some 
supposed  material  thing,  of  which  it  is  asserted  to  be  an  image. 
To  a  certain  point  at  least,  nearly  all  the  thinking  of  philosophers 
is  consonant  with  this  postulate.     The  subjective  cannot  be  like 

1  Zeller,  Gesch.  d.  deutschen  Philosophic  (1873),  872-874,  894. 


XI V.—A  N  ES  TIM  A  TE    OF   IDEAL  ISM. 


123 


the  objective ;  the  idea  of  a  house  cannot  be  like  a  house.  The 
proposition,  taken  in  one  way,  is  a  truism.  The  idea  of  a  house 
cannot  be  like  a  house :  the  idea  is  intellectual,  the  house  is  ma- 
terial ;  the  idea  is  in  my  mind,  the  house  is  external  to  my  mind; 
the  house  is  a  complex  of  modifications  of  materials,  the  idea  is 
a  modification  of  the  immaterial ;  my  idea  in  no  respect  is  a  cause 
of  the  house,  the  house  is  in  a  certain  respect  one  of  the  causes  of 
my  idea ;  the  idea  depends  on  acts  on  the  mind,  acts  in  the  mind, 
acts  of  the  mind,  the  house  depends  on  none  of  these.  Bricks 
and  mortar  are  not  like  mental  modes.  '  The  beings  of  the  mind 
are  not  of  clay.' 

But  while  Idealism  has  here  a  speculative  strength,  which  it 
is  not  wise  to  ignore,  it  is  not  without  its  weakness,  even  at  this 
very  point,  for  its  history  shows  that  it  is  rarely  willing  to  stand 
unreservedly  by  the  results  of  its  own  principle  as  regards  con- 
sciousness. If  it  accept  only  the  direct  and  infallible  knowledge 
supplied  in  consciousness,  it  has  no  common  ground  left  but  this, 
— that  there  is  the  one  train  of  ideas,  which  passes  in  the  con- 
sciousness of  a  particular  individual.  A  consistent  Idealist  can 
claim  to  know  no  more  than  this, — that  there  exist  ideas  in  his 
consciousness.  He  cannot  know  that  he  has  a  substantial  per- 
sonal existence,  or  that  there  is  any  other  being,  finite  or  infinite, 
beside  himself.  And  as  many  Idealists  are  not  satisfied  with  main- 
taining that  we  do  not  know  that  there  is  an  external  world,  but  go 
further,  and  declare  that  we  know  that  there  is  not  an  external 
world,  they  must  for  consistency's  sake  hold  that  an  Idealist  knows 
that  there  is  nothing,  thing  or  person,  beside  himself.  Solipsism, 
or  absolute  Egoism,  with  the  exclusion  of  proper  personality,  is  the 
logic  of  Idealism,  if  the  inferential  be  excluded.  But  if  inference, 
in  any  degree  whatever,  be  allowed,  not  only  would  the  natural 
logic  and  natural  inference  of  most  men  sweep  away  Idealism, 
but  its  own  principle  of  knowledge  is  subverted  by  the  terms  of 
the  supposition.  Idealism  stands  or  falls  by  the  principle  that 
no  inference  is  knowledge.  We  may  reach  inferences  by  knowl- 
edge, but  we  can  never  reach  knowledge  by  inference. 

'  An  idea  can  be  like  nothing  but  an  idea.'  We  have  said  that 
in  one  sense  this  is  a  truism.  There  is  another  sense,  in  which  it 
is  a  sophism.     As  a  truism  it  is  like  the  proposition  that  the  most 


124 


PROLEGOMENA. 


perfect  portrait  cannot  be  like  the  face,  that  a  picture  can  only  be 
like  a  picture.  The  face  is  flesh  and  blood,  the  picture  is  oil  and 
colour;  the  face  changes  its  hues  and  expression,  the  picture  can- 
not change;  the  face  is  rounded  and  diversified  to  the  touch,  the 
painting  is  on  one  surface.  And  yet  the  portrait  is  like  the  face, 
and  the  idea  is  like  the  object.  The  portrait  is  like  the  face  in 
this,  that  through  the  light  which  it  modifies,  as  its  medium,  it 
produces  certain  effects  on  the  consciousness  like  those  which  the 
face  itself  produces  through  the  same  medium.  Under  the  same 
laws,  the  idea  is  like  the  object,  in  that  it  is  a  faithful  mental  pic- 
ture, drawn  under  divine  laws,  by  the  touches  of  the  senses,  con- 
formably to  the  innate  conditions  of  the  mind  itself.  It  is  the 
picture  of  the  object,  painted  by  the  object  itself,  through  its 
media,  on  the  canvas,  which  is  conscious  of  the  picture  it  bears; 
or  rather  it  is  a  photograph  which  becomes  a  picture  by  the 
modification  produced  through  the  media,  and  by  the  internal 
changes  of  the  sensitive  substratum,  which  co-acts  responsively  to 
the  media.  The  object  is  as  it  seems  to  the  mind,  and  the  idea 
is  like  the  object,  so  far,  that  there  is  a  real  correspondence,  cor- 
relation, analogy,  conformity,  between  the  object  mediating  through 
its  means  of  force  and  the  idea  co-mediated  by  these  means,  and 
by  the  powers,  connate  or  educated,  of  the  mind  itself.  That  which 
produces  the  phenomenon  is  in  the  real  accord  of  natural  cause  and 
effect  with  the  phenomenon.  Different  phenomena  imply  differ- 
ent objects,  or  different  conditions  of  the  same  object.  In  Ideal- 
ism there  is  no  object  beyond  the  mind  and  correspondent  with 
the  phenomenon,  but  the  phenomenon  itself  exhausts  the  whole 
conception  of  object.  It  is  not  the  phenomenon  of  an  object,  but 
is  itself  object.  Hence  Idealism  proper  holds  that  in  the  phe- 
nomenon we  in  no  sense  grasp  anything  beyond  it,  while  Idealistic 
Realism  holds  that  in  an  important  sense,  though  mediately, 
we  do  grasp  the  thing  beyond, — in  other  words,  that  the  medium 
establishes  a  real  relation  between  the  object  itself  and  the  mind. 

2.  Idealism  seems  to  be  strong  in  the  fact  that  it  rests  upon 

generally  accepted   principles  in  regard   to   the  personality  of 

man.     The  common  view,  with  which  Idealism  concurs,  is  that .. 

v-4-not  the  whole  man,  which  is  the  Ego,  but  that  only  man's  mind, 

is  the  Ego ;  that  man  is  not  a  person,  but  merely  has  a  person  : 


XI V.—A  N  ES  TIM  A  TE    OF  IDEAL  ISM. 


125 


in  brief,  that  man  is  not  man.  It  assumes  the  simplicity  of  man 
proper.  The  Cartesian  construction  of  man  and  of  person  is  the 
received  one,  and  this  is  the  construction  on  which  Idealism 
builds.  When  we  are  conscious  of  our  self,  we  are  not  conscious 
of  the  material  nature  associated  with  our  self.  The  assertion 
of  Idealism  which  strikes  most  persons  as  the  extremest  of  its 
absurdities,  to  wit,  that  we  have  not  substantial  bodies,  or  do  not 
directly  know  we  have  them,  is  a  mere  logical  necessity  from  the 
commonly-received  principle, — a  principle  very  probably  held  by 
the  very  people  who  ignorantly  stand  aghast  at  its  inevitable  in- 
ference. The  dualistic  Realists,  on  their  own  principles,  no  more 
know  that  they  have  bodies  than  the  Idealists  do;  and  hence  some 
of  the  strongest  dualistic  Realists,  like  the  Scotch  school  in  gen- 
eral, lay  the  foundations  of  an  extreme  Idealism  in  the  very  effort 
to  overthrow  the  older  and  weaker  one.  In  denying  Berkeley 
they  unconsciously  assert  Fichte.1  This  school  has  consequently 
shown  a  tendency,  in  some  of  its  latest  and  noblest  representa- 
tives, to  run  out  into  a  sad  indeterminism,  or  to  go  over  to  the 
Idealism  against  which  it  has  fought  for  a  century.2 

But  the  seeming  strength  of  idealism  here  is  really  a  weakness ; 
for,  in  common  with  the  received  dualism,  it  accepts  a  false  con- 
struction of  the  personality  of  man.  The  attestation  of  conscious- 
ness is  as  real  to  the  substantial  existence  of  our  bodies,  as  an 
integral  part  of  our  person,  as  it  is  to  the  substantial  existence 
of  our  minds.  There  is  no  sort  of  proof  proper  that  man  is 
spirit,  apart  from  proof  that  he  also  is  body  [II9]. 

3.  Closely  connected  with  the  false  dualism  of  the  popular 
system  in  regard  to  the  person  of  man  is  its  construction  of  the 
relation  of  matter  to  mind.  This  also  has  always  been  a  tower 
of  strength  to  Idealism  ;  and  it  is  one  of  its  unquestionable  bene- 
fits, that  it  has  shown  the  untenableness  of  the  old  position.  If 
the  choice  must  lie  between  occasionalism,  pre-established  har- 
mony, and  materialistic  physical  influence  on  the  one  side,  or 
Idealism  on  the  other,  every  sound  thinker  will  accept  Idealism, 
at  least  provisionally,  as  not  so  great  an  evil  as  the  others.  The 
ignorant  physicist  sometimes  says,  "  We  know  that  there  is  matter. 
Why  need  we  go  further  to  an  unknown  something  called  mind  ?' 

1  See  Prolegomena,  V.  10,  15,  20.  *  See  Prolegomena,  IV.  6,  13,  VI.  14. 


126  PROLEGOMENA. 

But  his  very  assertion  is  self-destructive.  It  implies  the  priority 
of  the  something  knowing  to  the  something  known.  He  has 
not  been  able  to  assert  matter  without  postulating  mind.  You 
not  only  cannot  prove  matter,  you  cannot  define  it,  without  im- 
plying the  existence  of  mind.  In  its  assertion  that  mind  is  first, 
Idealism  is  beyond  all  successful  assault. 

Berkeley  here  did  a  great  work  in  pulling  down  the  false,  in 
showing  the  defects  of  the  existing,  systems.  Descartes  and 
Malebranche  accepted  matter,  and  were  at  a  loss  what  to  do  with 
it.  It  was  simply  in  their  way.  Locke's  was  the  magnificent 
chaos  of  all  systems.  It  only  needed  selection  to  determine 
whether  his  views  should  be  developed  into  scepticism,  material- 
ism, idealism,  or  realism.  Were  Berkeley  but  a  blind  giant,  it 
was,  at  this  point  at  least,  not  in  the  temple  of  a  true  God  that 
he  reached  forth  his  hands  to  feel  the  pillars.  It  was  Philistia's 
temple  of  false  theories  that  fell.  If  Berkeley  was  not  a  Solomon, 
he  was  at  least  a  Samson.  His  argument  against  matter  is,  as 
directed  against  some  of  the  dominant  theories  he  assailed,  simply 
invincible.  If  matter  were  no  more  than  what  they  assumed  it 
to  be,  could  do  no  more  than  they  supposed  it  to  do,  it  was  a 
mere  obstruction,  which  it  was  a  relief  to  sweep  out  of  the  way. 
If  the  battle  was  not  won,  the  deck  was  at  least  cleared  for 
action. 

Yet  at  this  point  it  is  a  weakness  of  Idealism  that,  in  regard 
to  the  relation  of  mind  and  matter,  it  attempts  to  set  aside  false 
theories  by  repudiating  well-grounded  facts.  The  evidence  that 
facts  are  facts  is  not  weakened  by  the  false  theories  that  are 
broached  to  account  for  them,  nor  by  our  inability  to  offer  any 
theory  which  explains  them.  Idealism  may  overthrow  occasional- 
ism, or  pre-existent  harmony,  or  physical  influence,  or  any  and 
every  theory  as  to  the  mode  in  which  the  non-Ego  operates  on  the 
Ego;  but  the  fact  that  the  non-Ego  does  operate  on  the  Ego  re- 
mains untouched.  In  denying  the  fact,  Idealism  is  forced  out  of 
itself  into  scepticism,  its  own  theory  becomes  chaotic  and  pre- 
posterous, and  it  reacts  into  realism,  or  even  materialism,  or  runs 
out  into  nihilism.  We  know  too  little  of  the  ultimate  nature  and 
relations  of  matter  and  mind  to  venture  beyond  the  ground  of 
facts  in  regard  to  them.     In  matter  are  hidden  divine  forces ;  it 


XIV.— AN  ESTIMATE    OF   IDEALISM.  127 

too  is  worthy  of  God ;  it  too  is  an  out-thought  of  God ;  and  we 
cannot  measure  it,  because  we  cannot  measure  Him.  We  cannot 
think  too  highly  of  spirit,  but  we  can  think  too  little  of  matter. 
Matter,  too,  is  in  the  sphere  of  faith.  We  cannot  walk  all  through 
its  domains  by  sight  merely.  There  are  three  spheres  of  wonder 
in  thought.  The  lowest  is  simple  matter,  with  its  mysteries 
and  beauty  and  grandeur.  The  highest  is  pure  Spirit,  the  self- 
existent  Cause  of  the  Universe,  and  his  angels.  Midway  between 
is  the  being  in  whom  spirit  takes  to  itself  matter,  not  that  they 
may  mechanically  cohere  with  their  wonders  separated,  but  that 
a  new  world  of  wonder  may  arise, — mysterious  forces,  and  forces 
which  neither  simple  matter,  nor  pure  spirit,  in  their  isolation, 
possesses.  Matter  and  mind  conjoined  do  not  merely  add  their 
powers  each  to  each,  but  evolve  new  powers,  incapable  of  exist- 
ence outside  of  their  union. 

4.  Idealism  in  its  best  forms  addresses  a  powerful  appeal  to 
confidence  in  making  so  much  of  the  universe  as  a  thing  of 
thought.  Its  Platonic  harmony  with  the  idea  as  the  primal  thing, 
the  presupposed  model  of  the  existent  in  nature,  is  part  of  its 
strength.  Against  the  theories  of  blind  fate,  of  aimless  chance, 
of  evolution,  without  mind  to  guide  it,  of  unconscious  nature 
fretting  itself  into  form  or  consciousness,  in  the  happy  accidents 
of  millions  of  ages  of  failure, — against  the  theories  that  in  any 
sense  make  mind  the  product  or  function  of  matter,  or  put  it  after 
matter,  or  co-ordinate  it  with  matter, — the  best  Idealism,  in 
asserting  spirit  as  the  glorious  original,  asserts  plan  as  before  all 
evolution,  asserts  that  the  entire  phenomenal,  whether  physical 
or  spiritual,  finds  its  last  root  and  cause  in  personal  reason. 

But  while  it  is  a  strength  of  Idealism  that  it  confesses  the 
thought  in  the  universe,  it  is  its  weakness  that  it  denies  the  word. 
The  word  is  the  body  of  the  thought,  the  medium  through  which 
thought  awakens  thought,  and  by  which  mind  is  operative  on 
mind.  After  all  its  efforts,  Idealism  totally  fails  to  give  an  intel- 
ligible account  of  the  excitation  of  thought.  Berkeley  is  totally 
unsatisfactory  in  the  explanation  of  the  impartation  of  the  divine 
ideas  to  us,  and  simply  helpless  when  he  confesses,  but  leaves 
unexplained,  the  fact  that  the  mind  of  one  man  communicates 
excitation  to  the  mind  of  another.      Fichte  confesses  that  the 


128  PROLEGOMENA. 

positing  of  the  non-Ego,  as  the  non-Ego  inevitably  appears  in 
every  man's  experience,  is  incapable  of  explication  ('unbegreif- 
liche') ;  and  Schelling,  in  his  Fichtean  period,  acknowledges  that 
while  the  limitation  of  the  Ego,  in. a  general  way,  can  be  explained, 
'the  definite  limitation  of  it  is  the  incomprehensible  and  inexplicable 
demand  in  philosophy.'1 

Berkeley  appeals  to  the  omnipotence  of  God  as  capable  of 
making  direct  impressions  on  the  mind ;  but  the  first  sentence 
of  the  Principles  shows  that  God  is  not  the  object  of  human 
knowledge, — we  have  no  more  than  our  knowledge  of  our  idea 
of  Him.  We  know  the  idea,  not  the  Being.  Berkeley  can  find 
no  solution  of  the  facts  he  admits,  except  by  a  tacit  desertion  of 
his  own  principles  of  knowledge.  Matter,  in  many  of  its  aspects, 
may  be  considered  as  the  medium  of  thought,  the  interpreting 
word  of  God's  mind, — the  necessary  condition  of  man's  con- 
scious relation  to  man;  but  of  all  these,  in  its  Gnostic  undervalua- 
tion of  matter,  Idealism  has  persistently  taken  no  notice. 

5.  Closely  allied  with  the  position  it  assigns  to  thought,  is  the 
strength  which  Idealism  derives  from  the  conception  of  the 
phenomena  of  the  universe,  as  language  in  which  mind  speaks  to 
mind,  or  speaks  to  itself.  '  Day  unto  day  uttereth  speech,  and 
night  unto  night  showeth  knowledge;  there  is  no  speech  nor 
language,  where  their  voice  is  not  heard.' 

Yet,  while  Idealism  speaks  much  of  language,  it  is  a  language 
without  words,  without  lip,  and  without  ear.  It  has  no  words, 
for  words  are  not  ideas,  but  the  representatives  of  ideas,  and  the 
media  of  expressing  them ;  and  Idealism  has  no  medium  be- 
tween minds, — it  has  mind  speaking  without  words,  articulating 
without  organs,  and  heard  without  an  ear.  Its  words  are  self- 
uttered,  that  is,  unuttered, — self-heard,  and  therefore  unheard. 

But  while  objective  nature  is  like  language  in  that  it  reveals 
mind  to  mind,  it  is  even  as  a  revealer  greatly  unlike  language  in 
many  respects.  Objective  nature  is  not  only  a  means  to  an  intel- 
lectual end,  but  is  also  in  some  respects  an  end  to  itself.  And 
even  when  it  is  a  means,  it  is,  in  its  first  and  most  direct  intent,  a 
means  to  a  natural,  not  to  an  intellectual,  end.  The  bird  has 
faculties  for  itself  alone ;  and  those  which  it  has  for  me  it  shares 

1  System  des  transcendental  Idealismus,  118. 


XIV.-AN  ESTIMATE    OF  IDEALISM.  129 

with  me.  It  does  not  only  sing  for  me,  it  sings  for  itself  also. 
The  flowers  that  blush  unseen  are  not  lost,  and  the  sweetness 
shed  on  the  desert  air  is  not  wasted.  The  intermediate  purposes 
of  nature  do  not  find  their  analogy  in  language,  and  hence  the 
conception  of  language  fails  to  cover  the  whole  problem.  It 
does  not  answer  to  build  a  system  on  the  straining  of  a  metaphor. 
But  the  secret  force  of  the  analogy,  even  as  far  as  we  grant  it,  is 
not  what  it  ought  to  be  for  the  ends  of  Idealism.  Objective 
nature  has  not  the  arbitrary  character  of  language.  Talking  man 
has  innumerable  languages, — man  as  the  excitant  of  the  percep- 
tions of  his  fellow  has  but  one  language,  and  to  percipient  man 
nature  addresses  but  one.  The  man  of  spoken  language  is 
'homo,'  and  'anthropos,' — and  the  nation  of  'homo'  does  not 
understand  '  anthropos ;'  but  nature's  man  is  man  himself,  as- 
serting himself  to  the  normal  perception  of  the  whole  race  in  the 
one  perception,  in  its  kind  identical  and  unmistakable.  If  nature 
finds  in  language  some  of  her  parallels,  she  finds  in  it,  in  others, 
her  contrasts.  She  is  so  vast,  and  so  manifold,  that  she  soon  ex- 
hausts the  figure  and  leaves  it  behind  her.  The  spoons  of  our 
Systems  never  throw  back  the  tide-line  of  her  ocean. 

6.  Idealism  has  been  strengthened  by  the  obscurity,  confusion, 
and  vacillation  of  thinkers  in  regard  to  the  notion  of  substance, 
or  of  the  '  thing  in  itself! 

Yet  Idealism  itself  involves  all  the  most  serious  demands  of 
the  notion  of  substance,  falls  into  its  greatest  difficulties,  and 
complicates  instead  of  relieving  them.  The  difficulties  touching 
substance  are  in  the  sphere  of  the  ideal.  But  although  it  raises 
the  difficulties,  it  never  settles  them.  It  has  all  the  empirical 
difficulties  in  accounting  for  what  seems,  and  then  the  compli- 
cating difficulty,  which  haunts  it  all  through,  that  this  only  seems. 
It  is  encumbered  with  the  perplexity  of  treating  physical  sub- 
stance as  if  it  were  a  fact,  while  it  yet  conceives  of  it  as  a  fiction. 
In  a  word,  it  is  encumbered  with  all  the  embarrassments  brought 
in  by  the  idea  of  physical  substance,  yet  can  avail  itself  of  none 
of  the  relief  the  idea  brings. 

7.  Closely  allied  with  the  notion  of  substance  is  that  of  cause 
and  causality,  whose  obscurities  have  given  a  place  of  shelter  to 
idealistic  speculation. 

9 


130 


PROLEGOMENA. 


But  Idealism  is  no  less  weak  than  other  systems  in  its  inter- 
pretation of  causality,  The  causal  relation  of  intellectual  forces 
and  effects,  of  mental  precedences  and  successions,  is  not  only 
as  obscure  in  its  own  nature  as  is  physical  causation,  but  is,  in 
fact,  the  source  of  difficulty  as  regards  the  physical.  It  is  the 
adjustment  in  the  mental  construction  which  creates  the  per- 
plexity. Here,  as  in  regard  to  substance,  Idealism  is  compelled 
to  accept  experience  as  a  source  of  difficulties,  yet  dare  not  use 
it  as  a  means  of  relief  from  them. 

8.  It  is  an  element  of  strength  in  Idealism,  in  common  with 
all  monistic  systems,  that  it  appeals  to  the  love  of  unity  natural 
to  the  mind.  All  great  tendencies  in  human  nature  point  in 
some  way  to  great  truths, — to  some  truth  possessed  or  some 
truth  needed.  When  they  swing  and  tremble,  it  is  still  under  a 
prevailing  drawing  toward  the  true;  and  when  they  at  last  lie 
still  and  point  steadily,  they  point  to  the  pole.  One  of  the  most 
marked  desires  of  human  thought  is  toward  unity,  to  make  as 
nearly  as  may  be  the  One  the  All.  The  great  struggle  of  think- 
ing has  been  toward  a  monistic  construction  of  the  facts,  and 
this  has  given  us  Pantheism,  Materialism,  Idealism,  and  the  Doc- 
trine of  Identity. 

It  is  a  weakness  of  Idealism,  in  common  with  Materialism  and 
Pantheism,  that  it  finds  unity  not  in  the  harmony  of  the  things 
that  differ,  but  in  the  absorption  of  the  one  into  the  other.  Two 
sets  of  things  are  before  us  in  the  natural  construction  of  expe- 
rience, as  all  schools  alike  admit, — things  spiritual,  things  mate- 
rial. Before  they  begin  to  philosophize,  the  Materialist  and  the 
Idealist  wholly  agree  on  the  phenomenal  facts.  There  seems  to 
be  a  world  external  to  me,  and  I  seem  to  be  conscious  that  there 
is.  But  when  they  begin  to  philosophize,  the  Materialist  insists 
that,  as  such  a  thing  as  mind  is  supposed  to  be  can  neither  act 
on  matter  nor  be  acted  on  by  matter,  there  can  be  no  mind.  The 
Idealist,  holding  to  the  fundamental  mode  of  the  Materialist 
construction,  simply  inverting  the  terms,  says,  'As  such  a  thing 
as  matter  is  supposed  to  be  can  neither  act  on  mind  nor  be 
acted  on  by  mind,  there  is  no  such  thing  as  matter.  Each  is  a 
dogmatist,  arbitrarily  assuming  the  element,  by  which  he  will 
stand,  as  separate  from  the  other,  and  each,  by  the  thing  he  re- 


XIV.— AN  ESTIMATE    OF  IDEALISM.  131 

jects,  making  void  the  thing  by  which  he  holds.  For  there  is 
no  genuine  proof  that  there  is  matter  which  is  not  a  proof  that 
there  is  mind,  no  genuine  proof  that  there  is  mind  which  is  not 
a  proof  that  there  is  matter.  All  proof  of  the  existence  of  matter 
links  itself  with  the  consciousness  which  the  mind  has  of  certain 
facts  which  involve  the  existence  of  matter;  all  proofs  of  the  ex- 
istence of  mind  are  linked  with  the  evidences  that  matter  operates 
on  it  and  is  operated  on  by  it.  Matter  isolated  from  mind  is  un- 
known, and  mind  isolated  from  matter  is  unknowing.  As  sub- 
ject and  object  are  correlate  terms,  and  the  real  existence  of  the 
thing  in  one  term  of  the  relation  implies  the  real  existence  of  the 
other,  so  mind  and  matter  are  not  opposites,  but  correlates.  As 
philosophy  alone  knows  them,  there  can  be  no  mind  conceived 
without  matter,  no  matter  conceived  without  mind.  Materialism 
and  Idealism  are  alike  forms  of  direct  self-contradiction. 

9.  It  is  a  source  of  strength  to  Idealism  that  with  its  principles 
various  speculative  errors,  especially  Materialism,  seem  to  be 
most  effectually  overthrown.  The  hope  of  accomplishing  this 
was  one  of  Berkeley's  practical  incentives.  That  he  has  not  ac- 
complished this  in  the  manner  and  to  the  degree  he  proposed  is 
certain,  but  his  labours  were  nevertheless  not  a  failure.  Berke- 
ley has  helped  to  lay  an  immovable  foundation  for  a  true  esti- 
mate of  the  value  of  the  soul  and  of  the  majesty  of  mind.  Quite 
outside  of  this  peculiar  speculation,  in  which  many  may  decline 
to  follow  him, — and,  indeed,  the  more  potently  if  we  drop  it, — 
he  has  helped  to  fix  forever,  to  thoughtful  men,  evidence  of  the 
personality,  the  independent  existence,  the  amazing  faculties  of 
man's  spirit.  If  he  has  not  demonstrated  that  there  is  no  sub- 
stantial body,  he  has  demonstrated  that,  whatever  body  may  be, 
it  is  for  the  soul ;  that  matter  is  for  mind ;  that  the  psychical 
rules  the  physical ;  that  the  spirit  is  the  educator  of  the  organs ; 
that  the  universe  is  expressed  thought  and  embodied  plan ;  it  is 
conceived  by  mind  for  mind,  is  the  language  in  which  the  In- 
finite Spirit  speaks  to  the  created  spirits;  that  law  is  but  the 
revelation  of  will,  nature  an  eternal  logic  and  aesthetic ;  that 
man  is  an  indivisible  person,  and  that  his  essential  personality  is 
inherent  in  his  soul ;  that  soul  is  not  the  result  of  organism,  but 
that  organism  is  the  result  of  soul ;  that  the  universe  we  know 


132 


PROLEGOMENA. 


cannot  exist  without  mind.  The  esse  of  the  known  is  percipi, 
man  is  the  measure  of  his  own  universe,  and  there  is  no  mans 
universe  outside  of  man. 

On  the  other  hand,  Idealism  promotes  Materialism  by  reaction, 
as  all  extremes,  in  the  same  way,  produce  their  counterparts.  To 
make  a  real  thing  nothing,  is  the  best  preparation  for  making  it 
everything.  The  soil  of  the  most  matured  Idealism  is,  equally 
with  that  of  a  one-sided  Realism,  the  soil  of  the  most  extravagant 
Materialism.  The  land  of  Fichte,  Schelling,  and  Hegel  is  the 
land  of  Feuerbach,  Vogt,  and  Moleschott,  as  the  land  of  Bacon, 
Hobbes,  and  Locke  is  the  land  of  Darwin,  Huxley,  and  Spencer. 
Many  in  the  world  of  thinkers,  nearly  all  in  the  every-day  world 
of  what  is  called  '  common  sense,'  if  fairly  pinned  down  to  the 
choice  between  'no  substantial  mind,'  'no  substantial  matter,' 
would  say,  'If  this  be  so,  there  is  no  substantial  mind.'  To  the 
populace  throughout,  and  to  nearly  all  the  cultivated,  the  thing 
seen,  felt,  heard,  tasted,  is  the  substance ;  not  the  thing  which 
sees,  feels,  hears,  tastes.  That  is  to  most  men  the  shadow.  If 
you  can  make  them  doubt  of  what  they  have  seen,  how  can  they 
continue  to  believe  in  that  which  they  have  not  seen  ? 

10.  Closely  associated  by  misconstruction  and  one-sided  ex- 
travagance with  Materialism  is  the  doctrine  of  Realism,  against 
whose  abuses  the  best  Idealism  is  arrayed.  The  common  sense 
of  the  Occidental  races  is  prevailingly  realistic,  but  realistic  be- 
yond all  the  metes  and  bounds  which  any  system  of  intelligent 
thinking  can  endure.  All  philosophers  are  agreed  that  in  a  cer- 
tain aspect  the  popular  interpretation  of  consciousness  is  demon- 
strably false.  It  is  so  false  that  half  an  hour's  talk  will  satisfy 
any  man  of  ordinary  intellect  that  he  has  misconstrued  the  testi- 
mony of  his  own  eyes,  ears,  and  touch.  When  the  refined  sense 
of  the  race  becomes  realistic,  it  tends  to  Materialism.  Those 
who  are  terrified  at  Idealism  would  do  well  to  contrast  its  work- 
ings not  merely  with  their  own  sober  Realism,  but  with  the 
workings  of  Materialism ;  to  put  side  by  side  materialistic  Fiance 
and  idealistic  Germany,  or  in  Germany  to  contrast  even  the  ex- 
travagances of  Idealism  with  the  reactionary  extravagances  of 
Materialism,  remembering  that  the  abuse  of  Realism  is  the  direct 
stronghold  of  Materialism. 


XIV.— AN  ESTIMATE    OF   IDEALISM. 


133 


But  if  the  extravagances  and  mistakes  of  Realism  are  favorable 
to  Idealism,  there  is  a  strength,  naturalness,  and  consistency  in  a 
sober  Realism,  which  make  it  a  very  formidable  antagonist  in  the 
sphere  of  speculation,  and  an  invincible  one  to  the  practical  mind. 
Not  only  so,  it  is  invincible  to  the  idealistic  mind  in  its  practical 
moods.  Fichte  himself  says,  '  Idealism  can  never  be  a  tvay  of 
thinking,  but  is  speculation  only.  When  it  comes  to  action, 
Realism  presses  upon  every  man,  even  upon  the  most  decided 
Idealist.'1  'Idealism  is  the  true  reverse  of  life.'  Fichte  else- 
where says,  '  If  I  do  not  acknowledge  practically  what  I  must 
acknowledge  theoretically,  I  put  myself  in  an  attitude  of  clear 
self-contradiction.'2  And  in  saying  this  he  passes  judgment  on 
his  own  system. 

11.  It  is  a  great  source  of  strength  to  Idealism  that,  appealing 
to  the  reason  as  its  ground,  those  who  are  its  antagonists  have 
so  often  failed  in  meeting  it  successfully, — have  so  often  insisted 
that  the  whole  question  is  to  be  carried  out  of  philosophy  and 
put  to  the  popular  vote, — or,  accepting  the  challenge  to  meet 
Idealism  in  the  sphere  of  speculation,  have,  on  that  sphere,  failed 
to  overthrow  it. 

If  the  antagonists  of  Idealism  have  strengthened  it  by  their 
differences,  the  friends  of  Idealism  have  weakened  it  by  their 
vital  differences.     Its  friends  have  failed  to  agree. 

12.  It  is  one  of  the  great  attractions  of  Idealism  to  thinkers 
that  it  meets  the  problems  of  thought  in  a.  philosophical  spirit.  If 
it  does  not  solve  them,  it  tries  to  solve  them.  If  it  does  not 
answer  the  question,  it  does  not  give  it  up.  If  its  heroes  are 
vanquished,  they  fall  in  battle,  with  their  harness  on. 

There  is  often  a  great  misconception  of  the  whole  purpose  of 
philosophical  effort.  It  is  not  to  find  a  ground  of  practical  con- 
viction sufficient  for  the  routine  of  every- day  life.  That  ground 
is  common  to  all  the  systems.  The  most  absolute  Idealist  and 
the  most  positive  Realist  are  undistinguishable  here.  The  whole 
circle  of  the  phenomenal  is  the  same  to  both.  It  is  not  the  8rt  but 
the  oiorc  which  divides  them.  It  is  indeed  one  of  the  marvels  of 
the  case,  that  Idealists  have  so  often  been  distinguished  in  the 

1  Philosoph.  Journal,  v.  322,  323,  n. 

3  Brief  an  Reinhold,  5.     See  Krug,  Idealismus. 


134 


PROLEGOMENA. 


largeness  and  pureness  of  their  practical  thinking  and  of  their 
active  lives.  One  grand  object  of  philosophy  is  to  vindicate  the 
sensations  or  instincts  to  the  reason,  or  to  correct  both  by  the 
reason,  or  reason  by  both,  or  to  show  that  they  lie  out  of  the 
range  of  reason  and  must  be  accepted  without  hope  of  harmon- 
izing them.  It  is  the  object  of  philosophy  to  ascend  as  high  as 
it  is  given  to  man  to  ascend,  to  adjust  our  beliefs  and  our  cog- 
nitions, and  to  escape  the  error  of  simply  believing  what  we  ought 
to  know,  or  of  assuming  to  know  what  we  can  only  believe. 
When  divine  revelation  is  accepted,  we  must  believe  in  order  to 
understand.  Is  this  the  canon  of  philosophy  too?  Under  which 
flag,  Credo  ut,  or  Intelligo  ut  ?  A  great  school,  the  school  of 
Belief,  replies,  Credo  ut :  another  school  would  totally  deny  the 
Credo  ut.  'However  harmless,'  says  Kant,  'psychological  Ideal- 
ism may  appear  as  regards  the  essential  aims  of  metaphysics 
(though  in  fact  it  is  not  harmless),  yet  it  would  remain  a  per- 
petual scandal  to  philosophy  and  the  common  reason  of  our  race 
to  be  compelled  to  assume,  simply  on  belief,  the  existence  of  things 
external  to  us, — the  very  things  from  which  we  derive  the  entire 
materials  for  the  cognitions  of  our  internal  sense, — and  when  any 
one  doubts  their  existence  to  be  at  a  loss  for  a  sufficient  proof  of 
it.'1  Brave  words;  but  Kant  never  reached  the  point  at  which  he 
could  pretend  to  say,  on  speculative  grounds,  Intelligo.  His  heart 
went  over  from  the  philosophers  to  the  vulgar,  and  tried  to  staunch 
the  wounds  of  the  '  Pure'  with  the  bandages  of  the  '  Practical;' 
but  the  bandages  of  the  'Practical'  could  only  be  found  in  the  re- 
pository of  the  'Pure,'  and  from  thence  Kant  had  removed  them. 
His  '  reason' affirmed  Idealism.  His  instinct  clung  to  Realism. 
Kant  perpetually  unravelled  in  one  what  he  wove  in  the  other. 
The  shroud  of  Penelope  was  never  completed.  Fichte,  Schel- 
ling,  Hegel,  Schopenhauer,  and  hundreds  of  others,  have  worked 
upon  it,  but  it  is  unfinished.  If  the  work  is  ever  stayed,  it  will 
not  be  by  its  completion,  but  by  the  coming  of  some  Ulysses  of 
metaphysics  who  shall  bring  it  to  an  end  by  removing  its  motive. 
Meanwhile  it  cannot  be  denied  that  the  Idealists  have  been 
marked  by  bold,  persistent  labour,  and  by  great  fidelity  to  specu- 
lative processes.     They  have  refused  all  compromise  with  'com- 

«  Krit.  d.  rein.  Vernunft,  Vorrede.     Ed.  Kirchrminn.     Dritt.  Aufl.,  Berlin,  1872,  p.  41. 


XIV.— AN  ESTIMATE    OF  IDEALISM  135 

mon  sense,'  have  pushed  away  persistently  the  friendly  but  coarse 
hand  of  empiricism.  There  is  an  air  of  the  heroic  characteristic 
of  the  school,  in  its  unceasing  warfare  with  all,  however  strong 
or  popular,  which  does  dishonour  to  man  as  a  being  of  specula- 
tive thought.  They  cannot  be  driven  or  bribed  into  compromising 
the  dignity  of  science,  the  majesty  of  mind. 

But  though  Idealism  has  nobly  represented  in  its  best  names  the 
philosophical  spirit,  it  has  by  no  means  a  monopoly  of  such  names 
or  of  this  spirit.  Other  systems  have  worthy  names,  and  some 
very  bright  ones  are  found  arrayed  against  Idealism.  Many  of 
the  most  illustrious  thinkers  of  England,  Scotland,  France,  and 
Germany  have  resisted  its  premises,  and  yet  more  frequently 
its  inferences.  Some  of  its  masters  sit  uneasy  on  their  thrones, 
put  there  against  their  protest  by  their  disciples.  All  recent 
Idealism  is  the  exaggeration  or  isolation  of  principles  of  Kant ; 
but  if  Idealism  is  Kantianism,  Kant  did  not  understand  his  own 
system.  If  his  creed  was  idealistic,  his  faith  was  realistic. 
Recent  Idealism  is  the  disavowed,  if  not  the  illegitimate,  child 
of  the  great  thinker  it  claims  as  its  father. 

13.  Idealism  has  nurtured  many  of  the  noblest  spirits  of  the  race, 
and  claims  the  power  of  begetting  exaltation  of  mind  and  charac- 
ter. Berkeley  is  a  sublime  embodiment  of  the  true  philosophical 
spirit;  of  the  loftiness  of  its  aims,  the  singleness  of  its  purpose, 
the  invincible  persistence  of  its  fidelity  to  conviction.  Without 
disloyalty  to  the  practical  turn  of  the  English  mind,  he  has  been 
true  to  purely  intellectual  interests.  He  at  least  has  not  degraded 
philosophy  to  the  kitchen.  His  intellectual  life  is  consistent  with 
his  own  utterances:  'The  first  spark  of  philosophy  was  derived 
from  heaven.  .  .  .  Theology  and  philosophy  gently  unbind  the 
ligaments  that  chain  the  soul  down  to  earth,  and  assist  her  flight 
toward  the  Sovereign  God.'1  Idealism  in  its  best  forms  is  char- 
acteristically the  system  of  noble,  intellectual,  and  pure  men.  If 
it  does  not  lift  men  to  the  heavens  to  which  they  aspire,  it  at  least 
keeps  them  out  of  the  slough  and  the  mire. 

Yet  Idealism  has  also,  in  some  cases,  nurtured,  even  in  noble 
spirits,  an  overweening  Titanic  arrogance.  Not  even  the  noble 
nature  of  Fichte  could  hide  this  tendency,  or  rather  the  frankness 

1  Siris,  $$  301,  302. 


I36  PROLEGOMENA. 

of  a  true  manliness  brought  it  into  consistent  relief.  It  stands 
forth  like  a  spectral  giant  of  the  Brocken  on  every  mountain  peak 
of  his  speculation.  One  passage  will  be  sufficient  to  illustrate  it: 
'And  now  with  this  view — that  there  is  no  objective  being 
correspondent  with  our  conceptions — be  free,  O  Mortal ! — be  re- 
deemed forever  from  the  fear  which  has  been  thy  humiliation  and 
torment!  Thou  shalt  tremble  no  more  before  a  necessity  which 
exists  but  in  thy  thoughts.  Thou  shalt  no  longer  fear  that  thou 
shalt  be  crushed  by  things  which  are  but  the  products  of  thine 
own  mind.  Thou  shalt  no  longer  class  thyself,  the  thinker,  with 
the  thoughts  which  go  forth  from  thee.  As  long  as  thou  wert 
able  to  believe  that  such  a  system  of  things,  as  thou  didst  describe 
to  thyself,  actually  existed,  external  to  thee,  independent  on  thee, 
and  that  thou  mightest  be  a  mere  link  in  the  chain  of  this  system, 
so  long  thy  fears  were  well  grounded.  Now  thou  art  redeemed, 
and  I  resign  thee  to  thyself!'1 

14.  Idealism  has  been  and  is,  in  some  shape,  received  by 
immense  portions  of  the  race, — predominatingly  in  the  philo- 
sophical races  of  Asia,  and  to  no  little  extent  in  Europe.  '  In 
Asia,'  says  Schopenhauer,  'Idealism  is,  both  in  Brahminism  and 
Buddhism,  a  doctrine  of  the  religion  of  the  people  even.  In 
Hindostan,  in  the  doctrine  of  the  Maja,  it  is  universal;  and  in 
Thibet,  the  main  seat  of  the  Buddhist  church,  it  is  taught  in  the 
most  popular  form.'2 

It  is  equally  true  that  the  Western  mind  is  not  inclined  to 
accept  Idealism.  The  Oriental  mind  receives  it  through  the 
channel  of  Pantheism.  To  that  mind  it  is  theology  rather  than 
philosophy.  'Idealism  in  Europe,' says  Schopenhauer, 'is  bare 
paradox, — it  is  known  as  a  paradox  scarcely  to  be  seriously 
thought  of,  confined  to  a  few  certain  abnormal  philosophers.' 

15.  Idealism  is  a  system  of  great  versatility,  and  has  the 
power  of  associating  its  fundamental  position  with  structures  of 
the  most  diverse  kind. 

But  it  is  also  true  that  if  it  can  be  built  in  with  the  strong  and 
noble,  it  can  also  be  built  in  with  the  weak  and  unworthy.     If  it 

»  Rcstimmung  des  Menschen,  159-162. 

a  Ueber  .  .  .  Grunde,  3d  Aufl.,  32.  Parerga,  2d  Aufl.,  ii.  40.  Ueber  den  Willen  in 
der  Natur,  3d  Aufl.,  133.     Frauenstadt,  Schopenhauer-Lexikon,  art.     Idealismus. 


XIV.— AN  ESTIMATE    OF   IDEALISM.  137 

has  won  to  itself  the  self-sacrificing  Christian  heart  of  Berkeley, 
and  has  drawn  into  it  his  profound  theistic  convictions,  it  has  also 
woven  in  with  itself  the  dreamy  Pantheism  of  the  Orient,  and  the 
more  vigorous  Pantheism  of  the  West.  It  has  adjusted  itself  to 
Fichte's  Moral  Order  of  the  World  as  an  ideal  God;  toSchelling's 
God,  of  his  first  era,  as  'the  absolute  indifference  of  Antitheses;' 
of  his  second  era,  as  the  God  'who  attains  to  perfected  being  by 
theogonic  process;'  and  of  his  third  era,  with  the  various  modi- 
fications of  his  mystic  theosophic  tendency.  It  has  been  bound 
up  with  Hegel's  Religion,  as  '  Man's  consciousness  of  God,  and 
of  God's  consciousness  of  himself  in  man  ;'  and  with  Schopen- 
hauer's unpaling  Atheism,  Pessimism,  and  Animalism.  Beginning 
in  the  spirit  with  Berkeley,  it  has  ended  in  the  flesh  with 
Materialism,  and  has  taken  in  all  between.  It  surely  has 
established  no  claim  to  be  a  religious  or  ethical  regulator. 

In  its  native  soil  it  is  the  philosophy  of  Brahminism  and  Bud- 
dhism, which  are  systems  of  Atheism  and  Pessimism.  The  Maja, 
which  is  the  popular  form  of  the  Idealism  of  the  Hindoos,  is 
'the  veil  of  illusion,  which  shrouds  the  eyes  of  mortals,  and 
causes  them  to  see  a  world  of  which  it  cannot  be  said  that  it 
is,  nor  even  that  it  is  not;  for  it  is  like  a  dream,  or  like  the 
sunlight  on  the  sands,  which  the  distant  traveller  mistakes  for 
water,  or  like  the  thong  which  he  takes  for  a  serpent  in  his  way. 
Suicide  is  the  masterpiece  of  Maja.'1 

16.  As  Idealism  is  one  of  the  earliest,  so  does  it  claim 
to  be  the  latest,  and  therefore  the  ripest,  result  of  speculative 
thought. 

As  a  philosophical  system,  not  as  an  adjunct  to  a  pantheistic 
theology  or  mythology,  or  to  the  atheistic  systems  of  the  East, 
Idealism  is  not  earliest  in  its  rise,  and  its  ripeness  is  of  no  value 
unless  the  fruit  be  good.  But  Idealism  is  not  the  last  result  of 
philosophical  ripening.  Already  the  marks  of  transition  are 
manifest.  The  philosophy  of  the  future  is  one  which  will'  be 
neither  absolute  Idealism  nor  absolute  Realism,  but  will  accept 
the  facts  of  both,  and  fuse  them  in  a  system  which,  like  man 
himself,  shall  blend  two  realities  as  distinct  yet  inseparable.  The 
duality  of  natures  harmonized,  yet  not  vanishing,  in  the  monism 

1  Frauenstadt,  Schopenhauer-Lexikon,  art.  Maja. 


138  PROLEGOMENA. 

of  person,  a  universe  of  accordant  not  of  discordant  matter  and 
mind,  held  together  and  ever  developing  under  the  plan  and  con- 
trol of  the  one  Supreme,  who  is  neither  absolutely  immanent  nor 
absolutely  supramundane,  but  relatively  both, — immanent  in  the 
sense  in  which  Deism  denies  his  presence,  supramundane  in  the 
sense  in  which  Pantheism  ignores  his  relation, — not  the  mere 
Maker  of  the  universe,  as  Deism  asserts,  nor  its  matter,  as  Pan- 
theism represents  him,  but  its  Preserver,  Benefactor,  Ruler,  and 
Father,  who,  whether  in  matter  or  mind,  reveals  the  perfect 
reason,  the  perfect  love,  the  perfect  will,  the  consummate  power, 
in  absolute  and  eternal  personality. 

17.  The  facts  we  have  presented  upon  the  one  side  justify  the 
language  in  which  a  distinguished  thinker  of  Germany  does 
homage  to  the  strength  of  Idealism  in  the  very  preparation  to 
expose  its  weakness  :x 

'  Idealism  is  in  substance  and  tendency  closely  allied  with 
Spiritualism ;  but  it  is  profounder,  more  imposing,  more  tower- 
ing. Among  all  philosophical  systems,  the  boldest  and  loftiest 
is  Idealism  ;  the  idea  of  the  self-dependence  of  the  mind  is  in  it 
carried  to  its  supremest  height ;  the  omnipotence  of  the  Ego  is 
its  fundamental  dogma;  the  Ego,  the  thinking  mind,  is  the  centre 
of  the  universe,  it  is  the  solitary  fixed  point  in  the  being  of 
things,  the  primal  spring  of  all  existence ;  the  Ego  is  God.  It 
is  in  the  fullest  and  highest  sense  of  the  word  the  system  of 
freedom  and  self-dependence.  Everything  in  it  is  freedom,  free 
activity,  the  spontaneity  of  the  Ego, — knowing  no  limits  but  those 
of  its  own  imposition;  for  outside  of  the  Ego  is  nothing  which 
can  set  bounds  to  it, — the  whole  external  world,  the  non-Ego,  is 
but  empty  seeming  or  product  of  the  self-active  Ego  itself.  In 
this  lies  the  gigantic  power  with  which  Idealism  so  often  lays  its 
grasp  on  the  mind  of  men  of  great  force  and  independence  of 
character.  This  explains  the  enchantment  with  which  it  often 
lures  especially  the  young  man,  who  feels  most  vividly  the 
self-dependence  of  his  spirit.  Idealism  is  the  system  of  fiery, 
active,  free  youth ;  Realism  the  system  of  sober,  cold,  calm 
old  age. 

1  Heinrich  Th.  Schmid  (1799-1836),  Professor  of  Philosophy  in  Heidelberg:  Vorle- 
sungen  iiber  das  Wesen  der  Philosophic,  Stuttg.,  1836. 


X I V.—A  N  ES  TIM  A  TE    OF   IDEAL  ISM. 


139 


'  Hence  also  it  is  that  the  moral  element  in  man  finds  its  most 
potent  stimulus  in  Idealism ;  for  Idealism,  by  pre-eminence, 
reposes  on  the  self-dependence  and  freedom  of  the  mind. 

'  As  in  Pantheism  it  is  the  religious  view  of  the  world  which 
predominates,  in  Idealism  it  is  the  ethical  view.  A  potent,  ex- 
alted, and  strict  style  of  moral  thinking  arises  from  the  idealistic 
principle.  This  principle  involves  Egoism  indeed,  but  it  is  an 
Egoism  of  the  noblest,  purest  kind,  standing  in  harmony  with  the 
most  genuine  morality.  For  it  throws  into  the  first  line,  not  the 
empirical,  sense-bound  Ego,  but  the  pure  rational  Ego.  Thus  at 
least  it  appears  in  its  highest  shape,  in  one  whose  strong,  lofty, 
masculine  soul  lived  wholly  in  Idealism.  We  mean  Fichte,  as 
he  presents  it  in  its  rugged  completeness  in  his  "  Doctrine  of 
Science." ' 

The  same  illustrious  writer,  whose  eloquent  tribute  to  the 
strength  of  Idealism  will  heighten  the  value  of  his  exposure  of 
its  weakness,  has  said,1  '  Let  us  look  now  at  the  shadow-side  of 
Idealism, — for  in  truth  it  lacks  not  in  very  dark  and  mournful 
shadows.  It  has  been  remarked,  in  speaking  of  Pantheism,  how 
intolerable  to  the  common  understanding  of  man  is  the  view  that 
the  world  of  the  senses  is  but  deception  and  seeming.  This  con- 
tradiction to  the  ordinary  view  of  the  world  is  greatly  strengthened 
in  Idealism,  as  according  to  it  not  merely  the  finite  world  of  the 
senses,  but  the  entire  Universe,  Nature,  Man,  and  God,  the 
Natural  and  the  Supernatural,  the  Corporeal  and  the  Spiritual, — 
in  brief,  all  that  is  actual,  external  to  the  Ego, — is  annihilated. 
Nothing  but  the  Ego  with  its  activity  has  true  substantiality;  the 
entire  external  world  is  but  show  and  illusion,  is  no  more  than 
an  empty,  insubstantial  play  of  images  which  the  Ego  calls  into 
being  and  then  allows  to  vanish,  is  no  more,  as  Fichte  expresses 
it,  than  "  the  mirage  of  our  divine  Ego."  Thus  the  Ego  finds 
itself  alone  i if  the  boundless  waste  of  emptiness  and  nothingness 
which  circles  it  all  round.  Can  any  man,  endowed  with  emotion, 
feel  satisfied  with  such  a  view?  Must  it  not  make  any  man 
shiver,  vividly  to  actualize  to  himself  the  desolate  loneliness  in- 
volved in  this  idealistic  view  of  the  world  ?' 

18.  Jean  Paul   has  painted,  with  his   characteristic  matchless 

1  Schmid,  Vorlesungen,  268. 


140 


PROLEGOMENA. 


eccentricity  and  vigour,  the  desolate  condition  to  which  an  actual- 
ized Idealism  brings  the  mind  :  '  The  worst  of  all  is  the  pinched, 
aimless,  perked-up,  insular  life  that  a  god  must  live.  He  has  no 
society.  If  I  am  not  (as  the  idealistic  Ego)  to  sit  still  all  the 
time  and  to  all  eternity,  if  I  am  to  let  myself  down  as  well  as  I 
can,  and  make  myself  finite,  just  to  have  something  about  me,  I 
shall  be  like  the  poor  little  princes ;  I  shall  have  nothing  about 
me  but  my  own  servile  creatures  to  echo  my  words.'  'Any  being 
whatever — the  Supreme  Being  himself,  if  you  choose — wishes 
something  to  love,  something  to  honour.  But  Fichte's  doc- 
trine of  every  man  his  own  body-maker  leaves  me  nothing  at  all, 
not  even  the  beggar's  dog  or  the  prisoner's  spider.  For,  granted 
that  those  two  animals  existed,  the  dog,  the  spider,  and  I 
would  only  have  the  nine  pictures  which  we  would  paint  of  our- 
selves and  of  each  other,  but  we  would  not  have  each  other.' 
'  Something  better  than  myself — that  better  something  to  which 
the  flame  of  love  leaps  up — is  not,  if  Idealism  be  true,  to  be 
had.  The  mantle  of  love,  which  for  ages  has  been  narrowed  to 
the  canonical  four  fingers'  breadth  of  the  bishop's  pallium,  now 
goes  up  in  a  blaze,  and  the  only  thing  a  man  has  left  to  love  is 
his  own  love.  Verily  I  wish  there  were  such  things  as  men,  and 
I  wish  I  were  one  of  them.'  '  If  it  has  fallen  to  my  lot,  unhappy 
dog  that  I  am,  that  nobody  really  exists  but  myself,  nobody  is 
as  badly  off  as  I  am.'  '  No  sort  of  enthusiasm  is  left  me  but 
logical  enthusiasm.  All  my  metaphysics,  chemistry,  technology, 
nosology,  botany,  entomology,  runs  down  into  the  old  principle, 
Know  thyself.  I  am  not  merely,  as  Bellarmin  says,  my  own 
Saviour,  but  I  am  also  my  own  devil,  my  own  messenger  of 
death,  and  master  of  the  knout  in  ordinary  to  my  own  majesty. 
Around  me  stretches  humanity,  turned  to  stone.  In  the  dark, 
desolate  stillness  glows  no  love,  no  admiration,  no  prayer,  no 
hope,  no  aim.  I  am  so  utterly  alone!  no  pulsation,  no  life,  any- 
where. Nothing  about  me,  and,  without  me,  nothing  but  nothing. 
Thus  come  I  out  of  eternity,  thus  go  I  into  eternity.  And  who 
hears  my  plaints  and  knows  me  now?  Ego.  Who  shall  hear 
me  and  who  shall  know  me  to  all  eternity?     Ego.' 

19.  The  picture  drawn  by  Jean  Paul  is  gloomy  enough,  yet  it 
has  a  solitary  point  of  light  and  relief.  The  Ego  itself  is  left :  one 


XIV.— AN  ESTIMATE    OF   IDEALISM. 


141 


only,  it  is  true,  but  each  man  will  consider  that  his  own.  And 
it  is  the  fact  that  Idealism  is  supposed  to  leave  this  great  some- 
thing secure  that  has  given  it  a  fascination  to  men,  who  feared 
that  other  systems  would  leave  them  nothing,  not  even  them- 
selves. A  self-conscious,  a  possibly  immortal,  something, — this, 
at  least,  is  gain. 

When  everything  else  sinks  in  the  ocean  of  idealistic  nothing- 
ness, does  not  the  personal  Ego  stand  unshaken,  a  rock  towering 
in  solitary  grandeur  above  the  sweep  of  all  the  billows  of  specu- 
lative doubt  ?  On  that  long  line  of  coast,  chafed  by  waves  which 
ever  pile  it  with  fresh  wrecks,  will  not  that  rock  of  personal 
consciousness  furnish  a  base  for  one  light-house  of  the  mind  ? 
Alas!  no;  for  the  logic  of  Idealism  robs  us  of  consciousness  of 
self.  If,  as  Berkeley  and  all  Idealists  assert,  ideas  without  cor- 
relate realities  are  the  only  objects  of  knowledge,  the  personal 
mind  itself  is  either  mere  idea  or  it  is  unknown. 

Idealism  can  only  affirm  '  There  is  consciousness,'  but  it  does 
not  knozv  what  is  conscious.  If  the  Ego  be  assumed  to  be  the 
object  of  knowledge,  it  is  in  that  very  fact  transmuted  into  idea; 
it  is  the  mirage  of  a  mirage.  Two  things  which  God  hath 
joined  together  cannot  be  put  asunder  without  loss  to  both. 
The  murder  of  matter  is  the  suicide  of  mind. 

20.  Tested,  then,  by  its  own  logic,  where  does  Idealism  end  ? 
We  shall  not  answer  the  question  for  it,  but  accept  the  answer 
of  its  pure  and  great  representative,  Fichte.  '  There  is,'  says 
he,1  'nothing  permanent,  either  within  me  or  external  to  me. 
All  is  ceaseless  change.  I  know  of  no  being,  not  even  of 
my  own.  There  is  no  being.  I  know  nothing  and  am 
nothing.  There  are  images:  they  are  the  only  things  which 
exist,  and  they  know  of  themselves  after  the  manner  of  images, 
— images  which  hover  by,  without  there  being  anything  which 
they  hover  by, — which  hang  together  by  images  of  images, — 
images  which  have  nothing  to  image,  unmeaning  and  aimless.  I 
myself  am  one  of  these  images.  Nay,  I  am  not  so  much  as  that; 
I  am  only  a  confused  image  of  images.  All  reality  is  changed 
to  a  marvellous  dream,  without  a  life  which  is  dreamed  of,  with- 
out a  mind  which  dreams ;  a  dream  which  hangs  together  in  a 

1  Bestimmung  des  Menschen,  142. 


142  PROLEGOMENA. 

dream  of  itself.  Intuition  is  the  dream;  thought — the  source  of  all 
the  being  and  of  all  the  reality  which  I  frame  to  myself,  source 
of  my  being,  source  of  my  power,  source  of  my  aims — is  the 
dream  of  that  dream.' 

XV.  Characteristics  of  the  Present  Edition. 

It  is  designed  that  the  present  edition  of  the  great  philosophical 
Classic  of  Berkeley  shall  be  in  every  respect  the  standard  one. 

1.  It  contains  the  text  of  the  Principles  given  in  Berkeley's 
works,  collected  and  edited  by  Alexander  Campbell  Fraser,  M.A., 
Professor  of  Logic  and  Metaphysics  in  the  University  of  Edin- 
burgh. This  edition  was  printed  in  1 871,  at  the  Clarendon  Press, 
Oxford,  4  vols.  8vo,  the  fourth  containing  a  life  of  Berkeley. 

The  text  of  the  English  edition  is  thoroughly  critical,  printed 
with  great  accuracy,  giving  the  various  readings  of  all  the  editions 
of  the  Principles.  The  present  text  is  a  careful  reproduction  of 
that  of  Fraser,  except  that  a  few  typographical  errata  have  been 
corrected,  after  collation  with  the  other  editions.  It  is  claimed 
for  the  present  text  of  Berkeley  that  it  is  more  accurate  than  any 
other. 

2.  It  contains  the  entire  illustrations  by  which  Professor  Fraser 
has  enriched  his  edition  of  the  Principles, — his  Preface  and  Notes, 
which  are  entirely  worthy  of  his  reputation  as  a  thorough  scholar, 
an  acute  thinker,  and  a  brilliant  writer.  His  notes  are  historical, 
critical,  and  exegetical ;  they  imply  admiration  of  Berkeley,  and 
a  sympathy,  though  not  a  blind  or  indiscriminate  one,  in  his  gen- 
eral thinking.  They  largely  concur  in  Berkeleyanism,  partly 
qualify  it,  and  in  certain  directions  aim  at  developing  it. 

3.  To  the  Principles  have  been  added  three  Appendixes  of  great 
value.  The  first  is  '  Berkeley's  Rough  Draft  of  the  Introduction 
to  the  Principles.'  It  possesses  '  a  biographical  and  literary,  as 
well  as  a  philosophical  interest,'  illustrating  the  rise  and  growth 
of  one  of  the  most  extraordinary  productions  of  human  specula- 
tion. The  second  appendix  gives  an  account  of  Arthur  Collier; 
who  nearly  cotemporaneously  with  Berkeley,  and  in  entire  inde- 
pendence on  him,  reached  the  same  general  results  as  to  the  non- 
existence of  an  external  world.  To  this  account  is  added  the 
Introduction  to  Collier's  Clavis  Universalis.     The  third  appendix 


XV.— CHARACTERISTICS    OF    THIS   EDITION. 


H3 


is  •  The  Theory  of  Vision  Vindicated'  by  a  number  of  the  most 
important  instances  of  the  '  experience  of  persons  born  blind.' 
Cheselden's  paper  is  reprinted  entire,  and  Mr.  Nunnely's  account 
of  a  case,  '  one  of  the  last  and  most  philosophically  described,' 
is  given  unabridged.  These  cases  have  a  special  bearing  on 
Berkeley's  theory,  but  they  are  of  great  importance  in  their  rela- 
tion to  all  the  theories  of  sense-perception,  and  have  an  interest 
to  thoughtful  readers  of  all  classes. 

4.  In  this  edition  will  be  found  the  entire  notes  and  illustrations 
of  Dr.  Frederick  Ueberweg,  late  Professor  of  Philosophy  in  the 
University  of  Konigsberg.  In  the  '  Philosophische  Bibliothek,' 
edited  by  J.  H.  von  Kirchmann,  which  is  confined  to  the  master- 
works  of  philosophy  in  ancient  and  modern  times,  the  first  work 
from  an  English  hand  is  Berkeley's  Principles.  The  preparation 
of  it  was  intrusted  to  Ueberweg,  one  of  the  greatest  scholars  of 
our  age.  He  is  known  to  English  readers  by  the  translation  of 
his  Logic  and  of  his  History  of  Philosophy.  His  estimates  and 
critiques  on  Berkeley  are  admirable.  Thoroughly  appreciative 
of  the  greatness  of  Berkeley  and  the  value  of  his  views,  the  ad- 
verse judgments  of  Ueberweg  are  the  more  important.  It  may 
be  fairly  claimed  for  his  notes  that  they  present  some  of  the  best 
estimates  and  critiques  ever  made  in  connection  with  Berkeley's 
system,  and  that  they  have  done  something  toward  that  confuta- 
tion of  Berkeley's  Idealism  which  some  of  his  admirers  have  pro- 
nounced impossible.  Ueberweg  says  that  his  notes  are  essential 
to  the  completion  of  his  work  on  Logic.  The  many  English 
readers  who  possess  and  value  Ueberweg's  Logic  will  on  that 
account,  were  there  no  other,  be  glad  to  have  his  notes  on 
Berkeley. 

To  the  notes  of  Fraser  and  of  Ueberweg  the  editor  has  added 
much  that  is  important  and  interesting  from  the  best  sources, 
with  a  large  amount  of  original  matter.  These  notes  of  Ueber- 
weg and  of  the  editor  are  numbered,  and  at  the  points  at  which 
they  illustrate  the  text  there  will  be  found  in  it  the  numbers  of 
the  notes,  in  heavy  brackets  [  ].  The  subjects  of  the  notes  are 
given  in  their  titles.  In  the  various  annotations  will  be  found 
the  most  important  parallels  and  illustrations  of  the  Principles 
furnished  by  Berkeley  himself  in  his  other  works. 


144  PRO  LEG  OMEN  A. 

5.  The  editor  has  prepared  extended  Prolegomena,  embracing 
— A  Sketch  of  Berkeley's  Life  and  Writings ;  an  Account  of 
his  Precursors ;  Summaries  of  his  System  ;  Berkeleyanism  :  its 
Friends,  Affinities,  and  Influence ;  Opponents  and  Objections ; 
Estimates  of  Berkeley:  his  Character,  Writings,  and  Influence; 
Idealism  Defined;  History,  Outlines,  and  Criticisms  of  the  Ideal- 
istic Systems,  from  Berkeley  to  the  Present;  Hume;  Kant; 
Fichte  ;  Schelling ;  Hegel ;  Schopenhauer ;  The  Strength  and 
Weakness  of  Idealism. 

6.  This  edition  contains  a  very  full  Analytical  Index  to  every 
part  of  the  work. 

7.  As  the  attention  of  all  readers  of  philosophical  works  is  now 
drawn  to  the  great  German  thinkers,  and  as  the  metaphysical 
terminology  of  that  language  has  peculiar  niceties  and  peculiar 
difficulties,  the  editor  has  believed  that  he  would  render  a  special 
service  by  making  this  book,  in  some  degree,  a  clue  to  these  diffi- 
culties and  a  guide  to  these  niceties.  This  he  has  done,  first,  by 
inserting  before  Uebervveg's  notes  the  terms  of  this  class  which 
he  uses  in  rendering  Berkeley ;  second,  by  adding  Ueberweg's 
German  terms  of  this  class  to  the  translation  of  his  notes;  and 
third,  by  giving  the  leading  German  terms  in  the  Index. 

XVI.  Its  Objects  and  Uses. 

1.  This  edition  is  meant  to  meet  the  intense  and  peculiar  inter- 
est felt  at  this  time  in  Berkeley's  views.  It  at  once  proves  and 
intensifies  this  interest  that,  in  such  close  proximity  in  time,  we 
should  have  from  the  successor  of  Hamilton  an  edition  of  the 
complete  works  of  Berkeley,  and  from  one  who  held  the  chair 
of  Kant  an  annotated  translation  of  Berkeley's  Principles. 

2.  The  mere  text  of  the  Principles,  as  it  is  here  presented,  can 
only  be  had  elsewhere  in  connections  which  oblige  the  buyer  to 
make  a  large  outlay,  and  compel  the  purchase  of  much  in  which 
he  may  feel  no  interest.  But  to  those  who  are  able  to  purchase, 
but  have  not  purchased,  Fraser's  Berkeley,  this  edition  of  the 
Principles  may  prove  at  least  an  advertisement,  perhaps  a  stimu- 
lant, to  the  securing  of  those  noble  works,  no  fragment  of  which 
is  destitute  of  value.  If  this  book  attains  its  end,  it  will  lead  to 
a  larger  study  of  all  that  Berkeley  has  written,  a  larger  sale  of 


XVI.— ITS    OBJECTS  AND    USES.  145 

his  works.  But  even  to  those  who  possess  Berkeley's  works, 
this  edition  of  the  Principles  may  serve  as  an  introduction  and 
companion  to  the  philosophical  portion  of  them. 

The  very  able  notes  of  Fraser,  vindicating  the  views  of  Berke- 
ley, and  the  notes  of  Ueberweg,  which,  with  distinguished  mod- 
eration, qualify  and  criticise  them  on  purely  scientific  grounds, 
will  help  to  make  this  book  the  most  able  and  attractive  expo- 
nent we  have  in  English  of  the  two  great  systems,  Idealism  and 
Realism. 

Berkeley's  Principles  thus  annotated  has  just  claims  to  be  taken 
as  a  text-book,  either  direct  or  collateral,  in  all  the  higher  insti- 
tutions of  education  in  our  country.  It  is  hoped  that  this  edition 
will  be  regarded  as  one  with  which  no  intelligent  reader,  student, 
or  professor  of  the  intellectual  sciences  can  afford  to  dispense. 

3.  The  Principles  of  Berkeley  is  the  best  book  from  an  English 
hand  for  commencing  thorough  philosophical  reading  and  inves- 
tigation. At  the  outstart,  as  the  very  preliminary  to  all  thinking, 
is  the  question,  'What  can  I  know  ?'  and  this  is  but  another  shape 
of  the  question,  'How  can  I  know  ?'  This  is  Berkeley's  question, — 
and  it  is  the  same  question  with  which  Kant  opened  the  great 
revolution  in  modern  philosophy;  it  is  the  question  of  the 
Critique  of  Pure  Reason,  urged  with  such  a  general  analogy  to 
Berkeley's  Principles  that  the  Critique  was  at  first  neglected,  as 
virtually  no  more  than  a  reproduction  of  Berkeleyanism.  No 
student  can  make  a  solitary  real  step  in  genuine  philosophical 
thinking  until  he  understands  Idealism,  and  there  is  no  other 
such  guide  at  the  beginning  of  this  as  Berkeley's  Principles.1 

4.  The  universal  judgment  is  that  the  Principles  is  not  a 
classic  in  philosophy  merely,  but  in  literature  also.  For,  in  com- 
mon with  the  other  works  of  Berkeley,  it  possesses  that  rare 
union  of  qualities  which  commands  at  once  the  admiration  of 
the  scholar  and  of  the  general  reader.  The  thought  is  so  clear 
that  no  amount  of  depth  prevents  seeing  to  the  bottom.  Like 
Plato,  Berkeley  conjoined  the  highest  poetry  with  powers  of  the 
abstrusest  meditation.  Rich  in  his  imagery,  at  times,  as  Jeremy 
Taylor,  he  is  yet  as  luminous  as  Addison.  His  style  is  one  which 
Sir  James  Mackintosh  'envied  for  all  writers  on  such  subjects.'2 

J  See  Prolegomena,  I.  2,  15.  a  See  Prolegomena,  VI. 

IO 


I46  PRO  LEGO  MEN  A. 

5.  This  book  has  been  arranged  so  as  to  make  it  in  some  sense 
an  Introdnctio7i  to  Philosophy.  Whenever  it  stops,  it  tries  to  give 
the  clue  to  the  student  which  shall  enable  him  to  go  farther.  It 
is  meant  to  show  the  student  the  processes  of  investigation  and 
arrangement,  to  help  him  to  help  himself;  it  opens  up  to  him  a 
large  body  of  philosophical  works  of  a  high  order,  and  individu- 
alizes them  to  him  by  quotation. 

6.  This  book  is  meant  in  part  as  an  aid  in  making  instruction  in 
mental  science  at  once  more  deep  and  attractive.  The  experience 
of  the  editor,  as  Professor  of  Intellectual  and  Moral  Philosophy, 
has  borne  a  part  in  leading  him  to  prepare  this  edition.  He  has 
for  several  years  delivered  lectures  to  the  Senior  Class  of  the 
University,  on  the  Modern  Systems  of  Philosophy,  from  Bacon 
to  Hegel  and  Cousin,  stating  the  views  of  the  writers  in  their 
own  words,  criticising  them,  and  inviting  criticisms  upon  them. 
He  has  found  that,  in  this  mode  of  treatment,  aversion  or  indif- 
ference to  philosophical  studies  has  invariably  given  way,  and,  in 
a  majority  of  cases,  has  been  converted  into  enthusiasm.  One 
of  the  most  cheering  tokens  of  this  has  been  the  desire  on  the 
part  of  many  in  the  classes  for  guidance  in  a  larger  course  of  in- 
dependent reading.  There  is  certainly  no  difficulty  in  indicating 
to  students  much  that  is  worthy  of  perusal ;  yet  there  is  hardly 
a  book  in  the  English  language  which  is  precisely  what  is  most 
desirable  for  such  a  class  of  readers.  The  great  philosophical 
works  of  the  present  cannot  be  appreciated  by  the  student  with- 
out a  knowledge  of  the  past.  There  is  no  thorough  study  of 
philosophy  without  historical  aids,  and  the  greatest  historical 
aids  are  not  books  about  the  past,  but  the  master-works  of  the 
past  themselves,  and  these  need  annotations  to  relieve  their  ob- 
scurities and  to  link  them  with  the  present.  It  is  very  important 
that  there  should  be  a  series  of  'Philosophical  Classics'  which 
shall  furnish  at  once  what  is  needed  for  the  library  and  the  class- 
room, which  shall  be  companions  to  the  lecture  and  aids  in  pri- 
vate study,  books  which  the  professor  shall  study  with  the  learner, 
and  not  alone  for  him,  and  which  shall  prove  at  once  an  incentive 
and  guide  to  ampler  reading. 

It  is  hoped  that  this  edition  will  meet  these  wants  so  far  as 
Berkeley  is  concerned,  and  that  it  will  be  received  with  a  favour 


XVI.— ITS    OBJECTS  AND    USES.  147 

which  may  encourage  the  publishers  to  add  to  the  '  Philosophical 
Classics '  other  works  adapted  to  aid  in  extending  and  satisfying 
an  interest  in  this  grand  department  of  knowledge,  in  giving 
broader  views  of  the  nature,  the  capabilities,  and  the  charms  of 
the  intellectual  sciences,  and  in  promoting  that  deep  and  healthy 
reflectiveness  which  is  the  greatest  need  of  our  whole  land  and 
of  our  whole  time. 

In  the  preparation  of  this  work,  a  very  large  portion  of  which 
has  been  made  during  the  summer  holidays  (and  what  holiday  is 
like  a  summer  with  Berkeley  ?),  the  editor  has  been  encouraged  by 
the  sympathetic  judgment  of  friends.  The  kind  reception  given  by 
the  'Princeton  Club'  to  a  paper  entitled  'Ueberweg  on  Berkeley,' 
which  was  read  before  them  at  their  request,  and  the  judgment 
they  expressed  that  an  edition  of  the  Principles  with  Annotations 
would  be  valuable,  was  the  immediate  occasion  of  the  offer  of  the 
work  to  a  publishing  house.  In  the  preparation  of  it  the  editor 
was  compelled,  in  matters  of  references,  to  depend  mainly  upon 
his  own  library.  Next  to  his  own  he  has  used  our  venerable  City 
Library ;  and  to  the  kindness  of  Lloyd  P.  Smith,  Esq.,  and  Mr. 
George  M.  Abbott,  its  Librarians,  he  is  indebted  for  the  unre- 
stricted use  of  its  treasures,  which,  in  spite  of  the  lack  of  proper 
public  appreciation  and  liberality,  furnish  the  most  important  aid 
to  which  the  scholars  of  Philadelphia  have  access. 

This  work  is,  the  editor  believes,  the  first  of  its  kind  from  an 
American  hand.  Though  we  have  had,  and  now  have,  scholars 
who  would  have  enriched  the  thinking  world  by  labours  of  this 
sort,  none  of  them,  he  believes,  have  attempted  an  extended  illus- 
tration of  a  philosophical  classic.  Nor  is  the  editor  aware  that 
there  is  in  our  language,  nor  even  in  the  German,  incomparably 
rich  as  it  is  in  literature  of  this  class,  any  body  of  Annotations,  of 
the  same  relative  extent  as  this,  on  a  modern  philosophical  classic. 
But  publishers  are  rarer  than  authors.  The  editor  feels  that  the 
distinguished  publishing  house  which  so  promptly  accepted  this 
work  is  richly  entitled  to  the  gratitude  of  the  public,  if  gratitude 
shall  be  the  feeling  with  which  the  work  is  received. 


THE   ENGLISH   EDITOR'S   PREFACE 


TREATISE   CONCERNING  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF 
HUMAN   KNOWLEDGE. 


149 


EDITOR'S    PREFACE 


TREATISE   CONCERNING  THE   PRINCIPLES   OF 
HUMAN   KNOWLEDGE. 


BERKELEY'S  Treatise  concerning  the  Principles  of  Human  Know- 
ledge is  the  most  systematically  reasoned  exposition  of  his  peculiar 
philosophy  which  his  works  contain. 

Like  the  New  Theory  of  Vision,  its  pioneer,  it  was  composed  at 
Trinity  College,  Dublin.  The  first  edition,  'printed  by  Aaron  Rhames, 
for  Jeremy  Pepyat,'  appeared  in  Dublin  in  1 710.  The  next,  which  con- 
tains some  additions  and  other  changes,  was  published  in  London  in 
1734,  'printed  by  Jacob  Tonson,'  the  Three  Dialogues  between  Hylas 
and  Philonous  being  conjoined  with  it  in  the  same  volume.  This 
edition  was  the  last  in  the  author's  lifetime.  The  variations  in  these 
are  carefully  marked  in  the  present  edition. 

An  edition  of  the  Principles  appeared  in  London  in  1776,  more  than 
twenty  years  after  Berkeley's  death,  'with  Remarks  on  each  section, 
in  which  his  doctrines  are  carefully  examined,  and  shewn  to  be  repug- 
nant to  facts,  his  principles  incompatible  with  the  constitution  of  human 
nature,  and  the  reason  and  fitness  of  things.'  To  this  edition,  likewise, 
the  Dialogues  between  Hylas  and  Philonous  are  appended,  followed  by 
'A  Philosophical  Discourse  on  the  Nature  of  Human  Being,  containing 
a  defence  of  Mr.  Locke's  Principles,  and  some  remarks  on  Dr.  Beattie's 
Essay  on  Truth,'  by  the  author  of  the  Remarks. 

To  the  edition  of  1776  the  following  'Advertisement'  is  prefixed: — 

'  Bishop  Berkeley's  Principles  of  Human  Knowledge,  and  his  Dialogues 
between  Hylas  and  Philonous  on  the  same  subject,  being  out  of  print, 
and  both  being  much  inquired  for,  the  Editor  thought  a  new  edition 
of  them,  with  an  Answer  thereto,  might  not  be  unacceptable  to  the 

151 


152 


EDITOR'S    PREFACE. 


public.  The  tenets  maintained  in  the  Dialogues  are  precisely  the  same 
with  those  in  the  Principles,  and  the  arguments  are  the  same,  though 
put  into  a  different  form;  but  it  was  thought  quite  unnecessary  to  make 
any  Reply  to  them,  as  the  Remarks  on  the  former  are  equally  applicable 
to  the  latter. 

'  How  far  the  author  of  the  Remarks  is  right  in  believing  they  contain 
a  full  refutation  of  the  doctrines  of  the  Bishop  must  be  left  to  the 
judgment  of  the  candid  reader;  he  has,  however,  the  satisfaction  of 
knowing  the  rectitude  of  his  intentions,  and  the  pleasing  hopes  he  en- 
tertains that  his  endeavours  may  be  attended  with  some  success  in  the 
cause  of  truths  of  the  greatest  importance.' 

The  Remarks  are  printed  on  the  right-hand  page  of  the  1776  edition, 
in  sections  corresponding  in  number  and  length  to  those  of  the  Prin- 
ciples. Their  acuteness  and  conclusiveness,  however,  is  by  no  means 
proportioned  to  their  bulk:  many  of  the  glaring  and  ludicrous  mis- 
representations of  which  Berkeley's  philosophy  has  been  the  subject 
are  here  gathered  and  served  up. 

Although  this  Treatise  is  the  fullest  explanation  of  Substance  and 
Power,  the  two  central  conceptions  of  Berkeley's  philosophy,  that  he 
has  given,  it  bears  the  marks  of  an  unfinished  work.  It  is  expressly 
designated  'Part  I,'  and  in  the  Preface  to  the  Dialogues  between  Hylas 
and Philonous  the  author  promises  a  Second  Part,  which  never  appeared. 
Passages  in  the  work  itself,  as  well  as  allusions  in  Berkeley's  Common- 
place Book,  suggest  that  only  a  portion  of  what  is  required  to  complete 
his  conception  is  here  executed.  In  referring  Dr.  Samuel  Johnson,  of 
New  York,  many  years  after  their  publication,  to  this  and  his  two  other 
early  metaphysical  essays,  Berkeley  thus  describes  their  character: — 
'I  had  no  inclination  to  trouble  the  world  with  large  volumes.  What 
I  have  done  was  rather  with  the  view  of  giving  hints  to  thinking  men, 
who  have  leisure  and  curiosity  to  go  to  the  bottom  of  things,  and 
pursue  them  in  their  own  minds.  Two  or  three  times  reading  these 
small  tracts,  and  making  what  is  read  the  occasion  of  thinking,  would, 
I  believe,  render  the  whole  familiar  and  easy  to  the  mind,  and  take  off 
that  shocking  appearance  which  hath  often  been  observed  to  attend 
speculative  truths.' 

The  contents  and  language  of  the  Principles  of  Human  Knowledge 
prove  that  Berkeley  had  been  a  careful  student  of  Locke's  Essay,  pub- 
lished twenty  years  previously,  and  dedicated,  like  the  Principles,  to 
the  Earl  of  Pembroke.  This  was  to  be  expected,  for  the  Essay,  partly 
through  the  influence  of  William  Molyneux,  the  friend  and  correspond- 


EDITOR'S    PREFACE. 


153 


ent  of  Locke,  had  become  an  authority  in  Trinity  College  in  Berkeley's 
undergraduate  days.  The  Principles  are  proposed  as  a  refutation  of 
leading  doctrines  in  the  Essay.  The  term  '  idea'  is  as  characteristic 
of  the  former  as  of  the  latter;  in  both  it  stands  for  the  immediate  object 
of  consciousness — alike  in  external  and  internal  intuition — in  memory, 
imagination,  and  generalization.  With  both,  the  only  objective  uni- 
verse of  which  we  are  directly  aware  consists  of  the  'ideas'  that  we  are 
conscious  of,  and  by  both  this  is  assumed  as  a  self-evident  truth.  Both 
appeal  exclusively  to  this  experience  as  their  final  test.  Locke's  classi- 
fication of  ideas  as  simple  and  complex,  with  some  of  his  divisions  and 
sub-divisions  in  each  class,  re-appear,  sometimes  in  altered  phraseology, 
in  the  Principles.  Berkeley's  whole  theory  of  Substance  and  Cause, 
Matter  and  Mind,  Space  and  Time,  is  a  bold  and  subtle  modification 
of  Locke's  theory  of  'ideas.'  A  distinguishing  feature  in  Berkeley  is, 
that  he  recognises  signs  of  independent  reality  in  one  order  of  Locke's 
'ideas' — those  given  in  the  senses,  and  is  thus  able  to  dispense  with  the 
reasonings  in  the  Fourth  Book  of  the  Essay  on  behalf  of  a  real  material 
world.  Then,  the  meaning  of  the  word  'Substance,'  which  perplexes 
Locke,  is  resolved  by  Berkeley  into  the  concrete  and  familiar  meaning 
of  the  word  T  {ego) — the  permanent  synthesis  of  ideas  perceivable  in 
sense  being,  according  to  him,  substances  only  in  a  secondary  meaning 
of  that  term.  'Cause'  or  'Power'  he  finds  exclusively  in  voluntary 
activity.  Finite  'Space'  is  with  him  experience  in  unresisted  organic 
movement,  which  is  capable  of  being  symbolised  in  the  visual  con- 
sciousness of  coexisting  colours.  Finite  'Time'  is  the  apprehension  of 
changes  in  our  ideas,  length  of  time  being  measured  by  the  number  of 
changes.  'Infinite  Space'  and  'Infinite  Time,'  because  inapprehensi- 
ble by  intelligence,  are  dismissed  from  philosophy,  as  terms  void  of 
meaning,  or  which  involve  contradictions. 

Next  to  Locke,  the  influence  of  Malebranche  is  apparent  in  the  fol- 
lowing Treatise ;  but  Berkeley  is  not  so  much  at  home  in  the  '  Divine 
vision'  of  the  French  metaphysician  as  among  the  'ideas'  of  the 
English  philosopher.  The  mysticism  of  the  Recherche  de  la  Verite 
was  repelled  by  the  transparent  clearness  of  Berkeley's  thought.  The 
slender  hold  that  is  retained  by  Malebranche  of  external  substance,  as 
well  as  the  theory  of  merely  occasional  causation  of  matter,  common 
to  him  and  Des  Cartes,  naturally  attracted  Berkeley,  however,  to  the 
Cartesian  school,  then  dominant  in  France,  and  reproduced  in  its 
mystical  form  in  England  by  Mr.  Norris. 

The  Platonism  which  pervades  Malebranche  perhaps  tended  to 
encourage  the  Platonic  thought  and  varied  learning  that  appear  in 


154 


EDITOR'S    PREFACE. 


Berkeley's  own  later  writings;  but  Locke,  Malebranche,  and  Des  Cartes 
are  almost  the  only  philosophers  directly  or  indirectly  recognised  in 
the  Principles  of  Human  Knowledge.  In  fact,  this  juvenile  Treatise 
moves,  as  it  seems  on  the  surface,  towards  the  opposite  pole  from  Pla- 
tonism  and  a  Platonic  idealism;  for,  Berkeley  by  'ideas'  means  phe- 
nomena and  sensible  things,  not  supersensible  realities  and  Divine 
Reason  of  Ontology. 

The  'Introduction'  to  the  Principles  proclaims  war  with  Universals, 
and  more  immediately  war  with  Locke.  Its  remedy  for  the  disorders 
of  philosophy  is  the  expulsion  of  abstract  ideas — which,  as  understood 
by  Berkeley,  involve  a  contradiction;  and  the  restriction  of  philoso- 
phers to  the  intelligible,  concrete  objects  of  which  mind  can  be  con- 
scious. The  metaphysician  is  here  required  to  resolve  the  meaning  of 
such  terms  as  Matter,  Substance,  Space,  and  Time  into  ideas,  relations 
of  ideas,  and  mind  which  is  the  one  necessary  condition  on  which  all 
ideas  and  their  relations  depend;  and  he  is  promised  that,  as  the  con- 
sequence of  this,  the  real  world,  hitherto  obscured  by  abstractions,  will 
become  intelligible.  All  ideas — in  other  words,  all  phenomena  or 
objects  of  which  we  can  be  conscious — must,  it  is  argued,  be  concrete 
and  particular.  It  is  relations  among  objects  of  which  we  can  be  con- 
scious, and  not  pretended  abstractions,  that  can  be  signified  by  univer- 
sal terms.  Abstract  Matter,  abstract  Substance,  abstract  Space,  abstract 
Time — that  is  Matter,  Substance,  Space,  and  Time  which  are  supposed 
to  be  what  cannot  be  resolved  into  particular  ideas,  and  relations 
among  such  ideas — are  thus  in  the  sequel  proved  to  be  absolutely  unin- 
telligible. Berkeley's  reformed  doctrine  of  abstraction,  and  of  the 
office  of  language,  virtually  banishes  them  all.  With  him,  'abstract 
ideas'  are  absurdities,  resulting  from  an  unlawful  analysis,  which  at- 
tempts to  penetrate  beneath  perception  or  conscious  experience — that 
essence  or  ground  of  existence;  and  the  lesson  of  the  'Introduction'  is 
virtually,  that  objective  existence  must  consist  exclusively  of  what  is 
particular  and  concrete.  The  only  lawful  kind  of  abstraction  is,  that 
through  which  we  have  what  Berkeley  calls  notions  of  relations  among 
ideas,  as  distinguished  from  ideas  themselves.  And,  as  names  are  re- 
quired to  constitute  notions,  this  introductory  polemic  against  abstract 
ideas,  or  pretended  analyses  of  the  original  synthesis  of  knowledge  and 
existence  in  perception,  takes  the  form  of  what  is  called  Nominalism*. 

*  The  relation  between  the  Phenomenalism  (apt  at  first  to  be  confounded  with  the  as- 
sertion of  Protagoras)  and  Nominalist  Idealism  of  Berkeley's  early  metaphysical  writings, 
on  the  one  hand,  and  the  Platonic  Realism  and  Idealism  of  his  Siris,  on  the  other,  is  one 


EDITOR'S    PREFACE.  155 

The  first  two  of  the  156  sections  which  compose  the  Principles  of 
Human  Knowledge  contain  a  classification  of  the  objects  of  which  we 
are  conscious,  and  a  recognition  of  Mind  as  the  one  condition  com- 
mon to  them  all. 

When  we  reflect  upon  our  knowledge,  we  find  (sect.  1)  that  its  ideas 
or  immediate  objects  are — (a)  the  phenomena  presented  to  us  in  or 
through  our  different  organs  of  external  sense ;  (b)  those  of  which  we 
are  conscious  in  our  internal  thoughts,  feelings,  desires,  and  volitions ; 
and  (c)  representations  (or  misrepresentations)  of  both  of  these  in 
memory  and  imagination.  Of  these  three  sorts  of  ideas,  the  sensible 
ones  are  found  in  experience  to  be  associated  together  independently 
of  the  will  of  the  percipient,  in  objective  groups,  forming  what  are 
commonly  called  'sensible  things,'  or  (in  the  popular  meaning  of  sub- 
stance) material  substances*.  And  all,  whether  called  phenomena,  or 
objects,  or  ideas ;  whether  presented  in  external  senses,  or  feelings  and 
operations  confined  to  the  individual  who  is  conscious  of  them,  or 
merely  imaginary  objects — inasmuch  as  they  are  all  objects  of  con- 
sciousness— imply  (sect.  2)  a  subject,  mind,  self,  or  ego,  that  perceives 
them,  remembers  them,  and  judges  of  their  relations.  On  mind  they 
must  all  depend,  so  far  at  least  as  they  are  actual  objects  of  conscious- 
ness, that  is  to  say,  so  far  as  they  are  ideas. 

What  is  immediately  given  to  us  in  experience  thus  consists  of  Mind 
or  Spirit,  in  the  state  of  being  conscious  of  ideas  or  objects  that  be- 
long to  one  or  other  of  the  three  classes  already  mentioned.  Spirits 
and  ideas  constitute  Berkeley's  Dualism.  (The  exact  definition  of  this 
duality  has  been  one  of  the  difficulties  in  his  philosophy.) 

The  lawful  aims  of  human  intelligence  accordingly  seem  to  be: — 

1.  The  observation  of  particular  ideas,  i.  e.  objects  or  phenomena. 

2.  The  scientific  determination  of  the  relations  of  particular  ideas  to 
one  another.  r 

of  the  most  important,  and  yet  hitherto  least  considered,  aspects  of  his  philosophy.  In 
Siris  (e.  g.  sect.  335,  &c.)  he  distinguishes  the  Platonic  Ideas  (a)  from  the  '  inert,  inactive 
objects'  or  phenomena  of  which  we  are  conscious,  in  our  presentative  and  representative 
experience  (i.  e.  his  own  '  ideas') ;  and  also  (b)  from  '  abstract  ideas,  in  the  modern  sense.' 
Plato's  Ideas  are  characterised  by  Berkeley  as  '  the  most  real  beings,  intellectual  and  un- 
changeable ;  and  therefore  more  real  than  the  fleeting,  transient  objects  of  sense,  which, 
wanting  stability,  cannot  be  subjects  of  science,  much  less  of  intellectual  knowledge." 

*  According  to  Berkeley,  we  are  immediately  percipient  in  sense  only  of  simple  ideas  ; 
our  so-called  perception  of  sensible  things  (i.  e.  combinations  of  simple  ideas)  is  in  a  great 
degree  mediate — involving  a  representative,  along  with  a  purely  presentative,  perception. 
When  we  see  what  we  recognise  to  be  an  apple,  but  without  touching,  tasting,  or  smelling 
it,  we  have  already  learned  by  custom  to  combine  its  qualities ;  and  we  have  learned  also 
to  represent  in  idea  its  other  than  visible  qualities,  on  occasion  of  the  purely  visual  state 
of  being  conscious  of  the  colour,  which  alone  is  visible. 


156  EDITOR'S    PREFACE. 

3.  The  philosophical  recognition  of  their  common  relation  of  de- 
pendence on  Mind ;  and  the  study  of  Mind,  as  manifested  in  various 
orders  of  intelligent  beings. 

But,  according  to  the  old  '  Principles'  of  metaphysicians,  this  is  not 
philosophy  at  all.  Philosophy  has  to  do  with  what  is  real,  absolute, 
or  substantial — with  Matter  or  Substance,  and  other  attractions,  which 
are  assumed  to  be  independent  of,  i.  e.  external  to,  the  perceptions  of 
every  mind. 

The  design  of  the  sections  which  follow  the  two  first  is,  to  state  and 
defend  new  universal  or  philosophical  Principles,  for  the  regulation  of 
the  understanding  in  its  attempts  to  conceive  and  reason  about  the 
universe.  They  are  proposed  instead  of  the  old  ones  which  assumed 
that  real  things  must  be  abstract  entities,  independent  of  Mind.  The 
sections  in  which  they  are  explained,  defended,  and  applied,  may  be 
arranged  in  three  Divisions,  thus : — 

I.  (Sect.  3 — 33.)  Here  the  new  Principles  of  philosophical  knowl- 
edge are  stated,  illustrated,  supported  by  facts  and  abstract  reasoning, 
and  contrasted  with  the  old  Principles  to  which  Berkeley  attributes  the 
confusion  and  scepticism  involved  in  all  previous  attempts.  They  are 
virtually  three  in  number — one  negative  and  two  affirmative,  viz. — 

1.  The  negation  of  Matter,  in  the  philosophical  meaning,  or  rather 
no-meaning,  of  the  word ;  i.  e.  as  signifying  an  unperceiving  and  un- 
perceived  substance  and  cause. 

2.  The  affirmation,  as  Substance  proper,  of  what  is  signified  by  the 
terms  mind,  spirit,  soul,  or  self — in  short,  by  'I'  {ego);  and,  as  Cause 
proper,  of  what  we  are  conscious  in  voluntary  effort  —  a  reasonable 
will. 

3.  The  affirmation  of  matter,  in  the  only  intelligible  meaning  of 
that  term,  viz.  as  consisting  of  the  ideas,  objects,  or  perceptions  of 
sense — which  appear,  disappear,  and  re-appear,  independently  of  the 
will  of  the  mind  that  is  conscious  of  them,  in  uniform  order  of  co- 
existence and  succession,  so  that  their  changes  may  be  foreseen,  and 
which  are  the  medium  of  intercourse  between  one  mind  and  another; 
of  material  substances,  or  groups  of  co-existing  sense-perceptions, 
united  in  conscious  experience  independently  of  our  will,  and  com- 
monly called  'sensible  things;'  and  of  material  causes,  or  uniform 
antecedents  in  the  permanent  and  rational  order  of  sensible  changes. 

In  short,  the  universe  in  which  we  find  ourselves  is  a  universe  that 
consists,  in  the  last  analysis,  of  mind  conscious  of  ideas  or  phenomena. 
The  ideas  of  sense  appear  in  an  order  which,  because  independent  of 


EDITOR'S    PREFACE. 


157 


our  individual  will,  may  be  called  external  to  each  of  us;  and  which, 
being  uniform,  is  capable  of  being  interpreted;  while  it  affords,  through 
its  meaning  or  reasonableness,  exercise  and  development  to  reason, 
and,  as  a  whole,  perpetually  illustrates  the  universal  supremacy  of  Di- 
vine Mind.  Abstract  or  unperceived  Matter,  and  abstract  or  uncon- 
scious Mind,  are  banished  from  philosophy  and  from  the  universe; 
particular  ideas  or  objects,  perceived  or  imagined,  and  dependent  for 
their  existence  on  conscious  minds,  capable  of  interpreting  their  rela- 
tions, are  alone  recognised  as  real,  by  the  new  Principles.  What  we 
have,  or  can  have,  to  do  with  in  the  universe,  must,  accordingly,  con- 
sist of  the  conscious  experience  of  conscious  agents,  in  the  indefinite 
varieties  of  that  experience  which  each  may  manifest.  Unexperienced  . 
abstractions  are  negation  or  absurdity,  to  be  exploded  under  the 
name  of  'abstract  ideas.'  They  can  neither  be  believed  in  nor  con- 
ceived. 

II.  (Sect.  34 — 84.)  A  series  of  supposed  Objections  to  the  fore- 
going Principles  of  the  philosophical  knowledge  of  the  world  and  man 
are  stated  and  refuted  in  succession  in  these  sections. 

III.  (Sect.  85 — 156.)  The  logical  Consequences  of  the  new  Prin- 
ciples, in  their  application  to  our  knowledge  of  (a)  the  ideas  or  object- 
ive things,  and  (b)  the  minds  or  subjective  things  that  constitute  the 
universe,  are  here  unfolded.  A  restoration  of  belief,  and  a  simplifica- 
tion and  purification  of  the  sciences,  by  the  exclusion  of  unmeaning 
abstract  questions,  are  represented  as  among  their  chief  advantages. 

Let  us  now  look  at  the  grounds,  in  faith,  reasoning,  and  experience, 
on  which  Berkeley  rests  these  new  Principles,  in  the  thirty-one  sections 
which  form  the  First  Division  of  his  work.  The  discussion  may  be 
said  to  take  its  rise  from  a  question  which  is  virtually  proposed  in  sec- 
tion 3.  The  objects  of  conscious  experience — in  a  word  our  ideas — 
were  alleged,  in  section  1,  to  be  (a)  sense-given  or  external  phenom- 
ena, (b)  internal  phenomena,  (c)  phenomena  which  may  be  repre-  ^ 
sentative  or  misrepresentative  of  both  these.  The  question  proposed, 
by  implication,  in  section  3  is  this : — 

Are  any  of  these  phenomena  not  ideas  merely,  but  also  things  that 
exist  absolutely — that  is  to  say,  independently  of  their  ideal  character, 
and  in  complete  abstraction  from  a  conscious  mind ;  or,  if  the  very 
phenomena  of  which  we  are  immediately  percipient  be  not  themselves 
thus  independent  of  being  perceived,  do  all,  or  any  of  them,  represent 
something  that  does  exist  absolutely?     In  short,  are  we,  can' we  be, 


) 


158  EDITOR'S   PREFACE. 

either  directly  or  indirectly,  cognisant  of  aught  existing  unintelligibly 
or  without  a  Mind  ? 

Now,  the  objects  or  phenomena  of  which  we  are  conscious  in  the 
senses,  i.  e.  our  sense-'i&zzs,  or  perceptions,  are,  it  is  assumed,  the  only 
ones  about  which  this  question  can  be  raised.  Hence  the  problem 
of  this  Division  of  the  Treatise  is — to  find  whether  the  phenomena 
presented  in  the  five  senses,  are  either  the?nselves  in  substance  exter- 
nal, or  represent  things  that  are  in  substance  external — meaning  by 
'external,'  without  (i.e.  unperceived  and  unconceived  by)  a  mind, 
foreign  to  all  conscious  experience. 

That  the  ideas  or  phenomena  actually  presented  to  us  in  the  five 
senses  cannot  themselves  be  qualities  of  what  is  external,  in  this  meaning 
of  the  term  '  external,'  is  affirmed  (sect.  3)  to  be  '  intuitively  evident.' 
\n  object  is  called  an  idea  because  it  is  present  in  a  conscious  experience. 
Now,  we  have  no  sensible  proof  that  it  continues  to  exist  when  it  is  not 
thus  present;  and  every  sensible  thing  includes  qualities  which,  by  the 
consent  of  all  who  think,  are  dependent  on  a  sentient  organization. 

But,  although  our  very  sense-given  ideas  themselves  cannot  exist 
substantially,  when  divested  of  their  ideal  or  immediately  objective 
character,  and  put  out  of  all  relation  to  a  conscious  mind,  may  they 
not,  it  is  asked  (sect.  8),  represent  what  exists  in  an  unthinking  sub- 
stance? This  supposition,  it  is  answered,  is  a  mere  unproved  supposi- 
tion, and  it  even  involves  a  contradiction.  Those  supposed  solid, 
extended,  and  coloured  originals  or  archetypes  of  our  sense-ideas  are 
themselves  perceived,  or  they  are  not.  If  they  are  perceived,  they  are 
ipso  facto  ideas ;  for,  an  idea  is  simply  that  which,  whatever  else  it  may 
be,  is  the  immediate  object  of  a  conscious  mind.  On  the  other  hand, 
if  they  are  not  themselves,  and  cannot  be,  contained  in  a  conscious 
experience,  they  cannot  resemble  what  is  so  contained.  'An  idea  can 
be  like  nothing  but  an  idea.'  A  quantity  of  conscious  experience  can 
be  like  nothing  but  another  quantity  of  conscious  experience.  This 
conclusion  cannot  be  evaded,  it  is  argued  (sect.  9),  by  Locke's  favour- 
ite discrimination  of  the  qualities  of  this  unperceiving  and  unper- 
ceived Matter  into  primary  and  secondary:  so  that  if  solid,  extended, 
coloured  substances  exist,  per  se,  or  absolutely,  it  is  impossible  that  we 
should  come  to  know  this ;  and,  if  they  do  not  thus  exist,  we  should 
have  exactly  the  same  reason  for  believing  in  their  absolute  existence 
that  we  now  have  (sect.  20). 

The  very  supposition,  however,  of  the  existence  of  anything  out  of 
conscious  experience  involves,  Berkeley  further  argues,  a  contradiction 
in  terms  (sect.   23).     We  may,  indeed,  imagine  trees  in  a  park,  or 


EDITOR'S    PREFACE. 


$9 


books  in  our  study,  with  no  one  at  hand  to  perceive  them,  and  main- 
tain their  existence  in  a  presentative  experience.  But,  are  we  not 
ourselves,  in  the  very  act  of  thus  imagining  them,  keeping  them  in 
existence  in  our  representative  experience  ?  Thus,  when  we  do  our 
utmost,  by  imagination,  to  conceive  bodies  existing  externally  or  ab- 
solutely, we  are,  in  the  very  act  of  doing  so,  making  them  ideas — not 
of  sense,  indeed,  but  of  imagination.  The  supposition  itself  of  their 
unideal  existence  makes  them  ideas ;  inasmuch  as  it  makes  them  im- 
aginary objects,  dependent  on  an  imagining  mind. 

On  the  whole,  to  say  that  sensible  objects  either  themselves  are,  or 
themselves  represent  substances  that  exist  independent  of  Mind,  is  to 
say  what  involves  a  contradiction  in  terms,  or  it  is  to  use  words  which 
mean  nothing.  It  is  to  speak  unintelligibly,  in  short,  according  to  the 
general  conclusion  of  this  part  of  the  Treatise. 

In  thus  banishing  Absolute  Material  Substance,  Berkeley  does  not 
allow  that  he  has  banished  Substance — a  substantiating  or  uniting 
principle,  in  which  phenomena  have  their  ground  and  meaning.  He 
substitutes  an  intelligible,  because  intelligent,  substantiating  principle, 
of  which  we  are  conscious,  for  an  unintelligible  and  contradictory 
one  of  which  we  neither  are  nor  can  be  conscious.  Here  Berkeley's 
thought  becomes  obscure.  I  think  it  may  be  worked  out  in  this  way : 
— Absolute  Material  Substance  is,  he  says,  an  empty  abstraction  of 
metaphjsicians,  and  every  real  substance  must  be  either  perceived  or 
percipient ;  for  we  cannot  go  below  experience  or  consciousness.  Now, 
every  percept  or  phenomenon  perceived  implies  a  percipient,  and  every 
percipient  implies  a  percept.  Are  substances,  then  (i.  e.  the  ultimate 
ground  of  phenomena),  percepts,  or  are  they  percipient  minds?  When 
we  compare  these,  we  find  that  the  deepest  and  truest  ground  of  things 
lies  in  the  latter,  and  not  in  the  former  ;  in  a  mind,  and  not  in  per- 
cepts or  phenomena  which  depend  upon  a  mind.  We  are  aware  in 
memory  of  the  mysterious  identity  of  the  former,  and  to  this  persona/ 
identity  there  is  no  counterpart  in  the  perpetual  changes  of  the  perceived 
or  objective  world.  The  substances  of  the  universe  are  thus  properly 
the  minds  or  persons  that  exist  in  it.  There  is,  strictly  speaking,  '  no 
other  Substance  than  Spirit,  or  that  which  perceives'  (sect.  7). 

It  is  next  argued  (sect.  25 — 27),  that  voluntary  mental  activity  is 
the  only  Causation  in  the  universe — that  all  Power,  as  well  as  all  Sub- 
stance, is  essentially  mental.  To  satisfy  ourselves  that  changes  among 
phenomena  are  only  the  passive  effects  of  spiritual  agency,  it  is  main- 
tained that  we  have  only  to  observe  them.  As  the  essence  of  all  phe- 
nomena has  been  proved  to  consist  in  perception  of  them,  it  follows 


l6o  EDITOR'S    PREFACE. 

that  they  cannot  contain  anything  of  which  the  percipient  is  incog- 
nisant.  Now,  power  or  activity  is  not  exhibited  by  any.  Sensible 
(or  other)  phenomena,  therefore,  cannot  be  the  cause  of  our  being  con 
scious.  Nor  can  they  cause  the  changes  which  occur  among  themselves : 
phenomena  are  related  to  each  other  as  signs  and  significates,  not  as 
causes  and  effects. 

But,  while  the  universe  of  ideas  or  phenomena  is  void  of  causality, 
power  (implied  in  the  changes  of  the  objects  of  consciousness)  must 
exist.  As  it  cannot  be  attributed  to  ideas,  it  must  belong  to  that  on 
which  they  depend.  Now,  Berkeley  has  already  concluded  that  what 
they  depend  on  must  be  conscious  Mind,  Self,  or  Ego.  To  conscious 
Mind,  Self,  or  Ego,  accordingly,  he  refers  all  the  changes  in  existence. 
Minds  not  only  substantiate  phenomena ;  they  cause  changes. 

But  there  is  a  plurality  of  powers  at  work  among  ideas.  Each  one 
of  us  finds,  on  trial,  that  his  personal  power  over  the  phenomena  of 
which  he  is  conscious  varies  (sect.  28 — 33).  We  can  make  and  un- 
make at  pleasure  the  objects  of  imagination ;  the  ideas  of  the  senses 
are  independent  in  a  much  greater  degree  of  the  mind  to  which  they 
are  present.  When  in  broad  daylight  we  open  our  eyes,  it  is  not  in 
our  power  to  choose  whether  we  shall  see  or  not,  or  to  determine  Avhat 
particular  objects  shall  present  themselves  to  our  view.  In  our  sense- 
experience  we  find  ourselves  confronted  by  the  signs  of  a  larger  reason 
and  a  firmer  will  than  are  exhibited  in  the  arbitrary  constructions  of 
our  own  imagination  ;  we  encounter  the  Supreme  Power  signified  by 
the  steady  natural  laws  of  sense-given  phenomena.  In  and  through 
our  senses,  we  awaken  to  the  discovery,  that  our  individual  conscious 
life  is,  in  the  sense-given  part  of  it,  a  portion  of  the  Universal  System, 
which  is  evolved  in  a  manner  so  orderly  and  constant  that  we  can,  by 
interpreting  what  we  perceive,  foresee  the  future,  and  regulate  our  lives. 
What  we  perceive  places  us  habitually  in  relation  to  Supreme  or  Es- 
sential Intelligence  expressed  in  the  laws  of  nature;  and  to  other 
minds,  like  our  own,  who  share  with  us  this  experience  of  the  senses, 
and  who,  through  its  means,  can  (we  find)  convey  to  us,  and  we  to 
them,  indications  of  our  respective  experiences.  The  ideas  which  are 
given  to  us  in  the  Senses  are  thus  distinguished  from  all  our  other 
ideas.  Their  arrangements  of  co-existence  and  succession  are  not 
merely  the  arbitrary  results  of  our  own  imaginative  activity;  they  are 
independent  of,  or  external  to,  our  will.  They  thus  reveal  to  us  the 
only  contemporaneous  External  World  of  which  we  have  any  proof, 
or  of  which  we  can  even  conceive  the  possibility — a  world  in  other 
minds.     Ideas  of  this  sort  (if,  indeed,  one  should  call  them  'ideas'  at 


EDITOR'S   PREFACE.  161 

all)  may  emphatically  be  distinguished  from  all  other  ideas,  as  real 
ones;  and  their  established  combinations  are  what  men  commonly 
call  'real  things.' 

These  sections  (28 — 33)  are  among  the  most  important  in  the 
Treatise.  They  express  Berkeley's  reasons  for  distinguishing  groups 
of  real  or  sense  ideas — which,  irrelative  to  anything  beyond,  can 
neither  be  representative  nor  misrepresentative — from  ideas  in  an  in- 
dividual imagination.  All  truth  and  all  error  belong  to  the  latter,  not 
to  the  former.  Physical  truth  is  the  true  interpretation  of  real  or  sense 
ideas.  Physical  error  is  the  misinterpretation  of  these  ideas.  But 
sense-ideas  themselves,  which  may  be  thus  interpreted  or  misinterpreted, 
represent  nothing — except,  indeed,  the  Divine  meaning  of  which  their 
laws  are  signs,  and  of  which  human  science  is  the  imperfect  interpreta- 
tion. They  can  have  no  archetypes  behind  them,  existing  in  an  un- 
conscious substance.  Imagination  is  the  only  representative  faculty. 
A  representative  sense-perception  is  an  absurdity*.  The  ideas  of  sense 
are  what  they  are,  and  we  cannot  go  deeper.  If  they  were  themselves 
representations  of  other  ideas,  then  these  others  would  become  the 
real  ideas,  and  those  so  called  would  be  relegated  to  imagination. 
And  Absolute  Matter  is  not  their  archetype,  which,  as  it  cannot  be 
perceived  in  sense,  can  as  little  be  suggested  by  custom  and  association, 
inferred  by  abstract  reasoning,  or  believed  in  by  the  common  faith  or 
reason  of  men.  The  world  of  material  things  is  thus  substantially 
syntheses  of  phenomena  in  conscious  minds,  and  Intelligence  is  the 
essence  of  the  universe. 

Such  in  spirit  are  Berkeley's  new  Principles,  with  the  grounds  in 
reason  and  experience  to  which  he  refers  them.  What  I  have  called 
the  Second  Division  of  the  Treatise  (sect.  34 — 84)  is  devoted  to  the 
statement  and  refutation  of  supposed  Objections  to  the  Principles. 

The  objections  and  answers  may  be  briefly  presented  as  follows: — 

First  objection.  (Sect.  34 — 40.)  The  preceding  Principles  banish 
from  existence  all  that  is  real  and  substantial,  and  substitute  a  universe 
of  mere  ideas  or  chimeras. 

Answer.  This  objection  is  a  play  upon  the  popular  meaning  of  the 
word  'idea.'  That  word  may  be  used  to  signify  objects  of  sense — in 
respect  of  their  necessary  dependence  upon  mind;  and  not  merely 
fancies  and  chimeras,  the  'ideas'  of  popular  language,  creatures  of  indi- 
vidual minds,  which  may,  and  often  do,  misrepresent  the  real  ideas  of 

*  Illustrations  of  this  statement,  and  a  comparison  of  Berkeley's  presentative  perception 
with  that  of  the  Scotch  psychologists,  will  be  given  afterwards. 

II 


162  EDITOR'S    PREFACE. 

the  natural  system  that  is  independent  of  our  will,  while  dependent  on 
Divine  Mind  and  Will.  An  idea,  in  the  language  of  this  system,  is 
simply  that  of  which  we  are  conscious. 

Second  objection.  (Sect.  41.)  The  preceding  Principles  abolish  the 
distinction  between  Perception  and  Imagination — between  imagining 
one's  self  burnt  and  actually  being  burnt. 

Answer.  Real  fire  differs  from  the  mere  thought  or  fancy  of  it,  as 
real  pain  does  from  the  mere  thought  or  fancy  of  pain;  and  yet  no  one 
supposes  that  real  any  more  than  imaginary  pain  can  exist  unperceived, 
or  in  an  unperceiving  substance. 

Third  objection.  (Sect.  42 — 44.)  We  see  sensible  things  actually 
existing  at  a  distance  from  us.  Now,  whatever  is  thus  seen  at  a 
distance  is  surely  seen  as  external,  which  contradicts  the  foregoing 
Principles. 

Answer.  Distance,  or  outness,  is  absolutely  invisible.  It  is  a  con- 
ception which  is  suggested  gradually,  by  our  experience  of  the  connec- 
tion between  colours  (which  alone  we  see)  and  visual  sensations  that 
accompany  seeing,  on  the  one  hand,  and  certain  varieties  of  tactual 
and  locomotive  experience,  on  the  other — as  was  proved  in  the  Essay 
towards  a  New  Theory  of  Vision,  in  which  the  mere  ideality  of  the 
visible  world  is  demonstrated*. 

Fourth  objection.  (Sect.  45 — 48.)  It  follows  from  the  new  Princi- 
ples, that  real  things,  i.  e.  combinations  of  real  or  sense-ideas,  must  be 
at  every  moment  annihilated  and  created  anew. 

Answer.  On  the  contrary,  it  is  quite  consistent  with  the  new  Prin- 
ciples that  a  sensible  thing  may  actually  exist,  in  the  sense-experience 
of  other  minds,  during  the  intervals  of  perception  by  an  individual 
mind ;  for  the  Principles  do  not  affirm  their  substantial  and  causal  de- 
pendence on  this,  that,  or  the  other  mind,  but  on  Mind.  They  imply, 
indeed,  a  constant  creation  or  presentation  in  finite  minds;  but  the 
conception  of  the  universe  in  a  state  of  constant  creation  was  familiar 
to  the  Schoolmen  and  other  Theists,  and  enables  us  impressively  to 
realise  Divine  Providence. 

Fifth  objection.  (Sect.  49.)  If  extension  and  the  other  primary 
qualities  of  matter  can  exist  only  in  mind,  it  follows  that  extension  is 
an  attribute  of  mind — that  mind  is  extended. 

Answer.  Extension  and  other  sensible  qualities  exist  in  mind  not  as 
modes  or  attributes,  which  is  unintelligible,  but  as  ideas,  or  objects  of 

*  Moreover,  even  if  the  outness  or  distance  of  things  were  visible,  it  would  not  follow 
that  eithei  they  or  their  distance  exist  unperceived.  On  the  contrary,  the  very  hypothesis 
implies  that  they  are  perceived  visually. 


EDITOR'S    PREFACE.  163 

which  Mind  is  percipient;  and  this  is  absolutely  inconsistent  with  the 
supposition  that  mind  itself  is  extended  or  solid*. 

Sixth  objection.  (Sect.  50.)  The  Newtonian  and  other  discoveries 
in  natural  philosophy  proceed  on  an  assumption  of  external  Matter, 
and  are  thus  inconsistent  with  the  new  Principles. 

Answer.  On  the  contrary,  external  Matter — if  '  external '  means 
what  exists  in  absolute  independence  of  Mind — is  useless  in  natural 
philosophy,  which  is  conversant  exclusively  with  particular  ideas,  phe- 
nomena, or  concrete  things,  and  not  with  mere  abstractions. 

Seventh  objection.  (Sect.  51.)  It  is  absurd,  because  at  variance  with 
the  universal  use  of  language,  to  exclude  power  or  causation  from 
Matter,  and  to  attribute  every  sensible  phenomenon  to  Mind,  as  the 
foregoing  Principles  do. 

Answer.  While  we  may  continue  to  speak  as  the  unreflecting  mul- 
titude do,  we  should  learn  to  think  with  the  reflecting  or  philosophical. 
We  may  still  speak  of  physical  causes,  even  when,  as  philosophers, 
we  have  recognised  that  all  true  efficiency  is  in  mind,  and  that  the 
material  world  is  only  a  system  of  sensible  symbols  regulated  by  mind. 

Eighth  objection.  (Sect.  54,  55.)  The  Common  Sense  or  universal 
belief  of  men  is  inconsistent  with  the  exclusively  ideal  character  of 
real  or  external  things. 

Answer.  This  is  doubtful,  when  we  consider  that,  in  their  natural 
confusion  of  thought,  ordinary  men  do  not  comprehend  the  metaphysi- 
cal meaning  of  their  own  assumptions;  and  it  seems  a  small  objection, 
when  we  recollect  the  prejudices,  dignified  as  Common  Sense,  which 
have  successively  surrendered  to  philosophy. 

Ninth  objection.  (Sect.  56,  57.)  Any  Principle  that  is  inconsistent  with 
the  common  belief  in  the  existence  of  an  external  world  must  be  rejected. 

Answer.  The  fact  that  we  are  conscious  of  not  being  ourselves  the 
cause  of  changes  in  our  sense-ideas,  which  we  gradually  learn  by  ex- 
perience to  foresee,  sufficiently  accounts  for  the  common  belief  in 
externality,  and  is  what  men  really  mean  by  the  word. 

Tenth  objection.  (Sect.  58,  59.)  The  foregoing  Principles  concern- 
ing Matter  and  Mind  are  inconsistent  with  various  established  rules  in 
mathematics  and  natural  philosophy. 

*  It  is  also  to  be  remembered  that  sensible  things  may  exist  '  in  mind,'  without  being 
mine—  meaning  by  '  mine'  the  creatures  of  my  will.  Mind  and  they  are  connected,  but 
not  as  cause  and  effect.  Properly  speaking,  that  only  is  mine  in  which  my  will  exerts 
itself.  But,  in  another  view,  my  involuntary  states  of  feeling  and  imagination  are  mine, 
because  their  existence  depends  on  my  individual  consciousness  of  them ;  and  even  sen- 
sible things  are  mine,  because,  though  present  in  many  minds  in  common,  they  are,  for 
me,  dependent  on  my  mind. 


164  EDITOR'S    PREFACE. 

Answer.  The  laws  of  motion,  and  the  other  truths  here  referred  to, 
may  be  all  conceived  and  expressed  in  perfect  consistency  with  the 
new  Principles  about  the  substantiality  and  causality  of  Minds,  and  the 
absence  of  all  proper  substance  and  causation  in  Matter. 

Eleventh  objection.  (Sect.  60 — 66.)  If,  according  to  the  foregoing 
Principles,  the  material  world  is  merely  the  series  of  phenomenal  or 
ideal  effects  of  which  we  are  conscious  in  our  senses,  the  elaborate 
contrivances  which  it  contains  are  useless. 

Answer.  These  elaborate  contrivances,  while  unnecessary  as  causes, 
are  relatively  necessary  as  signs :  they  express  to  us  the  occasional 
presence  of  other  finite  minds,  the  constant  presence  and  power  of 
Supreme  Mind,  and  the  Divine  Ideas  of  which  the  objective  universe 
is  the  symbol. 

•  Twelfth  objection.  (Sect.  67 — 79.)  Although  the  impossibility  of  an 
Absolute  Material  Substance  that  is  active,  solid,  and  extended  may  be 
a  demonstrable  Principle,  this  does  not  prove  the  impossibility  of  one 
that  is  inactive,  and  neither  solid  nor  extended,  which  may  be  the  occa- 
sion of  our  sense-ideas,  or  which  at  any  rate  may  exist. 

Answer.  This  supposition  is  unintelligible  :  the  words  in  which  it 
is  expressed  cannot  convey  any  meaning. 

Thirteenth  objection.  (Sect.  80,  81.)  Notwithstanding  the  foregoing 
Principles,  Matter  may  be  an  unknown  somewhat,  neither  substance 
nor  accident,  cause  nor  effect,  spirit  nor  idea;  and  all  the  reasonings 
against  the  notion  of  Matter,  conceived  as  something  positive,  fail, 
when  this  purely  negative  notion  is  maintained. 

Answer.  This  is  to  use  the  word  'Matter'  as  people  use  the  word 
'nothing:'  the  supposed  abstract  existence  cannot  be  distinguished 
from  nothing. 

Fourteenth  objection.  (Sect.  82 — 84.)  Although  we  cannot,  in  oppo- 
sition to  the  new  Principles,  infer  by  reasoning  the  independent  or 
absolute  existence  of  Matter,  according  to  any  possible  conception, 
either  positive  or  negative,  of  what  Matter  is ;  and  although  we  may 
be  unable  even  to  understand  what  the  word  means,  yet  Holy  Scripture 
is  sufficient  to  convince  every  Christian  of  the  existence  of  an  external 
material  world — as  an  object  of  faith. 

Answer.  The  absolute  or  independent  existence  of  a  material  world 
is  nowhere  affirmed  in  Scripture,  which  employs  language  in  its  popu- 
lar and  practical  meaning. 

In  what  I  have  called  the  Third  Division  of  the  Treatise  (sect.  85 — 
156),  the  new  Principles,  thus  guarded  against  objections,  are  applied 


EDITOR'S    PREFACE.  165 

to  invigorate  belief,  which  was  suffering  from  the  paralysis  of  meta- 
physical Scepticism.  They  are  also  employed  to  purify  and  simplify 
the  sciences  which  relate  to  the  ideal  world  of  the  senses — the  Physical 
Sciences;  and  those  which  relate  to  spirits,  by  whom  ideas  are  sus- 
tained, and  their  changes  determined — the  science  of  Minds,  and 
Theology.     It  may  be  thus  subdivided  : — 

I.  (Sect.  85 — 134-)  Application  of  the  new  Principles,  concerning 
Matter,  Mind,  Substance,  and  Cause,  to  our  knowledge  of  the  object- 
ive and  physical  world  of  ideas — 

1.  To  the  refutation  of  Scepticism,  as  to  the  existence  of  sensible 

things  (sect.  85 — 91);  and  of  God  (sect.  92 — 96); 

2.  To  the  liberation  of  Thought  from  the  bondage  of  unmeaning 

abstractions  (sect.  97 — 100)  ; 

3.  To  the  purification  of  Natural  Philosophy,  by  correcting  para- 

doxical conceptions  of  Time,  Space,  and  Motion  (sect.  101 
-116); 

4.  And  of   Mathematics,  through   criticism  of  our    notions   of 

Number  and  Extension,  and  by  the  abolition  of  the  contra- 
dictions involved  in  the  common  doctrine  of  Infinites  (sect. 
117— 134). 

II.  (Sect.  135 — 156.)  Application  of  the  new  Principles  to  our 
notions  of  Mind  or  Spirit — 

1.  To  explain  and  sustain  our  faith  in  our  natural  Immortality 

(sect.  137—144); 

2.  To  explain  and  vindicate  the  belief  which  each  man  has  in  the 

existence  of  other  men  (sect.  145)  ; 

3.  To  vindicate  belief  in  the  existence  of  Supreme  Mind  (sect. 

146—156). 

It  was  only  by  degrees  that  this  scheme  of  Berkeley's  philosophy 
attracted  the  attention  due  to  so  original  and  ingenious  a  mode  of 
conceiving  the  Universe.  A  fragment  of  metaphysics,  by  a  young  and 
almost  unknown  author,  published  at  a  distance  from  the  centre  of 
English  intellectual  life,  was  apt  to  be  overlooked.  In  connection 
with  the  Essay  on  Vision,  however,  it  drew  enough  of  regard  to  carry 
its  author  with  eclat  on  his  first  visit  to  London,  three  years  after  the 
publication  of  the  Principles.  He  then  published  the  immortal  Dia- 
logues between  Hylas  and  Philonous,  in  which  the  absurdity  of  Absolute 
Matter  is  illustrated,  and  the  doctrine  defended  against  objections,  in 
a  manner  meant  to  recommend  to  popular  acceptance  what,  on  the 
first  statement,  seemed  an  unpopular  paradox.  4-   C.  F. 


A  TREATISE 


CONCERNING 


THE    PRINCIPLES    OF    HUMAN    KNOWLEDGE. 


WHEREIN  THE  CHIEF  CAUSES  OF  ERROR  AND  DIFFICULTY  IN  THE 
SCIENCES,  WITH  THE  GROUNDS  OF  SCEPTICISM,  ATHEISM,  AND 
IRRELIGION,  ARE  INQUIRED   INTO. 


First  Printed  in  the  Year  1710. 


167 


TO   THE   RIGHT   HONOURABLE 

THOMAS,   EARL   OF    PEMBROKE1,  &c 

KNIGHT  OF  THE  MOST  NOBLE  ORDER  OF  THE  GARTER,  AND 

ONE  OF  THE  LORDS  OF  HER  MAJESTY'S  MOST 

HONOURABLE  PRIVY  COUNCIL. 

My  Lord, 
You  will  perhaps  wonder  that  an  obscure  person,  who  has  not  the 
honour  to  be  known  to  your  lordship,  should  presume  to  address  you  in 
this  manner.  But  that  a  man  who  has  written  something  with  a  design 
to  promote  Useful  Knowledge  and  Religion  in  the  world  should  make 
choice  of  your  lordship  for  his  patron,  will  not  be  thought  strange  by 
any  one  that  is  not  altogether  unacquainted  with  the  present  state  of 
the  church  and  learning,  and  consequently  ignorant  how  great  an  or- 
nament and  support  you  are  to  both.  Yet,  nothing  could  have  induced 
me  to  make  you  this  present  of  my  poor  endeavours,  were  I  not  en- 
couraged by  that  candour  and  native  goodness  which  is  so  bright  a 
part  in  your  lordship's  character.  I  might  add,  my  lord,  that  the  ex- 
traordinary favour  and  bounty  you  have  been  pleased  to  shew  towards 
our  Society2  gave  me  hopes  you  would  not  be  unwilling  to  countenance 
the  studies  of  one  of  its  members.  These  considerations  determined 
me  to  lay  this  treatise  at  your  lordship's  feet,  and  the  rather  because  I 
was  ambitious  to  have  it  known  that  I  am  with  the  truest  and  most 
profound  respect,  on  account  of  that  learning  and  virtue  which  the 
world  so  justly  admires  in  your  lordship, 

My  Lord, 

Your  lordship's  most  humble 

and  most  devoted  servant, 

GEORGE  BERKELEY. 

1  Thomas  Herbert,  eighth  Earl  of  Pembroke  and  fifth  Earl  of  Montgomery,  the  friend 
of  Locke — who  dedicated  his  Essay  to  him  as  a  work  '  having  some  little  correspondence 
with  some  parts  of  that  nobler  and  vast  system  of  the  sciences  your  lordship  has  made  so 
new,  exact,  and  instructive  a  draft  of — and  representative  of  a  family  renowned  in 
English  political  and  literary  history.  He  was  born  in  1656 ;  was  a  nobleman  of  Christ 
Church,  Oxford,  in  1672;  succeeded  to  his  titles  in  1683  ;  was  sworn  of  the  Privy  Council 
in  1689;  and  was  made  a  Knight  of  the  Garter  in  1700.  He  filled  some  of  the  highest 
offices  in  the  state,  in  the  reigns  of  William  and  Mary,  and  of  Anne.  He  was  Lord  Lieu- 
tenant of  Ireland  in  1707,  having  previously  been  one  of  the  Commissioners  by  whom  the 
union  between  England  and  Scotland  was  negotiated.     He  died  in  January,  1733. 

a  Trinity  College,  Dublin. 

169 


THE    PREFACE. 

What  I  here  make  public  has,  after  a  long  and  scrupulous  inquiry1, 
seemed  to  me  evidently  true  and  not  unuseful  to  be  known — particu- 
larly to  those  who  are  tainted  with  Scepticism,  or  want  a  demonstra- 
tion of  the  existence  and  immateriality  of  God,  or  the  natural  immor- 
tality of  the  soul.  Whether  it  be  so  or  no  I  am  content  the  reader 
should  impartially  examine  j  since  I  do  not  think  myself  any  farther 
concerned  for  the  success  of  what  I  have  written  than  as  it  is  agreeable 
to  truth.  But,  to  the  end  this  may  not  suffer,  I  make  it  my  request 
that  the  reader  suspend  his  judgment  till  he  has  once  at  least  read  the 
whole  through  with  that  degree  of  attention  and  thought  which  the 
subject-matter  shall  seem  to  deserve.  For,  as  there  are  some  passages 
that,  taken  by  themselves,  are  very  liable  (nor  could  it  be  remedied) 
to  gross  misinterpretation,  and  to  be  charged  with  most  absurd  conse- 
quences, which,  nevertheless,  upon  an  entire  perusal  will  appear  not  to 
follow  from  them ;  so  likewise,  though  the  whole  should  be  read  over, 
yet,  if  this  be  done  transiently,  it  is  very  probable  my  sense  may  be 
mistaken ;  but  to  a  thinking  reader,  I  flatter  myself  it  will  be  through- 
out clear  and  obvious.  As  for  the  characters  of  novelty  and  singu- 
larity2 which  some  of  the  following  notions  may  seem  to  bear,  it  is,  I 
hope,  needless  to  make  any  apology  on  that  account.  He  must  surely 
be  either  very  weak,  or  very  little  acquainted  with  the  sciences,  who 
shall  reject  a  truth  that  is  capable  of  demonstration3,  for  no  other 
reason  but  because  it  is  newly  known2,  and  contrary  to  the  prejudices 

1  In  his  Common-place  Book  Berkeley  seems  to  refer  his  speculations  to  his  boyhood. 
The  theory  of  the  sensible  world  propounded  in  the  following  Treatise  was  obviously  con- 
ceived by  him  before  the  publication  of  the  New  Theory  of  Vision,  which  was  a  first  in- 
stalment of  it. 

*  Cf.  Locke,  in  the  '  Epistle  Dedicatory'  of  his  Essay.  As  regards  the  '  novelty'  of  the 
chief  principles  of  the  following  treatise,  viz.  the  negation  of  Abstract  Entities  (absolute  or 
unperceived  Matter,  absolute  Space,  absolute  Time,  absolute  Substance,  and  absolute 
Cause) ;  and  the  affirmation  of  Mind,  as  the  Synthesis,  Substance,  and  Cause  of  all  ideas 
or  objects — the  best  preceding  philosophy,  ancient  and  modern,  was  a  dim  anticipation 
of  it. 

3  Cf.  sect.  6,  22,  24,  &c,  in  illustration  of  the  demonstrative  character  of  Berkeley's  dis- 
tinctive doctrine. 

171 


172  THE    PREFACE. 

of  mankind.  Thus  much  I  thought  fit  to  premise,  in  order  to  prevent, 
if  possible,  the  hasty  censures  of  a  sort  of  men  who  are  too  apt  to 
condemn  an  opinion  before  they  rightly  comprehend  it4. 

*  Berkeley's  one  request  to  his  reader,  here  and  throughout  his  writings,  is,  to  take 
pains  to  understand  his  meaning.  This  especially  requires  us  to  avoid  confounding  his 
sense-ideas  with  mere  fancies  or  chimeras — arbitrary  creations  of  the  individual  mind. 
The  history  of  this  doctrine  has  been  a  history  of  its  misinterpretation. 


INTRODUCTION. 

1.  Philosophy  being  nothing  else  but  the  study  of  wisdom  and 
truth1,  it  may  with  reason  be  expected  that  those  who  have  spent 
most  time  and  pains  in  it  should  enjoy  a  greater  calm  and  se- 
renity of  mind,  a  greater  clearness  and  evidence  of  knowledge, 
and  be  less  disturbed  with  doubts  and  difficulties  than  other  men. 
Yet  so  it  is,  we  see  the  illiterate  bulk  of  mankind,  that  walk  the 
high  road  of  plain  common  sense,  and  are  governed  by  the  dic- 
tates of  nature,  for  the  most  part  easy  and  undisturbed.  To  them 
nothing  that  is  familiar  appears  unaccountable  or  difficult  to 
comprehend.  They  complain  not  of  any  want  of  evidence  in 
their  senses,  and  are  out  of  all  danger  of  becoming  Sceptics. 
But  no  sooner  do  we  depart  from  sense  and  instinct  to  follow 
the  light  of  a  superior  principle — to  reason,  meditate,  and  reflect 
on  the  nature  of  things,  but  a  thousand  scruples  spring  up  in  our 
minds  concerning  those  things  which  before  we  seemed  fully  to 
comprehend.  Prejudices  and  errors  of  sense  do  from  all  parts 
discover  themselves  to  our  view ;  and,  endeavouring  to  correct 
these  by  reason,  we  are  insensibly  drawn  into  uncouth  paradoxes, 
difficulties,  and  inconsistencies,  which  multiply  and  grow  upon  us 
as  we  advance  in  speculation,  till  at  length,  having  wandered 
through  many  intricate  mazes,  we  find  ourselves  just  where  we 
were,  or,  which  is  worse,  sit  down  in  a  forlorn  Scepticism2. 

2.  The  cause  of  this  is  thought  to  be  the  obscurity  of  things,  or 
the  natural  weakness  and  imperfection  of  our  understandings.  It 
is  said,  '  the  faculties  we  have  are  few,  and  those  designed  by  na- 

1  '  Philosophy,  which  is  nothing  but  the  true  knowledge  of  things.'     Locke. 

2  The  purpose  of  these  early  essays  of  Berkeley  was  to  reconcile  philosophy  with  common 
sense,  by  employing  demonstration  to  make  common  sense  reveal  itself  truly.  Cf.  the 
closing  sentences  in  the  Third  Dialogue  between  Hylas  and  Philonous. 

173 


1 74  INTRO  D  UC  TIO  N. 

ture  for  the  support  and  pleasure  of  life,  and  not  to  penetrate  into 
the  inward  essence  and  constitution  of  things.  Besides,  the  mind 
of  man  being  finite,  when  it  treats  of  things  which  partake  of  in- 
finity, it  is  not  to  be  wondered  at  if  it  run  into  absurdities  and 
contradictions,  out  of  which  it  is  impossible  it  should  ever  extri- 
cate itself,  it  being  of  the  nature  of  infinite  not  to  be  compre- 
hended by  that  which  is  finite3.' 

3.  But,  perhaps,  we  may  be  too  partial  to  ourselves  in  placing 
the  fault  originally  in  our  faculties,  and  not  rather  in  the  wrong 
use  we  make  of  them.  It  is  a  hard  thing  to  suppose  that  right 
deductions  from  true  principles  should  ever  end  in  consequences 
which  cannot  be  maintained  or  made  consistent.  We  should 
believe  that  God  has  dealt  more  bountifully  with  the  sons  of  men 
than  to  give  them  a  strong  desire  for  that  knowledge  which  he 
had  placed  quite  out  of  their  reach.  This  were  not  agreeable  to 
the  wonted  indulgent  methods  of  Providence,  which,  whatever 
appetites  it  may  have  implanted  in  the  creatures,  doth  usually 
furnish  them  with  such  means  as,  if  rightly  made  use  of,  will  not 
fail  to  satisfy  them.  Upon  the  whole,  I  am  inclined  to  think 
that  the  far  greater  part,  if  not  all,  of  those  difficulties  which  have 
hitherto  amused  philosophers,  and  blocked  up  the  way  to  knowl- 
edge, are  entirely  owing  to  ourselves — that  we  have  first  raised 
a  dust  and  then  complain  we  cannot  see. 

4.  My  purpose  therefore  is,  to  try  if  I  can  discover  what  those 
Principles  are4  which  have  introduced  all  that  doubtfulness  and 
uncertainty,  those  absurdities  and  contradictions,  into  the  several 
sects  of  philosophy;  insomuch  that  the  wisest  men  have  thought 
our  ignorance  incurable,  conceiving  it  to  arise  from  the  natural 
dulness  and  limitation  of  our  faculties3.  And  surely  it  is  a  work 
well  deserving  our  pains  to  make  a  strict  inquiry  concerning  the 
First  Principles  of  Human  Knowledge,  to  sift  and  examine  them 
on  all  sides,  especially  since  there  may  be  some  grounds  to  sus- 

3  Cf.  Locke's  Essay,  Introduction,  sect.  4 — 7;  B.  II.  ch.  23,  #  12,  &c.  Locke  (who  is 
here  in  Berkeley's  eye)  attributes  the  perplexities  of  philosophy  to  our  narrow  faculties, 
which  are  meant,  he  maintains,  to  regulate  our  lives,  and  not  to  explain  the  mysteries  of 
Being.     See  also  Des  Cartes,  Priitcipia,  I.  26,  27,  &c. ;  Malebranche,   Recherche,  III.  2. 

4  The  assumption  that  Matter,  Space,  Time,  Substance,  Cause,  may  ami  do  exist  a.s 
abstract  entities,  i.e.  unperceived  and  unconceived  by  a  mind,  is,  with  Berkeley,  the  funda- 
mental false  principle,  to  which  is  due  the  alleged  confusion  and  inconsistency  of  philosophy, 
and  the  consequent  inclination  to  philosophical  and  religious  scepticism. 


INTRODUCTION.  175 

pect  that  those  lets  and  difficulties,  which  stay  and  embarrass  the 
mind  in  its  search  after  truth,  do  not  spring  from  any  darkness 
and  intricacy  in  the  objects,  or  natural  defect  in  the  understand- 
ing, so  much  as  from  false  Principles  which  have  been  insisted 
on,  and  might  have  been  avoided. 

5.  How  difficult  and  discouraging  soever  this  attempt  may 
seem,  when  I  consider  what  a  number  of  very  great  and  extraor- 
dinary men  have  gone  before  me  in  the  like  designs3,  yet  I  am 
not  without  some  hopes — upon  the  consideration  that  the  largest 
views  are  not  always  the  clearest,  and  that  he  who  is  short-sighted 
will  be  obliged  to  draw  the  object  nearer,  and  may,  perhaps,  by  a 
close  and  narrow  survey,  discern  that  which  had  escaped  far  better 
eyes. 

6.  In  order  to  prepare  the  mind  of  the  reader  for  the  easier 
conceiving  what  follows,  it  is  proper  to  premise  somewhat,  by 
way  of  Introduction,  concerning  the  nature  and  abuse  of  Lan- 
guage. But  the  unravelling  this  matter  leads  me  in  some 
measure  to  anticipate  my  design,  by  taking  notice  of  what  seems 
to  have  had  a  chief  part  in  rendering  speculation  intricate  and 
perplexed,  and  to  have  occasioned  innumerable  errors  and  diffi- 
culties in  almost  all  parts  of  knowledge.  And  that  is  the  opinion 
that  the  mind  hath  a  power  of  framing  abstract  ideas  or  notions  of 
things6.  [']  He  who  is  not  a  perfect  stranger  to  the  writings 
and  disputes  of  philosophers  must  needs  acknowledge  that  no 

5  A  work  previously  undertaken  under  the  same  designation,  by  Des  Cartes  in  his  Prin- 
cipia,  and,  in  fact  if  not  in  name,  by  Locke  in  his  Essay. 

6  Here  '  abstract  idea'  and  '  notion'  are  used  convertibly.  Cf.  sect.  142.  Cf.  with  what 
follows  against  abstract  ideas  in  the  remainder  of  the  Introduction,  sect.  97 — 100,  118 — 
132,  143 ;  New  Theory  of  Vision,  sect.  122 — 125 ;  Alciphron,  Dial.  vii.  5 — 7 ;  Defence  of 
Free  Thinking  in  Mathematics,  sect.  45 — 48  ;  Siris,  sect.  323,  335,  &c,  where  he  distin- 
guishes the  Platonic  Ideas  from  the  '  ideas'  and  Nominalism  of  his  own  early  philosophy. 

In  the  following  sections  Berkeley  has  Locke  chiefly  in  view.  He  appears  here  as  the 
second  great  modern  defender  of  Nominalism,  and  is  so  referred  to  by  Hume,  Treatise  of 
Human  Nature,  B.  I.  part  1,  ch.  7.  Hobbes  was  the  first.  Berkeley's  reasonings,  in  the 
sections  which  follow,  have  become  commonplace  in  later  discussions  of  the  question, 
What  are  we  cognizant  of  when  we  use  the  common  terms  on  which  human  science  de- 
pends? According  to  Berkeley,  it  is  not  an  idea,  inasmuch  as  all  ideas  (i.e.  presentative 
and  representative  objects)  must  either  be  particular  or  else  involve  contradictory  charac- 
ters ;  it  is,  he  concludes,  a  relation  among  ideas  that  we  know  when  we  employ  general 
terms.  Yet,  many  who  have  accepted  his  reasonings  against  abstract  ideas  have  not  dis- 
cerned their  connexion  with  his  abolition  of  abstract  Matter  and  Space. 


176  INTRODUCTION. 

small  part  of  them  are  spent  about  abstract  ideas.  These  are  in 
a  more  especial  manner  thought  to  be  the  object  of  those  sciences 
which  go  by  the  name  of  Logic  and  Metaphysics,  and  of  all  that 
which  passes  under  the  notion  of  the  most  abstracted  and  sublime 
learning,  in  all  which  one  shall  scarce  find  any  question  handled 
in  such  a  manner  as  does  not  suppose  their  existence  in  the  mind, 
and  that  it  is  well  acquainted  with  them. 

7.  It  is  agreed  on  all  hands  that  the  qualities  or  modes  of 
things  do  never  really  exist  each  of  them  apart  by  itself,  and 
separated  from  all  others,  but  are  mixed,  as  it  were,  and  blended 
together,  several  in  the  same  object.  But,  we  are  told,  the  mind 
being  able  to  consider  each  quality  singly,  or  abstracted  from 
those  other  qualities  with  which  it  is  united,  does  by  that  means 
frame  to  itself  abstract  ideas.  For  example,  there  is  perceived  by 
sight  an  object  extended,  coloured,  and  moved;  this  mixed  or 
compound  idea  the  mind  resolving  into  its  simple,  constituent 
parts,  and  viewing  each  by  itself,  exclusive  of  the  rest,  does  frame 
the  abstract  ideas  of  extension,  colour,  and  motion.  Not  that  it 
is  possible  for  colour  or  motion  to  exist  without  extension ;  but 
only  that  the  mind  can  frame  to  itself  by  abstraction  the  idea  of 
colour  exclusive  of  extension,  and  of  motion  exclusive  of  both 
colour  and  extension. 

8.  Again,  the  mind  having  observed  that  in  the  particular 
extensions  perceived  by  sense  there  is  something  common  and 
alike  in  all,  and  some  other  things  peculiar,  as  this  or  that  figure 
or  magnitude,  which  distinguish  them  one  from  another;  it  con- 
siders apart  or  singles  out  by  itself  that  which  is  common,  making 
thereof  a  most  abstract  idea  of  extension,  which  is  neither  line, 
surface,  nor  solid,  nor  has  any  figure  or  magnitude,  but  is  an  idea 
entirely  prescinded  from  all  these.  So  likewise  the  mind,  by 
leaving  out  of  the  particular  colours  perceived  by  sense  that  which 
distinguishes  them  one  from  another,  and  retaining  that  only 
which  is  common  to  all,  makes  an  idea  of  colour  in  abstract  which 
is  neither  red,  nor  blue,  nor  white,  nor  any  other  determinate 
colour.  And,  in  like  manner,  by  considering  motion  abstractedly 
not  only  from  the  body  moved,  but  likewise  from  the  figure  it 
describes,  and  all  particular  directions  and  velocities,  the  abstract 


INTRODUCTION.  \yy 

idea  of  motion  is  framed ;  which  equally  corresponds  to  all  par- 
ticular motions  whatsoever  that  may  be  perceived  by  sense. 

9.  And  as  the  mind  frames  to  itself  abstract  ideas  of  qualities 
or  modes,  so  does  it,  by  the  same  precision  or  mental  separation, 
attain  abstract  ideas  of  the  more  compounded  beings7  which  in- 
clude several  coexistent  qualities.  For  example,  the  mind  having 
observed  that  Peter,  James,  and  John  resemble  each  other  in  cer- 
tain common  agreements  of  shape  and  other  qualities,  leaves  out 
of  the  complex  or  compounded  idea  it  has  of  Peter,  James  and 
any  other  particular  man,  that  which  is  peculiar  to  each,  retaining 
only  what  is  common  to  all,  and  so  makes  an  abstract  idea  wherein 
all  the  particulars  equally  partake — abstracting  entirely  from  and 
cutting  off  all  those  circumstances  and  differences  which  might 
determine  it  to  any  particular  existence.  And  after  this  manner 
it  is  said  we  come  by  the  abstract  idea  of  man,  or,  if  you  please, 
humanity,  or  human  nature  ;  wherein  it  is  true  there  is  included 
colour,  because  there  is  no  man  but  has  some  colour,  but  then  it 
can  be  neither  white,  nor  black,  nor  any  particular  colour,  because 
there  is  no  one  particular  colour  wherein  all  men  partake.  So 
likewise  there  is  included  stature,  but  then  it  is  neither  tall  stature, 
nor  low  stature,  nor  yet  middle  stature,  but  something  abstracted 
from  all  these.  And  so  of  the  rest.  Moreover,  there  being  a 
great  variety  of  other  creatures  that  partake  in  some  parts,  but 
not  all,  of  the  complex  idea  of  man,  the  mind,  leaving  out  those 
parts  which  are  peculiar  to  men,  and  retaining  those  only  which 
are  common  to  all  the  living  creatures,  frames  the  idea  of  animal, 
which  abstracts  not  only  from  all  particular  men,  but  also  all 
birds,  beasts,  fishes,  and  insects.  The  constituent  parts  of  the 
abstract  idea  of  animal  are  body,  life,  sense,  and  spontaneous 
motion.  By  body  is  meant  body  without  any  particular  shape  or 
figure,  there  being  no  one  shape  or  figure  common  to  all  animals, 
without  covering,  either  of  hair,  or  feathers,  or  scales,  &c,  nor 
yet  naked :  hair,  feathers,  scales,  and  nakedness  being  the  distin- 
guishing properties  of  particular  animals,  and  for  that  reason  left 
out  of  the  abstract  idea.  Upon  the  same  account  the  spontaneous 
motion  must  be  neither  walking,  nor  flying,  nor  creeping ;  it  is 

7  Cf.  sect.  1  of  the  Principles. 

12 


i78 


INTRODUCTION. 


nevertheless  a  motion,  but  what  that  motion  is  it  is  not  easy  to 
conceive. 

10.  Whether  others  have  this  wonderful  faculty  of  abstracting 
their  ideas8,  they  best  can  tell :  for  myself,  [9  I  dare  be  confident  I 
have  it  not]  I  find  indeed  I  have  indeed  a  faculty  of  imagining, 
or  representing  to  myself,  the  ideas  of  those  particular  things  I 
have  perceived,  and  of  variously  compounding  and  dividing  them. 
I  can  imagine  a  man'  with  two  heads,  or  the  upper  parts  of  a  man 
joined  to  the  body  of  a  horse.  I  can  consider  the  hand,  the  eye, 
the  nose,  each  by  itself  abstracted  or  separated  from  the  rest  of 
the  body.  But  then  whatever  hand  or  eye  I  imagine,  it  must  have 
some  particular  shape  and  colour.  Likewise  the  idea  of  man  that 
I  frame  to  myself  must  be  either  of  a  white,  or  a  black,  or  a  tawny, 
a  straight,  or  a  crooked,  a  tall,  or  a  low,  or  a  middle-sized  man. 
I  cannot  by  any  effort  of  thought  conceive  the  abstract  idea  above 
described.  And  it  is  equally  impossible  for  me  to  form  the  ab- 
stract idea  of  motion  distinct  from  the  body  moving,  and  which 
is  neither  swift  nor  slow,  curvilinear  nor  rectilinear  ;  and  the  like 
may  be  said  of  all  other  abstract  general  ideas  whatsoeVer.  To 
be  plain,  I  own  myself  able  to  abstract  in  one  sense,  as  when  I 
consider  some  particular  parts  or  qualities  separated  from  others, 
with  which,  though  they  are  united  in  some  object,  yet  it  is  pos- 
sible they  may  really  exist  without  them.  But  I  deny  that  I  can 
abstract  from  one  another,  or  conceive  separately,  those  qualities 
which  it  is  impossible  should  exist  so  separated ;  or  that  I  can 
frame  a  general  notion,  by  abstracting  from  particulars  in  the 
manner  aforesaid — which  last  are  the  two  proper  acceptations  of 
abstraction.  And  there  is  ground  to  think  most  men  will  acknowl- 
edge themselves  to  be  in  my  case.  The  generality  of  men  which 
are  simple  and  illiterate  never  pretend  to  abstract  notions10.  It  is 
said  they  are  difficult  and  not  to  be  attained  without  pains  and 

8  Cf.  Derodon's  Logica,  P.  II.  c.  6, 7  ;  Philosophia  Contractu,  I.  i.  \  7 — 11 ;  and  Gassendi, 
Leg.  Jnstit.,  I.  8,  for  reasoning  similar  to  what  follows  in  this  section.  Also  Cudworth, 
Eternal  and  Immutable  Morality,  B.  IV. ;  Browne's  Procedure  of  the  Understanding,  B. 
II.  ch.  4;  Bolingbroke's  Works,  vol.  I.  pp.  117,  &c. 

9  Omitted  in  second  edition. 

10  '  abstract  notions' — here  used  convertibly  with  '  abstract  ideas.'  Cf.  sect.  142,  on  the 
meaning  of  the  term  notion. 


INTRODUCTION. 


179 


study;  we  may  therefore  reasonably  conclude  that,  if  such  there 
be,  they  are  confined  only  to  the  learned. 

II.  I  proceed  to  examine  what  can  be  alleged  in  defence  of  the 
doctrine  of  abstraction",  and  try  if  I  can  discover  what  it  is  that 
inclines  the  men  of  speculation  to  embrace  an  opinion  so  remote 
from  common  sense  as  that  seems  to  be.  There  has  been  a  late 
["excellent]  and  deservedly  esteemed  philosopher  [2],  who,  no 
doubt,  has  given  it  very  much  countenance,  by  seeming  to  think 
the  having  abstract  general  ideas  is  what  puts  the  widest  differ- 
ence in  point  of  understanding  betwixt  man  and  beast.  '  The 
having  of  general  ideas,'  saith  he,  '  is  that  which  puts  a  perfect 
distinction  betwixt  man  and  brutes,  and  is  an  excellency  which 
the  faculties  of  brutes  do  by  no  means  attain  unto.  For,  it  is 
evident  we  observe  no  foot-steps  in  them  of  making  use  of  gen- 
eral signs  for  universal  ideas ;  from  which  we  have  reason  to  im- 
agine that  they  have  not  the  faculty  of  abstracting,  or  making  gen- 
eral ideas,  since  they  have  no  use  of  words  or  any  other  general 
signs.'  And  a  little  after.  '  Therefore,  I  think,  we  may  suppose 
that  it  is  in  this  that  the  species  of  brutes  are  discriminated  from 
men,  and  it  is  that  proper  difference  wherein  they  are  wholly 
separated,  and  which  at  last  widens  to  so  wide  a  distance.  For, 
if  they  have  any  ideas  at  all,  and  are  not  bare  machines  (as  some 
[3]  would  have  them),  we  cannot  deny  them  to  have  some  reason. 
It  seems  as  evident  to  me  that  they  do,  some  of  them,  in  certain 
instances  reason  as  that  they  have  sense ;  but  it  is  only  in  par- 
ticular ideas,  just  as  they  receive  them  from  their  senses.  They 
are  the  best  of  them  tied  up  within  those  narrow  bounds,  and 
have  not  (as  I  think)  the  faculty  to  enlarge  them  by  any  kind  of 
abstraction.' — Essay  on  Hitman  Understanding,  B.  II.  ch.  11.  §  10 
and  11.  I  readily  agree  with  this  learned  author,  that  the  facul- 
ties of  brutes  can  by  no  means  attain  to  abstraction.  But  then 
if  this  be  made  the  distinguishing  property  of  that  sort  of  animals, 
I  fear  a  great  many  of  those  that  pass  for  men  must  be  reckoned 

11  Here  assumed  to  mean,  that  we  can  perceive  or  imagine  Entities,  from  which  all  phe- 
nomena of  experience  have  been  abstracted,  and  which  are  thus  abstract  objects  or  ideas, 
e.  g.  '  Existence,'  after  abstraction  of  all  the  phenomena  in  which  it  manifests  itself  to  us ; 
or  '  Matter,'  after  abstraction  of  all  the  phenomena  which  appear  in  the  senses — perception 
or  intelligence  being  abstracted,  in  short. 

12  Omitted  in  second  edition. 


!8o  INTRODUCTION. 

into  their  number.  The  reason  that  is  here  assigned  why  we 
have  no  grounds  to  think  brutes  have  abstract  general  ideas 
is,  that  we  observe  in  them  no  use  of  words  or  any  other  general 
signs;  which  is  built  on  this  supposition — that  the  making  use 
of  words  implies  the  having  general  ideas.  From  which  it  fol- 
lows that  men  who  use  language  are  able  to  abstract  or  generalize 
their  ideas.  That  this  is  the  sense  and  arguing  of  the  author  will 
further  appear  by  his  answering  the  question  he  in  another  place 
puts :  '  Since  all  things  that  exist  are  only  particulars,  how  come 
we  by  general  terms?'  His  answer  is  :  '  Words  become  general 
by  being  made  the  signs  of  general  ideas.' — Essay  on  Human  Un- 
derstanding, B.  III.  ch.  3.  §  6.  But  it  seems  that  a  word13  be- 
comes general  by  being  made  the  sign,  not  of  an  abstract  general 
idea,  but  of  several  particular  ideas,  any  one  of  which  it  indiffer- 
ently suggests  to  the  mind14.  For  example,  when  it  is  said  'the 
change  of  motion  is  proportional  to  the  impressed  force,'  or  that 
'  whatever  has  extension  is  divisible,'  these  propositions  are  to  be 
understood  of  motion  and  extension  in  general ;  and  nevertheless 
it  will  not  follow  that  they  suggest  to  my  thoughts  an  idea  of 
motion  without  a  body  moved,  or  any  determinate  direction 
and  velocity,  or  that  I  must  conceive  an  abstract  general  idea  of 
extension,  which  is  neither  line,  surface,  nor  solid,  neither  great 
nor  small,  black,  white,  nor  red,  nor  of  any  other  determinate 
colour.  It  is  only  implied  that  whatever  particular  motion  I  con- 
sider, whether  it  be  swift  or  slow,  perpendicular,  horizontal,  or 
oblique,  or  in  whatever  object,  the  axiom  concerning  it  holds 
equally  true.  As  does  the  other  of  every  particular  extension,  it 
matters  not  whether  line,  surface,  or  solid,  whether  of  this  or  that 
magnitude  or  figure. 

1 2.  By  observing  how  ideas  become  general,  we  may  the  better 
judge  how  words  are  made  so.  And  here  it  is  to  be  noted  that  I 
do  not  deny  absolutely  there  are  general  ideas,  but  only  that  there 

»3  '  To  this  I  cannot  assent,  being  of  opinion  that  a  word,'  &c. — in  first  edition. 

**  Though  we  cannot  have  the  logical  extent  and  content  of  our  concepts  intuitively  ex- 
hibited to  us,  either  in  a  percept  or  in  an  image,  it  is  to  be  noted  that  we  may  have  resem- 
bling signs  of  conceptual  relations,  as  well  as  verbal  or  non-resembling  signs.  We  think 
by  means  of  specimen-objects,  in  which  our  concepts  are  exemplified;  as  well  as  by  means 
of  arbi  rary  verbal  symbols — in  short,  after  the  analogy  of  geometry,  as  well  as  after  the 
analogy  of  algebra.     Cf.  the  following  section. 


INTRODUCTION.  Ig'i 

are  any  abstract  general  ideas15 ;  for,  in  the  passages  we  have  quoted 
wherein  there  is  mention  of  general  ideas,  it  is  always  supposed 
that  they  are  formed  by  abstraction,  after  the  manner  set  forth  in 
sections  8  and  9.  Now,  if  we  will  annex  a  meaning  to  our  words, 
and  speak  only  of  what  we  can  conceive,  I  believe  we  shall 
acknowledge  that  an  idea  which,  considered  in  itself,  is  particular, 
becomes  general  by  being  made  to  represent  or  stand  for  all  other 
particular  ideas  of  the  same  sort.  To  make  this  plain  by  an  ex- 
ample, suppose  a  geometrician  is  demonstrating  the  method  of 
cutting  a  line  in  two  equal  parts.  He  draws,  for  instance,  a  black 
line  of  an  inch  in  length :  this,  which  in  itself  is  a  particular  line, 
is  nevertheless  with  regard  to  its  signification  general,  since,  as  it 
is  there  used,  it  represents  all  particular  lines  whatsoever  ;  so  that 
what  is  demonstrated  of  it  is  demonstrated  of  all  lines,  or,  in  other 
words,  of  a  line  in  general.  And,  as  tliat  particular  line  becomes 
general  by  being  made  a  sign,  so  the  name  '  line,'  which  taken 
absolutely  is  particular,  by  being  a  sign  is  made  general.  And 
as  the  former  owes  its  generality  not  to  its  being  the  sign  of  an 
abstract  or  general  line,  but  of  all  particular  right  lines  that  may 
possibly  exist,  so  the  latter  must  be  thought  to  derive  its  gen- 
erality from  the  same  cause,  namely,  the  various  particular  lines 
which  it  indifferently  denotes. 

13.  To  give  the  reader  a  yet  clearer  view  of  the  nature  of 
abstract  ideas,  and  the  uses  they  are  thought  necessary  to,  I  shall 
add  one  more  passage  out  of  the  Essay  on  Human  Understand- 
ing, [4]  which  is  as  follows  :  "Abstract  ideas  are  not  so  obvious  or 
easy  to  children  or  the  yet  unexercised  mind  as  particular  ones. 
If  they  seem  so  to  grown  men  it  is  only  because  by  constant 
and  familiar  use  they  are  made  so.  For,  when  we  nicely  reflect 
upon  them,  we  shall  find  that  general  ideas  are  fictions  and  con- 
trivances of  the  mind,  that  carry  difficulty  with  them,  and  do  not 
so  easily  offer  themselves  as  we  are  apt  to  imagine.  For  example, 
does  it  not  require  some  pains  and  skill  to  form  the  general  idea 

r5  Berkeley  distinguishes  between  (a)  reasoning  or  thinking,  e>.  g.  about  length  without 
any  reference  to  breadth,  which  he  allows ;  and  (b)  having  an  idea  or  intuition  of  length 
without  breadth,  which  he  denies  the  possibility  of.  Length  and  breadth  combined  make 
only  one  idea,  or  sensuous  presentation  or  representation.  All  ideas,  whether  in  sense  or 
imagery,  must  be  particular.  We  rise  above  them  only  in  a  less  or  more  extensive  appre- 
hension of  their  relations, — not  by  the  apprehension  of  ideas  different  in  kind,  because 
abstract,  and  which  were  supposed  to  be  the  object-matter  of  metaphysics. 


182  INTRODUCTION. 

of  a  triangle  (which  is  yet  none  of  the  most  abstract,  compre- 
hensive, and  difficult) ;  for  it  must  be  neither  oblique  nor  rect- 
angle, neither  equilateral,  equicrural,  nor  scalenon,  but  all  and 
none  of  these  at  once?  In  effect,  it  is  something  imperfect  that 
cannot  exist,  an  idea  wherein  some  parts  of  several  different  and 
inconsistent  ideas  are  put  together.  It  is  true  the  mind  in  this 
imperfect  state  has  need  of  such  ideas,  and  makes  all  the  haste 
to  them  it  can,  for  the  conveniency  of  communication  and  en- 
largement of  knowledge,  to  both  which  it  is  naturally  very  much 
inclined.  But  yet  one  has  reason  to  suspect  such  ideas  are  marks 
of  our  imperfection.  At  least  this  is  enough  to  shew  that  the 
most  abstract  and  general  ideas  are  not  those  that  the  mind  is 
first  and  most  easily  acquainted  with,  nor  such  as  its  earliest 
knowledge  is  conversant  about." — B.  iv.  ch.  7.  §  9.  If  any  man 
has  the  faculty  of  framing  in  his  mind  such  an  idea  of  a  triangle 
as  is  here  described,  it  is  in  vain  to  pretend  to  dispute  him  out 
of  it,  nor  would  I  go  about  it.  All  I  desire  is  that  the  reader 
would  fully  and  certainly  inform  himself  whether  he  has  such  an 
idea  or  no.  And  this,  methinks,  can  be  no  hard  task  for  anyone 
to  perform.  What  more  easy  than  for  any  one  to  look  a  little  into 
his  own  thoughts,  and  there  try  whether  he  has,  or  can  attain  to 
have,  an  idea  that  shall  correspond  with  the  description  that  is 
here  given  of  the  general  idea  of  a  triangle — which  is  neither 
oblique  nor  rectangle,  equilateral,  equicrural  nor  scalenon,  but 
all  and  none  of  these  at  once16? 

14.  Much  is  here  said  of  the  difficulty  that  abstract  ideas  carry 
with  them,  and  the  pains  and  skill  requisite  to  the  forming  them. 
And  it  is  on  all  hands  agreed  that  there  is  need  of  great  toil  and 
labour  of  the  mind,  to  emancipate  our  thoughts  from  particular 
objects,  and  raise  them  to  those  sublime  speculations  that  are 
conversant  about  abstract  ideas.  From  all  which  the  natural 
consequence  should  seem  to  be,  that  so  difficult  a  thing  as  the 
forming  abstract  ideas  was  not  necessary  {ox  communication,  which 
is  so  easy  and  familiar  to  all  sorts  of  men.  But,  we  are  told,  if 
they  seem  obvious  and  easy  to  grown  men,  it  is  only  because  by 
constant  and  familiar  use  they  are  made  so.  Now,  I  would  fain 
know  at  what  time  it  is  men  are  employed  in  surmounting  that 

'«  Cf.  Alciphron,  Dial.  VII.  7. 


INTRODUCTION.  183 

difficulty,  and  furnishing  themselves  with  those  necessary  helps 
for  discourse.  It  cannot  be  when  they  are  grown  up,  for  then  it 
seems  they  are  not  conscious  of  any  such  painstaking;  it  remains 
therefore  to  be  the  business  of  their  childhood.  And  surely  the 
great  and  multiplied  labour  of  framing  abstract  notions17  will 
be  found  a  hard  task  for  that  tender  age.  Is  it  not  a  hard  thing 
to  imagine  that  a  couple  of  children  cannot  prate  together  of 
their  sugar-plums  and  rattles  and  the  rest  of  their  little  trinkets, 
till  they  have  first  tacked  together  numberless  inconsistencies, 
and  so  framed  in  their  minds  abstract  general  ideas,  and  annexed 
them  to  every  common  name  they  make  use  of? 

15.  Nor  do  I  think  them  a  whit  more  needful  for  the  enlarge- 
ment of  knowledge  than  for  communication.  It  is,  I  know,  a  point 
much  insisted  on,  that  all  knowledge  and  demonstration  are  about 
universal  notions18,  to  which  I  fully  agree;  but  then  it  does  not 
appear  to  me  that  those  notions'8  are  formed  by  abstraction  in 
the  manner  premised — universality,  so  far  as  I  can  comprehend, 
not  consisting  in  the  absolute,  positive  nature  or  conception  of 
anything,  but  in  the  relation  it  bears  to  the  particulars  signified 
or  represented  by  it ;  by  virtue  whereof  it  is  that  things,  names, 
or  notions18,  being  in  their  own  nature  particular,  are  rendered 
universal1?.  Thus,  when  I  demonstrate  any  proposition  con- 
cerning triangles,  it  is  to  be  supposed  that  I  have  in  view  the 
universal  idea  of  a  triangle ;  which  ought  not  to  be  understood 
as  if  I  could  frame  an  idea  of  a  triangle  which  was  neither  equi- 
lateral, nor  scalenon,  nor  equicrural ;  but  only  that  the  particular 
triangle  I  consider,  whether  of  this  or  that  sort  it  matters  not, 
doth  equally  stand  for  and  represent  all  rectilinear  triangles  what- 
soever, and  is  in  that  sense  universal.  All  which  seems  very  plain 
and  not  to  include  any  difficulty  in  it. 

»7  In  Berkeley's  language,  we  have  notions  but  no  ideas  of  substance  proper  (i.  e.  Mind), 
or  of  relations  among  particular  phenomena.  Sensible  objects,  passive  states  of  mind,  and 
representations  (or  misrepresentations)  of  these  in  imagination,  are  alone  ideas.  Cf.  sect. 
142 ;  also  Siris,  sect.  308. 

18  See  note  17. 

»9  i.  e.  '  things'  and  '  notions'  which  are  resembling,  and  '  names'  which  are  non-resem- 
bling signs,  are  in  themselves  particular,  as  every  immediate  object  of  which  we  are 
conscious  must  be.  They  are  universalized  in  the  act  of  thinking  their  relations — the  ap- 
prehension of  relations  being  the  essence  of  thought.  Note  that  '  notions'  are  here  said  to 
be  particular ;  which  they  are,  in  as  far  as  they  must  be  capable  of  being  individualized  or 
exemplified  in  individual  experiences.     Notion  seems  here  to  be  used  for  10  ative  image. 


1 84  IN  TRODUC  TION. 

16.  But  here  it  will  be  demanded,  how  we  can  know  any  pro- 
position to  be  true  of  all  particular  triangles,  except  we  have  first 
seen  it  demonstrated  of  the  abstract  idea  of  a  triangle  which 
equally  agrees  to  all?  For,  because  a  property  may  be  demon- 
strated to  agree  to  some  one  particular  triangle,  it  will  not  thence 
follow  that  it  equally  belongs  to  any  other  triangle,  which  in  all 
respects  is  not  the  same  with  it.  For  example,  having  demon- 
strated that  the  three  angles  of  an  isosceles  rectangular  triangle 
are  equal  to  two  right  ones,  I  cannot  therefore  conclude  this 
affection  agrees  to  all  other  triangles  which  have  neither  a  right 
angle  nor  two  equal  sides.  It  seems  therefore  that,  to  be  certain 
this  proposition  is  universally  true,  we  must  either  make  a  par- 
ticular demonstration  for  every  particular  triangle,  which  is  im- 
possible, or  once  for  all  demonstrate  it  of  the  abstract  idea  of  a 
triangle,  in  which  all  the  particulars  do  indifferently  partake 
and  by  which  they  are  all  equally  represented.  To  which  I  an- 
swer, that,  though  the  idea  I  have  in  view  whilst  I  make  the 
demonstration  be,  for  instance,  that  of  an  isosceles  rectangular 
triangle  whose  sides  are  of  a  determinate  length,  I  may  never- 
theless be  certain  it  extends  to  all  other  rectilinear  triangles,  of 
what  sort  or  bigness  soever.  And  that  because  neither  the  right 
angle,  nor  the  equality,  nor  determinate  length  of  the  sides  are 
at  all  concerned  in  the  demonstration.  It  is  true  the  diagram  I 
have  in  view  includes  all  these  particulars,  but  then  there  is  not 
the  least  mention  made  of  them  in  the  proof  of  the  proposition. 
It  is  not  said  the  three  angles  are  equal  to  two  right  ones,  because 
one  of  them  is  a  right  angle,  or  because  the  sides  comprehending 
it  are  of  the  same  length.  Which  sufficiently  shews  that  the 
right  angle  might  have  been  oblique,  and  the  sides  unequal,  and 
for  all  that  the  demonstration  have  held  good.  And  for  this 
reason  it  is  that  I  conclude  that  to  be  true  of  any  obliquangular 
or  scalenon  which  I  had  demonstrated  of  a  particular  right-angled 
equicrural  triangle,  and  not  because  I  demonstrated  the  proposi- 
tion of  the  abstract  idea  of  a  triangle.  [2°And  here  it  must  be 
acknowledged  that  a  man  may  consider  a  figure  merely  as  trian- 
gular, without  attending  to  the  particular  qualities  of  the  angles, 
or  relations  of  the  sides.  [5]    So  far  he  may  abstract ;  but  this 

30  What  follows,  to  the  end  of  this  section,  was  added  in  the  1734  edition. 


INTRODUCTION.  185 

will  never  prove  that  he  can  frame  an  abstract,  general,  incon- 
sistent idea  of  a  triangle.  In  like  manner  we  may  consider  Peter 
so  far  forth  as  man,  or  so  far  forth  as  animal,  without  framing  the 
forementioned  abstract  idea,  either  of  man  or  of  animal,  inasmuch 
as  all  that  is  perceived  is  not  considered.] 

17.  It  were  an  endless  as  well  as  an  useless  thing  to  trace  the 
Schoolmen,  those  great  masters  of  abstraction,  through  all  the 
manifold  inextricable  labyrinths  of  error  and  dispute  which  their 
doctrine  of  abstract  natures  and  notions  seems  to  have  led  them 
into.  What  bickerings  and  controversies,  and  what  a  learned 
dust  have  been  raised  about  those  matters,  and  what  mighty 
advantage  has  been  from  thence  derived  to  mankind,  are  things 
at  this  day  too  clearly  known  to  need  being  insisted  on.  And  it 
had  been  well  if  the  ill  effects  of  that  doctrine  were  confined  to 
those  only  who  make  the  most  avowed  profession  of  it.  When 
men  consider  the  great  pains,  industry,  and  parts  that  have  for  so 
many  ages  been  laid  out  on  the  cultivation  and  advancement  of 
the  sciences,  and  that  notwithstanding  all  this  the  far  greater  part 
of  them  remain  full  of  darkness  and  uncertainty,  and  disputes 
that  are  like  never  to  have  an  end,  and  even  those  that  are  thought 
to  be  supported  by  the  most  clear  and  cogent  demonstrations 
contain  in  them  paradoxes  which  are  perfectly  irreconcilable  to 
the  understandings  of  men,  and  that,  taking  all  together,  a  very 
small  portion  of  them  does  supply  any  real  benefit  to  mankind, 
otherwise  than  by  being  an  innocent  diversion  and  amusement21 
— I  say,  the  consideration  of  all  this  is  apt  to  throw  them  into 
a  despondency  and  perfect  contempt  of  all  study.  But  this  may 
perhaps  cease  upon  a  view  of  the  false  principles  that  have  ob- 
tained in  the  world,  amongst  all  which  there  is  none,  methinks, 
hath  a  more  wide  and  extended  sway  over  the  thoughts  of  spec- 
ulative men  than  this22  of  abstract  general  ideas. 

18.  I  come  now  to  consider  the  source  oi  this  prevailing  notion, 
and  that  seems  to  me  to  be  language.  And  surely  nothing  of  less 
extent  than  reason  itself  could  have  been  the  source  of  an  opinion 

ai  So  Bacon  in  the  Novum  Organon. 

82  Cf.  Introduction,  sect.  1 — '  this  that  we  have  been  endeavouring  to  overthrow' — in  first 
edition. 


1 86  INTRODUCTION. 

so  universally  received.  The  truth  of  this  appears  as  from  other 
reasons  so  also  from  the  plain  confession  of  the  ablest  patrons  of 
abstract  ideas,  who  acknowledge  that  they  are  made  in  order  to 
naming;  from  which  it  is  a  clear  consequence  that  if  there  had 
been  no  such  thing  as  speech  or  universal  signs23  there  never  had 
been  any  thought  of  abstraction.  See  B.  iii.  ch.  6.  §  39,  and  else- 
where of  the  Essay  on  Human  Understanding.  Let  us  examine 
the  manner  wherein  words  have  contributed  to  the  origin  of  that 
mistake. — First  then,  it  is  thought  that  every  name  has,  or  ought 
to  have,  one  only  precise  and  settled  signification,  which  inclines 
men  to  think  there  are  certain  abstract,  determinate  ideas  that 
constitute  the  true  and  only  immediate  signification  of  each  gen- 
eral name;  and  that  it  is  by  the  mediation  of  these  abstract  ideas 
that  a  general  name  comes  to  signify  any  particular  thing. 
Whereas,  in  truth,  there  is  no  such  thing  as  one  precise  and  definite 
signification24  annexed  to  any  general  name,  they  all  signifying 
indifferently  a  great  number  of  particular  ideas.  All  which  does 
evidently  follow  from  what  has  been  already  said,  and  will  clearly 
appear  to  any  one  by  a  little  reflection.  To  this  it  will  be  objected 
that  every  name  that  has  a  definition  is  thereby  restrained  to  one 
certain  signification.  For  example,  a  triangle  is  defined  to  be  '  a 
plain  surface  comprehended  by  three  right  lines,'  by  which  that 
name  is  limited  to  denote  one  certain  idea  and  no  other.  To 
which  T  answer,  that  in  the  definition  it  is  not  said  whether  the 
surface  be  great  or  small,  black  or  white,  nor  whether  the  sides 
are  long  or  short,  equal  or  unequal,  nor  with  what  angles  they  are 
inclined  to  each  other;  in  all  which  there  may  be  great  variety, 
and  consequently  there  is  no  one  settled  idea25  which  limits  the 
signification  of  the  word  triangle.  It  is  one  thing  for  to  keep  a 
name  constantly  to  the  same  definition,  and  another  to  make  it 
stand  everywhere  for  the  same  idea25;  the  one  is  necessary26,  the 
other  useless  and  impracticable. 

23  This  should  include  resembling  as  well  as  non-resembling  signs — relative  images  as 
well  as  verbal  symbols.  But  no  particular  image  can  represent  in  the  phantasy  the  content 
and  extent  of  a  notion,  which  imply  the  recognition  by  the  mind  of  a  relation  among  a 
plurality  of  particular  objects. 

**  This  must  be  understood  of  the  denotation  of  names. 

»s  i.e.  presentative  or  representative  intuition. 

96  A  definition  determines  the  ideas  or  particular  objects  to  which  the  name  is  applicable, 
but  the  notion  signified  by  the  name  cannot  be  individualized  in  an  abstract  object. 


INTRODUCTION.  187 

19.  But,  to  give  a  farther  account  how  words  came  to  produce 
the  doctrine  of  abstract  ideas,  it  must  be  observed  that  it  is  a 
received  opinion  that  language  has  no  other  end  but  the  commu- 
nicating our  ideas,  and  that  every  significant  name  stands  for  an 
idea.  This  being  so,  and  it  being  withal  certain  that  names 
which  yet  are  not  thought  altogether  insignificant  do  not  always 
mark  out  particular  conceivable  ideas,  it  is  straightway  concluded 
that  they  stand  for  abstract  notions.  That  there  are  many  names 
in  use  amongst  speculative  men  which  do  not  always  suggest  to 
others  determinate,  particular  ideas,  or  in  truth  anything  at  all, 
is  what  nobody  will  deny.  And  a  little  attention  will  discover 
that  it  is  not  necessary  (even  in  the  strictest  reasonings)  significant 
names  which  stand  for  ideas  should,  every  time  they  are  used, 
excite  in  the  understanding  the  ideas  they  are  made  to  stand  for — 
in  reading  and  discoursing,  names  being  for  the  most  part  used  as 
letters  are  in  Algebra,  in  which,  though  a  particular  quantity  be 
marked  by  each  letter,  yet  to  proceed  right  it  is  not  requisite  that 
in  every  step  each  letter  suggest  to  your  thoughts  that  particular 
quantity  it  was  appointed  to  stand  for27. 

20.  Besides,  the  communicating  of  ideas  marked  by  words  is 
not  the  chief  and  only  end  of  language,  as  is  commonly  supposed. 
There  are  other  ends,  as  the  raising  of  some  passion,  the  exciting 
to  or  deterring  from  an  action,  the  putting  the  mind  in  some 
particular  disposition — to  which  the  former28  is  in  many  cases 
barely  subservient,  and  sometimes  entirely  omitted,  when  these 
can  be  obtained  without  it,  as  I  think  does  not  unfrequently 
happen  in  the  familiar  use  of  language.  I  entreat  the  reader  to 
reflect  with  himself,  and  see  if  it  does  not  often  happen,  either  in 
hearing  or  reading  a  discourse,  that  the  passions  of  fear,  love, 
hatred,  admiration,  and  disdain,  and  the  like,  arise  immediately 
in  his  mind  upon  the  perception  of  certain  words,  without  any 
ideas  29  coming  between.  At  first,  indeed,  the  words  might  have 
occasioned  ideas2^  that  were  fitting  to  produce  those  emotions ; 

-i  See  Leibnitz  on  Symbolical  Knowledge  {Opera  Philosophica,  pp.  79—80,  Erdmann), 
and  Stewart  on  'Abstraction,'  in  his  Elements,  vol.  I.  ch.  4,  $  1.  Names  are  constructive 
in  their  office,  as  ministers  of  thought.     Cf.  Principles,  sect.  1. 

28  i.  e.  the  communication  of  ideas — in  other  words,  the  excitement  of  particular  images 
in  the  fancy,  which  verbal  language  often  supersedes  to  a  great  extent. 

=9  'ideas,'  i.e.  images  of  particular  objects  to  which  the  words  are  applicable. 


1 88  INTRODUCTION. 

but,  if  I  mistake  not,  it  will  be  found  that,  when  language  is  once 
grown  familiar,  the  hearing  of  the  sounds  or  sight  of  the  charac- 
ters is  oft  immediately  attended  with  those  passions  which  at  first 
were  wont  to  be  produced  by  the  intervention  of  ideas2?  that  are 
now  quite  omitted.  May  we  not,  for  example,  be  affected  with 
the  promise  of  a  good  thing,  though  we  have  not  an  idea  of  what 
it  is  ?  Or  is  not  the  being  threatened  with  danger  sufficient  to 
excite  a  dread,  though  we  think  not  of  any  particular  evil  likely 
to  befal  us,  nor  yet  frame  to  ourselves  an  idea  of  danger  in  ab- 
stract? If  any  one  shall  join  ever  so  little  reflection  of  his  own 
to  what  has  been  said,  I  believe  that  it  will  evidently  appear  to 
him  that  general  names  are  often  used  in  the  propriety  of  language 
without  the  speakers  designing  them  for  marks  of  ideas  29  in  his 
own,  which  he  would  have  them  raise  in  the  mind  of  the  hearer. 
Even  proper  names  themselves  do  not  seem  always  spoken  with 
a  design  to  bring  into  our  view  the  ideas 2?  of  those  individuals 
that  are  supposed  to  be  marked  by  them.  For  example,  when  a 
schoolman  tells  me 'Aristotle  hath  said  it,' all  I  conceive  he  means 
by  it  is  to  dispose  me  to  embrace  his  opinion  with  the  deference 
and  submission  which  custom  has  annexed  to  that  name.  And 
this  effect  is  often  so  instantly  produced  in  the  minds  of  those 
who  are  accustomed  to  resign  their  judgment  to  authority  of  that 
philosopher,  as  it  is  impossible  any  idea  either  of  his  person, 
writings,  or  reputation  should  go  before.  [3°So  close  and  imme- 
diate a  connexion  may  custom  establish  betwixt  the  very  word 
Aristotle  and  the  motions  of  assent  and  reverence  in  the  minds 
of  some  men.]  Innumerable  examples  of  this  kind  may  be  given, 
but  why  should  I  insist  on  those  things  which  every  one's  expe- 
rience will,  I  doubt  not,  plentifully  suggest  unto  him?  [6] 

21.  We  have,  I  think,  shewn  the  impossibility  of  Abstract  Ideas. 
We  have  considered  what  has  been  said  for  them  by  their  ablest 
patrons ;  and  endeavoured  to  shew  they  are  of  no  use  for  those 
ends  to  which  they  are  thought  necessary.  And  lastly,  we  have 
traced  them  to  the  source  from  whence  they  flow,  which  appears 
evidently  to  be  language. — It  cannot  be  denied  that  words  are  of 
excellent  use,  in  that  by  their  means  all  that  stock  of  knowledge 

3°  This  sentence  is  omitted  in  the  second  edition. 


INTRODUCTION.  189 

which  has  been  purchased  by  the  joint  labours  of  inquisitive  men 
in  all  ages  and  nations  may  be  drawn  into  the  view  and  made  the 
possession  of  one  single  person.  But  most  parts  of  knowledge 
have  been  [3Iso]  strangely  perplexed  and  darkened  by  the  abuse 
of  words,  and  general  ways  of  speech  wherein  they  are  delivered, 
[3Ithat  it  may  almost  be  made  a  question  whether  language  has 
contributed  more  to  the  hindrance  or  advancement  of  the  sci- 
ences]. Since  therefore  words  are  so  apt  to  impose  on  the  under- 
standing, [3I I  am  resolved  in  my  inquiries  to  make  as  little  use 
of  them  as  possibly  I  can]:  whatever  ideas  I  consider,  I  shall  en- 
deavour to  take  them  bare  and  naked  into  my  view,  keeping  out 
of  my  thoughts,  so  far  as  I  am  able,  those  names  which  long  and 
constant  use  hath  so  strictly  united  with  them;  from  which  I  may 
expect  to  derive  the  following  advantages : — 

22.  First,  I  shall  be  sure  to  get  clear  of  all  controversies  purely 
verbal — the  springing  up  of  which  weeds  in  almost  all  the  sciences 
has  been  a  main  hindrance  to  the  growth  of  true  and  sound 
knowledge.  Secondly,  this  seems  to  be  a  sure  way  to  extricate 
myself  out  of  that  fine  and  subtle  net  of  abstract  ideas  which  has 
so  miserably  perplexed  and  entangled  the  minds  of  men  ;  and  that 
with  this  peculiar  circumstance,  that  by  how  much  the  finer  and 
more  curious  was  the  wit  of  any  man,  by  so  much  the  deeper  was 
he  likely  to  be  ensnared  and  faster  held  therein.  Thirdly,  so  long 
as  I  confine  my  thoughts  to  my  own  ideas32  divested  of  words,  I 
do  not  see  how  I  can  easily  be  mistaken.  The  objects  I  consider, 
I  clearly  and  adequately  know.  I  cannot  be  deceived  in  thinking 
I  have  an  idea  which  I  have  not.  It  is  not  possible  for  me  to 
imagine  that  any  of  my  own  ideas  are  alike  or  unlike  that  are 
not  truly  so.  To  discern  the  agreements  or  disagreements  there 
are  between  my  ideas,  to  see  what  ideas  are  included  in  any 
compound  idea  and  what  not,  there  is  nothing  more  requisite 
than  an  attentive  perception  of  what  passes  in  my  own  under- 
standing. 

23.  But  the  attainment  of  all  these  advantages  does  presuppose 
an  entire  deliverance  from  the  deception  of  words,  which  I  dare 

31  Omitted  in  second  edition. 

3°  '  My  own  ideas,"  i.e.  the  particular  objects  of  which  I  am  presentatively  or  represent- 
atively conscious. 


190 


INTRODUCTION. 


hardly  promise  myself;  so  difficult  a  thing  it  is  to  dissolve  an 
union  so  early  begun,  and  confirmed  by  so  long  a  habit  as  that 
betwixt  words  and  ideas.  Which  difficulty  seems  to  have  been 
very  much  increased  by  the  doctrine  of  abstraction.  For,  so  long 
as  men  thought  abstract  ideas  were  annexed  to  their  words,  it 
does  not  seem  strange  that  they  should  use  words  for  ideas — it 
being  found  an  impracticable  thing  to  lay  aside  the  word,  and 
retain  the  abstract  idea  in  the  mind,  which  in  itself  was  perfectly 
inconceivable.  This  seems  to  me  the  principal  cause  why  those33 
who  have  so  emphatically  recommended  to  others  the  laying 
aside  all  use  of  words  in  their  meditations,  and  contemplating 
their  bare  ideas,  have  yet  failed  to  perform  it  themselves.  Of 
late  many  have  been  very  sensible  of  the  absurd  opinions  and 
insignificant  disputes  which  grow  out  of  the  abuse  of  words. 
And,  in  order  to  remedy  these  evils,  they33  advise  well,  that  we 
attend  to  the  ideas  signified,  and  draw  off  our  attention  from  the 
words  which  signify  them.  [7]  But,  how  good  soever  this  advice 
may  be  they  have  given  others,  it  is  plain  they  could  not  have  a 
due  regard  to  it  themselves,  so  long  as  they  thought  the  only 
immediate  use  of  words  was  to  signify  ideas,  and  that  the  im- 
mediate signification  of  every  general  name  was  a  determinate 
abstract  idea. 

24.  But,  these  being  known  to  be  mistakes,  a  man  may  with 
greater  ease  prevent  his  being  imposed  on  by  words.  He  that 
knows  he  has  no  other  than  particular  ideas,  will  not  puzzle  him- 
self in  vain  to  find  out  and  conceive  the  abstract  idea  annexed  to 
any  name.  And  he  that  knows  names  do  not  always  stand  for 
ideas34  will  spare  himself  the  labour  of  looking  for  ideas  where 
there  are  none  to  be  had.  It  were,  therefore,  to  be  wished  that 
every  one  would  use  his  utmost  endeavours  to  obtain  a  clear 
view  of  the  ideas  he  would  consider,  separating  from  them  all 
that  dress  and  incumbrance  of  words  which  so  much  contribute 
to  blind  the  judgment  and  divide  the  attention.  In  vain  do  we 
extend  our  view  into  the  heavens  and  pry  into  the  entrails  of  the 

33  He  probably  refers  to  Locke. 

34  Inasmuch  as  they  may  stand  for  relations  of  ideas,  whether  in  sense  or  imagination  ; 
and  for  a  Mind  or  Self,  as  distinguished  from  any  of  its  particular  ideas.  Cf.  sect.  142. 
In  the  state  which  Leibnitz  calls  'symbolical  consciousness'  we  can  use  words  without 
realizing  their  meaning. 


INTRODUCTION.  I9I 

earth,  in  vain  do  we  consult  the  writings  of  learned  men  and 
trace  the  dark  footsteps  of  antiquity — we  need  only  draw  the 
curtain  of  words,  to  behold  the  fairest  tree  of  knowledge,  whose 
fruit  is  excellent,  and  within  the  reach  of  our  hand. 

25.  Unless  we  take  care  to  clear  the  First  Principles  of 
Knowledge  from  the  embarras  and  delusion  of  words,  we  may 
make  infinite  reasonings  upon  them  to  no  purpose;  we  may  draw 
consequences  from  consequences,  and  be  never  the  wiser.  The 
farther  we  go,  we  shall  only  lose  ourselves  the  more  irre- 
coverably, and  be  the  deeper  entangled  in  difficulties  and  mis- 
takes. Whoever  therefore  designs  to  read  the  following  sheets, 
I  entreat  him  that  he  would  make  my  words  the  occasion  of  his 
own  thinking,  and  endeavour  to  attain  the  same  train  of  thoughts 
in  reading  that  I  had  in  writing  them.  By  this  means  it  will  be 
easy  for  him  to  discover  the  truth  or  falsity  of  what  I  say.  He 
will  be  out  of  all  danger  of  being  deceived  by  my  words,  and  I 
do  not  see  how  he  can  be  led  into  an  error  by  considering  his 
own  naked,  undisguised  ideas. 


PRINCIPLES 


OF 


HUMAN    KNOWLEDGE. 


I.  IT  is  evident  to  any  one  who  takes  a  survey  of  the  objects* 
p]  of  human  knowledge,  that  they  are  either  ideas  actually  im- 
printed on  the  senses ;  or  else  such  as  are  perceived  by  attend- 
ing to  the  passions  and  operations  of  the  mind ;  or,  lastly,  ideas 
formed  by  help  of  memory  and  imagination — either  compound- 
ing, dividing,  or  barely  representing  those  originally  perceived 
in  the  aforesaid  ways.  By  sight  I  have  the  ideas  of  light  and 
colours,  with  their  several  degrees  and  variations.  By  touch  I 
perceive  hard  and  soft,  heat  and  cold,  motion  and  resistance,  and 
of  all  these  more  and  less  either  as  to  quantity  or  degree. 
Smelling  furnishes  me  with  odours ;  the  palate  with  tastes ;  and 
hearing  conveys  sounds  to  the  mind  in  all  their  variety  of  tone 
and  composition.     And  as  several  of  these  are  observed  to  ac- 

x  This  threefold  division  of  the  objects  or  phenomena  of  which  we  are  conscious — viz. 
(a)  Sense-ideas  or  presentations ;  (b)  the  ideas  of  the  'passions  and  operations'  of  mind, 
by  some  called  internal  presentations ;  (c)  representations,  which  may  be  more  or  less 
elaborated — nearly  corresponds  to  Locke's  simple  ideas  of  sense  and  reflection,  and  his 
complex  ideas.  The  two  first  are  Hume's  '  impressions,'  and  the  last  his  '  ideas.'  But 
Berkeley  raises  a  question  which  Locke  did  not  conceive,  viz.  Do  any  of  the  three  classes 
of  objects  or  ideas  of  which  we  are  conscious  exist  independently  of  a  conscious  mind  ;• 
or,  if  not,  do  any  represent  or  suggest  what  exists  thus  absolutely?  Are  they,  or  at  any 
rate  do  they  stand  for,  '  things  in  themselves ' — substances  from  which  all  perception  or 
consciousness  may  be  abstracted?  Can  we,  in  short,  find  in  perception,  by  any  analysis, 
Mind  and  Matter  existing  in  a  mutually  independent  duality  ?  This  treatise  is  an  answer 
to  this  question.    Cf.  sect.  86,  89. 

13  193 


194 


OF    THE    PRINCIPLES 


company  each  other,  they  come  to  be  marked  by  one  name,  and 
so  to  be  reputed  as  one  thing2.  Thus,  for  example,  a  certain 
colour,  taste,  smell,  figure  and  consistence  having  been  observed 
to  go  together,  are  accounted  one  distinct  thing,  signified  by  the 
name  apple  ;  other  collections  of  ideas  constitute  a  stone,  a  tree, 
a  book,  and  the  like  sensible  things — which  as  they  are  pleasing 
or  disagreeable  excite  the  passions  of  love,  hatred,  joy,  grief,  and 
so  forth. 

2.  But,  besides  all  that  endless  variety  of  ideas  or  objects  of 
knowledge,  there  is  likewise  something3  which  knows  or  per- 
ceives them,  and  exercises  divers  operations,  as  willing,  imagin- 
ing, remembering,  about  them.  This  perceiving,  active  being  is 
what  I  call  mind,  spirit,  soul,  or  myself.  By  which  words  I  do  not 
denote  any  one  of  my  ideas,  but  a  thing  entirely  distinct  from 
them,  wherein  they  exist,  or,  which  is  the  same  thing,  whereby 
they  are  perceived — for  the  existence  of  an  idea  consists  in  being 
perceived4. 

3.  That  neither  our  thoughts,  nor  passions,  nor  ideas  formed 
by  the  imagination,  exist  without  the  mind5,  is  what  everybody 
will  allow.  And  to  me  it  is  no  less  evident  that  the  various 
sensations  or  ideas  imprinted  on  the  sense,  however  blended  or 


2  This  is  the  synthetic  or  constructive  function  of  names,  according  to  Berkeley.  He 
here  and  elsewhere  distinguishes  between  sensible  things  properly  so  called,  and  the  simple 
ideas  or  objects  of  sense,  of  which  '  things'  are  composed.     Cf.  sect.  33,  38. 

3  This  'something'  is  the  Ego  or  conscious  subject,  which  the  object-world  implies, 
through  which  it  is  united  and  becomes  intelligible,  and  by  which  it  is  causally  regulated. 
But  Berkeley  does  not  affirm  of  the  Ego,  any  more  than  of  the  world  of  ideas,  that  it 
exists  absolutely,  i.  e.  independently  of  being  conscious — that  the  percipient  is  independent 
of  ideas,  any  more  than  that  these  last  are  independent  of  a  percipient. — For  Berkeley's 
notion  of  Self,  as  distinguished  from  his  ideas,  cf.  sect.  7,  where  he  speaks  of  the  Self  or 
Ego  as  the  only  'substance;'  and  sect.  27,  125 — 140.  Though  he  affirms,  in  this  section 
and  elsewhere,  that  Self  and  its  ideas  are  '  entirely  distinct '  from  one  another,  he  denies 
that  they  are  distinct  substances.  The  Dualism  of  Berkeley — spirits  and  ideas — does  not 
underlie  perception,  but  is,  so  to  speak,  co-extensive  with  it.  It  is  resolvable  into  the  dis- 
tinction between  the  Ego,  as  permanent  or  identical,  and  the  phenomena  of  which  each 
Ego  is  conscious,  in  sense  or  otherwise,  as  changing — with  whatever  is  implied  in  this, 
which,  however,  he  does  not  try  to  analyse. 

*  i.  e.  by  a  percipient — but  not  necessarily  by  me.  Cf.  sect.  48.  An  idea  must  now  be, 
or  have  been,  or  hereafter  become,  part  of  the  experience  of  a  mind,  in  order  to  its  pres- 
ent, past,  or  future  actual  existence.     Cf.  sect.  6. 

5  '  without  the  mind,'  i.e.  unperceived  and  unimagined. 


OF   HUMAN   KNOWLEDGE.  .     195 

combined  together  (that  is,  whatever  objects6  they  compose), 
cannot  exist  otherwise  than  in  a  mind7  perceiving  them. — I 
think  an  intuitive  knowledge  may  be  obtained  of  this  by  any  one 
that  shall  attend  to  what  is  meant  by  the  term  exist  when  applied 
to  sensible  things.  The  table  I  write  on  I  say  exists,  that  is,  I 
see  and  feel  it ;  and  if  I  were  out  of  my  study  I  should  say  it 
existed — meaning  thereby  that  if  I  was  in  my  study  I  might  per- 
ceive it,  or  that  some  other  spirit  actually  does  perceive  it8. 
There  was  an  odour,  that  is,  it  was  smelt;  there  was  a  sound, 
that  is,  it  was  heard ;  a  colour  or  figure,  and  it  was  perceived  by 
sight  or  touch.  This  is  all  that  I  can  understand  by  these  and 
the  like  expressions.  For  as  to  what  is  said  of  the  absolute  ex- 
istence of  unthinking  things  without  any  relation  to  their  being 
perceived,  that  is  to  me  perfectly  unintelligible.  Their  esse  is 
percipi,  nor  is  it  possible  they  should  have  any  existence  out  of 
the  minds  or  thinking  things  which  perceive  them.  [°] 

4.  9It  is  indeed  an  opinion10  strangely  prevailing  amongst  men, 
that  houses,  mountains,  rivers,  and  in  a  word  all  sensible  objects, 

6  Here  '  objects' =  sensible  things.  This  is  the  popular  meaning  of  the  term  object,  as 
distinguished  from  its  more  extensive  or  philosophical  meaning.  Cf.  Theory  of  Vision 
Vindicated,  sect.  9 — 11. 

7  '  in  a  mind,'  i.  e.  as  phenomena  of  which  a  mind  is  conscious.  The  main  problem  of 
the  book  is,  To  determine  whether  those  objects  or  ideas  which  constitute  what  are  com- 
monly called  real  or  sensible  things  are  independent  of  a  conscious  mind,  in  a  way  that 
thoughts  and  passions  and  fancies  are  not — whether,  in  short,  the  presented  world  of  the 
senses  is  non-egoistic,  in  another  manner  than  the  presented  world  of  our  own  feelings,  or 
than  the  representative  world  of  imagination ;  and,  if  so,  what  that  manner  may  be. 
What  should  we  mean  when  we  say  that  w«j?-ideas — in  other  words,  objects  of  sense — 
are  '  external?'  Is  it  that  they  exist  independently  of  a  percipient  mind  ;  or  merely  of  my 
mind,  they  being  my  medium  of  intercourse  with  other  minds,  and  of  other  minds  with 
me?  Berkeley's  solution,  here  given  by  anticipation,  is  that  sense-ideas,  like  all  other 
objects  of  consciousness,  cannot  exist  actually,  otherwise  than  in  a  mind  perceiving  them 
(i.e.  as  objects  immediately  present  to  an  intelligence).  He  afterwards  enumerates  marks 
by  which  real  or  sensible  are  distinguishable  from  merely  imaginary  objects.  See  sect. 
29—33- 

8  This  is  part  of  Berkeley's  interpretation  of  our  belief  in  the  distinct  and  permanent 
existence  of  sensible  things.  It  is  a  belief  that  they  are  conditionally  presentable  in  sense 
— '  permanent  possibilities  of  sensation,'  as  Mr.  J.  S.  Mill  would  say.  See  Examination 
of  Hamilton's  Philosophy,  pp.  220-33,  third  edition. 

9  Sect.  4 — 24  contain  Berkeley's  proof  of  his  doctrine,  contained  in  sect.  3,  about  sensi- 
ble ideas  and  things. 

10  He  does  not  mean  to  say  that  this  opinion  can  be  held  intelligently  by  those  to  whom 
he  here  attributes  it.     Cf.  sect.  54,  56. 


196  .  OF    THE    PRINCIPLES 

have  an  existence,  natural  or  real,  distinct  from  their  being  per- 
ceived by  the  understanding.  But,  with  how  great  an  assurance 
and  acquiescence  soever  this  principle  may  be  entertained  in  the 
world,  yet  whoever  shall  find  in  his  heart  to  call  it  in  question 
may,  if  I  mistake  not,  perceive  it  to  involve  a  manifest  contradic- 
tion. For,  what  are  the  forementioned  objects  but  the  things  we 
perceive  by  sense?  and  what  do  we  perceive  besides  our  own 
ideas  or  sensations  ?  and  is  it  not  plainly  repugnant  that  any  one 
of  these,  or  any  combination  of  them,  should  exist  unperceived"  ? 

5.  If  we  throughly  examine  this  tenet  it  will,  perhaps,  be 
found  at  bottom  to  depend  on  the  doctrine  of  abstract  ideas.  For 
can  there  be  a  nicer  strain  of  abstraction  than  to  distinguish  the 
existence  of  sensible  objects  from  their  being  perceived,  so  as  to 
conceive  ["]  them  existing  unperceived?  Light  and  colours, 
heat  and  cold,  extension  and  figures — in  a  word  the  things  we  see 
and  feel — what  are  they  but  so  many  sensations,  notions12,  ideas, 
or  impressions  on  the  sense  ?  and  is  it  possible  to  separate,  even 
in  thought,  any  of  these  from  perception  ?  For  my  part,  I  might 
as  easily  divide  a  thing  from  itself.  I  may,  indeed,  divide  in 
my  thoughts,  or  conceive  apart  from  each  other,  those  things 
which,  perhaps,  I  never  perceived  by  sense  so  divided.  Thus,  I 
imagine  the  trunk  of  a  human  body  without  the  limbs,  or  con- 
ceive the  smell  of  a  rose  without  thinking  on  the  rose  itself.  So 
far,  I  will  not  deny,  I  can  abstract — if  that  may  properly  be  called 
abstraction  which  extends  only  to  the  conceiving  separately  such 
objects  as  it  is  possible  may  really  exist  or  be  actually  perceived 
asunder.  But  my  conceiving  or  imagining  power  does  not  extend 
beyond  the  possibility  of  real  existence  or  perception.   ["]  Hence, 

11  That  all  the  objects  of  which  we  are  actually  percipient  are  ideas  or  sensations  (in 
Berkeley's  meaning  of  the  words)  during  the  percipient  act,  inasmuch  as  they  are  then 
objects-perceived, — whatever  besides  and  in  other  circumstances  they  may  be, — is  self- 
evident.  They  are  at  least  ideas,  i.  e.  perceived-objects,  while  a  mind  is  in  the  act  of  being 
sensibly  percipient  of  them.  Whether  they  ever  exist  otherwise;  or  whether,  if  not,  they 
represent  what  is  existing  otherwise,  are  two  questions  which  Berkeley  proceeds  to  an- 
swewn  the  negative.  He  argues  that  their  uncognised  existence  is  not  merely  unproved 
but  involves  a  contradiction  in  terms,  or,  at  least,  can  mean  nothing. 

»•  The  term  notion,  elsewhere  either  restricted  to  minds  or  applied  to  concepts,  seems  to 
be  here  applied  to  the  immediate  object-world  of  the  senses.  Locke  uses  it  with  similar 
looseness. 


OF   HUMAN   KNOWLEDGE. 


197 


as  it  is  impossible  for  me  to  see  or  feel  anything  without  an  actual 
sensation  of  that  thing,  so  is  it  impossible  for  me  to  conceive  in 
my  thoughts  any  sensible  thing  or  object  distinct13  from  the  sen- 
sation or  perception  of  it.  [14In  truth,  the  object  and  the  sensa- 
tion are  the  same  thing15,  and  cannot  therefore  be  abstracted  from 
each  other.] 

6.  Some  truths  there  are  so  near  and  obvious  to  the  mind  that 
a  man  need  only  open  his  eyes  to  see  them.  Such  I  take  this 
important  one  to  be,  viz.  that  all  the  choir  of  heaven  and  furni- 
ture of  the  earth,  in  a  word  all  those  bodies  which  compose  the 
mighty  frame  of  the  world,  have  not  any  subsistence  without  a 
mind,  that  their  being  is  to  be  perceived  or  known ;  that  conse- 
quently so  long  as  they  are  not  actually  perceived  by  me,  or  do 
not  exist  in  my  mind  or  that  of  any  other  created  spirit,  they  must 
either  have  no  existence  at  all,  or  else  subsist  in  the  mind  of  some 
Eternal  Spirit — it  being  perfectly  unintelligible,  and  involving  all 
the  absurdity  of  abstraction,  to  attribute  to  any  single  part  of  them 
an  existence  independent  of  a  spirit.  [l6To  be  convinced  of 
which,  the  reader  need  only  reflect,  and  try  to  separate  in  his  own 
thoughts  the  being  of  a  sensible  thing  from  its  being  perceived.']  [I3] 

7.  From  what  has  been  said  it  is  evident  there  is  not  any  other 
Substance  than  Spirit,  or  that  which  perceives17.  [I4]  But,  for  the 
fuller  demonstration  of  this  point,  let  it  be  considered  the  sensible 

x3  i.e.  existing  distinct  from  perception. 

x*  This  sentence  is  omitted  in  the  second  edition. 

»5  With  Berkeley  '  object,'  '  idea,'  or  '  sensation,'  with  reference  to  our  sense-experience, 
signify  what  is  assumed  to  be  numerically  the  same,  and  which  cannot  therefore  be  distin- 
guished from  itself  by  abstraction.  An  absolute  negation  of  meaning,  or  else  a  contradic- 
tion in  terms — which  are  virtually  equivalent — alone  remain,  when  an  attempt  is  made  to 
disentangle  '  sensible  things'  from  a  perception  of  them. 

16  In  the  first  edition,  instead  of  this  sentence,  we  have  the  following :  '  To  make  this 
appear  with  all  the  light  and  evidence  of  an  Axiom,  it  seems  sufficient  if  I  can  but  awaken 
the  reflexion  of  the  reader,  that  he  may  take  an  impartial  view  of  his  own  meaning,  and 
turn  his  thoughts  upon  the  subject  itself,  free  and  disengaged  from  all  embarras  of  words 
and  prepossession  in  favour  of  received  mistakes.' 

»7  Berkeley  thus  holds  a  duality  of  '  things'  (viz.  spirits  and  ideas),  and  a  unity  of '  sub- 
stance.' Moreover,  he  does  not  say  that  this  '  substance'  may  exist  unpercipient  of  any 
ideas,  whilst  ideas  or  objects  necessarily  depend  on  being  perceived.  On  the  contrary  he 
goes  on  to  say  that  '  there  can  be  no  unthinking  substance  or  substratum'  of  ideas.  And 
elsewhere  he  argues  that  a  mind  must  be  always  conscious.  Cf.  sect.  98,  and  also  sect. 
139,  where  he  appears  to  hold  that  the  very  existence  of  a  spirit  or  substance  consists  in 
perceiving  ideas  or  being  conscious — that  its  esse  is  feixipere. 


198  OF    THE    PRINCIPLES 

qualities  are  colour,  figure,  motion,  smell,  taste,  &c,  i.  e.  the  ideas 
perceived  by  sense.  Now,  for  an  idea  to  exist  in  an  unperceiving 
thing  is  a  manifest  contradiction,  for  to  have  an  idea  is  all  one  as 
to  perceive;  that  therefore  wherein  colour,  figure,.&C.  exist  must 
perceive  them ;  hence  it  is  clear  there  can  be  no  unthinking  sub- 
stance or  substratum  of  those  ideas. 

8.  But,  say  you,  though  the  ideas  themselves  do  not  exist 
without  the  mind18,  yet  there  may  be  things  like  them,  whereof 
they  are  copies  or  resemblances,  which  things  exist  without  the 
mind  in  an  unthinking  substance19.  I  answer,  an  idea  can  be  like 
nothing  but  an  idea;  [15]  a  colour  or  figure  can  be  like  nothing 
but  another  colour  or  figure.  If  we  look  but  never  so  little  into 
our  thoughts,  we  shall  find  it  impossible  for  us  to  conceive  a  like- 
ness except  only  between  our  ideas.  Again,  I  ask  whether  those 
supposed  originals  or  external  things,  of  which  our  ideas  are  the 
pictures  or  representations,  be  themselves  perceivable  or  no?  If 
they  are,  then  they  are  ideas  and  we  have  gained  our  point ;  but 
if  you  say  they  are  not,  I  appeal  to  any  one  whether  it  be  sense  to 
assert  a  colour  is  like  something  which  is  invisible ;  hard  or  soft, 
like  something  which  is  intangible;  and  so  of  the  rest.  [l6] 

9.  Some  there  are  who  make  a  distinction  betwixt  primary  and 
secondary  qualities20.  [17]  By  the  former  they  mean  extension, 
figure,  motion,  rest,  solidity  or  impenetrability,  and  number  ;  by 
the  latter  they  denote  all  other  sensible  qualities,  as  colours, 
sounds,  tastes,  and  so  forth.  The  ideas  we  have  of  these  they 
acknowledge  not  to  be  the  resemblances  of  anything  existing 
without  the  mind,  or  unperceived,  but  they  will  have  our  ideas  of 
the  primary  qualities  to  be  patterns  or  images  of  things  which 
exist  without  the  mind,  in  an  unthinking  substance  which  they 
call  Matter.  [l8]  By  Matter,  therefore,  we  are  to  understand  an 
inert,  senseless  substance,  in  which  extension,  figure,  and  motion 
do  actually  subsist.  But  it  is  evident,  from  what  we  have 
already  shewn,  that  extension,  figure,  and  motion  are  only  [IQ] 
ideas  existing  in  the  mind,  and  that  an  idea  can  be  like  nothing  but 

'8  As  Sir  W.  Hamilton  (e.g.  Reid's  Works,  pp.  883,  &c.)  seems  to  say  the  immediate 
objects  or  ideas  of  sense  do. 

»9  As  some  who  hold  a  representative  perception  say. 

20  Here  again  In-  refers  to  Locke,  whose  notion  of  material  substance  is  charged  with 
being  self-contradictory.     See  Essay,  B.  II.  ch.  8. 


OF   HUMAN   KNOWLEDGE. 


199 


another  idea,  and  that  consequently  neither  they  nor  their  arche- 
types can  exist  in  an  unperceiving  substance.  Hence,  it  is  plain 
that  the  very  notion  of  what  is  called  Matter  or  corporeal  sub- 
stance, involves  a  contradiction  in  it.  [2°]  [2IInsomuch  that  I 
should  not  think  it  necessary  to  spend  more  time  in  exposing  its 
absurdity.  But,  because  the  tenet  of  the  existence  of  Matter 
seems  to  have  taken  so  deep  a  root  in  the  minds  of  philosophers, 
and  draws  after  it  so  many  ill  consequences,  I  choose  rather  to  be 
thought  prolix  and  tedious  than  omit  anything  that  might  con- 
duce to  the  full  discovery  and  extirpation  of  that  prejudice.] 

10.  They  who  assert  that  figure,  motion,  and  the  rest  of  the 
primary  or  original22  qualities  do  exist  without  the  mind  in  un- 
thinking substances,  do  at  the  same  time  acknowledge  that 
colours,  sounds,  heat,  cold,  and  suchlike  secondary  qualities,  do 
not — which  they  tell  us  are  sensations  existing  in  the  mind  alone, 
that  depend  on  and  are  occasioned  by  the  different  size,  texture, 
and  motion  of  the  minute  particles  of  matter23.  This  they  take 
for  an  undoubted  truth,  which  they  can  demonstrate  beyond  all 
exception.  Now,  if  it  be  certain  that  those  original  qualities  are 
inseparably  united  with  the  other  sensible  qualities,  and  not,  even 
in  thought,  capable  of  being  abstracted  from  them,  it  plainly  follows 
that  they  exist  only  in  the  mind.  But  I  desire  any  one  to  reflect 
and  try  whether  he  can,  by  any  abstraction  of  thought,  conceive 
the  extension  and  motion  of  a  body  without  all  other  sensible 
qualities.  [2I]  For  my  own  part,  I  see  evidently  that  it  is  not  j 
in  my  power  to  frame  an  idea  of  a  body  extended  and'  moving, 
but  I  must  withal  give  it  some  colour  or  other  sensible  quality 
which  is  acknowledged  to  exist  only  in  the  mind.  [22]  In  short, 
extension,  figure,  and  motion,  abstracted  from  all  other  qualities, 
are  inconceivable.  Where  therefore  the  other  sensible  qualities 
are,  there  must  these  be  also,  to  wit,  in  the  mind  and  nowhere 
else24. 

21  What  follows  to  the  end  of  the  section  is  omitted  in  the  second  edition. 

22  Sometimes  called  objective  qualities — which  are  supposed  to  exist  without  a  mind  or 
unperceived,  and  in  an  unperceiving  substance.  Cf.  First  Dialogue  between  Hylas  and 
Philnnous,  pp.  279,  &c. 

*)  Cf.  sect.  10.  See  Locke"s  Essay,  B.  II.  ch.  8,  §  18  ;  ch.  23,  §  11  ;  B.  IV.  ch.  3,  §  24— 
26. 

■4  '  in  the  mind,  and  nowhere  else' — i.  e.  perceived  or  conceived,  and  in  no  other  man- 
ner.    Cf.  Third  Dialogue  between  Hylas  and  Philonous,  p.  346. 


«/ 


200  OF    THE    PRINCIPLES 

11.  Again, great  and  small,  swift  and  slow,  are  allowed  to  exist 
nowhere  without  the  mind,  being  entirely  relative,  and  changing 
as  the  frame  or  position  of  the  organs  of  sense  varies.  The  ex- 
tension therefore  which  exists  without  the  mind  is  neither  great 
nor  small,  the  motion  neither  swift  nor  slow,  that  is,  they  are 
nothing  at  all.  [23]  But,  say  you,  they  are  extension  in  general, 
and  motion  in  general :  thus  we  see  how  much  the  tenet  of  ex- 
tended moveable  substances  existing  without  the  mind25  depends 
on  that  strange  doctrine  of  abstract  ideas.  And  here  I  cannot  but 
remark  how  nearly  the  vague  and  indeterminate  description  of 
Matter  or  corporeal  substance,  which  the  modern  philosophers 
are  run  into  by  their  own  principles,  resembles  that  antiquated 
and  so-much  ridiculed  notion  of  materia  prima,  to  be  met  with  in 
Aristotle  and  his  followers.  Without  extension  solidity  cannot 
be  conceived ;  since  therefore  it  has  been  shewn  that  extension26 
exists  not  in  an  unthinking  substance,  the  same  must  also  be  true 
of  solidity. 

12.  That  number  is  entirely  the  creature  of  the  mind27,  even 
though  the  other  qualities  be  allowed  to  exist  without,  will  be 
evident  to  whoever  considers  that  the  same  thing  bears  a  different 
denomination  of  number  as  the  mind  views  it  with  different 
respects.  Thus,  the  same  extension  is  one,  or  three,  or  thirty-six, 
according  as  the  mind  considers  it  with  reference  to  a  yard,  a  foot, 
or  an  inch.  Number  is  so  visibly  relative,  and  dependent  on  men's 
understanding,  that  it  is  strange  to  think  how  any  one  should 
give  it  an  absolute  existence  without  the  mind.  We  say  one 
book,  one  page,  one  line,  &c. ;  all  these  are  equally  units,  though 


*5  'without  the  mind'— without  a  mind,  or  in  an  absolute  negation  of  all  intelligence, 
Divine  or  finite. 

26  Extension  is  thus  the  fundamental  characteristic  of  the  material  world.  Both  geo- 
metrical and  physical  solidity,  as  well  as  motion,  are  said  to  imply  extension.  But  Berke- 
ley's analysis  rather  resolves  extension  into  a  locomotive  experience  in  sense,  which  visual 
sensations  of  colour  may  symbolize. 

*7  '  the  creature  of  the  mind,'  i.e.  dependent  on  being  conceived  by  a  mind.  Cf.  Siris, 
sect.  288.  This  dependence  is  here  illustrated  by  the  relation  of  number  to  the  point  of 
view  of  the  individual  mind ;  as  the  dependence  of  the  other  primary  qualities  was  illus- 
trated by  their  relations  to  the  organization  of  the  percipient.  In  this,  the  preceding,  and 
the  following  sections,  Berkeley  argues  the  inconsistency  of  the  absoluteness  attributed  to 
the  primary  qualities,  with  their  acknowledged  dependence  on  our  organization,  and  on 
our  intellectual  point  of  view. 


OF   HUMAN   KNOWLEDGE.  201 

some  contain  several  of  the  others.  And  in  each  instance,  it  is 
plain,  the  unit  relates  to  some  particular  combination  of  ideas 
arbitrarily  [2<]  put  together  by  the  mind28. 

13.  Unity  I  know  some29  will  have  to  be  a  simple  or  uncom- 
pounded  idea,  accompanying  all  other  ideas  into  the  mind.  That 
I  have  any  such  idea  answering  the  word  unity  I  do  not  find  ; 
and  if  I  had,  methinks  I  could  not  miss  finding  it:  on  the  con- 
trary, it  should  be  the  most  familiar  to  my  understanding,  since 
it  is  said  to  accompany  all  other  ideas,  and  to  be  perceived  by  all 
the  ways  of  sensation  and  reflexion.  [2S]  To  say  no  more,  it  is 
an  abstract  idea. 

14.  I  shall  farther  add,  that,  after  the  same  manner  as  modern 
philosophers  prove30  certain  sensible  qualities  to  have  no  exist- 
ence in  Matter,  or  without  the  mind,  the  same  thing  may  be  like- 
wise proved  of  all  other  sensible  qualities  whatsoever.  Thus,  for 
instance,  it  is  said  that  heat  and  cold  are  affections  only  of  the 
mind,  and  not  at  all  patterns  of  real  beings,  existing  in  the  cor- 
poreal substances  which  excite  them,  for  that  the  same  body 
which  appears  cold  to  one  hand  seems  warm  to  another.  [20] 
Now,  why  may  we  not  as  well  argue  that  figure  and  extension 
are  not  patterns  or  resemblances  of  qualities  existing  in  Matter, 
because  to  the  same  eye  at  different  stations,  or  eyes  of  a  differ- 
ent texture  at  the  same  station,  they  appear  various,  and  cannot 
therefore  be  the  images  of  anything  settled  and  determinate  with- 
out the  mind  ?  Again,  it  is  proved  that  sweetness  is  not  really 
in  the  sapid  thing,  because  the  thing  remaining  unaltered  the 
sweetness  is  changed  into  bitter,  as  in  case  of  a  fever  or  otherwise 
vitiated  palate.  Is  it  not  as  reasonable  to  say  that  motion  is  not 
without  the  mind,  since  if  the  succession  of  ideas  in  the  mind  be- 
come swifter  the  motion,  it  is  acknowledged,  shall  appear  slower 
without31  any  alteration  in  any  external  object  ? 

15.  In  short,  let  any  one  consider  those  arguments  which  are 
thought  manifestly  to  prove  that  colours  and  tastes  exist  only 
in  the  mind,  and  he  shall  find  they  may  with  equal  force  be 

28  Cf.  New  Theory  of  Vision,  sect.  107 — no. 
=9  e.g.  Locke,  Essay,  B.  II.  ch.  7,  §  7;  ch.  16,  §  1. 
3°  '  certain  sensible  qualities' — '  colours,  tastes,  &c.' — in  first  edition. 
31  '  without  any  alteration  in  any  external  object' — '  without  any  external  alteration' — in 
first  edition. 


202  OF    THE    PRINCIPLES 

brought  to  prove  the  same  thing  of  extension,  figure,  and  mo- 
tion32. Though  it  must  be  confessed  this  method  of  arguing 
does  not  so  much  prove  that  there  is  no  extension  or  colour  in 
an  outward  object33,  as  that  we  do  not  know  by  sense  which  is 
the  true  extension  or  colour  of  the  object.  But  the  arguments 
foregoing  plainly  shew  it  to  be  impossible  that  any  colour  or 
extension  at  all,  or  other  sensible  quality  whatsoever,  should 
exist  in  an  unthinking  subject  without  the  mind,  or  in  truth,  that 
there  should  be  any  such  thing  as  an  outward  object. 

16.  But  let  us  examine  a  little  the  received  opinion. — It  is  said 
extension  is  a  mode  or  accident  of  Matter,  and  that  Matter  is  the 
substratum  that  supports  it.  Now  I  desire  that  you  would  ex- 
plain to  me  what  is  meant  by  Matter's  supporting  extension.  Say 
you,  I  have  no  idea  of  Matter  and  therefore  cannot  explain  it.  I 
answer,  though  you  have  no  positive,  yet,  if  you  have  any  mean- 
ing at  all,  you  must  at  least  have  a  relative  idea  of  Matter ; 
though  you  know  not  what  it  is,  yet  you  must  be  supposed  to 
know  what  relation  it  bears  to  accidents,  and  what  is  meant  by 
its  supporting  them.  It  is  evident  '  support '  cannot  here  be 
taken  in  its  usual  or  literal  sense — as  when  we  say  that  pillars 
support  a  building;  in  what  sense  therefore  must  it  be  taken? 
[34  For  my  part,  I  am  not  able  to  discover  any  sense  at  all  that 
can  be  applicable  to  it.] 

17.  If  we  inquire  into  what  the  most  accurate  philosophers 
declare  themselves  to  mean  by  material  substance,  we  shall  find 
them  acknowledge  they  have  no  other  meaning  annexed  to  those 
sounds  but  the  idea  of  Being  in  general,  together  with  the  rela- 
tive notion  of  its  supporting  accidents.[27]  The  general  idea  of 
Being  appeareth  to  me  the  most  abstract  and  incomprehensible 
of  all  other;  and  as  for  its  supporting  accidents,  this,  as  we  have 
just  now  observed,  cannot  be  understood  in  the  common  sense 
of  those  words ;  it  must  therefore  be  taken  in  some  other  sense, 
but  what  that  is  they  do  not  explain.     So  that  when  I  consider 

y  Cf.  First  Dialogue  between  Hylas  and  Philonous,  pp.  278 — 285. 

33  '  an  outward  object,'  i.  e.  an  object  abstracted  from  all  intelligence — an  absolute 
object,  which  is  alleged  to  be  a  contradiction,  all  objectivity  implying  a  relation  to  an  intel- 
ligence, and  the  qualities  in  question  relation  to  an  embodied  intelligence,  with  its  organic 
variations. 

34  This  sentence  is  omitted  in  the  second  edition. 


OF   HUMAN   KNOWLEDGE.  203 

the  two  parts  or  branches  which  make  the  signification  of  the 
words  material  substance,  I  am  convinced  there  is  no  distinct 
meaning  annexed  to  them.  But  why  should  we  trouble  our- 
selves any  farther,  in  discussing  this  material  substratum  or  sup- 
port of  figure  and  motion,  and  other  sensible  qualities  ?  Does 
it  not  suppose  they  have  an  existence  without  the  mind?  And 
is  not  this  a  direct  repugnancy,  and  altogether  inconceivable  ? 

18.  But,  though  it  were  possible  that  solid,  figured,  moveable 
substances  may  exist  without  the  mind,  corresponding  to  the 
ideas  we  have  of  bodies,  yet  how  is  it  possible  for  us  to  know 
this  ?  Either  we  must  know  it  by  sense  or  by  reason35. — As  for 
our  senses,  by  them  we  have  the  knowledge  only  of  our  sensa- 
tions, ideas,  or  those  things  that  are  immediately  perceived  by 
sense,  call  them  what  you  will :  but  they  do  not  inform  us  that 
things  exist  without  the  mind,  or  unperceived,  like  to  those 
which  are  perceived.[28]  This  the  materialists  [2^]  themselves  ac- 
knowledge.— It  remains  therefore  that  if  we  have  any  knowledge 
at  all  of  external  things,  it  must  be  by  reason,  inferring  their 
existence  from  what  is  immediately  perceived  by  sense.  But 
(3<5I  do  not  see)  what  reason  can  induce  us  to  believe  the  exist- 
ence of  bodies  without  the  mind,  from  what  we  perceive,  since 
the  very  patrons  of  Matter  themselves  do  not  pretend  there  is 
any  necessary  connexion  betwixt  them  and  our  ideas  ?  I  say  it 
is  granted  on  all  hands  (and  what  happens  in  dreams,  frensies, 
and  the  like,  puts  it  beyond  dispute)  that  it  is  possible  we  might 
be  affected  with  all  [3°]  the  ideas  we  have  now,  though  there  were 
no  bodies  existing  without  resembling  them37.  Hence,  it  is 
evident  the  supposition  of  external  bodies38  is  not  necessary  for 
the  producing  our  ideas ;  since  it  is   granted  they  are  produced 

35  '  reason,"  i.  e.  reasoning,  or  inference  from  our  immediate  sense-experience — our  sen- 
sations or  ideas  of  sense.  It  is  argued,  in  this  and  the  next  section,  that  the  absolute 
existence  of  Matter  cannot  be  proved,  either  by  the  senses,  or  by  reasoning  from  our 
sense-perceptions. 

36  Omitted  in  the  second  edition,  and  the  sentence  converted  into  a  question. 

37  But  the  ideas  or  objects  of  which  we  are  cognizant  in  dreams,  &c.  differ  in  important 
characteristics  from  the  ideas  or  objects  of  which  we  are  conscious  in  sense.  Cf.  sect.  29 — 
33.  The  former  are  not  in  harmony  with  what  may  be  called  the  universal  and  well- 
ordered  dream  of  real  life. 

38  •  external  bodies,"  i.  e.  bodies  that  exist  absolutely  or  unperceived — independently  of 
any  sense-experience. 


204 


OF    THE    PRINCIPLES 


sometimes,  and  might  possibly  be  produced  always  in  the  same 
order,  we  see  them  in  at  present,  without  their  concurrence. 

19.  But,  though  we  might  possibly  have  all  our  sensations 
without  them,  yet  perhaps  it  may  be  thought  easier  to  conceive 
and  explain  the  manner  of  their  production,  by  supposing  exter- 
nal bodies  in  their  likeness  rather  than  otherwise ;  and  so  it 
might  be  at  least  probable  there  are  such  things  as  bodies  that 
excite  their  ideas  in  our  minds.  But  neither  can  this  be  said  ; 
for,  though  we  give  the  materialists  [3I]  their  external  bodies,  they 
by  their  own  confession  are  never  the  nearer  knowing  how  our 
ideas  are  produced;  since  they  own  themselves  unable  to  com- 
prehend in  what  manner  body  can  act  upon  spirit,  or  how  it  is 
possible  it  should  imprint  any  idea  in  the  mind39.  Hence  it  is 
evident  the  production40  of  ideas  or  sensations  in  our  minds,  can 
be  no  reason  why  we  should  suppose  Matter  or  corporeal  sub- 
stances41, since  that  is  acknowledged  to  remain  equally  inex- 
plicable with  or  without  this  supposition.  If  therefore  it  were 
possible  for  bodies  to  exist  without  the  mind,  yet  to  hold  they 
do  so,  must  needs  be  a  very  precarious  opinion ;  since  it  is  to 
suppose,  without  any  reason  at  all,  that  God  has  created  innumer- 
able beings  that  are  entirely  useless,  and  serve  to  no  manner  of 
purpose.  [32] 

20.  In  short,  if  there  were  external  bodies42,  it  is  impossible 
we  should  ever  come  to  know  it;  and  if  there  were  not,  we 
might  have  the  very  same  reasons  to  think  there  were  that  we 
have  now.  Suppose — what  no  one  can  deny  possible — an  intel- 
ligence without  the  help  of  external  bodies42,  to  be  affected  with 
the  same  train  of  sensations  or  ideas  that  you  are,  imprinted  in 
the  same  order  and  with  like  vividness  in  his  mind43.  I  ask 
whether  that  intelligence  hath  not  all  the  reason  to  believe  the 

39  i.  e.  they  cannot  shew  how  the  unintelligible  or  contradictory  hypothesis  of  Absolute 
Matter  accounts  for  our  having  the  sense-experience  we  have  had,  are  conscious  of  having, 
or  expect  to  have ;  or  which  we  suppose  other  conscious  minds  to  be  having,  to  have  hid, 
or  to  be  about  to  have. 

<°  '  the  production,'  &c,  i.  e.  the  fact  that  we  and  others  actually  have  sense-percep- 
tions. 

4»  •  Matter,"  in  an  intelligible  meaning  of  the  term,  he  not  only  allows  to  exist,  but 
maintains  its  existence  to  be  intuitively  evident. 

**  i.  e.  bodies  existing  without  being  perceived  or  concejgH^^any  knowing  substance. 

43  i.  e.  to  have  all  our  sense-experience. 


OF   HUMAN   KNOWLEDGE.  205 

existence  of  corporeal  substances,  represented  by  his  ideas,  and 
exciting  them  in  his  mind,  that  you  can  possibly  have  for  believ- 
ing the  same  thing  ?[33]  Of  this  there  can  be  no  question — 
which  one  consideration  were  enough  to  make  any  reasonable 
person  suspect  the  strength  of  whatever  arguments  he  may 
think  himself  to  have,  for  the  existence  of  bodies  without  the 
mind. 

21.  Were  it  necessary  to  add  any  farther  proof  against  the 
existence  of  Matter44,  after  what  has  been  said,  I  could  instance 
several  of  those  errors  and  difficulties  (not  to  mention  impieties) 
which  have  sprung  from  that  tenet.  It  has  occasioned  number- 
less controversies  and  disputes  in  philosophy,  and  not  a  few  of 
far  greater  moment  in  religion.  But  I  shall  not  enter  into  the 
detail  of  them  in  this  place,  as  well  because  I  think  arguments 
a  posteriori  l3*"]  are  unnecessary  for  confirming  what  has  been, 
if  I  mistake  not,  sufficiently  demonstrated  a  priori,  as  because  I 
shall  hereafter  find  occasion  to  speak  somewhat  of  them45. 

22.  I  am  afraid  I  have  given  cause  to  think  I  am  needlessly 
prolix  in  handling  this  subject.  For,  to  what  purpose  is  it  to 
dilate  on  that  which  may  be  demonstrated  with  the  utmost  evi- 
dence in  a  line  or  two,  to  any  one  that  is  capable  of  the  least 
reflection  ?  It  is  but  looking  into  your  own  thoughts,  and  so 
trying  whether  you  can  conceive  it  possible  for  a  sound,  or 
figure,  or  motion,  or  colour  to  exist  without  the  mind  or  unper- 
ceived.  This  easy  trial46  may  perhaps  make  you  see  that  what 
you  contend  for  is  a  downright  contradiction.  Insomuch  that  I 
am  content  to  put  the  whole  upon  this  issue: — If  you  can  but 
conceive  it  possible  for  one  extended  moveable  substance,  or,  in 
general,  for  any  one  idea,[35]  or  anything  like  an  idea,  to  exist 
otherwise  than  in  a  mind  perceiving  it47,  I  shall  readily  give  up 
the  cause.  And,  as  for  all  that  compages  of  external  bodies  you 
contend  for,  I  shall  grant  you  its  existence,  though  you  cannot 

44  i.  e.  absolute  or  uncognised  Matter — not  interpretable  sense-perceptions,  the  existence 
of  which  last  Berkeley  assumes. 

45  Cf.  sect.  85— 156. 

4«  The  appeal  here  and  elsewhere  is  to  reflection — directly  upon  our  own  experience 
and  indirectly  upon  that  of  others. 

47  i.  e.  otherwise  than  as  an  idea — perceived  or  conceived — a  presented  or  represented 
object. 


<. 


206  OF    THE    PRINCIPLES 

either  give  me  any  reason  why  you  believe  it  exists,  or  assign 
any  use  to  it  when  it  is  supposed  to  exist.  I  say,  the  bare  possi- 
bility of  your  opinions  being  true  shall  pass  for  an  argument  that 
it  is  so. 

23.  But,  say  you,  surely  there  is  nothing  easier  than  for  me  to 
imagine  trees,  for  instance,  in  a  park,  or  books  existing  in  a  closet, 
and  nobody  by  to  perceive  them.  I  answer,  you  may  so,  there 
is  no  difficulty  in  it;  but  what  is  all  this,  I  beseech  you,  more 
than  framing  in  your  mind  certain  ideas  which  you  call  books 
and  trees,  and  at  the  same  time  omitting  to  frame  the  idea  of  any 
one  that  may  perceive  them  ?  But  do  not  you  yourself  perceive 
or  think  of  them  all  the  while43?  This  therefore  is  nothing  to 
the  purpose :  it  only  shews  you  have  the  power  of  imagining  or 
forming  ideas  in  your  mind ;  but  it  does  not  shew  that  you  can 
conceive  it  possible  the  objects  of  your  thought  may  exist  with- 
out the  mind.  To  make  out  this,  it  is  necessary  that  you  con- 
ceive them  existing  unconceived  or  unthought  of,  which  is  a 
manifest  repugnancy.  [36]  When  we  do  our  utmost  to  conceive 
the  existence  of  external  bodies4?,  we  are  all  the  while  only  con- 
templating our  own  ideas50.  But  the  mind  taking  no  notice  of 
itself,  is  deluded  to  think  it  can  and  does  conceive  bodies  existing 
unthought  of  or  without  the  mind,  though  at  the  same  time  they 
are  apprehended  by  or  exist  in  itself51.  [37]  A  little  attention  will 
discover  to  any  one  the  truth  and  evidence  of  what  is  here  said, 
and  make  it  unnecessary  to  insist  on  any  other  proofs  against  the 
existence  of  material  substance. 

24.  [52  Could  men  but  forbear  to  amuse  themselves  with  words, 

48  There  seems  to  be  a  confusion  of  existence  in  sense  with  existence  in  imagination,  iu 
this  section.  To  exist  as  an  object  in  fancy  is  indeed  to  exist,  but  not  as  part  of  the 
universal  system  of  sensible  order ;  and  it  is  the  apparently  interrupted  existence  of  this 
system,  on  his  doctrine,  that  Berkeley  has  to  reconcile  with  the  common  belief,  on  which 
we  all  act. 

49  '  to  conceive  the  existence  of  external  bodies,'  i.e.  to  conceive  bodies  that  are  neither 
perceived  nor  conceived — that  are  not  ideas  or  objects  at  all,  but  which  exist  absolutely. 
To  suppose  what  we  conceive  to  be  thus  unconceived,  when  we  are  actually  conceiving  it, 
is,  it  is  argued,  to  suppose  a  contradiction  in  terms.  Such  Being  is  absolutely  unapproach- 
able by  intelligence. 

s°  '  ideas' — i.  e.  ideas  of  imagination,  not  of  sense. 

S"  A  delusion  which  is  at  the  root  of  those  objections  to  metaphysics  which  overlook  the 
subjective  phase  of  all  physics. 

5'  This  sentence  is  omitted  in  the  second  edition. 


OF   HUMAN   KNOWLEDGE.  20? 

we  should,  I  believe,  soon  come  to  an  agreement  in  this  point.] 
It  is  very  obvious,  upon  the  least  inquiry  into  our  own  thoughts, 
to  know  whether  it  be  possible  for  us  to  understand  what  is  meant 
by  the  absolute  existence  of  sensible  objects  in  themselves,  or  without 
the  jnind53.  To  me  it  is  evident  those  words  mark  out  either  a 
direct  contradiction,  or  else  nothing  at  all.  [38]  And  to  convince 
others  of  this,  I  know  no  readier  or  fairer  way  than  to  entreat 
they  would  calmly  attend  to  their  own  thoughts  ;  and  if  by  this 
attention  the  emptiness  or  repugnancy  of  those  expressions  does 
appear,  surely  nothing  more  is  requisite  for  their  conviction.  It 
is  on  this  therefore  that  I  insist,  to  wit,  that  the  absolute  existence 
of  unthinking  things  are  words  without  a  meaning,  or  which  in- 
clude a  contradiction.  This  is  what  I  repeat  and  inculcate,  and 
earnestly  recommend  to  the  attentive  thoughts  of  the  reader. 

W  25.  All  our  ideas,  sensations,  notions54,  or  the  things  which 
we  perceive,  by  whatsoever  names  they  may  be  distinguished, 
are  visibly  inactive — there  is  nothing  of  power  or  agency  in- 
cluded in  them.  So  that  one  idea  or  object  of  thought  cannot 
produce  or  make  any  alteration  in  another55.  To  be  satisfied  of 
the  truth  of  this,  there  is  nothing  else  requisite  but  a  bare  ob- 
servation of  our  ideas.  For,  since  they  and  every  part  of  them 
exist  only  in  the  mind,  it  follows  that  there  is  nothing  in  them 
but  what  is  perceived :  but  whoever  shall  attend  to  his  ideas, 
whether  of  sense  or  reflection,  will  not  perceive  in  them  any 
power  or  activity;  there  is,  therefore,  no  such  thing  contained 
in  them.  A  little  attention  will  discover  to  us  that  the  very 
being  of  an  idea  implies  passiveness  and  inertness  in  it,  insomuch 
that  it  is  impossible  for  an  idea  to  do  anything,  or,  strictly  speaking, 
to  be  the  cause  of  anything :  neither  can  it  be  the  resemblance 
or  pattern   of  any  active   being,  as  is  evident  from  sect.  8.  [39] 

53  '  The  absolute  existence  of  sensible  objects,  i.e.  in  themselves  or  without  a  mind,'  is 
the  principle  which  Berkeley  argues  against  as  either  meaningless  or  contradictory — not 
the  existence  of  a  material  world  or  sensible  order,  regulated  independently  of  our  individual 
will,  and  to  which  our  actions  must  conform  if  we  are  to  avoid  pain  and  secure  pleasure. 

54  Here  again  '  notion'  applied  to  ideas  or  inactive  things. 

55  In  this  and  the  next  section,  Berkeley  argues  that  there  can  be  no  power  or  causality 
proper,  in  the  world  of  ideas  or  objects,  uniformities  of  co-existence  and  succession  alone 
being  either  immediately  or  mediately  perceivable — the  doctrine  of  Hume,  Brown,  Comte, 
and  Mr.  Mill. 


208  OF    THE    PRINCIPLES 

Whence  it  plainly  follows  that  extension,  figure,  and  motion 
cannot  be  the  cause  ofNour  sensations.  To  say,  therefore,  that 
these  are  the  effects  of  powers  resulting  from  the  configuration, 
number,  motion,  and  size  of  corpuscles,  must  certainly  be  false. 

26.  We  perceive  a  continual  succession  of  ideas,  some  are 
anew  excited,  others  are  changed  or  totally  disappear.  There 
is  therefore  some  cause56  of  these  ideas,  whereon  they  depend57, 
and  which  produces  and  changes  them.  That  this  cause  cannot 
be  any  quality  or  idea  or  combination  of  ideas,  is  clear  from  the 
preceding  section.  It  must  therefore  be  a  substance58 ;  but  it  has 
been  shewn  that  there  is  no  corporeal  or  material  substance :  it 
remains  therefore  that  the  cause  of  ideas  is  an  incorporeal  active 
substance  or  Spirit. 

27.  A  Spirit  is  one  simple,  undivided,  active  being — as  it  per- 
ceives ideas  it  is  called  the  understanding,  and  as  it  produces  or 
otherwise  operates  about  them  it  is  called  the  will.  Hence  there 
can  be  no  idea  formed  of  a  soul  or  spirit ;  for  all  ideas  whatever, 
being  passive  and  inert,  (vid.  sect.  25,)  they  cannot  represent  unto 
us,  by  way  of  image  or  likeness,  that  which  acts.  A  little  atten- 
tion will  make  it  plain  to  anyone  that  to  have  an  idea  which  shall 
be  like  that  active  principle  of  motion  and  change  of  ideas  is  ab- 
solutely impossible.  Such  is  the  nature  of  spirit,  or  that  which 
acts,  that  it  cannot  be  of  itself  perceived,  but  only  by  the  effects 
which  it  produceth59.  [4°]  If  any  man  shall  doubt  of  the  truth  of 
what  is  here  delivered,  let  him  but  reflect  and  try  if  he  can  frame 
the  idea  of  any  power  or  active  being ;  and  whether  he  has  ideas 
of  two  principal  powers,  marked  by  the  names  will  and  under- 
standing, distinct  from  each  other  as  well  as  from  a  third  idea  of 

56  Berkeley  here  assumes  as  granted  the  metaphysical  and  synthetical  principle  of  caus- 
ality— that  every  phenomenal  change  implies  a  cause — which  cause,  he  goes  on  to  shew, 
cannot  be  itself  phenomenal. 

57  '  depend' — not  for  their  very  existence,  which,  according  to  Berkeley,  depends  upon 
their  being  perceived,  but  for  the  changing  forms  in  which  they  exist  relatively  to  one 
another. 

58  He  here  connects  the  metaphysical  and  synthetical  principles  of  Cause  and  Substance 
— finding  them  united  and  realized  in  actively  conscious  Mind. 

59  In  other  words,  it  cannot  be  an  object  of  perception,  though  its  effects  can.  We  are 
conscious  of  it  as  percipient  only,  not  as  perceived.  Does  this  consciousness  of  being  per- 
cipient imply  consciousness  of  active  will  ?  For  Berkeley's  treatment  of  the  objection  that 
mental  substances  and  causes  are  as  unmeaning  or  contradictory  as  material  substances  or 
causes,  see  Third  Dialogue  between  Hylas  and  Philonous,  pp.  327 — 329. 


OF   HUMAN   KNOWLEDGE.  209 

Substance  or  Being  in  general,  with  a  relative  notion  of  its  sup- 
porting or  being  the  subject  [4I]  of  the  aforesaid  powers — which  is 
signified  by  the  name  soul  or  spirit.  This  is  what  some  hold  ;  but, 
so  far  as  I  can  see,  the  words  will,  ^"understanding,  mind,']  soul, 
sprit,  do  not  stand  for  different  ideas,  or,  in  truth,  for  any  idea  at 
all,  but  for  something  which  is  very  different  from  ideas,  and 
which,  being  an  agent,  cannot  be  like  unto,  or  represented  by,  any 
idea  whatsoever.  [6l Though  it  must  be  owned  at  the  same  time 
that  we  have  some  notion  of  soul,  spirit,  and  the  operations  of  the 
mind62;  such  as  willing,  loving,  hating — inasmuch  as  we  know 
or  understand  the  meaning  of  these  words.]  [42] 

28.  I  find  I  can  excite  ideas63  in  my  mind  at  pleasure,  and  vary 
and  shift  the  scene  as  oft  as  I  think  fit.  It  is  no  more  than  will- 
ing, and  straightway  this  or  that  idea  arises  in  my  fancy ;  and  by 
the  same  power  it  is  obliterated  and  makes  way  for  another. 
Thfs  making  and  unmaking  of  ideas  doth  very  properly  denomi- 
nate the  mind  active.  Thus  much  is  certain  and  grounded  on 
experience :  but  when  we  talk  of  unthinking  agents,  or  of  ex- 
citing ideas  exclusive  of  volition,  we  only  amuse  ourselves  with 
words 64. 

29.  But,  whatever  power  I  may  have  over  my  own  thoughts,  I 
find  the  ideas  actually  perceived  by  Sense  have  not  a  like  depend- 
ence on  my  will65.  [43]    When  in  broad  daylight  I  open  my  eyes,  it 

60  Omitted  in  second  edition. 

61  This  sentence  is  not  contained  in  the  first  edition. 

62  In  sect.  1  he  speaks  of  ideas  perceived  by  attending  to  the  operations  of  the  mind.' 

63  'ideas,'  i.e.  of  imagination. 

6*  With  Berkeley  the  object-world  of  ideas  is  partly  distinguished  from  Self  by  its  essen- 
tial passivity.  Every  object  is  caused ;  nothing  except  a  Self  or  Ego  causes.  Cause  or 
power  is  with  him  of  the  essence  of  our  notion  of  mind,  to  which  we  necessarily  attribute 
power  or  activity — thus  distinguishing  our  Self  from  the  changing  ideas  of  which  we  are 
conscious.  Except  figuratively,  we  never  attribute  action  to  ideas  or  objects.  Cf.  Siris, 
sect.  249,  250,  292 — 295. 

6S  In  this  and  the  four  following  sections,  Berkeley  mentions  marks  by  which  sense-phe- 
nomena are  found  in  experience  to  be  distinguished  from  all  the  other  ideas  of  which  we 
are  cognisant,  and  in  consequence  of  which  they  are  termed  '  real,'  '  external,'  or  properly 
'objective;'  while  other  phenomena  (those  of  feeling  and  imagination)  are  called  subjec- 
tive or  individual.  The  changes  in  the  ideas  or  phenomena  presented  in  the  senses  are 
found  to  be  part  of  Universal  External  Order — external,  inasmuch  as  it  is  independent  of 
the  will  of  the  sense-percipient — the  interpretation  of  which  enables  us  to  foresee  (sect.  31) 
more  or  less  of  our  future  sense-experience ;  thus  determining  our  pleasures  and  pains,  and 
also  informing  us  of  the  existence  of  other  conscious  minds. 

14 


2IO  OF    THE    PRINCIPLES 

is  not  in  my  power  to  choose  whether  I  shall  see  or  no,  or  to  de- 
termine what  particular  objects  shall  present  themselves  to  my 
view ;  and  so  likewise  as  to  the  hearing  and  other  senses,  the 
ideas  imprinted  on  them  are  not  creatures  of  my  will.  There  is 
therefore  some  other  Will  or  Spirit  that  produces  them.  [44] 

30.  The  ideas  of  Sense  are  more  strong,  lively,  and  distinct  than 
those  of  the  imagination66;  they  have  likewise  a  steadiness,  order, 
and  coherence,  and  are  not  excited  at  random,  as  those  which  are 
the  effects  of  human  wills  often  are,  but  in  a  regular  train  or 
series — the  admirable  connexion  whereof  sufficiently  testifies  the 
wisdom  and  benevolence  of  its  Author.  Now  the  jet  rules_  or 
established  methods  wherein  the  Mind  we  depend  on  excites  in 
us  the  ideas  of  sense,  are  called  the  laws  of  nature  ;  [45]  and  these 
we  learn  by  experience,  which  teaches  us  that  such  and  such 
ideas  are  attended  with  such  and  such  other  ideas,  in  the  ordinary 
course  of  things. 

31.  This  gives  us  a  sort  of  foresight  which  enables  us  to  regu- 
late our  actions  for  the  benefit  of  life.  And  without  this  we 
should  be  eternally  at  a  loss;  we  could  not  know  how  to  act  any- 
thing that  might  procure  us  the  least  pleasure,  or  remove  the 
least  pain  of  sense.  That  food  nourishes,  sleep  refreshes,  and  fire 
warms  us ;  that  to  sow  in  the  seed-time  is  the  way  to  reap  in  the 
harvest ;  and  in  general  that  to  obtain  such  or  such  ends,  such 
or  such  means  are  conducive — all  this  we  know,  not  by  discover- 
ing any  necessary67  connexion  between  our  ideas,  but  only  by  the 
observation  of  the  settled  laws  of  nature,  without  which  we  should 
be  all  in  uncertainty  and  confusion,  and  a  grown  man  no  more 
know  how  to  manage  himself  in  the  affairs  of  life  than  an  infant 
just  born.  [46] 

32.  And  yet  this  consistent  uniform  working,  which  so  evi- 
dently displays  the  goodness  and  wisdom  of  that  Governing  Spirit 
whose  Will  constitutes  the  laws  of  nature,  is  so  far  from  leading 
our  thoughts  to  Him,  that  it  rather  sends  them  wandering  after 
second  causes.     For,  when  we  perceive  certain  ideas  of  Sense 

66  This  mark — the  superior  strength,  liveliness,  and  distinctness  of  our  sense-ideas — was 
afterwards  noted  by  Hume.     See  Inquiry  concerning  Human  Understanding,  sect.  II. 

*7  Berkeley  insists  throughout  his  writings  on  the  arbitrary  character  of  the  laws  of 
nature  in  general,  and  of  those  by  which  the  phenomena  of  vision  symbolize  those  of  touch 
in  particular. 


OF   HUMAN  KNOWLEDGE.  211 

constantly  followed  by  other  ideas,  and  we  know  this  is  not  of  our 
own  doing,  we  forthwith  attribute  power  and  agency  to  the  ideas 
themselves,  and  make  one  the  cause  of  another,  than  which 
nothing  can  be  more  absurd  and  unintelligible.  Thus,  for  exam- 
ple, having  observed  that  when  we  perceive  by  sight  a  certain 
round  luminous  figure  we  at  the  same  time  perceive  by  touch  the 
idea  or  sensation  called  heat,  we  do  from  thence  conclude  the 
sun  to  be  the  cause  of  heat.  And  in  like  manner  perceiving  the 
motion  and  collision  of  bodies  to  be  attended  with  sound,  we  are 
inclined  to  think  the  latter  the  effect  of  the  former68.  [47] 

33.  The  ideas  imprinted  on  the  Senses  by  the  Author  of  nature 
are  called  real  things :  and  those  excited  in  the  imagination  being 
less  regular,  vivid,  and  constant,  are  more  properly69  termed 
ideas,  or  images  of  tilings,  which  they  copy  and  represent.  But 
then  our  sensations,  be  they  never  so  vivid  and  distinct,  are  never- 
theless ideas,  that  is,  they  exist  in  the  mind,  or  are  perceived  by 
it,  as  truly  as  the  ideas  of  its  own  framing.  The  ideas  of  Sense 
are  allowed  to  have  more  reality  in  them,  that  is,  to  be  more 
strong,  orderly,  and  coherent  than  the  creatures  of  the  mind  ;  but 
this  is  no  argument  that  they  exist  without  the  mind.  They  are 
also  less  dependent  on  the  spirit,  or  thinking  substance  which 
perceives  them,  in  that  they  are  excited  by  the  will  of  another  and 
more  powerful  spirit;  yet  still  they  are  ideas,  and  certainly  no 
idea,  whether  faint  or  strong,  can  exist  otherwise  than  in  a. mind 
perceiving  it7°. 

68  So  Schiller,  in  Don  Carlos,  Act  III,  where  he  represents  the  sceptics  as  failing  to  see 
the  God  who  veils  Himself  in  everlasting  laws.  Berkeley,  like  Hume,  Brown,  Comte, 
Mill,  &c,  eliminates  all  power  or  causality  from  the  material  world;  but,  unlike  them,  he 
recognises  power  or  causality,  properly  so  called,  in  conscious  mind — in  the  Ego — distin- 
guished from  the  ideas  of  which  it  is  immediately  cognisant  as  contemporaneous  and  suc- 
cessive. '  Physical  causation,'  or  constant  order  in  the  co-existence  and  succession  of  phe- 
nomena, accordingly,  is  not  causation  proper,  but  the  effect  of  it. 

*9  In  popular  language  '  idea'  is  applied  exclusively  to  the  representations  and  misrepre- 
sentations of  fancy  or  thought,  and  not,  as  with  Berkeley,  to  the  '  real  things'  present  in  the 
senses.     See  Leibnitz,  De  modo  distinguendi  Phenomena  Realia  ab  Imaginariis. 

70  In  the  thirty-one  preceding  sections,  two  relations  should  be  carefully  distinguished — 
that  of  conscious  mind  to  the  sense-ideas  of  which  it  is  conscious,  and  which  depend  upon 
conscious  mind  for  their  very  existence ;  and  that  of  mind  to  the  changes  of  such  ideas  or 
phenomena.  The  former  relation — that  of  percipient  and  percept — is  not  the  relation  of 
cause  and  effect  at  all,  but  is  sui  generis.  The  latter  and  correlative  relation,  also  involved 
in  our  consciousness,  is  alone  causal,  and  is  our  only  proper  example  of  causality — the 
orderly  relations  of  phenomena  to  one  another  being  only  results  of  causal  energy — of  in- 


212  OF    THE    PRINCIPLES 

34.  Before  we  proceed  any  farther  it  is  necessary  we  spend  some 
time  in  answering  objections71  which  may  probably  be  made 
against  the  principles  we  have  hitherto  laid  down.  In  doing  of 
which,  if  I  seem  too  prolix  to  those  of  quick  apprehensions,  I  de- 
sire I  may  be  excused,  since  all  men  do  not  equally  apprehend 
things  of  this  nature,  and  I  am  willing  to  be  understood  by  every  one. 

First,  then,  it  will  be  objected  that  by  the  foregoing  principles  all 
that  is  real  and  substantial  in  nature  is  banished  out  of  the  world, 
and  instead  thereof  a  chimerical  scheme  of  ideas  takes  place. 
[48]  All  things  that  exist  exist  only  in  the  mind,  that  is,  they 
are  purely  notional.  What  therefore  becomes  of  the  sun,  moon, 
and  stars  ?  What  must  we  think  of  houses,  rivers,  mountains, 
trees,  stones ;  nay,  even  of  our  own  bodies  ?  Are  all  these  but 
so  many  chimeras  and  illusions  on  the  fancy  ?  To  all  which,  and 
whatever  else  of  the  same  sort  maybe  objected,  I  answer,  that  by 
the  principles  premised  we  are  not  deprived  of  any  one  thing  in 
nature.  Whatever  we  see,  feel,  hear,  or  any  wise  conceive  or  un- 
derstand, remains  as  secure  as  ever,  and  is  as  real  as  ever.  There 
is  a  rerum  natura,  and  the  distinction  between  realities  and  chi- 
meras retains  its  full  force.  This  is  evident  from  sect.  29,  30,  and 
33,  where  we  have  shewn  what  is  meant  by  real  things,  in  opposi- 
tion to  chimeras  or  ideas  of  our  own  framing;  but  then  they  both 
equally  exist  in  the  mind,  and  in  that  sense72  are  alike  ideas. 

35.  I  do  not  argue  against  the  existence  of  any  one  thing  that 
we  can  apprehend  either  by  sense  or  reflection.  That  the  things 
I  see  with  my  eyes  and  touch  with  my  hands  do  exist,  really 
exist,  I  make  not  the  least  question.  The  only  thing  whose  ex- 
istence we  deny  is  that  which  philosophers  call  Matter  or  corporeal 

tending  volition — and  not  power  or  causality  itself.  Note  also  that  while  Berkeley  regards 
all  phenomena  as  dependent  on  an  intelligence  and  a  will,  he  regards  the  changes  in  sense- 
phenomena  as  emphatically  independent,  for  all  practical  purposes,  of  the  will  of  the  finite 
sense-percipient. 

t-  Sect.  34 — 84  contain  Berkeley's  answers  to  supposed  objections  to  the  foregoing  prin- 
ciples, concerning  the  true  meaning  of  the  terms  '  Matter'  and  '  Mind,'  'Substance'  and 
'Cause;'  and  to  his  distinction  between  the  presented  realities  of  the  material  or  sensible 
world,  and  the  chimeras  of  imagination. 

7*  To  be  an  '  idea'  is,  with  Berkeley,  to  be  the  object  of  a  conscious  intelligence.  But 
he  does  not  define  precisely  the  relation  of  ideas  to  minds  conscious  of  them.  '  Existence 
in  the  mind'  is  existence  in  this  relation.  His  problem  (which  he  determines  in  die  nega- 
tive) is,  the  possibility  of  the  existence  of  sense-ideas — objects  of  sense-experience — out  of 
this  relation. 


OF   HUMAN   KNOWLEDGE. 


213 


substance.  And  in  doing  of  this  there  is  no  damage  done  to  the 
rest  of  mankind,  who,  I  dare  say,  will  never  miss  it.  The  Atheist 
indeed  will  want  the  colour  of  an  empty  name  to  support  his 
impiety;  and  the  Philosophers  may  possibly  find  they  have  lost 
a  great  handle  for  trifling  and  disputation.  ["But  that  is  all  the 
harm  that  I  can  see  done.] 

36.  If  any  man  thinks  this  detracts  from  the  existence  or  reality 
of  things,  [49]  he  is  very  far  from  understanding  what  hath  been 
premised  in  the  plainest  terms  I  could  think  of.  Take  here  an 
abstract  of  what  has  been  said : — There  are  spiritual  substances, 
minds,  or  human  souls,  which  will  or  excite74  ideas  in  themselves 
at  pleasure;  but  these74  are  faint,  weak,  and  unsteady  in  respect 
of  others  they  perceive  by  sense — which,  being  impressed  upon 
them  according  to  certain  rules  or  laws  of  nature,  speak  them- 
selves the  effects  of  a  mind  more  powerful  and  wise  than  human 
spirits75.  These  latter  are  said  to  have  more  reality  in  them  than 
the  former ; — by  which  is  meant  that  they  are  more  affecting, 
orderly,  and  distinct,  and  that  they  are  not  fictions  of  the  mind 
perceiving  them76.  And  in  this  sense  the  sun  that  I  see  by  day 
is  the  real  sun,  and  that  which  I  imagine  by  night  is  the  idea  of 
the  former.  In  the  sense  here  given  of  reality,  it  is  evident  that 
every  vegetable,  star,  mineral,  and  in  general  each  part  of  the 
mundane  system,  is  as  much  a  real  being  by  our  principles  as  by 
any  other.  Whether  others  mean  anything  by  the  term  reality 
different  from  what  I  do,  I  entreat  them  to  look  into  their  own 
thoughts  and  see77. 

37.  It  will  be  urged  that  thus  much  at  least  is  true,  to  wit,  that 
we  take  away  all  corporeal  substances.  To  this  my  answer  is, 
that  if  the  word  substance  be  taken  in  the  vulgar  sense — for  a 
combination  of  sensible  qualities,  such  as  extension,  solidity, 
weight,  and  the  like — this  we  cannot  be  accused  of  taking  away ?8 : 

73  Omitted  in  second  edition. 

74  i.e.  of  imagination.     Cf.  sect.  28 — 30. 

75  Cf.  sect.  29. 

7s  Cf.  sect.  33.  '  Not  fictions,'  i.  e.  they  are  presentative,  and  therefore  cannot  be  mis- 
representative  in  their  character. 

77  The  metaphysic  of  Berkeley  is  an  endeavour  to  convert  the  word  '  real '  from  being 
the  symbol  of  an  unintelligible  abstraction  into  that  of  the  conscious  experience  of  a 
mind. 

78  With   Berkeley  substances  are   either  (a)   conscious   minds,  which   are   substances 


214  0F    THE    PRINCIPLES 

but  if  it  be  taken  in  a  philosophic  sense — for  the  support  of  ac- 
cidents or  qualities  without  the  mind78 — then  indeed  I  acknowl- 
edge that  we  take  it  away,  if  one  may  be  said  to  take  away  that 
which  never  had  any  existence,  not  even  in  the  imagination.  [5°] 

38.  But  after  all,  say  you,  it  sounds  very  harsh  to  say  we  eat 
and  drink  ideas,  and  are  clothed  with  ideas.  I  acknowledge  it 
does  so — the  word  idea  not  being  used  in  common  discourse  to 
signify  the  several  combinations  of  sensible  qualities  which  are 
called  things ;  [5I]  and  it  is  certain  that  any  expression  which 
varies  from  the  familiar  use  of  language  will  seem  harsh  and 
ridiculous.  But  this  doth  not  concern  the  truth  of  the  proposition, 
which  in  other  words  is  no  more  than  to  say,  we  are  fed  and 
clothed  with  those  things  which  we  perceive  immediately  by  our 
senses  ?9.  The  hardness  or  softness,  the  colour,  taste,  warmth, 
figure,  or  suchlike  qualities,  which  combined  together80  constitute 
the  several  sorts  of  victuals  and  apparel,  have  been  shewn  to  exist 
only  in  the  mind  that  perceives  them  ;  and  this  is  all  that  is  meant 
by  calling  them  ideas ;  which  word  if  it  was  as  ordinarily  used 
as  thing,  would  sound  no  harsher  nor  more  ridiculous  than  it. 
I  am  not  for  disputing  about  the  propriety,  but  the  truth  of  the 
expression.  If  therefore  you  agree  with  me  that  we  eat  and  drink 
and  are  clad  with  the  immediate  objects  of  sense,  which  cannot 
exist  unperceived  or  without  the  mind,  I  shall  readily  grant  it  is 
more  proper  or  conformable  to  custom  that  they  should  be  called 
things  rather  than  ideas. 

39.  If  it  be  demanded  why  I  make  use  of  the  word  idea,  and 
do  not  rather  in  compliance  with  custom  call  them  things;  I 
answer,  I  do  it  for  two  reasons : — first,  because  the  term  thing, 
in  contradistinction  to  idea,  is  generally  supposed  to  denote 
somewhat  existing  without  the  mind  ;  secondly,  because  thing 
hath  a  more  comprehensive  signification  than  idea,  including 
spirit  or  thinking  things  as  well  as  ideas.  Since  therefore  the 
objects  of  sense  exist  only  in  the  mind,  and  are  withal  thought- 
proper,  or  (b)  the  divinely  conceived  and  constituted  groups  of  sense-phenomena  called 
'  sensible  things,'  which  are  substances  conventionally. 

79  And  which,  because  perceived,  are  ideas — an  idea  being  with  Berkeley  a  perceived 
or  imagined  object. 

80  'combined  together,'  i.  e.  as  '  sensible  things,"  according  to  the  natural  laws  of  the 
contemporaneity  and  succession  of  ideas  or  phenomena.     Cf.  sect.  33. 


OF   HUMAN   KNOWLEDGE.  215 

less  and  inactive,  I  chose  to  mark  them  by  the  word  idea,  which 
implies  those  properties81. 

40.  But,  say  what  we  can,  some  one  perhaps  may  be  apt  to 
reply,  he  will  still  believe  his  senses,  and  never  suffer  any  argu- 
ments, how  plausible  soever,  to  prevail  over  the  certainty  of 
them.  [52]  Be  it  so ;  assert  the  evidence  of  sense  as  high  as  you 
please,  we  are  willing  to  do  the  same.  That  what  I  see,  hear, 
and  feel  doth  exist,  that  is  to  say,  is  perceived  by  me,  I  no  more 
doubt  than  I  do  of  my  own  being.  But  I  do  not  see  how  the 
testimony  of  sense  can  be  alleged  as  a  proof  for  the  existence  of 
anything  which  is  not  perceived  by  sense82.  We  are  not  for 
having  any  man  turn  sceptic  and  disbelieve  his  senses ;  on  the 
contrary,  we  give  them  all  the  stress  and  assurance  imaginable  ; 
nor  are  there  any  principles  more  opposite  to  Scepticism  than 
those  we  have  laid  down,  as  shall  be  hereafter  clearly  shewn83. 

41.  Secondly,  it  will  be  objected  that  there  is  a  great  difference 
betwixt  real  fire  for  instance,  and  the  idea  of  fire,  betwixt  dream- 
ing or  imagining  oneself  burnt,  and  actually  being  so :  if  you 
suspect  it  to  be  only  the  idea  of  fire  which  you  see,  do  but  put 
your  hand  into  it  and  you  will  be  convinced  with  a  witness.  [S3] 
This  and  the  like  may  be  urged  in  opposition  to  our  tenets.  To 
all  which  the  answer  is  evident  from  what  hath  been  already 
said84;  and  I  shall  only  add  in  this  place,  that  if  real  fire  be  very 

81  Berkeley's  philosophy  is  a  system  of  Intelligible  Realism  or  Dualism,  rather  than 
of  Idealism  in  the  popular  meaning  of  idea — for,  he  uses  the  word  idea  merely  to  mark 
the  fact,  that  he  recognises  the  existence  of  objective  things  only  so  far  as  they  are  per- 
ceived and  passive  objects  of  a  conscious  mind ;  and  he  does  not,  as  the  term  Idealism 
suggests,  regard  '  sensible  things '  as  created  or  constructed  by  the  voluntary  activity  of 
the  individual  mind  in  which  they  appear.  They  are  perceived,  but  neither  created  nor 
regulated,  by  the  finite  percipient,  and  are  thus  external  in  the  only  practical  meaning  of 
that  term. 

8»  The  existence  of  Matter,  out  of  the  relation  of  percept  and  percipient,  cannot,  with- 
out a  contradiction,  be  said  to  be  sensibly  perceived.  Therefore,  our  sense-perceptions,  at 
any  rate,  do  not  justify  us  in  affirming  more  about  their  immediate  objects  than  that  they 
are  ideas  or  objects  of  which  we  are  sentient.  Custom,  not  sense,  according  to  Berkeley, 
induces  our  imagination  and  expectation  of  such  and  such  future  sense-perceptions,  in- 
consequence of  such  and  such  present  and  actual  ones.     But  cf.  Siris,  sect.  347 — 349. 

83  Cf.  sect.  87 — 91,  against  the  scepticism  which  originates  in  the  alleged  fallacy  of  the 
senses. 

84  It  is  always  to  be  remembered  that  with  Berkeley  the  presented  ideas  or  objects  of 
sense  are  themselves  the  archetypes  or  real  things,  whilst  the  ideas  of  imagination  are 
images  of,  or  derived  from,  the  archetypes  of  sense. 


2i6  OF    THE    PRINCIPLES 

different  from  the  idea  of  fire,  so  also  is  the  real  pain  that  it 
occasions  very  different  from  the  idea  of  the  same  pain,  and  yet 
nobody  will  pretend  that  real  pain  either  is,  or  can  possibly  be, 
in  an  unperceiving  thing,  or  without  the  mind,  any  more  than  its 
idea85. 

42.  Thirdly,  it  will  be  objected  that  we  see  things  actually 
without  or  at  a  distance  from  us,  and  which  consequently  do  not 
exist  in  the  mind  ;  it  being  absurd  that  those  things  which  are 
seen  at  the  distance  of  several  miles  should  be  as  near  to  us  as 
our  own  thoughts86.  In  answer  to  this,  I  desire  it  may  be  con- 
sidered that  in  a  dream  we  do  oft  perceive  things  as  existing  at 
a  great  distance  off,  and  yet  for  all  that,  those  things  are  ac- 
knowledged to  have  their  existence  only  in  the  mind.  [54] 

43.  But,  for  the  fuller  clearing  of  this  point,  it  may  be  worth 
while  to  consider  how  it  is  that  we  perceive  distance  and  things 
placed  at  a  distance  by  sight.  For,  that  we  should  in  truth  see 
external  space,  and  bodies  actually  existing  in  it,  some  nearer, 
others  farther  off,  seems  to  carry  with  it  some  opposition  to  what 
hath  been  said  of  their  existing  nowhere  without  the  mind.  The 
consideration  of  this  difficulty  it  was  that  gave  birth  to  my  Essay 
towards  a  New  Theory  of  Vision,  which  was  published  not  long 
since  87[55] — wherein  it  is  shewn  that  distance  or  outness  is 
neither  immediately  of  itself  perceived  by  sight88,  nor  yet  appre- 
hended or  judged  of  by  lines  and  angles,  or  anything  that  hath 
a  necessary  connexion  with  it8* ;  but  that  it  is  only  suggested  to 
our  thoughts  by  certain  visible  ideas  and  sensations  attending 
vision,  which  in  their  own  nature  have  no  manner  of  similitude 
or  relation  either  with  distance  or  things  placed  at  a  distance  9°; 

8s  Here  feelings  are  spoken  of  as  in  the  same  relation  to  a  consciousness  of  them  as 
sensible  things  are,  i.  e.  both  are  alike  dependent  on,  but  not  of  the  essence  or  substance 
of,  the  percipient — the  conscious  person. 

86  That  our  percepts  should  be  seen  '  at  a  distance  of  several  miles'  is  not  inconsistent 
with  their  being  dependent  on  a  percipient,  if  the  distance — the  ambient  or  external  space 
— is  itself  only  an  object-perceived,  and  therefore  dependent  on  a  percipient.  Cf.  sect. 
67. 

87  See  the  Editor's  preface  to  the  Essay. 

88  Essay,  sect.  2. 

*>  Ibid.  sect.  11—15. 
v  Ibid.  sect.  16—28. 


OF   HUMAN   KNOWLEDGE. 


2I7 


but,  by  a  connexion  taught  us  by  experience,  they  come  to  sig- 
nify and  suggest  them  to  us,  after  the  same  manner  that  words 
of  any  language  suggest  the  ideas  they  are  made  to  stand  for91 ; 
insomuch  that  a  man  born  blind  and  afterwards  made  to  see, 
would  not,  at  first  sight,  think  the  things  he  saw  to  be  without 
his  mind,  or  at  any  distance  from  him.  See  sect.  41  of  the  fore- 
mentioned  treatise. 

44.  The  ideas  of  sight  and  touch  make  two  species  entirely 
distinct  and  heterogeneous92.  The  former  are  marks  and  prog- 
nostics of  the  latter.  That  the  proper  objects  of  sight  neither 
exist  without  the  mind,  nor  are  the  images  of  external  things, 
was  shewn  even  in  that  treatise93.  Though  throughout  the 
same  the  contrary  be  supposed  true  of  tangible  objects — not 
that  to  suppose  that  vulgar  error  was  necessary  for  establishing 
the  notion  therein  laid  down,  but  because  it  was  beside  my  pur- 
pose to  examine  and  refute  it  in  a  discourse  concerning  Vision. 
So  that  in  strict  truth  the  ideas  of  sight94,  when  we  apprehend 
by  them  distance  and  things  placed  at  a  distance,  do  not  suggest 
or  mark  out  to  us  things  actually  existing  at  a  distance,  but  only 
admonish  us  what  ideas  of  touch95  will  be  imprinted  in  our 
minds  at  such  and  such  distances  of  time,  and  in  consequence 
of  such  or  such  actions.  It  is,  I  say,  evident  from  what  has  been 
said  in  the  foregoing  parts  of  this  Treatise,  and  in  sect.  147  and 
elsewhere  of  the  Essay  concerning  Vision,  that  visible  ideas  are 
the  Language  whereby  the  Governing  Spirit  on  whom  we  depend 
informs  us  what  tangible  ideas  he  is  about  to  imprint  upon  us, 
in  case  we  excite  this  or  that  motion  in  our  own  bodies.  But 
for  a  fuller  information  in  this  point  I  refer  to  the  Essay  itself. 

45.  Fourthly,  it  will  be  objected  that  from  the  foregoing  prin- 
ciples it  follows  things  are  every  moment  annihilated  and  created 

?x  Essay,  sect.  51. 

92  Ibid.  sect.  47 — 49,  121 — 141. 

9i  Md.  sect.  43. 

94  i.  e.  what  we  are  conscious  of  in  seeing. 

95  i.e.  ta:tual  sensations.  Touch  is  here  taken  in  its  wider  meaning,  and  includes  our 
muscular  and  locomotive  experience,  which  with  Berkeley  is  involved  in  the  conception 
of  distance.  Cf.  Mr.  Mill's  Examination  of  Sir  W.  Hamilton's  Philosophy,  chap.  13,  in 
third  edition. 


218  OF    THE    PRINCIPLES 

anew?6,  [s6]  The  objects  of  sense  exist  only  when  they  are  per- 
ceived ;  the  trees  therefore  are  in  the  garden,  or  the  chairs  in  the 
parlour,  no  lo.iger  than  while  there  is  somebody  by  to  perceive 
them.  Upon  shutting  my  eyes  all  the  furniture  in  the  room  is 
reduced  to  nothing,  and  barely  upon  opening  them  it  is  again 
created.  In  answer  to  all  which,  I  refer  the  reader  to  what  has 
been  said  in  sect.  3,  4,  &c,  and  desire  he  will  consider  whether 
he  means  anything  by  the  actual  existence97  of  an  idea[57]  dis- 
tinct from  its  being  perceived.  For  my  part,  after  the  nicest 
inquiry  I  could  make,  I  am  not  able  to  discover  that  anything 
else  is  meant  by  those  words ;  and  I  once  more  entreat  the  reader 
to  sound  his  own  thoughts,  and  not  suffer  himself  to  be  imposed 
on  by  words.  If  he  can  conceive  it  possible  either  for  his  ideas 
or  their  archetypes  to  exist  without  being  perceived,  then  I  give 
up  the  cause ;  but  if  he  cannot,  he  will  acknowledge  it  is  un- 
reasonable for  him  to  stand  up  in  defence  of  he  knows  not 
what,  and  pretend  to  charge  on  me  as  an  absurdity  the  not 
assenting  to  those  propositions  Which  at  bottom  have  no  mean- 
ing in  them. 

46.  It  will  not  be  amiss  to  observe  how  far  the  received  prin- 
ciples of  philosophy  are  themselves  chargeable  with  those  pre- 
tended absurdities.  It  is  thought  strangely  absurd  that  upon 
closing  my  eyelids  all  the  visible  objects  around  me  should  be 
reduced  to  nothing;  and  yet  is  not  this  what  philosophers  com- 
monly acknowledge,  when  they  agree  on  all  hands  that  light 
and  colours,  which  alone  are  the  proper  and  immediate  objects 
of  sight,  are  mere  sensations  that  exist  no  longer  than  they  are 

96  To  define  the  condition  of  sensible  things  during  the  intervals  of  our  perception  of 
them,  consistently  with  the  belief  of  all  sane  persons  regarding  the  material  world,  is  a 
challenge  which  has  been  often  addressed  to  the  advocates  of  an  Intelligible  Realism. 
According  to  Berkeley,  there  are  no  intervals  in  the  existence — either  actual,  i.  e.  as  per- 
ceived, or  potential,  i.e.  as  perceivable — of  sensible  things.  They  are  permanently  per- 
ceivable, under  the  laws  of  nature,  though  not  perpetually  perceived  by  this,  that,  or  the 
Other  finite  percipient.  In  other  words,  they  always  exist  actually  in  the  Divine  Concep- 
tion, and  potentially,  in  relation  to  finite  minds,  in  the  Divine  Will,  the  evolutions  of  ex- 
ternal nature  being  the  constant  expression  of  that  Will. — As  to  creation,  cf.  Sirk,  sect. 
325 — 328,  &c. 

97  Berkeley  allows  to  unperceived  bodies  a  potential  or  conditional,  though  not  an 
actual,  existi  nee  relatively  to  us.  When  we  say  a  body  exists  potentially,  we  mean  that 
if,  in  (he  light,  we  open  our  eyes,  anil  look  towards  it,  we  shall  see  it,  and  that  If  we  place 
our  hand  where  it  is  we  shall  feel  it. 


OF   HUMAN    KNOWLEDGE.  219 

perceived?  [58]  Again,  it  may  to  some  perhaps  seem  very  in- 
credible that  things  should  be  every  moment  creating,  yet  this 
very  notion  is  commonly  taught  in  the  schools.  [59]  For  the 
Schoolmen,  though  they  acknowledge  the  existence  of  Matter?8, 
and  that  the  whole  mundane  fabric  is  framed  out  of  it,  are 
nevertheless  of  opinion  that  it  cannot  subsist  without  the  divine 
conservation,  which  by  them  is  expounded  to  be  a  continual 
creation". 

47.  Farther,  a  little  thought  will  discover  to  us  that  though  we 
allow  the  existence  of  Matter  or  corporeal  substance,  yet  it  will 
unavoidably  follow,  from  the  principles  which  are  now  generally 
admitted,  that  the  particular  bodies,  of  what  kind  soever,  do  none 
of  them  exist  whilst  they  are  not  perceived.  [-50]  For,  it  is  evident 
from  sect.  1 1  and  the  following  sections,  that  the  Matter  philos- 
ophers contend  for  is  an  incomprehensible  somewhat,  which  hath 
none  of  those  particular  qualities  whereby  the  bodies  falling  under 
our  senses  are  distinguished  one  from  another.  But,  to  make  this 
more  plain,  it  must  be  remarked  that  the  infinite  divisibility  of 
Matter  is  now  universally  allowed,  at  least  by  the  most  approved 
and  considerable  philosophers,  who  on  the  received  principles 
demonstrate  it  beyond  all  exception.  Hence,  it  follows  there  is 
an  infinite  number  of  parts  in  each  particle  of  Matter  [6l]  which 
are  not  perceived  by  sense100.  The  reason  therefore  that  any  par- 
ticular body  seems  to  be  of  a  finite  magnitude,  or  exhibits  only 

9s  '  Matter,'  i.  e.  material  substance  or  Matter  existing  per  se. 

99  '  Those  who  have  contended  for  a  material  world  have  yet  acknowledged  that  natura 
naturans  (to  use  the  language  of  the  Schoolmen)  is  God,  and  that  the  Divine  conserva- 
tion of  things  is  equipollent  to  and  in  fact  the  same  thing  with  a  continued  repeated  crea- 
tion ;  in  a  word,  that  conservation  and  creation  differ  only  as  the  terminus  a  quo.  These 
are  the  common  opinions  of  Schoolmen ;  and  Durandus,  who  held  the  world  to  be  a  ma- 
chine, like  a  clock  made  up  and  put  in  motion  by  God,  but  afterwards  continued  to  go  of 
itself,  was  therein  particular,  and  had  few  followers.  The  very  poets  teach  a  doctrine  not 
unlike  the  Schools— mens  agitat  molem  (Virgil,  .Eneid,  VI).  The  Stoics  and  Platonists  are 
everywhere  full  of  the  same  notion.  I  am  not  therefore  singular  in  this  point  itself,  so 
much  as  in  my  way  of  proving  it.*  (Berkeley's  Letter  to  Dr.  Samuel  Johnson  of  New 
York.)  Cf.  Alciphron,  Dial.  IV.  sect.  14;  Vindication  of  New  Theory  of  Vision,  sect.  8, 
17,  &c. ;  Siris,  passim,  but  especially  in  the  latter  part.  See  also  Correspondence  between 
Clarke  and  Leibnitz.  Jonathan  Edwards,  in  his  book  on  Original  Sin,  and  elsewhere, 
maintains  the  continual  creation  of  all  existing  persons  as  well  as  things,  and  employs  it  in 
defence  of  his  theology.  In  several  of  his  writings  Edwards  approaches  the  peculiar  doc- 
trines of  Berkeley  regarding  the  material  world.  It  is  worthy  of  note  that  when  Berke- 
ley was  in  Rhode  Island,  Edwards  was  settled  in  Massachusetts. 

100  Cf.  sect.  123 — 132. 


220  OF    THE    PRINCIPLES 

a  finite  number  of  parts  to  sense,  is,  not  because  it  contains  no 
more,  since  in  itself  it  contains  an  infinite  number  of  parts,  but 
because  the  sense  is  not  acute  enough  to  discern  them.  [62]  In 
proportion  therefore  as  the  sense  is  rendered  more  acute,  it  per- 
ceives a  greater  number  of  parts  in  the  object,  that  is,  the  object 
appears  greater,  [63]  and  its  figure  varies,  those  parts  in  its  ex- 
tremities which  were  before  unperceivable  appearing  now  to 
bound  it  in  very  different  lines  and  angles  from  those  perceived 
by  an  obtuser  sense.  And  at  length,  after  various  changes  of 
size  and  shape,  when  the  sense  becomes  infinitely  acute  the  body 
shall  seem  infinite.  [64]  During  all  which  there  is  no  alteration  in 
the  body,  but  only  in  the  sense.  Each  body  therefore,  considered 
in  itself,  is  infinitely  extended,  [65]  and  consequently  void  of  all 
shape  and  figure.  From  which  it  follows  that,  though  we  should 
grant  the  existence  of  Matter  to  be  never  so  certain,  yet  it  is  withal 
as  certain,  the  materialists  themselves  are  by  their  own  principles 
forced  to  acknowledge,  that  neither  the  particular  bodies  per- 
ceived by  sense,  nor  anything  like  them,  exists  without  the  mind. 
Matter,  I  say,  and  each  particle  thereof,  is  according  to  them  in- 
finite and  shapeless,  and  it  is  the  mind  that  frames  all  that  variety 
of  bodies  which  compose  the  visible  world,  any  one  whereof  does 
not  exist  longer  than  it  is  perceived. 

48.  But,  after  all,  if  we  consider  it,  the  objection  proposed  in 
sect.  45  will  not  be  found  reasonably  charged  on  the  principles 
we  have  premised,  so  as  in  truth  to  make  any  objection  at  all 
against  our  notions.  For,  though  we  hold  indeed  the  objects  of 
sense  to  be  nothing  else  but  ideas  which  cannot  exist  unperceived; 
yet  we  may  not  hence  conclude  they  have  no  existence  except 
only  while  they  are  perceived  by  us,  since  there  may  be  some 
other  spirit  that  perceives  them  though  we  do  not.  Wherever 
bodies  are  said  to  have  no  existence  without  the  mind,  I  would 
not  be  understood  to  mean  this  or  that  particular  mind,  but  all 
minds  whatsoever1.  It  does  not  therefore  follow  from  the  fore- 
going principles  that  bodies  are  annihilated  and  created  every 
moment,  or  exist  not  at  all  during  the  intervals  between  our  per- 
ception of  them.  [^3 

«  Cf.  sect.  2,  3,  &c,  and  the  Second  and  Third  Dialogues  of  Hylas  and  Philonous. 


OF   HUMAN   KNOWLEDGE.  22 1 

49.  Fifthly,  it  may  perhaps  be  objected  that  if  extension  and 
figure  exist  only  in  the  mind,  it  follows  that  the  mind  is  extended 
and  figured ;  since  extension  is  a  mode  or  attribute  which  (to 
speak  with  the  schools)  is  predicated  of  the  subject  [6?]  in  which 
it  exists.  I  answer,  those  qualities  are  in  the  mind  only  as  they 
are  perceived  by  it — that  is,  not  by  way  of  mode  or  attribute,  but 
only  by  way  ofidea*;  [68]  and  it  no  more  follows  the  soul  or  mind 
is  extended,  because  extension  exists  in  it  alone,  than  it  does  that 
it  is  red  or  blue,  because  those  colours  are  on  all  hands  acknow- 
ledged to  exist  in  it,  and  nowhere  else3.  As  to  what  philosophers 
say  of  subject  and  mode,  that  seems  very  groundless  and  unin- 
telligible. For  instance,  in  this  proposition  f  a  die  is  hard,  ex- 
tended, and  square,'  they  will  have  it  that  the  word  die  denotes 
a  subject  or  substance,  distinct  from  the  hardness,  extension,  and 
figure  which  are  predicated  of  it,  and  in  which  they  exist.  This 
I  cannot  comprehend :  to  me  a  die  seems  to  be  nothing  distinct 
from  those  things  which  are  termed  its  modes  or  accidents.  And, 
to  say  a  die  is  hard,  extended,  and  square  is  not  to  attribute  those 

2  i.  e.  '  mode  or  attribute,'  as  philosophers  employ  these  terms,  when  they  (unintelligibly) 
distinguish  modes  or  attributes  from  absolute  material  subjects  or  substances.  With  Berke- 
ley, the  '  substance'  of  matter  (when  the  term  is  applied  at  all  to  sensible  things)  is  the  estab- 
lished group  of  phenomena  of  which  a  particular  thing  consists.  Now  extension,  and  the 
other  so-called  qualities  of  sensible  things,  are  not,  Berkeley  argues,  related  to  mind  either 
(a)  according  to  the  unmeaning  relation  of  subject  and  attribute,  of  which  philosophers 
speak,  nor  (b)  as  one  sense-idea  or  phenomenon  is  related  to  another  sense-idea  or  phenom- 
enon, in  the  group  of  sense-phenomena  which  constitutes,  with  him,  the  (perceivable)  sub- 
stance of  a  material  thing.  A  mind  and  its  sense-perceptions  are,  on  the  contrary,  related 
as  percipient  or  person  to  the  ideas  or  objects  perceived — whatever  '  otherness'  that  sui 
generis  relation  implies.  Berkeley  sees  in  this  relation  a  certain  sort  of  duality,  i.  e.  (1) 
mind  or  person,  and  (2)  its  ideas  ;  but  it  has  been  disputed  whether  this  distinction  of  per- 
sons and  their  ideas  is  with  him  a  properly  numerical,  or  a  merely  logical  distinction.  At 
any  rate,  he  rejects  the  unintelligible  hypothesis  that  sense-ideas  exist  as  entities  that  are 
independent  of  all  intelligence  of  them— Divine  or  finite  ;  and  he  also  refuses  to  regard 
them  as  mere  creations  or  constructions,  due  to  the  will  of  the  finite  thinker  who  is  con- 
scious of  them.  Sense-ideas  are  signs  of  that  Universal  Divine  Order,  which  God  enables 
us,  through  immediate  perception  and  custom  or  suggestion,  to  become  so  cognisant  of  in 
physical  science,  as  that  the  Order  is  in  a  measure  understood  by  us.  And  the  sense-ideas 
present  in  one  mind  are  numerically  different  from  the  sense-ideas  present  in  another — 
like  different  copies  of  the  same  book,  all  suggesting  a  like  (i.  e.  the  same)  meaning.  Cf. 
Collier's  theory  of  the  '  inexistence'  of  Matter  in  human  minds,  and  the  existence  of  all 
minds  in  the  Adyo«.     Parr's  Metaphysical  Tracts,  pp.  116,  &c. 

3  Moreover,  mind  can  conceivably  exist  without  perceiving  extended  or  sensible  objects, 
for  it  may  exist  conscious  of  objects  of  another  sort ;  but  extended  objects  cannot  exist 
without  being  perceived.     Hence  mind  is  distinct  from  any  of  its  ideas. 


222  OF    THE    PRINCIPLES 

qualities  to  a  subject  distinct  from  and  supporting  them,  but  only 
an  explication  of  the  meaning  of  the  word  die.  \^~\ 

50.  Sixthly,  you  will  say  there  have  been  a  great  many  things 
explained  by  matter  and  motion ;  take  away  these  and  you  destroy 
the  whole  corpuscular  philosophy,  and  undermine  those  mechan- 
ical principles  which  have  been  applied  with  so  much  success  to 
account  for  the  phenomena.  In  short,  whatever  advances  have 
been  made,  either  by  ancient  or  modern  philosophers,  in  the 
study  of  nature  do  all  proceed  on  the  supposition  that  corporeal 
substance  or  Matter  doth  really  exist.  To  this  I  answer  that 
there  is  not  any  one  phenomenon  explained  on  that  supposition 
which  may  not  as  well  be  explained  without  it,  as  might  easily 
be  made  appear  by  an  induction  of  particulars.  [7°]  To  explain 
the  phenomena,  is  all  one  as  to  shew  why,  upon  such  and  such 
occasions,  we  are  affected  with  such  and  such  ideas.  But  how 
Matter  should  operate  on  a  Spirit,  or  produce  any  idea  in  it4,  is 
what  no  philosopher  will  pretend  to  explain ;  it  is  therefore  evident 
there  can  be  no  use  of  Matter  in  natural  philosophy.  Besides, 
they  who  attempt  to  account  for  things  do  it  not  by  corporeal 
substance,  but  by  figure,  motion,  and  other  qualities,  which  are 
in  truth  no  more  than  mere  ideas,  and  therefore  cannot  be  the 
cause  of  anything,  as  hath  been  already  shewn.     See  sect.  25. 

51.  Seventhly  1  it  will  upon  this  be  demanded  whether  it  does 
not  seem  absurd  to  take  away  natural  causes,  and  ascribe  every- 
thing to  the  immediate  operation  of  Spirits  ?  We  must  no  longer 
say  upon  these  principles  that  fire  heats,  or  water  cools,  but  that 
a  Spirit  heats,  and  so  forth.  Would  not  a  man  be  deservedly 
laughed  at,  who  should  talk  after  this  manner?  I  answer,  he 
would  so ;  in  such  things  we  ought  to  '  think  with  the  learned, 
and  speak  with  the  vulgar.'     They  who  to  demonstration  are 

*  Philosophers  have  treated  the  relation  of  Matter  to  Mind  in  perception  as  one  of  cause 
and  effect — the  result,  according  to  Berkeley,  of  illegitimate  analysis  or  abstraction,  which 
creates  a  fictitious  duality  of  substance.  By  his  new  principles,  philosophy  is  based  on  a 
recognition  of  the  fact  that  perception  is  neither  the  cause  nor  the  effect  of  its  object,  but 
in  a  relation  to  it  that  is  sui  generis  and  ultimate.  Cf.  Prof.  Ferrier  on  '  perception'  and 
'  matter,'  in  his  Institutes  of  Metaphysics,  Prop.  IV.,  and  Remains,  Vol.  II.  pp.  261 — 288. 
407—409. 


OF   HUMAN    KNOWLEDGE. 


223 


convinced  of  the  truth  of  the  Copernican  system  do  neverthe- 
less say '  the  sun  rises,'  'the  sun  sets,'  or  '  comes  to  the  meridian  ;' 
and  if  they  affected  a  contrary  style  in  common  talk  it  would 
without  doubt  appear  very  ridiculous.  A  little  reflection  on 
what  is  here  said  will  make  it  manifest  that  the  common  use  of 
language  would  receive  no  manner  of  alteration  or  disturbance 
from  the  admission  of  our  tenets. 

52.  In  the  ordinary  affairs  of  life,  any  phrases  may  be  retained, 
so  long  as  they  excite  in  us  proper  sentiments,  or  dispositions  to 
act  in  such  a  manner  as  is  necessary  for  our  well-being,  how  false 
soever  they  may  be  if  taken  in  a  strict  and  speculative  sense. 
Nay,  this  is  unavoidable,  since,  propriety  being  regulated  by 
custom,  language  is  suited  to  the  received  opinions,  which  are  not 
always  the  truest.  Hence  it  is  impossible — even  in  the  most 
rigid,  philosophic  reasonings — so  far  to  alter  the  bent  and  genius 
of  the  tongue  we  speak,  as  never  to  give  a  handle  for  cavillers  to 
pretend  difficulties  and  inconsistencies.  But,  a  fair  and  ingenuous 
reader  will  collect  the  sense  from  the  scope  and  tenor  and  con- 
nexion of  a  discourse,  making  allowances  for  those  inaccurate 
modes  of  speech  which  use  has  made  inevitable. 

53.  As  to  the  opinion  that  there  are  no  Corporeal  Causes,  this 
has  been  heretofore  maintained  by  some  of  the  Schoolmen,  as  it  is 
of  late  by  others  among  the  modern  philosophers,  who  though  they 
allow  Matter  to  exist,  yet  will  have  God  alone  to  be  the  immediate 
efficient  cause  of  all  things s.  These  men  [7I]  saw  that  amongst  j 
all  the  objects  of  sense  there  was  none  which  had  any  power  or 
activity  included  in  it;  and  that  by  consequence  this  was  likewise 
true  of  whatever  bodies  they  supposed  to  exist  without  the  mind, 
like  unto  the  immediate  objects  of  sense6.  But  then,  that  they 
should  suppose  an  innumerable  multitude  of  created  beings, 
which  they  acknowledge  are  not  capable  of  producing  any  one 
effect  in  nature,  and  which  therefore  are  made  to  no  manner  of 
purpose,  since  God  might  have  done  everything  as  well  without 

5  He  refers  to  Des  Cartes,  and  especially  Geulinx,  Malebranche,  &c,  who,  while  they 
argued  for  material  substance,  denied  the  causality  of  sensible  things.  With  them,  as  with 
Berkeley,  there  are  no  causes  in  the  material  or  phenomenal  world — only  effects,  which  are 
evolved  in  a  constant  order,  contemporaneous  and  successive,  and  thus  express  the  mean- 
ing of  the  Supreme  Power.     See  Malebranche,  Entretiens,  VI.,  VII. 

6  i.  e.  of  their  hypothetical  material  world,  existing  unperceived. 


224 


OF    THE    PRINCIPLES 


them — this  I  say,  though  we  should  allow  it  possible,  must  yet 
be  a  very  unaccountable  and  extravagant  supposition  7. 

54.  In  the  eighth  place,  the  universal  concurrent  assent  of 
mankind8  may  be  thought  by  some  an  invincible  argument  in 
behalf  of  Matter,  or  the  existence  of  external  things.  Must  we 
suppose  the  whole  world  to  be  mistaken  ?  And  if  so,  what  cause 
can  be  assigned  of  so  widespread  and  predominant  an  error? — I 
answer,  first,  that,  upon  a  narrow  inquiry,  it  will  not  perhaps  be 
found  so  many  as  is  imagined  do  really  believe  the  existence  of 
Matter  or  things  without  the  mind.  Strictly  speaking,  to  believe 
that  which  involves  a  contradiction,  or  has  no  meaning  in  it 9,  is 
impossible ;  and  whether  the  foregoing  expressions  are  not  of 
that  sort,  I  refer  it  to  the  impartial  examination  of  the  reader. 
In  one  sense,  indeed,  men  may  be  said  to  believe  that  Matter 
exists,  that  is,  they  act  as  if  the  immediate  cause  of  their  sensa- 
tions, which  affects  them  every  moment,  and  is  so  nearly  present 
to  them,  were  some  senseless  unthinking  being.  But,  that  they 
should  clearly  apprehend  any  meaning  marked  by  those  words, 
and  form  thereof  a  settled  speculative  opinion,  is  what  I  am  not 
able  to  conceive.  This  is  not  the  only  instance  wherein  men  im- 
pose upon  themselves,  by  imagining  they  believe  those  proposi- 
tions which  they  have  often  heard,  though  at  bottom  they  have 
no  meaning  in  them. 

55.  But  secondly,  though  we  should  grant  a  notion  to  be  never 
so  universally  and  stedfastly  adhered  to,  yet  this  is  but  a  weak 
argument  of  its  truth  to  whoever  considers  what  a  vast  number 
of  prejudices  and  false  opinions  are  everywhere  embraced  with 
the  utmost  tenaciousness,  by  the  unreflecting  (which  are  the  far 
greater)  part  of  mankind.  There  was  a  time  when  the  antipodes 
and  motion  of  the  earth  were  looked  upon  as  monstrous  absurd- 
ities even  by  men  of  learning :  and  if  it  be  considered  what  a 

7  On  the  principle,  '  Entia  non  sunt  multiplicanda  praeter  necessitatem.' 

8  Commonly  called  the  argument  from  Common  Sense,  and  illustrated  in  the  writings 
of  Reid  and  other  Scotch  psychologists.  That  the  unreflecting  part  of  mankind  should 
hold  an  unintelligible,  or  at  least  confused,  Realism  is  not  to  be  wondered  at,  when  we 
recollect  that  it  is  the  very  office  of  philosophy  to  interpret  the  sensible  reality,  which  they 
and  philosophers  acknowledge  in  common  to  be  '  external,'  in  some  meaning  of  the  term. 

9  Sect.  4,  9,  15,  17,  22,  24. 


OF   HUMAN  KNOWLEDGE.  225 

small  proportion  they  bear  to  the  rest  of  mankind,  we  shall  find 
that  at  this  day  those  notions  have  gained  but  a  very  inconsider- 
able footing  in  the  world. 

56.  But  it  is  demanded  that  we  assign  a  cause  of  this  prejudice, 
and  account  for  its  obtaining  in  the  world.  To  this  I  answer, 
that  men  knowing  they  perceived  several  ideas10,  whereof  they 
themselves  were  not  the  authors — as  not  being  excited  from 
within  nor  depending  on  the  operation  of  their  wills — this  made 
them  maintain  those  ideas10  or  objects  of  perception  had  an 
existence  independent  of  and  without  the  mind,  without  ever 
dreaming  that  a  contradiction  was  involved  in  those  words.  But, 
philosophers  having  plainly  seen  that  the  immediate  objects  of 
perception  do  not  exist  without  the  mind,  they  in  some  degree 
corrected  the  mistake  of  the  vulgar" ;  but  at  the  same  time  run 
into  another  which  seems  no  less  absurd,  to  wit,  that  there  are 
certain  objects  really  existing  without  the  mind,  or  having  a 
subsistence  distinct  from  being  perceived,  of  which  our  ideas  are 
only  images  or  resemblances,  imprinted  by  those  objects12  on 
the  mind.  And  this  notion  of  the  philosophers  owes  its  origin 
to  the  same  cause  with  the  former,  namely,  their  being  conscious 
that  they  were  not  the  authors  of  their  own  sensations,  which 
they  evidently  knew  were  imprinted  from  without,  and  which 
therefore  must  have  some  cause  distinct  from  the  minds  on 
which  they  are  imprinted. 

57.  But  why  they  should  suppose  the  ideas  of  sense  to  be 
excited  in  us  by  things  in  their  likeness,  and  not  rather  have 
recourse  to  Spirit  which  alone  can  act,  may  be  accounted  for, 
first,  because  they  were  not  aware  of  the  repugnancy  there  is, 
as  well  in  supposing  things  like  unto  our  ideas  existing  without, 
as  in  attributing  to  them  power  or  activity.     Secondly,  because 

10  i.  e.  j«7j*-ideas. — Though  his  own  sense-ideas  or  objects  are  independent  of  the  will 
of  the  finite  percipient,  it  does  not  follow  that  they  are  independent  of  his  perception.  Cf. 
sect.  29 — 33. 

"  By  recognising  that  what  we  are  immediately  percipient  of  must  be  ideal,  or  at  least 
that  it  is  only  known  by  us  in  sense  as  ideal — as  a  sense-percept. 

12  i.  e.  by  the  unperceived  or  absolute  objects  which,  on  this  hypothesis  of  a  representa- 
tive sense-perception,  were  assumed  to  exist  behind  the  properly  perceived  objects  or  ideas, 
and  to  be  (according  to  some)  the  cause  of  their  appearance  in  our  consciousness.  Cf. 
Third  Dialogue  between  Hylas  and  Philonous,  p.  359. 

IS 


226  OF    THE    PRINCIPLES 

the  Supreme  Spirit  which  excites  those  ideas  in  our  minds,  is 
not  marked  out  and  limited  to  our  view  by  any  particular  finite 
collection  of  sensible  ideas,  as  human  agents  are  by  their  size, 
complexion,  limbs,  and  motions.  And  thirdly,  because  His 
operations  are  regular  and  uniform.  Whenever  the  course  of 
nature  is  interrupted  by  a  miracle,  men  are  ready  to  own  the 
presence  of  a  superior  agent.  But,  when  we  see  things  go  on 
in  the  ordinary  course  they  do  not  excite  in  us  any  reflection ; 
their  order  and  concatenation,  though  it  be  an  argument  of  the 
greatest  wisdom,  power,  and  goodness  in  their  creator,  is  yet  so 
constant  and  familiar  to  us  that  we  do  not  think  them  the  im- 
mediate effects  of  a  Free  Spirit ;  especially  since  inconsistency 
and  mutability  in  acting,  though  it  be  an  imperfection,  is  looked 
on  as  a  mark  o{  freedom13. 

58.  Tenthly,  [?2]  it  will  be  objected  that  the  notions  we  advance 
are  inconsistent  with  several  sound  truths  in  philosophy  and 
mathematics.  For  example,  the  motion  of  the  earth  is  now 
universally  admitted  by  astronomers  as  a  truth  grounded  on  the 
clearest  and  most  convincing  reasons.  But,  on  the  foregoing 
principles,  there  can  be  no  such  thing.  For,  motion  being  only 
an  idea,  it  follows  that  if  it  be  not  perceived  it  exists  not :  but  the 
motion  of  the  earth  is  not  perceived  by  sense.  I  answer,  that 
tenet,  if  rightly  understood,  will  be  found  to  agree  with  the  prin- 
ciples we  have  premised  ;  for,  the  question  whether  the  earth 
moves  or  no  amounts  in  reality  to  no  more  than  this,  to  wit, 
whether  we  have  reason  to  conclude,  from  what  has  been  ob- 
served by  astronomers,  that  if  we  were  placed  in  such  and  such 
circumstances,  and  such  or  such  a  position  and  distance  both  from 
the  earth  and  sun,  we  should  perceive  the  former  to  move  among 
the  choir  of  the  planets,  and  appearing  in  all  respects  like  one  of 
them  ;  ["]  and  this,  by  the  established  rules  of  nature  which  we 
have  no  reason  to  mistrust,  is  reasonably  collected  from  the 
phenomena. 

59.  We  may,  from  the  experience  we  have  had  of  the  train 

«3  Hence  the  difficulty  men  have  in  recognising  that  the  Divine  Ideas  and  Will,  and  the 
Laws  of  Nature,  are  coincident.  But  in  fact  the  scientific  discovery  of  laws  in  nature, 
instead  of  narrowing,  extends  the  sphere  of  intelligible  Divine  agency. 


OF   HUMAN   KNOWLEDGE. 


227 


and  succession  of  ideas14  in  our  minds,  often  make,  I  will  not  say- 
uncertain  conjectures,  but  sure  and  well-grounded  predictions 
concerning  the  ideas14  we  shall  be  affected  with  pursuant  to  a 
great  train  of  actions,  and  be  enabled  to  pass  a  right  judgment 
of  what  would  have  appeared  to  us,  in  case  we  were  placed  in 
circumstances  very  different  from  those  we  are  in  at  present. 
Herein  consists  the  knowledge  of  nature,  which  may  preserve 
its  use  and  certainty  very  consistently  with  what  hath  been  said. 
It  will  be  easy  to  apply  this  to  whatever  objections  of  the  like 
sort  may  be  drawn  from  the  magnitude  of  the  stars,  or  any  other 
discoveries  in  astronomy  or  nature.  [74] 

60.  In  the  eleventh  place,  it  will  be  demanded  to  what  purpose 
serves  that  curious  organization  of  plants,  and  the  animal  me- 
chanism in  the  parts  of  animals;  might  not  vegetables  grow,  and 
shoot  forth  leaves  and  blossoms,  and  animals  perform  all  their 
motions  as  well  without  as  with  all  that  variety  of  internal  parts 
so  elegantly  contrived  and  put  together ;  which,  being  ideas,  have 
nothing  powerful  or  operative  in  them,  nor  have  any  necessary15 
connexion  with  the  effects  ascribed  to  them  ?  If  it  be  a  Spirit 
that  immediately  produces  every  effect  by  z.  fiat  ox  act  of  his  will, 
we  must  think  all  that  is  fine  and  artificial  in  the  works,  whether 
of  man  or  nature,  to  be  made  in  vain.  By  this  doctrine,  though 
an  artist  has  made  the  spring  and  wheels,  and  every  movement 
of  a  watch,  and  adjusted  them  in  such  a  manner  as  he  knew 
would  produce  the  motions  he  designed,  yet  he  must  think  all 
this  done  to  no  purpose,  and  that  it  is  an  Intelligence  which 
directs  the  index,  and  points  to  the  hour  of  the  day.  If  so,  why 
may  not  the  Intelligence  do  it,  without  his  being  at  the  pains 
of  making  the  movements  and  putting  them  together?  Why 
does  not  an  empty  case  serve  as  well  as  another  ?  And  how 
comes  it  to  pass  that  whenever  there  is  any  fault  in  the  going  of 
a  watch,  there  is  some  corresponding  disorder  to  be  found  in 

'4  '  ideas,"  i.  e.  sense-ideas  or  sensations.  This  '  experience'  consists  of  the  established 
association  of  sensations  or  percepts  in  the  order  of  external  nature,  not  mere  'association 
of  ideas' — in  the  popular  meaning  of  the  word  idea. 

xs  Cf.  sect.  25,  and  also  various  passages  in  Berkeley's  writings  in  which  he  insists  upon 
the  arbitrariness  of  the  so-called  causal  relations  among  sensible  things,  and  the  conse- 
quent sense-symbolism  of  Nature.  It  is  thus  that  he  speaks  of  a  language  of  Vision.  Cf. 
Theory  of  Vision  Vindicated,  passim. 


228  OF    THE   PRINCIPLES 

the  movements,  which  being  mended  by  a  skilful  hand  all  is  right 
again  ?  The  like  may  be  said  of  all  the  clockwork  of  nature, 
great  part  whereof  is  so  wonderfully  fine  and  subtle  as  scarce  to 
be  discerned  by  the  best  microscope.  In  short,  it  will  be  asked, 
how,  upon  our  principles,  any  tolerable  account  can  be  given,  or 
any  final  cause  assigned  of  an  innumerable  multitude  of  bodies 
and  machines,  framed  with  the  most  exquisite  art,  which  in  the 
common  philosophy  have  very  apposite  uses  assigned  them,  and 
serve  to  explain  abundance  of  phenomena  ? 

61.  To  all  which  I  answer,  first,  that  though  there  were  some 
difficulties  relating  to  the  administration  of  Providence,  and  the 
uses  by  it  assigned  to  the  several  parts  of  nature,  which  I  could 
not  solve  by  the  foregoing  principles,  yet  this  objection  could 
be  of  small  weight  against  the  truth  and  certainty  of  those  things 
which  may  be  proved  a  priori,  with  the  utmost  evidence  and 
rigour  of  demonstration16.  [7S]  Secondly,  but  neither  are  the  re- 
ceived principles  free  from  the  like  difficulties  ;  for,  it  may  still  be 
demanded  to  what  end  God  should  take  those  roundabout  methods 
of  effecting  things  by  instruments  and  machines,  which  no  one 
can  deny  might  have  been  effected  by  the  mere  command  of  His 
will  without  all  that  apparatus:  nay,  if  we  narrowly  consider  it, 
we  shall  find  the  objection  may  be  retorted  with  greater  force 
on  those  who  hold  the  existence  of  those  machines  without  the 
mind  ;  for  it  has  been  made  evident  [76]  that  solidity,  bulk,  figure, 
motion,  and  the  like  have  no  activity  or  efficacy  in  them,  so  as  to 
be  capable  of  producing  any  one  effect  in  nature.  See  sect.  25. 
Whoever  therefore  supposes  them17  to  exist  (allowing  the  sup- 
position possible)  when  they  are  not  perceived  does  it  mani- 
festly to  no  purpose;  since  the  only  use  that  is  assigned  to 
them17,  as  they  exist  unperceived,  is  that  they  produce  those 
perceivable  effects  which  in  truth  cannot  be  ascribed  to  anything 
but  Spirit. 

62.  But,  to  come  nigher  the  difficulty,  it  must  be  observed  that 
though  the  fabrication  of  all  those  parts  and  organs  be  not  ab- 

16  Cf.  sect.  3,  4,  22 — 24. 

»7  '  them,"  i.  e.  the  solid  and  extended  objects,  which  are  supposed  to  exist  unperceived 
and  unpercipient — as  distinguished  from  the  Intelligent  Cause  to  whom  Berkeley  attrib- 
utes the  orderly  appearance,  disappearance,  and  reappearance  of  ideas  or  objects  in  the 


OF   HUMAN   KNOWLEDGE.  229 

solutely  necessary  to  the  producing  any  effect,  yet  it  is  necessary 
to  the  producing  of  things  in  a  constant  regular  way  according  to 
the  laws  of  nature.  ["]  There  are  certain  general  laws  that  run 
through  the  whole  chain  of  natural  effects :  these  are  learned  by 
the  observation  and  study  of  nature,  and  are  by  men  applied  as 
well  to  the  framing  artificial  things  for  the  use  and  ornament  of 
life  as  to  the  explaining  the  various  phenomena — which  expli- 
cation consists  only  in  shewing  the  conformity  any  particular  phe- 
nomenon hath  to  the  general  laws  of  nature,  or,  which  is  the  same 
thing,  in  discovering  the  uniformity  there  is  in  the  production 
of  natural  effects  ;  as  will  be  evident  to  whoever  shall  attend  to 
the  several  instances  wherein  philosophers  pretend  to  account  for 
appearances.  That  there  is  a  great  and  conspicuous  use  in  these 
regular  constant  methods  of  working  observed  by  the  Supreme 
Agent  hath  been  shewn  in  sect.  31.  And  it  is  no  less  visible  that 
a  particular  size,  figure,  motion,  and  disposition  of  parts  are  neces- 
sary, though  not  absolutely  to  the  producing  any  effect,  yet  to  the 
producing  it  according  to  the  standing  mechanical  laws  of  nature. 
Thus,  for  instance,  it  cannot  be  denied  that  God,  or  the  Intel- 
ligence that  sustains  and  rules  the  ordinary  course  of  things,  might 
if  He  were  minded  to  produce  a  miracle,  cause  all  the  motions 
on  the  dial-plate  of  a  watch,  though  nobody  had  ever  made  the 
movements  and  put  them  in  it :  but  yet,  if  He  will  act  agreeably 
to  the  rules  of  mechanism,  by  Him  for  wise  ends  established  and 
maintained  in  the  creation,  it  is  necessary  that  those  actions  of 
the  watchmaker,  whereby  he  makes  the  movements  and  rightly 
adjusts  them,  precede  the  production  of  the  aforesaid  motions; 
as  also  that  any  disorder  in  them  be  attended  with  [?8]  the  per- 
ception of  some  corresponding  disorder  in  the  movements,  which 
being  once  corrected  all  is  right  again. 

63.  It  may  indeed  on  some  occasions  be  necessary  that  the 
Author  of  nature  display  His  overruling  power  in  producing 
some  appearance  out  of  the  ordinary  series  of  things18.  Such 
exceptions  from  the  general  rules  of  nature  are  proper  to  surprise 
and  awe  men  into  an  acknowledgment  of  the  Divine  Being;  but 

18  So  far  as  that  series  has  been  interpreted  by  us.  The  nature  and  moral  office  of 
miraculous  or  supernatural  events,  in  a  system  of  Universal  Providence,  is  here  touched 
upon. 


230  OF   THE  PRINCIPLES 

then  they  are  to  be  used  but  seldom,  otherwise  there  is  a  plain 
reason  why  they  should  fail  of  that  effect.  [7?]  Besides,  God  seems 
to  choose  the  convincing  our  reason  of  His  attributes  by  the 
works  of  nature,  which  discover  so  much  harmony  and  con- 
trivance in  their  make,  and  are  such  plain  indications  of  wisdom 
and  beneficence  in  their  Author,  rather  than  to  astonish  us  into 
a  belief  of  His  Being  by  anomalous  and  surprising  events. 

64.  To  set  this  matter  in  a  yet  clearer  light,  I  shall  observe 
that  what  has  been  objected  in  sect.  60  amounts  in  reality  to  no 
more  than  this : — ideas  are  not  anyhow  and  at  random  produced, 
there  being  a  certain  order  and  connexion  between  them,  like  to 
that  of  cause  and  effect :  there  are  also  several  combinations  of 
them  made  in  a  very  regular  and  artificial  manner,  which  seem 
like  so  many  instruments  in  the  hand  of  nature  that,  being  hid 
as  it  were  behind  the  scenes,  have  a  secret  operation  in  producing 
those  appearances  which  are  seen  on  the  theatre  of  the  world, 
being  themselves  discernible  only  to  the  curious  eye  of  the  phi- 
losopher. But,  since  one  idea  cannot  be  the  cause  of  another,  to 
what  purpose  is  that  connexion  ?  And,  since  those  instruments, 
being  barely  inefficacious  perceptions^  in  the  mind,  are  not  sub- 
servient to  the  production  of  natural  effects,  it  is  demanded  why 
they  are  made ;  or,  in  other  words,  what  reason  can  be  assigned 
why  God  should  make  us,  upon  a  close  inspection  into  His 
works,  behold  so  great  variety  of  ideas  so  artfully  laid  together, 
and  so  much  according  to  rule;  it  not  being  [2°  credible]  that  He 
would  be  at  the  expense  (if  one  may  so  speak)  of  all  that  art  and 
regularity  to  no  purpose.  [8o] 

65.  To  all  which  my  answer  is,  first,  that  the  connexion  of 
ideas  does  not  imply  the  relation  of  cause  and  effect,  but  only  of 
a  mark  or  sign  with  the  thing  signified.  The  fire  which  I  see  is 
not  the  cause  of  the  pain  I  suffer  upon  my  approaching  it,  but 
the  mark  that  forewarns  me  of  it.  In  like  manner  the  noise  that 
I  hear  is  not  the  effect  of  this  or  that  motion  or  collision  of  the 
ambient  bodies,  but  the  sign  thereof31.  Secondly,  the  reason  why 
ideas  are  formed  into  machines,  that  is,  artificial  and  regular  conir 

«9  Cf.  sect.  25. 

30  '  imaginable' — in  first  edition. 

21  According  to  Berkeley,  Minds,  Spirits,  Persons  are  the  only  proper  causes ;  and  it  is 
only  by  an  abuse  of  language  that  the  term  '  cause'  is  applied  to  the  Ideas  or  objects  which 


OF  HUMAN  KNOWLEDGE.  031 

binations,  is  the  same  with  that  for  combining  letters  into  words22. 
That  a  few  original  ideas  may  be  made  to  signify  a  great  number 
of  effects  and  actions,  it  is  necessary  they  be  variously  combined 
together.  And,  to  the  end  their  use  be  permanent  and  universal, 
these  combinations  must  be  made  by  ride,  and  with  wise  con- 
trivance. By  this  means  abundance  of  information  is  conveyed 
unto  us,  concerning  what  we  are  to  expect  from  such  and  such 
actions,  and  what  methods  are  proper  to  be  taken  for  the  exciting 
such  and  such  ideas — which  in  effect  is  all  that  I  conceive  to  be 
distinctly  meant  when  it  is  said23  that,  by  discerning  the  figure, 
texture,  and  mechanism  of  the  inward  parts  of  bodies,  whether 
natural  or  artificial,  we  may  attain  to  know  the  several  uses  and 
properties  depending  thereon,  or  the  nature  of  the  thing. 

66.  Hence,  it  is  evident  that  those  things  which,  under  the 
notion  of  a  cause  co-operating  or  concurring  to  the  production 
of  effects,  are  altogether  inexplicable,  and  run  us  into  great 
absurdities,  may  be  very  naturally  explained,  and  have  a  proper 
and  obvious  use  assigned  to  them,  when  they  are  considered  only 
as  marks  or  signs  for  our  information.  And  it  is  the  searching 
after  and  endeavouring  to  understand  this  Language  (if  I  may 
so  call  it)  of  the  Author  of  nature,  that  ought  to  be  the  employ- 
ment of  the  natural  philosopher;  and  not  the  pretending  to  ex- 
plain things  by  corporeal  causes,  which  doctrine  seems  to  have 
too  much  estranged  the  minds  of  men  from  that  active  principle, 
that  supreme  and  wise  Spirit  '  in  whom  we  live,  move,  and  have 
our  being.' 

67.  In  the  twelfth  place,  it  may  perhaps  be  objected  that — 
though  it  be  clear  from  what  has  been  said  that  there  can  be  no 

are  invariable  antecedents  of  other  ideas  or  objects — the  prior  form  of  their  objective  or 
phenomenal  existence.  He  contrasts  so-called  Physical  with  Spiritual  Causation — the 
latter  being  implied  in  our  conception  of  mind ;  the  former  consisting  in  the  observable 
relations  of  phenomena,  in  which  causation  proper  is  unperceived,  and  therefore  non- 
existent. Physical  Science  is  the  interpretation  of  natural  signs,  and  is  only  confused 
(Berkeley  would  say)  by  reference  to  an  unconscious  agency  which  is  inconceivable. 

22  Berkeley,  in  meeting  this  objection,  thus  reverts  to  his  favourite  theory  of  a  Universal 
Natural  Symbolism  as  the  true  character  of  the  sensible  world.  See  next  section,  which 
describes  the  orderly  co-existences  and  sequences  of  nature  as  not  causally  necessary,  but 
arbitrarily  constructed— -in  order  to  be  a  means  of  social  intercourse,  and  for  the  use  of 
man  in  his  contemplation  of  the  Supreme  Mind. 

n  See  Locke's  Essay,  B.  IV.  ch.  3,  §  25—28,  &c. 


232  OF    THE    PRINCIPLES 

such  thing  as  an  inert,  senseless,  extended,  solid,  figured,  move- 
able substance  existing  without  the  mind,  such  as  philosophers 
describe  Matter — yet,  if  any  man  shall  leave  out  of  his  idea  of 
matter  the  positive  ideas  of  extension,  figure,  solidity  and  motion, 
and  say  that  he  means  only  by  that  word  an  inert,  senseless 
substance,  that  exists  without  the  mind  or  unperceived,  which  is 
the  occasion  of  our  ideas,  or  at  the  presence  whereof  God  is 
pleased  to  excite  ideas  in  us —  [8l]  it  doth  not  appear  but  that 
Matter  taken  in  this  sense  may  possibly  exist.  In  answer  to 
which  I  say,  first,  that  it  seems  no  less  absurd  to  suppose  a  sub- 
stance without  accidents,  than  it  is  to  suppose  accidents  without 
a  substance24.  But  secondly,  though  we  should  grant  this  un- 
known substance  may  possibly  exist,  yet  where  can  it  be  supposed 
to  be?  That  it  exists  not  in  the  mind25  is  agreed;  and  that  it 
exists  not  in  place  is  no  less  certain — since  all  place  or  extension 
exists  only  in  the  mind26,  as  hath  been  already  proved.  It  re- 
mains therefore  that  it  exists  nowhere  at  all. 

68.  Let  us  examine  a  little  the  description  that  is  here  given 
us  of  matter.  It  neither  acts,  nor  perceives,  nor  is  perceived; 
for  this  is  all  that  is  meant  by  saying  it  is  an  inert,  senseless, 
unknown  substance;  which  is  a  definition  entirely  made  up  of 
negatives,  excepting  only  the  relative  notion  of  its  standing  under 
or  supporting.  But  then  it  must  be  observed  that  it  supports 
nothing  at  all,  and  how  nearly  this  comes  to  the  description  of 
a  nonentity  I  desire  may  be  considered.  But,  say  you,  it  is  the 
unknown  occasion^,  at  the  presence  of  which  ideas  are  excited  in 
us  by  the  will  of  God.  Now,  I  would  fain  know  how  anything 
can  be  present  to  us,  which  is  neither  perceivable  by  sense  nor 
reflection,  nor  capable  of  producing  any  idea  in  our  minds,  nor 
is  at  all  extended,  nor  hath  any  form,  nor  exists  in  any  place. 

24  With  Berkeley,  material  substance  is  merely  the  complement  of  simple  ideas  or 
phenomena  which  arbitrarily  constitute  a  particular  thing.  (Cf.  sect.  37.)  The  Divine 
Will  is,  with  him,  the  cause  of  phenomena  being  thus  constituted,  combined,  or  substan- 
tiated. His  substance-proper,  i.e.  mind,  is  necessary,  because  an  object-perceived  neces- 
sarily implies  a  percipient. 

25  i.  e.  that  it  is  not  perceived. 

36  i.e.  '  place '  exists  only  as  perceived  or  conceived  by  an  intelligence — sense-percep- 
tion being  its  real,  and  conception  its  imagined  existence.  Mind  is  thus,  with  Berkeley, 
the  place  of  locality  and  of  space.     Cf.  Siris,  sect.  285,  &c. 

*7  He  refers  to  the  Cartesian  theory  of  occasional  causes. 


OF  HUMAN  KNOWLEDGE.  233 

The  words  '  to  be  present,'  when  thus  applied,  must  needs  be  taken 
in  some  abstract  and  strange  meaning,  and  which  I  am  not  able 
to  comprehend. 

69.  Again,  let  us  examine  what  is  meant  by  occasion.  So  far 
as  I  can  gather  from  the  common  use  of  language,  that  word 
signifies  either  the  agent  which  produces  any  effect,  or  else  some- 
thing that  is  observed  to  accompany  or  go  before  it  in  the  ordi- 
nary course  of  things.  [82]  But,  when  it  is  applied  to  Matter  as 
above  described,  it  can  be  taken  in  neither  of  those  senses ;  for 
Matter  is  said  to  be  passive  and  inert,  and  so  cannot  be  an  agent 
or  efficient  cause.  It  is  also  unperceivable,  as  being  devoid  of 
all  sensible  qualities,  and  so  cannot  be  the  occasion  of  our  per- 
ceptions in  the  latter  sense — as  when  the  burning  my  finger  is 
said  to  be  the  occasion  of  the  pain  that  attends  it.  What  there- 
fore can  be  meant  by  calling  matter  an  occasion  ?  This  term  is 
either  used  in  no  sense  at  all,  or  else  in  some  very  distant  from 
its  received  signification. 

70.  You  will  perhaps  say  that  Matter,  though  it  be  not  per- 
ceived by  us,  is  nevertheless  perceived  by  God,  to  whom  it  is  the 
occasion  of  exciting  ideas  in  our  minds28.  For,  say  you,  since 
we  observe  our  sensations  to  be  imprinted  in  an  orderly  and  con- 
stant manner,  it  is  but  reasonable  to  suppose  there  are  certain 
constant  and  regular  occasions  of  their  being  produced.  That 
is  to  say,  that  there  are  certain  permanent  and  distinct  parcels  of 
Matter,  corresponding  to  our  ideas,  which,  though  they  do  not 
excite  them  in  our  minds,  or  anywise  immediately  affect  us,  as 
being  altogether  passive  and  unperceivable  to  us,  they  are  never- 
theless to  God,  by  whom  they  are  perceived29,  as  it  were  so  many 
occasions  to  remind  Him  when  and  what  ideas  to  imprint  on 
our  minds — that  so  things  may  go  on  in  a  constant  uniform 
manner. 

71.  In  answer  to  this,  I  observe  that,  as  the  notion  of  Matter 
is  here  stated,  the  question  is  no  longer  concerning  the  existence 

28  So  Geulinx  and  Malebranche. 

^  As  known  by  the  Divine  intelligence,  they  are  accordingly  ideas.  And,  if  this  means 
merely  that  the  sensible  system  is  the  expression  of  Divine  Ideas,  which  are  its  ultimate 
archetype — that  the  Ideas  of  God  are  symbolised  in  our  senses,  to  be  interpreted  or  mis- 
interpreted by  human  minds,  as  reason  in  man  is  applied  or  misapplied — this  theory  allies 
itself  with  the  Platonic.     It  is  partly  worked  out  in  Siris, 


234  OF   THE  PRINCIPLES 

of  a  thing  distinct  from  Spirit  and  idea,  from  perceiving  and  being 
perceived  ;  but  whether  there  are  not  certain  ideas  of  I  know  not 
what  sort,  in  the  mind  of  God,  [83]  which  are  so  many  marks  or 
notes  that  direct  Him  how  to  produce  sensations  in  our  minds  in 
a  constant  and  regular  method — much  after  the  same  manner 
as  a  musician  is  directed  by  the  notes  of  music  to  produce  that 
harmonious  train  and  composition  of  sound  which  is  called  a 
tune,  though  they  who  hear  the  music  do  not  perceive  the  notes, 
and  may  be  entirely  ignorant  of  them.  But,  this  notion  of  Matter 
(which  after  all  is  the  only  intelligible  one  that  I  can  pick  from 
what  is  said  of  unknown  occasions)  seems  too  extravagant  to 
deserve  a  confutation.  Besides,  it  is  in  effect  no  objection  against 
what  we  have  advanced,  viz.  that  there  is  no  senseless  unper- 
ceived  substance. 

72.  If  we  follow  the  light  of  reason,  we  shall,  from  the  constant 
uniform  method  of  our  sensations,  collect  the  goodness  and  wis- 
dom of  the  Spirit  who  excites  them  in  our  minds ;  but  this  is  all 
that  I  can  see  reasonably  concluded  from  thence.  To  me,  I  say, 
it  is  evident  that  the  being  of  a  Spirit  infinitely  wise,  good,  and 
powerful  is  abundantly  sufficient  to  explain  all  the  appearances 
of  nature30.  But,  as  for  inert,  sense/ess  Matter,  nothing  that  I  per- 
ceive has  any  the  least  connexion  with  it,  or  leads  to  the  thoughts 
of  it.  And  I  would  fain  see  any  one  explain  any  the  meanest 
phenomenon  in  nature  by  it,  or  shew  any  manner  of  reason, 
though  in  the  lowest  rank  of  probability,  that  he  can  have  for 
its  existence,  or  even  make  any  tolerable  sense  or  meaning  of 
that  supposition.  For,  as  to  its  being  an  occasion,  we  have,  I 
think,  evidently  shewn  that  with  regard  to  us  it  is  no  occasion. 
It  remains  therefore  that  it  must  be,  if  at  all,  the  occasion  to 
God  of  exciting  ideas  in  us ;  and  what  this  amounts  to  we  have 
just  now  seen. 

73.  It  is  worth  while  to  reflect  a  little  on  the  motives  which 
induced  men  to  suppose  the  existence  of  material  substance ;  that 
so  having  observed  the  gradual  ceasing  and  expiration  of  those 
motives  or  reasons,  we  may  proportionably  withdraw  the  assent 

30  '  It  seems  to  me,'  says  Hume,  '  that  this  theory  of  the  universal  energy  and  operation 
of  the  Supreme  Being  is  too  bold  ever  to  carry  conviction  with  it  to  a  mind  sufficiently 
apprised  of  the  weakness  of  human  reason,  and  the  narrow  limits  to  which  it  is  confined 
in  all  its  operations.'     Inquiry  concerning  Human  Understanding,  sect.  VII.  p.  i. 


OF  H UMA  N  KN O  IV L EDGE.  235 

that  was  grounded  on  them.  First,  therefore,  it  was  thought  that 
colour,  figure,  motion,  and  the  rest  of  the  sensible  qualities  or 
accidents,  did  really  exist  without  the  mind ;  and  for  this  reason 
it  seemed  needful  to  suppose  some  unthinking  substratum  or  sub- 
stance wherein  they  did  exist — since  they  could  not  be  conceived 
to  exist  by  themselves31.  Afterwards,  in  process  of  time,  men 
being  convinced  that  colours,  sounds,  and  the  rest  of  the  sensible, 
secondary  qualities  had  no  existence  without  the  mind,  they 
stripped  this  substratum  or  material  substance  of  those  qualities32, 
leaving  only  the  primary  ones,  figure,  motion,  and  suchlike,  which 
they  still  conceived  to  exist  without  the  mind,  and  consequently 
to  stand  in  need  of  a  material  support.  But,  it  having  been  shewn 
that  none  even  of  these  can  possibly  exist  otherwise  than  in  a 
Spirit  or  Mind  which  perceives  them,  it  follows  [84]  that  we  have 
no  longer  any  reason  to  suppose  the  being  of  Matter33 ;  nay,  that 
it  is  utterly  impossible  there  should  be  any  such  thing,  so  long 
as  that  word  is  taken  to  denote  an  unthinking  substratum  of  quali- 
ties or  accidents  wherein  they  exist  without  the  mind. 

74.  But — though  it  be  allowed  by  the  materialists  themselves 
that  Matter  was  thought  of  only  for  the  sake  of  supporting  acci- 
dents, and,  the  reason  entirely  ceasing34,  one  might  expect  the 
mind  should  naturally,  and  without  any  reluctance  at  all,  quit  the 
belief  of  what  was  solely  grounded  thereon — yet  the  prejudice  is 
riveted  so  deeply  in  our  thoughts,  that  we  can  scarce  tell  how  to 
part  with  it,  and  are  therefore  inclined,  since  the  thing  itself  is 
indefensible,  at  least  to  retain  the  name,  which  we  apply  to  I  know 
not  what  abstracted  and  indefinite  notions  of  being,  or  occasion, 
though  without  any  show  of  reason,  at  least  so  far  as  I  can  see. 
For,  what  is  there  on  our  part,  [8s]  or  what  do  we  perceive, 
amongst  all  the  ideas,  sensations,  notions  which  are  imprinted  on 
our  minds,  either  by  sense  or  reflection,  from  whence  may  be 
inferred  the  existence  of  an  inert,  thoughtless,  unperceived  oc- 

31  Is  the  assumption  of  the  need  for  substance  of  some  sort,  percipient  if  not  corporeal, 
regarded  by  Berkeley  as  a  truth  of  the  absolute  or  common  reason  ? 

32  e.  g.  Des  Cartes,  Malebranche,  Locke,  &c. 

33  That  is,  if  we  mean  by  Matter,  something  existing  unperceived  and  unperceiving. 
But  '  matter,'  in  another  and  intelligible  meaning  of  the  word,  according  to  Berkeley,  may 
and  does  exist. 

3*  Seeing  that  sensible  phenomena  are  sufficiently  '  supported '  by  mind. 


236  OF   THE   PRINCIPLES 

casion  ?  and,  on  the  other  hand,  on  the  part  of  an  All-sufficient 
Spirit,  what  can  there  be  that  should  make  us  believe  or  even 
suspect  He  is  directed  by  an  inert  occasion35  to  excite  ideas  in 
our  minds  ? 

75.  It  is  a  very  extraordinary  instance  of  the  force  of  preju- 
dice, and  much  to  be  lamented,  that  the  mind  of  man  retains 
so  great  a  fondness,  against  all  the  evidence  of  reason,  for  a 
stupid  thoughtless  somewhat,  [86]  by  the  interposition  whereof  it 
would  as  it  were  screen  itself  from  the  Providence  of  God,  and 
remove  it  farther  off  from  the  affairs  of  the  world.  But,  though 
we  do  the  utmost  we  can  to  secure  the  belief  of  Matter,  though, 
when  reason  forsakes  us,  we  endeavour  to  support  our  opinion 
on  the  bare  possibility  of  the  thing,  and  though  we  indulge  our- 
selves in  the  full  scope  of  an  imagination  not  regulated  by  reason 
to  make  out  that  poor  possibility,  yet  the  upshot  of  all  is — that 
there  are  certain  unknown  Ideas  in  the  mind  of  God  ;  for  this,  if 
anything,  is  all  that  I  conceive  to  be  meant  by  occasion  with  regard 
to  God.     And  this  at  the  bottom  is  no  longer  contending  for  the 

\  thing,  but  for  the  name. 

76.  Whether  therefore  there  are  such  Ideas  in  the  mind  of  God, 
and  whether  they  may  be  called  by  the  name  Matter,  I  shall  not 
dispute36.  But,  if  you  stick  to  the  notion  of  an  unthinking  sub- 
stance or  support  of  extension,  motion,  and  other  sensible  quali- 
ties, then  to  me  it  is  most  evidently  impossible  there  should  be 
any  such  thing  ;  since  it  is  a  plain  repugnancy  that  those  qualities 
should  exist  in  or  be  supported  by  an  unperceiving  substance37. 

yy.  But,  say  you,  though  it  be  granted  that  there  is  no  thought- 
less support  of  extension  and  the  other  qualities  or  accidents 
which  we  perceive,  yet  there  may  perhaps  be  some  inert,  unper- 
ceiving substance  or  substratum  of  some  other  qualities,  as  incom- 
prehensible to  us  as  colours  are  to  a  man  born  blind,  because  we 

35  unless  that  '  occasion  '  is  only  another  term  for  His  own  Ideas. 

36  Berkeley's  philosophy  seems  to  imply  the  existence  of  Divine  Ideas,  which  receive 
expression  in  the  laws  of  nature,  and  of  which  human  science  is  the  imperfect  interpreta- 
tion. In  this  view,  the  assertion  of  the  existence  of  Matter,  material  substance,  or  occa- 
sion is  simply  an  assertion  that  the  phenomenal  universe  into  which  we  are  born  is  a 
reasonable  «r  interpretable  universe ;  and  that  it  would  be  actually  interpreted,  if  our 
conceptions  were  harmonized  with  the  Divine  or  Absolute  Conception  which  it  expresses. 
The  Divine  Thought  would  thus  be  Absolute  Truth  or  Being.     Cf.  Siris  passim. 

37  Cf.  sect.  3—24. 


OF  H  UMA  N-  KN  OWLEDGE. 


237 


have  not  a  sense  adapted  to  them.  [8?]  But,  if  we  had  a  new  sense, 
we  should  possibly  no  more  doubt  of  their  existence  than  a  blind 
man  made  to  see  does  of  the  existence  of  light  and  colours. — I 
answer,  first,  if  what  you  mean  by  the  word  Matter  be  only  the 
unknown  support  of  unknown  qualities,  it  is  no  matter  whether 
there  is  such  a  thing  or  no,  since  it  no  way  concerns  us ;  and  I 
do  not  see  the  advantage  there  is  in  disputing  about  what  we 
know  not  what,  and  we  know  not  why. 

78.  But,  secondly,  if  we  had  a  new  sense  it  could  only  furnish 
us  with  new  ideas  or  sensations ;  and  then  we  should  have  the 
same  reason  against  their  existing  in  an  unperceiving  substance 
that  has  been  already  offered  with  relation  to  figure,  motion, 
colour,  and  the  like.  Qualities,  as  hath  been  shewn,  are  nothing 
else  but  sensations  or  ideas,  which  exist  only  in  a  mind  perceiving 
them  ;  and  this  is  true  not  only  of  the  ideas  we  are  acquainted 
with  at  present,  but  likewise  of  all  possible  ideas  whatsoever. 

79.  But,  you  will  insist,  what  if  I  have  no  reason  to  believe 
the  existence  of  Matter  ?  what  if  I  cannot  assign  any  use  to  it  or 
explain  anything  by  it,  or  even  conceive  what  is  meant  by  that 
word  ?  yet  still  it  is  no  contradiction  to  say  that  Matter  exists, 
and  that  this  Matter  is  in  general  a  substance,  or  occasion  of  ideas  ; 
though  indeed  to  go  about  to  unfold  the  meaning  or  adhere  to 
any  particular  explication  of  those  words  may  be  attended  with 
great  difficulties.  I  answer,  when  words  are  used  without  a 
meaning,  you  may  put  them  together  as  you  please  without 
danger  of  running  into  a  contradiction.  You  may  say,  for  exam- 
ple, that  twice  two  is  equal  to  seven,  so  long  as  you  declare  you 
do  not  take  the  words  of  that  proposition  in  their  usual  accepta- 
tion but  for  marks  of  you  know  not  what.  And,  by  the  same 
reason,  you  may  say  there  is  an  inert  thoughtless  substance  with- 
out accidents  which  is  the  occasion  of  our  ideas.  And  we  shall 
understand  just  as  much  by  one  proposition  as  the  other. 

80.  In  the  last  place,  you  will  say,  what  if  we  give  up  the  cause 
of  material  Substance,  and  stand  to  it  that  Matter  is-an  unknown 
somewhat — neither  substance  nor  accident,  spirit  nor  idea,  inert, 
thoughtless,  indivisible,  immoveable,  unextended,  existing  in  no 
place  ?     For,  say  you,  whatever  may  be  urged  against  substance 


238  OF   THE  PRINCIPLES 

or  occasion,  or  any  other  positive  or  relative  notion  of  Matter, 
hath  no  place  at  all,  so  long  as  this  negative  definition  of  Matter 
is  adhered  to.  I  answer,  you  may,  if  so  it  shall  seem  good,  use 
the  word  '  Matter'  in  the  same  sense  as  other  men  use  \  nothing,' 
and  so  make  those  terms  convertible  in  your  style.  For,  after 
all,  this  is  what  appears  to  me  to  be  the  result  of  that  definition 
— the  parts  whereof  when  I  consider  with  attention,  either  col- 
lectively or  separate  from  each  other,  I  do  not  find  that  there  is 
any  kind  of  effect  or  impression  made  on  my  mind  different  from 
what  is  excited  by  the  term  nothing. 

81.  You  will  reply,  perhaps,  that  in  the  foresaid  definition  is 
included  what  doth  sufficiently  distinguish  it  from  nothing — the 
positive  abstract  idea  of  quiddity,  entity,  or  existence.  I  own,  in- 
deed, that  those  who  pretend  to  the  faculty  of  framing  abstract 
general  ideas  do  talk  as  if  they  had  such  an  idea,  which  is,  say 
they,  the  most  abstract  and  general  notion  of  all ;  that  is,  to  me, 
the  most  incomprehensible  of  all  others.  That  there  are  a  great 
variety  of  spirits  of  different  orders  and  capacities,  whose  facul- 
ties both  in  number  and  extent  are  far  exceeding  those  the  Author 
of  my  being  has  bestowed  on  me,  I  see  no  reason  to  deny.  And 
for  me  to  pretend  to  determine  by  my  own  few,  stinted,  narrow 
inlets  of  perception,  what  ideas  the  inexhaustible  power  of  the 
Supreme  Spirit  may  imprint  upon  them  were  certainly  the  utmost 
folly  and  presumption — since  there  may  be,  for  aught  that  I  know, 
innumerable  sorts  of  ideas  or  sensations,  as  different  from  one 
another,  and  from  all  that  I  have  perceived,  as  colours  are  from 
sounds38.  But,  how  ready  soever  I  may  be  to  acknowledge 
the  scantiness  of  my  comprehension  with  regard  to  the  endless 
variety  of  spirits  and  ideas  that  may  possibly  exist,  yet  for  any 
one  to  pretend  to  a  notion  of  Entity  or  Existence,  abstracted  from 
spirit  and  idea,  from  perceiving  and  being  perceived,  is,  I  suspect, 
a  downright  repugnancy  and  trifling  with  words. — It  remains 
that  we  consider  the  objections  which  may  possibly  be  made  on 
the  part  of  Religion. 

38  Matter  and  physical  science  is  relative,  inasmuch  as  we  may  suppose  an  indefinite 
number  of  additional  senses,  affording  corresponding  varieties  of  sense-experience,  of 
course  at  present  inconceivable  by  man.  Or,  we  may  suppose  an  intelligence  destitute  of 
all  J<r«J*-perceptions,  and  having  ideas  or  objects  of  another  sort  altogether. 


OF  HUMAN  KNOWLEDGE. 


239 


82.  Some  there  are  who  think  that,  though  the  arguments  for 
the  real  existence  of  bodies  which  are  drawn  from  Reason  be 
allowed  not  to  amount  to  demonstration,  yet  the  Holy  Scriptures 
are  so  clear  in  the  point,  as  will  sufficiently  convince  every  good 
Christian  that  bodies  do  really  exist,  and  are  something  more 
than  mere  ideas;  there  being  in  Holy  Writ  innumerable  facts 
related  which  evidently  suppose  the  reality  of  timber  and  stone, 
mountains  and  rivers,  and  cities,  and  human  bodies39.  To  which 
I  answer  that  no  sort  of  writings  whatever,  sacred  or  profane, 
which  use  those  and  the  like  words  in  the  vulgar  acceptation,  or 
so  as  to  have  a  meaning  in  them,  are  in  danger  of  having  their 

*  truth  called  in  question  by  our  doctrine.  That  all  those  things 
do  really  exist,  that  there  are  bodies,  even  corporeal  substances, 
when  taken  in  the  vulgar  sense,  has  been  shewn  to  be  agreeable 
to  our  principles  :  and  the  difference  betwixt  tilings  and  ideas, 
realities  and  chimeras,  has  been  distinctly  explained.  See  sect. 
29,  30,  33,  36,  &c.  And  I  do  not  think  that  either  what  philoso- 
phers call  Matter,  or  the  existence  of  objects  without  the  mind4°, 
is  anywhere  mentioned  in  Scripture. 

83.  Again,  whether  there  be  or  be  not  external  things41,  it  is 
agreed  on  all  hands  that  the  proper  use  of  words  is  the  marking 
our  conceptions,  or  things  only  as  they  are  known  and  perceived 
by  us ;  whence  it  plainly  follows  that  in  the  tenets  we  have  laid 
down  there  is  nothing  inconsistent  with  the  right  use  and  sig- 
nificancy  of  language,  and  that  discourse,  of  what  kind  soever, 
so  far  as  it  is  intelligible,  remains  undisturbed.  But  all  this  seems 
so  very  manifest,  from  what  has  been  largely  set  forth  in  the 
premises,  that  it  is  needless  to  insist  any  farther  on  it. 

84.  But,  it  will  be  urged  that  miracles  do,  at  least,  lose  much 
of  their  stress  and  import  by  our  principles.  What  must  we 
think  of  Moses'  rod  ?  was  it  not  really  turned  into  a  serpent,  or 

39  Holy  Scripture,  and  the  assumed  possibility  of  its  existence,  added  to  our  natural 
tendency  to  believe,  are  the  grounds  on  which  Malebranche  and  Norris  infer  the  existence 
of  a  material  world.  Berkeley's  material  world  needs  no  proof — unless  of  its  permanent 
orderliness,  which  he  rests  on  suggestion  and  custom.  His  aim  is  not  to  prove  that  the 
material  world  exists,  but  to  explain  what  we  should  mean  when  we  say  that  it  exists. 

*°  i.  e.  existing  uncognised  by  any  intelligence — finite  or  Divine. 

4»  '  external  things,'  i.  e.  things  existing  absolutely,  or  out  of  all  relation  to  any  cognitive 
agent. 


240  OF   THE  PRINCIPLES 

was  there  only  a  change  of  ideas  in  the  minds  of  the  spectators  ? 
And,  can  it  be  supposed  that  our  Saviour  did  no  more  at  the 
marriage-feast  in  Cana  than  impose  on  the  sight,  and  smell,  and 
taste  of  the  guests,  so  as  to  create  in  them  the  appearance  or 
idea  only  of  wine  ?  The  same  may  be  said  of  all  other  mira- 
cles ;  [88]  which,  in  consequence  of  the  foregoing  principles,  must 
be  looked  upon  only  as  so  many  cheats,  or  illusions  of  fancy. — 
To  this  I  reply,  that  the  rod  was  changed  into  a  real  serpent,  and 
the  water  into  real  wine.  That  this  does  not  in  the  least  con- 
tradict what  I  have  elsewhere  said  will  be  evident  from  sect.  34 
and  35.  But  this  business  of  real  and  imaginary  has  been  already 
so  plainly  and  fully  explained,  and  so  often  referred  to,  and  the' 
difficulties  about  it  are  so  easily  answered  from  what  has  gone 
before,  that  it  were  an  affront  to  the  reader's  understanding  to 
resume  the  explication  of  it  in  this  place.  [89]  I  shall  only  observe 
that  if  at  table  all  who  were  present  should  see,  and  smell,  and 
taste,  and  drink  wine,  and  find  the  effects  of  it,  with  tne  there 
could  be  no  doubt  of  its  reality42; — so  that  at  bottom  the  scruple 
concerning  real  miracles  has  no  place  at  all  on  ours,  but  only  on 
the  received  principles,  and  consequently  makes  rather  for  than 
against  what  has  been  said. 

85.  Having  done  with  the  Objections,  which  I  endeavoured  to 
propose  in  the  clearest  light,  and  gave  them  all  the  force  and 
weight  I  could,  we  proceed  in  the  next  place  to  take  a  view  of 
our  tenets  in  their  Consequences43.  Some  of  these  appear  at  first 
sight — as  that  several  difficult  and  obscure  questions,  on  which 
abundance  of  speculation  has  been  thrown  away,  are  entirely 
banished  from  philosophy.  '  Whether  corporeal  substance  can 
think,'  '  whether  Matter  be  infinitely  divisible,'  and  '  how  it  oper- 
ates on  spirit' — these  and  the  like  inquiries  have  given  infinite 
amusement  to  philosophers  in  all  ages ;  but,  depending  on  the 

*»  The  simultaneous  consciousness  of,  or  participation  in,  the  '  same '  j«««-ideas,  by 
different  persons,  as  distinguished  from  the  purely  individual  or  personal  consciousness 
of  imaginary  objects  and  emotions,  is  here  referred  to  as  a  test  of  the  reality  of  the 
former. 

43  They  are  unfolded  in  the  remaining  sections  of  the  Treatise,  sect.  85 — 156 :  those 
which  apply  to  ideas  and  sensible  things  in  sect.  86 — 134 ;  what  belongs  to  spirits,  or  sub- 
jective substances  and  powers,  in  the  remainder  of  the  Treatise. 


OF  HUMAN  KNOWLEDGE.  24 1 

existence  of  Matter,  they  have  no  longer  any  place  on  our  prin- 
ciples. Many  other  advantages  there  are,  as  well  with  regard  to 
religion  as  the  sciences,  which  it  is  easy  for  any  one  to  deduce 
from  what  has  been  premised ;  but  this  will  appear  more  plainly 
in  the  sequel. 

86.  From  the  principles  we  have  laid  down  it  follows  human 
knowledge  may  naturally  be  reduced  to  two  heads — that  of  ideas 
and  that  of  spirits.     Of  each  of  these  I  shall  treat  in  order. 

And  first  as  to  ideas  or  unthinking  things.  Our  knowledge 
of  these  has  been  very  much  obscured  and  confounded,  and  we 
have  been  led  into  very  dangerous  errors,  by  supposing  a  two- 
fold existence  of  the  objects  of  sense44 — the  one  intelligible  or  in 
the  mind,  the  other  real  and  without  the  mind;  [9°]  whereby  un- 
thinking things  are  thought  to  have  a  natural  subsistence  of  their 
own  distinct  from  being  perceived  by  spirits.  This,  which,  if  I 
mistake  not,  hath  been  shewn  to  be  a  most  groundless  and  absurd 
notion,  is  the  very  root  of  Scepticism 4S ;  for,  so  long  as  men 
thought  that  real  things  subsisted  without  the  mind,  and  that 
their  knowledge  was  only  so  far  forth  real  as  it  was  conformable 
to  real  things,  it  follows  they  could  not  be  certain  that  they  had 
any  real  knowledge  at  all.  For  how  can  it  be  known  that  the 
things  which  are  perceived  are  conformable  to  those  which  are 
not  perceived,  or  exist  without  the  mind?  [9I] 

87.  Colour,  figure,  motion,  extension,  and  the  like,  considered 
only  as  so  many  sensations  in  the  mind,  are  perfectly  known, 
there  being  nothing  in  them  which  is  not  perceived.  But,  if  they 
are  looked  on  as  notes  or  images,  referred  to  things  or  archetypes 
existing  without  the  mind,  then  are  we  involved  all  in  scepticism. 
We  see  only  the  appearances,  and  not  the  real  qualities  of  things. 
What  may  be  the  extension,  figure,  or  motion  of  anything  really 
and  absolutely,  or  in  itself,  it  is  impossible  for  us  to  know,  but 
only  the  proportion  or  relation  they  bear  to  our  senses.     Things 

44  Berkeley's  'principles'  abo'ish  this  representative  idea  in  perception, and  recognise  as 
the  real  object  only  what  we  are  sensibly  conscious  of— not  any  uncognised  archetype. 

45  So  Hume,  Reid,  and  Hamilton,  who  see  in  the  hypothesis  of  a  representative  per- 
ception, implying  '  a  twofold  existence  of  the  objects  of  sense,'  the  germ  of  scepticism. 
Berkeley  claims  that  under  his  interpretation  of  what  reality,  externality,  and  existence 
mean,  an  intuitive  knowledge  of  the  real  existence  of  sensible  things  is  given  to  us. 

16 


242  OF    THE    PRINCIPLES 

remaining  the  same,  our  ideas  vary,  and  which  of  them,  or  even 
whether  any  of  them  at  all,  represent  the  true  quality  really  exist- 
ing in  the  thing,  it  is  out  of  our  reach  to  determine.  So  that,  for 
aught  we  know,  all  we  see,  hear,  and  feel,  may  be  only  phantom 
and  vain  chimera,  and  not  at  all  agree  with  the  real  things  exist- 
ing in  rerum  natura.  All  this  sceptical  cant  follows  from  our 
supposing  a  difference  be  ween  things  and  ideas,  and  that  the 
former  have  a  subsistence  without  the  mind  or  unperceived.  It 
were  easy  to  dilate  on  this  subject,  and  shew  how  the  arguments 
urged  by  sceptics  in  all  ages  depend  on  the  supposition  of  exter- 
nal objects.  [4<5But  this  is  too  obvious  to  need  being  insisted  on.] 
88.  So  long  as  we  attribute  a  real  existence  to  unthinking 
things,  distinct  from  their  being  perceived,  it  is  not  only  im- 
possible for  us  to  know  with  evidence  the  nature  of  any  real 
unthinking  being,  but  even  that  it  exists.  Hence  it  is  that  we 
see  philosophers  distrust  their  senses,  and  doubt  of  the  existence 
of  heaven  and  earth,  of  everything  they  see  or  feel,  even  of  their 
own  bodies.  And,  after  all  their  labouring  and  struggle  of  thought, 
they  are  forced  to  own  we  cannot  attain  to  any  self-evident  or 
demonstrative  knowledge  of  the  existence  of  sensible  things47. 
But,  all  this  doubtfulness,  which  so  bewilders  and  confounds  the 
mind  and  makes  philosophy  ridiculous  in  the  eyes  of  the  world, 
vanishes  if  we  annex  a  meaning  to  our  words,  and  do  not  amuse 
ourselves  with  the  terms  '  absolute,'  'external,'  'exist,'  &c. — sig- 
nifying we  know  not  what.  For  my  part,  I  can  as  well  doubt  of 
my  own  being  as  of  the  being  of  those  things  which  I  actually 
perceive  by  sense ;  it  being  a  manifest  contradiction  that  any 
sensible  object  should  be  immediately  perceived  by  sight  or 
touch,  and  at  the  same  time  have  no  existence  in  nature,  since 
the  very  existence  of  an  unthinking  being  consists  in  being  per- 
ceived**. 


*6  This  sentence  is  omitted  in  the  second  edition. 

47  This  is  admitted  by  Des  Cartes,  Malebranche,  and  Locke. 

+*  On  Berkeley's  own  principles,  there  is  no  contradiction  in  the  non-existence  in  sense 
of  these  '  qualities'  of  a  material  substance  which  we  are  not  at  the  moment  sensibly  per- 
cipient of — which  we  merely  infer  we  should  be  percipient  of  on  certain  conditions,  e.  g. 
the  smell,  &c.  of  an  orange  whilst  we  are  only  looking  at  it.  Their  non-existence  in 
imagination,  when  they  are  suggested  by  what  we  are  sensibly  conscious  of,  is  indeed,  on 
his  principles,  contradictory. 


OF   HUMAN   KNOWLEDGE.  243 

89.  Nothing  seems  of  more  importance  towards  erecting  a 
firm  system  of  sound  and  real  knowledge,  which  may  be  proof 
against  the  assaults  of  Scepticism,  than  to  lay  the  beginning  in  a 
distinct  explication  of  what  is  meant  by  thing,  reality,  existence ; 
for  in  vain  shall  we  dispute  concerning  the  real  existence  of 
things,  or  pretend  to  any  knowledge  thereof,  so  long  as  we  have 
not  fixed  the  meaning  of  those  words4?.  Tiling  or  Being  is  the 
most  general  name  of  all ;  it  comprehends  under  it  two  kinds 
entirely  distinct  and  heterogeneous,  and  which  have  nothing 
common  but  the  name,  viz.  spirits  and  ideas.  The  former  are 
active,  indivisible,  [5°  incorruptible]  substances :  the  latter  are 
inert,  fleeting,  [5°perishable  passions,]  or  dependent  beings,  which 
subsist  not  by  themselves51,  but  are  supported  by,  or  exist  in 
minds  or  spiritual  substances.  [52We  comprehend  our  own 
existence  by  inward  feeling  or  reflection,  and  that  of  other  spirits 
by  reason53.  We  may  be  said  to  have  some  knowledge  or  notion 
of  our  own  minds,  of  spirits  and  active  beings,  whereof  in  a  strict 
sense  we  have  not  ideas54.  In  like  manner,  we  know  and  have  a 
notion  of  relations55  between  things  or  ideas — which  relations 
are  distinct  from  the  ideas  or  things  related,  inasmuch  as  the 
latter  may  be  perceived  by  us  without  our  perceiving  the  former. 
To  me  it  seems  that  ideas,  spirits,  and  relations  are  all  in  their 


49  The  chief  end  of  the  Berkeleian  philosophy  is  to  reach  an  intelligible  conception  of 
Being,  Existence,  or  Thing,  (favourite  terms  with  philosophers) ;  which,  according  to 
Berkeley,  are  not,  as  Locke  would  have  it,  simple  ideas,  but  general  names.  Being  or 
Existence,  as  explained  by  Berkeley,  may  be  viewed  either  in  relation  to  its  permanent  or 
to  its  variable  element.  In  the  former  aspect  it  is  the  spiritual  substance  or  self;  in  the 
latter,  when  manifested  in  the  j*«.r*-given  co-existences  of  simple  ideas  or  objects,  it  is 
what  we  call  material  or  sensible  existence.  Spirits  and  also  syntheses  of  sense-given 
objects  may  be  called  '  things.'  With  Berkeley  the  word  '  thing'  stands,  not  for  an  arche- 
type of  the  associated  groups  of  phenomena  of  which  a  mind  is  percipient,  but  either  for 
the  groups  themselves,  or  for  the  minds  cognizant  of  them,  and  who  cause  the  changes 
which  they  manifest. 

so  Omitted  in  second  edition. 

51  But  whilst  ideas  or  objects  depend  on  being  perceived,  do  not  spirits  depend  on  ideas 
in  order  to  be  percipient  ? 

52  What  follows  to  the  end  of  this  section  was  added  in  the  second  edition. 

53  "reason,  'i.e.  reasoning  or  inference,  from  the  changes  in  the  sense-ideas  or  phenomena 
of  which  we  are  conscious. 

54  Cf.  sect.  139 — 142. 

55  '  Notion'  is  thus  applied  by  Berkeley  to  our  knowledge  of  minds,  and  to  our  knowl- 
edge of  relations  among  ideas. 


244  0F    THE    PRINCIPLES 

respective  kinds  the  object  of  human  knowledge  and5*5  subject  of 
discourse ;  and  that  the  term  idea  would  be  improperly  extended 
to  signify  everything  we  know  or  have  any  notion  of] 

90.  Ideas  imprinted  on  the  senses  are  real  things,  or  do  really 
exist57;  this  we  do  not  deny,  but  we  deny  they  can  subsist  with- 
out the  minds  which  perceive  them,  or  that  they  are  resemblances 
of  any  archetypes  existing  without  the  minds8:  since  the  very 
being  of  a  sensation  or  idea  consists  in  being  perceived,  and  an 
idea  can  be  like  nothing  but  an  idea.  Again,  the  things  perceived 
by  sense  may  be  termed  external,  with  regard  to  their  origin — 
in  that  they  are  not  generated  from  within  by  the  mind  itself,  but 
imprinted  by  a  Spirit  distinct  from  that  which  perceives  them. 
Sensible  objects  may  likewise  be  said  to  be  'without  the  mind'  in 
another  sense,  namely  when  they  exist  in  some  other  mind  ;  thus, 
when  I  shut  my  eyes,  the  things  I  saw  may  still  exist,  but  it 
must  be  in  another  mind59. 

91.  It  were  a  mistake  to  think  that  what  is  here  said  derogates 
in  the  least  from  the  reality  of  things.  It  is  acknowledged,  on 
the  received  principles,  that  extension,  motion,  and  in  a  word  all 
sensible  qualities,  have  need  of  a  support,  as  not  being  able  to 
subsist  by  themselves.  But  the  objects  perceived  by  sense  are 
allowed  to  be  nothing  but  combinations  of  those  qualities,  and 
consequently  cannot  subsist  by  themselves.60  Thus  far  it  is 
agreed  on  all  hands.     So  that  in  denying  the  things  perceived 

s6  '  and  '  =  or  (?), — unless  '  object '  is  used  in  a  vague  meaning,  including  more  than 
idea.  Cf.  sect.  1;  also  New  Theory  of  Vision  Vindicated,  sect.  IX,  12;  Siris,  sect.  297, 
308. 

57  Cf.  sect.  33,  for  the  meaning  of  the  term  '  real.' 

58  i.e.  without  or  unperceived  by  any  mind,  human  or  Divine;  which  is  quite  consistent 
with  their  being  '  external '  to  a  finite  percipient,  i.e.  independent  of  his  will,  and  deter- 
mined by  the  conceptions  of  a  higher  mind  than  his — consistent  also  with  the  existence  of 
archetypal  Ideas  in  the  Divine  Mind. 

59  Berkeley  here  explains  what  he  regards  as  the  legitimate  meanings  of  the  term  exter- 
nality. Men  cannot  act,  cannot  live,  without  assuming  an  external  world — in  some  con- 
ception of  the  term  'external.'  It  is  the  business  of  the  philosopher  to  say  what  that 
conception  ought  to  be.  Berkeley  here  acknowledges  (a)  an  externality  in  our  own  pos- 
sible  experience,  past  and  future,  as  determined  by  natural  laws,  which  are  independent 
of  the  will  of  the  percipient ;  and  (b)  an  externality  to  our  own  conscious  experience, 
in  the  contemporaneous,  as  well  as  in  the  past  or  future,  experience  of  other  minds,  finite 
or  Divine. 

60  i.  e.  they  are  not  properly  substances,  though  Berkeley  sometimes  speaks  of  them  as 
such.     Cf.  sect.  37. 


OF   HUMAN   KNOWLEDGE. 


245 


by  sense  an  existence  independent  of  a  substance  or  support 
wherein  they  may  exist  [92],  we  detract  nothing  from  the  received 
opinion  of  their  reality,  and  are  guilty  of  no  innovation  in  that 
respect.  All  the  difference  is  that,  according  to  us,  the  unthink- 
ing beings  perceived  by  sense  have  no  existence  distinct  from 
being  perceived,  and  cannot  therefore  exist  in  any  other  sub- 
stance than  those  unextended  indivisible  substances  or  spirits 
which  act  and  think  and  perceive  them ;  whereas  philosophers 
vulgarly  hold  the  sensible  qualities  do  exist  in  an  inert,  ex- 
tended, unperceiving  substance  which  they  call  Matter — to  which 
they  attribute  a  natural  subsistence,  exterior  to  all  thinking 
beings,  or  distinct  from  being  perceived  by  any  mind  what- 
soever, even  the  eternal  mind  of  the  Creator,  wherein  they  sup- 
pose only  ideas  of  the  corporeal  substances61  created  by  Him: 
if  indeed  they  allow  them  to  be  at  all  created62. 

92.  For,  as  we  have  shewn  the  doctrine  of  Matter  or  corporeal 
substance  to  have  been  the  main  pillar  and  support  of  Scepti- 
cism, so  likewise  upon  the  same  foundation  have  been  raised  all 
the  impious  schemes  of  Atheism  and  Irreligion.  Nay,  so  great 
a  difficulty  has  it  been  thought  to  conceive  Matter  produced  out 
of  nothing,  that  the  most  celebrated  among  the  ancient  philoso- 
phers, even  of  those  who  maintained  the  being  of  a  God,  have 
thought  Matter^  to  be  uncreated  and  coeternal  with  Him.  How 
great  a  friend  material  substance  has  been  to  Atheists  in  all  ages 
were  needless  to  relate.  All  their  monstrous  systems  have  so 
visible  and  necessary  a  dependence  on  it  that,  when  this  corner- 
stone is  once  removed,  the  whole  fabric  cannot  choose  but  fall  to 
the  ground,  insomuch  that  it  is  no  longer  worth  while  to  bestow 
a  particular  consideration  on  the  absurdities  of  every  wretched 
sect  of  Atheists. 

61  '  ideas  of  the  corporeal  substances' — whereas  Berkeley  might  say  real  ideas  which 
are  themselves  our  world  of  sensible  things. 

62  On  the  scheme  of  intelligible  Realism,  '  creation'  of  matter  is  the  production,  in 
finite  minds,  of  sense-objects  or  ideas,  which  are,  as  it  were,  letters  of  the  alphabet,  in  a 
language  which  God  employs  for  the  expression  of  His  Ideas,  and  of  which  human  science 
is  the  partial  interpretation.     Cf.  Skis,  sect.  326. 

63  'Matter,'  i.e.  an  unperceiving  and  unperceived  Substance  and  Cause — to  which 
Atheists  attribute  our  personal  existence  and  that  of  the  universe  in  which  we  find  our- 
selves.    Such  Matter  once  allowed,  what  proof  that  it  is  not  Supreme  or  Absolute  Being  ? 


246  OF    THE    PRINCIPLES 

93.  That  impious  and  profane  persons  should  readily  fall  in 
with  those  systems  which  favour  their  inclinations,  by  deriding 
immaterial  substance,  and  supposing  the  soul  to  be  divisible  and 
subject  to  corruption  as  the  body ;  which  exclude  all  freedom, 
intelligence,  and  design  from  the  formation  of  things,  and  in- 
stead thereof  make  a  self-existent,  stupid,  unthinking  substance 
the  root  and  origin  of  all  beings ;  that  they  should  hearken  to 
those  who  deny  a  Providence,  or  inspection  of  a  Superior  Mind 
over  the  affairs  of  the  world,  attributing  the  whole  series  of 
events  either  to  blind  chance  or  fatal  necessity  arising  from  the 
impulse  of  one  body  on  another — all  this  is  very  natural.  And, 
on  the  other  hand,  when  men  of  better  principles  observe  the 
enemies  of  religion  lay  so  great  a  stress  on  unthinking  Matter, 
and  all  of  them  use  so  much  industry  and  artifice  to  reduce 
everything  to  it,  methinks  they  should  rejoice  to  see  them 
deprived  of  their  grand  support,  and  driven  from  that  only  fort- 
ress, without  which  your  Epicureans,  Hobbists,  and  the  like[93], 
have  not  even  the  shadow  of  a  pretence,  but  become  the  most 
cheap  and  easy  triumph  in  the  world. 

94.  The  existence  of  Matter,  or  bodies  unperceived,  has  not 
only  been  the  main  support  of  Atheists  and  Fatalists,  but  on  the 
same  principle  doth  Idolatry  likewise  in  all  its  various  forms 
depend.  Did  men  but  consider  that  the  sun,  moon,  and  stars, 
and  every  other  object  of  the  senses,  are  only  so  many  sensations 
in  their  minds,  which  have  no  other  existence  but  barely  being 
perceived,  doubtless  they  would  never  fall  down  and  worship 
their  own  ideas — but  rather  address  their  homage  to  that  Eternal 
Invisible  Mind  which  produces  and  sustains  all  things. 

95.  The  same  absurd  principle,  by  mingling  itself  with  the 
articles  of  our  faith,  has  occasioned  no  small  difficulties  to  Chris- 
tians. For  example,  about  the  Resurrection,  how  many  scruples 
and  objections  have  been  raised  by  Socinians  and  others  ?  But 
do  not  the  most  plausible  of  them  depend  on  the  supposition 
that  a  body  is  denominated  the  same,  with  regard  not  to  the 
form  or  that  which  is  perceived  by  sense64,  but  the  material  sub- 
stance, which  remains  the  same  under  several   forms?     Take 

6«  Of  which  Berkeley  does  not  predicate  a  numerical  identity.  Cf.  Third  Dialogue 
between  Hylas  and  I'hilonous,  pp.  343 — 345. 


OF   HUMAN   KNOWLEDGE. 


247 


away  this  material  substance — about  the  identity  whereof  all  the 
dispute  is — and  mean  by  body  what  every  plain  ordinary  person 
means  by  that  word,  to  wit,  that  which  is  immediately  seen  and 
felt,  which  is  only  a  combination  of  sensible  qualities  or  ideas, 
and  then  their  most  unanswerable  objections  come  to  nothing. 

96.  Matter65  being  once  expelled  out  of  nature  drags  with  it 
so  many  sceptical  and  impious  notions,  such  an  incredible  num- 
ber of  disputes  and  puzzling  questions,  which  have  been  thorns 
in  the  sides  of  divines  as  well  as  philosophers,  and  made  so 
much  fruitless  work  for  mankind,  that  if  the  arguments  we  have 
produced  against  it  are  not  found  equal  to  demonstration  (as  to 
me  they  evidently  seem),  yet  I  am  sure  all  friends  to  knowledge, 
peace,  and  religion  have  reason  to  wish  they  were. 

97.  Beside  the  external66  existence  of  the  objects  of  percep- 
tion, another  great  source  of  errors  and  difficulties  with  regard 
to  ideal  knowledge  is  the  doctrine  of  abstract  ideas,  such  as  it 
hath  been  set  forth  in  the  Introduction.  The  plainest  things  in 
the  world,  those  we  are  most  intimately  acquainted  with  and 
perfectly  know,  when  they  are  considered  in  an  abstract  way, 
appear  strangely  difficult  and  incomprehensible.  Time,  place, 
and  motion,  taken  in  particular  or  concrete,  are  what  everybody 
knows ;  but,  having  passed  through  the  hands  of  a  metaphysi- 
cian, they  become  too  abstract  and  fine  to  be  apprehended  by 
men  of  ordinary  sense.  Bid  -'our  servant  meet  you  at  such  a 
time  in  such  a  place,  and  he  shall  never  stay  to  deliberate  on  the 
meaning  of  those  words ;  in  conceiving  that  particular  time  and 
place,  or  the  motion  by  which  he  is  to  get  thither,  he  finds  not 
the  least  difficulty.  But  if  time  be  taken  exclusive  of  all  those 
particular  actions  and  ideas  that  diversify  the  day,  merely  for  the 
continuation  of  existence  or  duration  in  abstract,  then  it  will 
perhaps  gravel  even  a  philosopher  to  comprehend  it. 

98.  For  my  own  part,  whenever  I  attempt  to  frame  a  simple 
idea  of  time[W\,  abstracted  from  the  succession  of  ideas  in  my 
mind,  which  flows  uniformly  and  is  participated  by  all  beings,  I 

65  '  matter,'  i.e.  absolute  Matter,  unknowing,  and  unknown  by  any  intelligence. 

66  '  external,'  i.  e.  in  the  philosophical,  but  not  in  Berkeley's  meaning  of  externality.    Cf. 
sect.  90,  note. 


248  OF    THE    PRINCIPLES 

am  lost  and  embrangled  in  inextricable  difficulties.  I  have  no 
notion  of  it  at  all,  only  I  hear  others  say  it  is  infinitely  divisible, 
and  speak  of  it  in  such  a  manner  as  leads  me  to  harbour  odd 
thoughts  of  my  existence67; — since  that  doctrine  lays  one  under 
an  absolute  necessity  of  thinking,  either  that  he  passes  away 
innumerable  ages  without  a  thought,  or  else  that  he  is  annihi- 
lated every  moment  of  his  life,  both  which  seem  equally  absurd. 
Time  therefore  being  nothing,  abstracted  from  the  succession  of 
ideas  in  our  minds,  it  follows  that  the  duration  of  any  finite  spirit 
must  be  estimated  by  the  number  of  ideas  or  actions  succeeding 
each  other  in  that  same  spirit  or  mind.  Hence,  it  is  a  plain 
consequence  that  the  soul  always  thinks ;  and  in  truth  whoever 
shall  go  about  to  divide  in  his  thoughts,  or  abstract  the  existence 
of  a  spirit  from  its  cogitation,  will,  I  believe,  find  it  no  easy  task68. 
99.  So  likewise  when  we  attempt  to  abstract  extension  and 
motion  from  all  other  qualities,  and  consider  them  by  them- 
selves, we  presently  lose  sight  of  them,  and  run  into  great  ex- 
travagances. [^  Hence  spring  those  odd  paradoxes,  that  the 
'  fire  is  not  hot,'  nor  '  the  wall  white,'  &c,  or  that  heat  and  colour 
are  in  the  objects  nothing  but  figure  and  motion.]  All  which 
depend  on  a  twofold  abstraction ;  first,  it  is  supposed  that  exten- 
sion, for  example,  may  be  abstracted  from  all  other  sensible 
qualities  ;  and  secondly,  that  the  entity  of  extension  may  be 
abstracted  from  its  being  perceived.  But,  whoever  shall  reflect, 
and  take  care  to  understand  what  he  says,  will,  if  I  mistake  not, 
acknowledge  that  all  sensible  qualities  are  alike  sensations  and 
alike  real ;  that  where  the  extension  is,  there  is  the  colour  too, 
i.e.  in  his  mind7°,  and  that  their  archetypes  can  exist  only  in 
some  other  mind**\  and  that  the  objects  of  sense72  are  nothing 

67  i.e.  of  what  Mind,  Self,  the  Ego  means,  of  its  relation  to  time,  and  what  personal 
identity  consists  in.  Berkeley  sometimes  seems  to  imply  that  the  existence  of  the  Ego  is 
independent  of  rime  or  succession,  in  an  eternal  present  (an  /  am),  amid  the  changes  of 
phenomena  of  which  it  is  conscious. 

68  As  the  esse  of  sense-ideas  or  sensible  objects  is  percipi,  according  to  Berkeley,  so  the 
esse  of  minds  or  persons  is  percipere.  The  existence  of  a  Mind  thus  depends  on  con- 
sciousness, and  the  sensible  existence  of  Matter  depends  on  a  sense-percipient. 

69  This  sentence  is  omitted  in  the  second  edition. 
7°  Cf.  New  Theory  of  Vision,  sect.  43,  &c. 

?'  i.  e.  as  ideas,  sensible  or  intelligible — human  or  Divine. 

7*  '  objects  of  sense,'  i.e.  sensible  or  external  things.  Cf.  sect.  1,  on  the  meaning  of 
thing,  as  distinct  from  object-proper  or  simple  idea. 


OF   HUMAN   KNOWLEDGE. 


249 


but  those  sensations  combined,  blended,  or  (if  one  may  so  speak) 
concreted  together ;  none  of  all  which  can  be  supposed  to  exist 
unperceived.  [73And  that  consequently  the  wall  is  as  truly  white 
as  it  is  extended,  and  in  the  same  sense.] 

100.  What  it  is  for  a  man  to  be  happy,  or  an  object  good,  every 
one  may  think  he  knows.  But  to  frame  an  abstract  idea  of  happi- 
ness, prescinded  from  all  particular  pleasure,  or  of  goodness  from 
everything  that  is  good,  this  is  what  few  can  pretend  to.  So  like- 
wise a  man  may  be  just  and  virtuous  without  having  precise  ideas 
of  justice  and  virtue.  The  opinion  that  those  and  the  like  words 
stand  for  general  notions,  abstracted  from  all  particular  persons 
and  actions,  seems  to  have  rendered  morality  very  difficult,  and 
the  study  thereof  of  small  use  to  mankind.  And  in  effect  one 
may  make  a  great  progress  in  school-ethics  without  ever  being 
the  wiser  or  better  man  for  it,  or  knowing  how  to  behave  him- 
self in  the  affairs  of  life  more  to  the  advantage  of  himself  or  his 
neighbours  than  he  did  before.  This  hint  may  suffice  to  let  any 
one  see  the  doctrine  of  abstraction  has  not  a  little  contributed 
towards  spoiling  the  most  useful  parts  of  knowledge.  [9S] 

101.  The  two  great  provinces  of  speculative  science  conversant 
about  ideas  received  from  sense,  are  Natural  Philosophy  and 
Mathematics ;  with  regard  to  each  of  these  I  shall  make  some 
observations. — And  first  I  shall  say  somewhat  of  Natural  Phil- 
osophy. On  this  subject  it  is  that  the  sceptics  triumph.  All 
that  stock  of  arguments  they  produce  to  depreciate  our  faculties 
and  make  mankind  appear  ignorant  and  low,  are  drawn  principally 
from  this  head,  namely,  that  we  are  under  an  invincible  blindness 
as  to  the  true  and  real  nature  of  things.  This  they  exaggerate, 
and  love  to  enlarge  on.  We  are  miserably  bantered,  say  they, 
by  our  senses,  and  amused  only  with  the  outside  and  show  of 
things.  The  real  essence™,  the  internal  qualities  and  constitution 
of  every  the  meanest  object,  is  hid  from  our  view ;  something 

73  This  sentence  is  omitted  in  the  second  edition. 

74  With  Berkeley,  the  nominal  or  logical  essence  is  the  real  essence  of  things,  in  as  far 
as  things  are  in  sense  what  they  are  conceived  to  be.  But  this  is  quite  consistent  with  the 
fact  that  we  may  and  do  misinterpret  the  sensible  symbols  which  constitute  our  material 
universe ;  and  thus  our  conceptions  of  their  meaning  are  often  misconceptions — so  that 
their  logical  or  nominal  essence  becomes  different  from  their  real  essence. 


250  OF    THE    PRINCIPLES 

there  is  in  every  drop  of  water,  every  grain  of  sand,  which  it  is 
beyond  the  power  of  human  understanding  to  fathom  or  com- 
prehend. But,  it  is  evident  from  what  has  been  shewn  that  all 
this  complaint  is  groundless,  and  that  we  are  influenced  by  false 
principles  to  that  degree  as  to  mistrust  our  senses,  and  think 
we  know  nothing  of  those  things  which  we  perfectly  compre- 
hend. 

102.  One  great  inducement  to  our  pronouncing  ourselves 
ignorant  of  the  nature  of  things  is  the  current  opinion  that  every- 
thing includes  within  itself  the  cause  of  its  properties  ;  or  that 
there  is  in  each  object  an  inward  essence  which  is  the  source 
whence  its  discernible  qualities  flow,  and  whereon  they  depend. 
[96]  Some  have  pretended  to  account  for  appearances  by  occult 
qualities,  but  of  late  they  are  mostly  resolved  into  mechanical 
causes,  to  wit,  the  figure,  motion,  weight,  and  suchlike  qualities, 
of  insensible  particles?5;  whereas,  in  truth,  there  is  no  other  agent 
or  efficient  cause  than  spirit,  it  being  evident  that  motion,  as  well 
as  all  other  ideas,  is  perfectly  inert.  See  sect.  25.  Hence,  to 
endeavour  to  explain  the  production  of  colours  or  sounds,  by 
figure,  motion,  magnitude  and  the  like,  must  needs  be  labour  in 
vain.  And  accordingly  we  see  the  attempts  of  that  kind  are  not 
at  all  satisfactory.  Which  may  be  said  in  general  of  those  in- 
stances wherein  one  idea  or  quality  is  assigned  for  the  cause  of 
another.  I  need  not  say  how  many  hypotheses  and  speculations 
are  left  out,  and  how  much  the  study  of  nature  is  abridged  by 
this  doctrine  ?6. 

103.  The  great  mechanical  principle  now  in  vogue  is  attraction. 
That  a  stone  falls  to  the  earth,  or  the  sea  swells  towards  the 
moon,  may  to  some  appear  sufficiently  explained  thereby.  But 
how  are  we  enlightened  by  being  told  this  is  done  by  attraction? 
Is  it  that  that  word  signifies  the  manner  of  the  tendency,  and  that 
it  is  by  the  mutual  drawing  of  bodies  instead  of  their  being 
impelled   or   protruded   towards  each    other  ?     But,  nothing  is 

75  e.g.  Locke's  Essay,  IV.  3. 

76  Berkeleyism  is  so  far  a  Spiritual  Positivism,  which  eliminates  all  causation  from  the 
objective  world,  concentrates  it  in  Mind,  and  seeks  among  phenomena  or  ideas  only  for 
the  laws  of  their  constant  co-existence  and  succession.  But  the  modern  Positivists  deny 
thai  we  may  thus  infer  the  ultimate  causality  of  Mind,  holding  that  the  ultimate  cause  or 
power  is  incognisable — that  the  universe  is  a  '  singular  effect." 


OF  HUMAN  KNOWLEDGE.  25  I 

determined  of  the  manner  or  action,  and  it  may  as  truly  (for 
aught  we  know)  be  termed  '  impulse,'  or  '  protrusion,'  as  '  attrac- 
tion.' [97]  Again,  the  parts  of  steel  we  see  cohere  firmly  together, 
and  this  also  is  accounted  for  by  attraction  ;  but,  in  this  as  in  the 
other  instances,  I  do  not  perceive  that  anything  is  signified  besides 
the  effect  itself;  for  as  to  the  manner  of  the  action  whereby  it  is 
produced,  or  the  cause  which  produces  it,  these  are  not  so  much 
as  aimed  at. 

104.  Indeed,  if  we  take  a  view  of  the  several  phenomena,  and 
compare  them  together,  we  may  observe  some  likeness  and  con- 
formity between  them.  For  example,  in  the  falling  of  a  stone  to 
the  ground,  in  the  rising  of  the  sea  towards  the  moon,  in  cohesion, 
crystallization,  &c,  there  is  something  alike,  namely,  an  union  or 
mutual  approach  of  bodies.  So  that  any  one  of  these  or  the  like 
phenomena  may  not  seem  strange  or  surprising  to  a  man  who 
has  nicely  observed  and  compared  the  effects  of  nature.  For  that 
only  is  thought  so  which  is  uncommon,  or  a  thing  by  itself,  and 
out  of  the  ordinary  course  of  our  observation.  That  bodies 
should  tend  towards  the  centre  of  the  earth  is  not  thought  strange, 
because  it  is  what  we  perceive  every  moment  of  our  lives.  But, 
that  they  should  have  a  like  gravitation  towards  the  centre  of  the 
moon  may  seem  odd  and  unaccountable  to  most  men,  because  it 
is  discerned  only  in  the  tides.  But  a  philosopher,  whose  thoughts 
take  in  a  larger  compass  of  nature,  having  observed  a  certain 
similitude  of  appearances,  as  well  in  the  heavens  as  the  earth,  that 
argue  innumerable  bodies  to  have  a  mutual  tendency  towards 
each  other,  which  he  denotes  by  the  general  name  '  attraction,' 
whatever  can  be  reduced  to  that  he  thinks  justly  accounted  for. 
Thus  he  explains  the  tides  by  the  attraction  of  the  terraqueous 
globe  towards  the  moon,  which  to  him  does  not  appear  odd  or 
anomalous,  but  only  a  particular  example  of  a  general  rule  or  law 
of  nature. 

105.  If  therefore  we  consider  the  difference  there  is  betwixt 
natural  philosophers  and  other  men,  with  regard  to  their  know- 
ledge of  the  phenomena,  we  shall  find  it  consists  not  in  an  exacter 
knowledge  of  the  efficient  cause  that  produces  them — for  that  can 
be  no  other  than  the  will  of  a  spirit — but  only  in  a  greater  large- 
ness of  comprehension,  whereby  analogies,  harmonies,  and  agree- 


252  OF    THE    PRINCIPLES 

merits  are  discovered  in  the  works  of  nature,  and  the  particular 
effects  explained,  that  is,  reduced  to  general  rules,  see  sect.  62, 
which  rules,  grounded  on  the  analogy  and  uniformness  observed 
in  the  production  of  natural  effects,  are  most  agreeable  and  sought 
after  by  the  mind  ;  for  that  they  extend  our  prospect  beyond  what 
is  present  and  near  to  us,  and  enable  us  to  make  very  probable 
conjectures  touching  things  that  may  have  happened  at  very  great 
distances  of  time  and  place,  as  well  as  to  predict  things  to  come; 
which  sort  of  endeavour  towards  omniscience  is  much  affected 
by  the  mind. 

106.  But  we  should  proceed  warily  in  such  things,  for  we  are 
apt  to  lay  too  great  a  stress  on  analogies,  and,  to  the  prejudice 
of  truth,  humour  that  eagerness  of  the  mind  whereby  it  is  carried 
to  extend  its  knowledge  into  general  theorems.  For  example,  in 
the  business  of  gravitation  or  mutual  attraction,  because  it  appears 
in  many  instances,  some  are  straightway  for  pronouncing  it  uni- 
versal;  and  that  to  attract  and  be  attracted  by  every  other  body 
is  an  essential  quality  inherent  in  all  bodies  whatsoever.  Whereas 
it  is  evident  the  fixed  stars  have  no  such  tendency  towards  each 
other;  [98]  and,  so  far  is  that  gravitation  from  being  essential  to 
bodies  that  in  some  instances  a  quite  contrary  principle  seems  to 
shew  itself;  as  in  the  perpendicular  growth  of  plants,  and  the 
elasticity  of  the  air.  ["]  There  is  nothing  necessary  or  essential 
in  the  case  77,  but  it  depends  entirely  on  the  will  of  the  Governing 
Spirit ?8,  who  causes  certain  bodies  to  cleave  together  or  tend 
towards  each  other  according  to  various  laws,  whilst  He  keeps 
others  at  a  fixed  distance  ;  and  to  some  He  gives  a  quite  contrary 
tendency  to  fly  asunder  just  as  He  sees  convenient. 

107.  After  what  has  been  premised,  I  think  we  may  lay  down 
the  following  conclusions.  First,  it  is  plain  philosophers  amuse 
themselves  in  vain,  when  they  enquire  for  any  natural  efficient 
cause,  distinct  from  a  mind  or  spirit.     Secondly,  considering  the 

77  According  to  Sir  W.  Hamilton,  for  example,  we  are  intellectually  necessitated  to 
think  that  every  new  phenomenon  must  have  previously  existed  in  another  form — but  not 
necessarily  in  this,  that,  or  the  other  particular  form ;  for  a  knowledge  of  which  we  are 
indebted  to  experience. 

78  In  other  words,  what  the  preceding  form  of  any  new  phenomena  actually  w.is,  li.is 
been  determined  by  the  Supreme  Will,  and  is,  in  that  sense,  arbitrary.  God  is  the  proper 
cause  of  the  antecedent  and  consequent  forms  or  phenomena  of  existence  being  what  we 
actually  find  them  to  be. 


OF   HUMAN   KNOWLEDGE. 


253 


whole  creation  is  the  workmanship  of  a  wise  and  good  Agent,  it 
should  seem  to  become  philosophers  to  employ  their  thoughts 
(contrary  to  what  some  hold79)  about  the  final  causes  of  things  ; 
[ 8o  for,  besides  that  this  would  prove  a  very  pleasing  entertain- 
ment to  the  mind,  it  might  be  of  great  advantage,  in  that  it  not 
only  discovers  to  us  the  attributes  of  the  Creator,  but  may  also 
direct  us  in  several  instances  to  the  proper  uses  and  applications 
of  things;]  and  I  must  confess  I  see  no  reason  why  pointing  out 
the  various  ends  to  which  natural  things  are  adapted,  and  for 
which  they  were  originally  with  unspeakable  wisdom  contrived, 
should  not  be  thought  one  good  way  of  accounting  for  them,  and 
altogether  worthy  a  philosopher.  Thirdly,  from  what  has  been 
premised  no  reason  can  be  drawn  why  the  history  of  nature  should 
not  still  be  studied,  and  observations  and  experiments  made — 
which,  that  they  are  of  use  to  mankind,  and  enable  us  to  draw 
any  general  conclusions,  is  not  the  result  of  any  immutable 
habitudes  or  relations  between  things  themselves,  but  only  of 
God's  goodness  and  kindness  to  men  in  the  administration  of  the 
world.  See  sect.  30  and  31.  Fourthly,  by  a  diligent  observation 
of  the  phenomena  within  our  view,  we  may  discover  the  general 
laws  of  nature,  and  from  them  deduce  the  other  phenomena ;  I 
do  not  say  demonstrate,  for  all  deductions  of  that  kind  depend 
on  a  supposition  that  the  Author  of  nature  always  operates  uni- 
formly, and  in  a  constant  observance  of  those  rules  we  take  for 
principles 8l — which  we  cannot  evidently  know. 

108.  [82  It  appears  from  sect.  66,  &c.  that  the  steady  consistent 
methods  of  nature  may  not  unfitly  be  styled  the  Language  of 
its  Author,  whereby  He  discovers  His  attributes  to  our  view  and 
directs  us  how  to  act  for  the  convenience  and  felicity  of  life.  And 
to  me]  Those  men  who  frame83  general  rules  from  the  phenomena, 
and  afterwards  derive  84  the  phenomena  from  those  rules,  seem 8s 

79  He  probably  refers  to  Bacon. 

80  Omitted  in  second  edition. 

81  Our  assumed  '  principles,'  or  supposed  laws  of  nature,  maybe  subordinate  or  special, 
and  therefore  variable,  associations  of  sensible  signs  which,  in  their  ultimate  meaning, 
express  a  perfect,  and  therefore  necessary,  Divine  Idea. 

82  Omitted  in  the  second  edition. 

83  i.e.  inductively. 
8*  i.e.  deductively. 

8S  *  seem  to  consider  signs  rather  than  causes ' — '  seem  to  be  grammarians,  and  their 


254 


OF    THE    PRINCIPLES 


to  consider  signs  rather  than  causes.  86A  man  may  well  under- 
stand natural  signs  without  knowing  their  analogy,  or  being  able 
to  say  by  what  rule  a  thing  is  so  or  so.  And,  as  it  is  very  pos- 
sible to  write  improperly,  through  too  strict  an  observance  of 
general  grammar-rules  ;  so,  in  arguing  from  general  laws  of  nature, 
it  is  not  impossible  we  may  extend  8?  the  analogy  too  far,  and  by 
that  means  run  into  mistakes. 

109.  [88To  carry  on  the  resemblance.]  As  in  reading  other 
books  a  wise  man  will  choose  to  fix  his  thoughts  on  the  sense 
and  apply  it  to  use,  rather  than  lay  them  out  in  grammatical 
remarks  on  the  language  ;  so,  in  perusing  the  volume  of  nature, 
methinks  it  is  beneath  the  dignity  of  the  mind  to  affect  an  exact- 
ness in  reducing  each  particular  phenomenon  to  general  rules,  or 
shewing  how  it  follows  from  them.  We  should  propose  to  our- 
selves nobler  views,  namely,  to  recreate  and  exalt  the  mind  with 
a  prospect  of  the  beauty,  order,  extent,  and  variety  of  natural 
things  :  hence,  by  proper  inferences,  to  enlarge  our  notions  of  the 
grandeur,  wisdom  and  beneficence  of  the  Creator;  and  lastly,  to 
make  the  several  parts  of  the  creation,  so  far  as  in  us  lies,  sub- 
servient to  the  ends  they  were  designed  for,  God's  glory,  and  the 
sustentation  and  comfort  of  ourselves  and  fellow-creatures.  [I0°] 

no.  [89The  best  key  for  the  aforesaid  analogy  or  natural 
Science  will  be  easily  acknowledged  to  be  a  certain  celebrated 
Treatise  of  Mechanics^]  [ I01  ]  In  the  entrance  of  which  justly 
admired  treatise,  Time,  Space,  and  Motion  are  distinguished  into 
absolute  and  relative,  true  and  apparent,  mathematical  and  vulgar ; 

art  the  grammar  of  nature.  Two  ways  there  are  of  learning  a  language — either  by  rule 
or  by  practice' — in  first  edition. 

86  'A  man  may  be  well  read  in  the  language  of  nature  without  understanding  the  gram- 
mar of  it,  or  being  able  to  say,'  &c. — in  first  edition. 

87  '  extend  ' — '  stretch' — in  first  edition. 

88  Omitted  in  second  edition. 

S9  In  the  first  edition,  instead  of  this  sentence,  the  section  commences  thus  :  '  The  best 
grammar  of  the  kind  we  are  speaking  of  will  be  easily  acknowledged  to  be  a  treatise  of 
Mechanics,  demonstrated  and  applied  to  nature  by  a  philosopher  of  a  neighbouring  nation 
whom  all  the  world  admire.  I  shall  not  take  upon  me  to  make  remarks  on  the  perform- 
ance of  that  extraordinary  person;  only  some  things  he  has  advanced  so  directly  opposite 
to  the  doctrine  we  have  hitherto  laid  down,  that  we  should  be  wanting  in  the  regard  due 
to  the  authority  of  so  great  a  man  did  we  not  take  some  notice  of  them.'  He  refers,  of 
course,  to  Newton.  The  first  edition  was  published  in  Ireland — hence  '  neighbouring 
nation.' — On  absolute  Space,  cf.  Siris,  sect.  270,  &c. 


OF   HUMAN    KNOWLEDGE.  255 

— which  distinction,  as  it  is  at  large  explained  by  the  author, 
does  suppose  those  quantities  to  have  an  existence  without  the 
mind ;  and  that  they  are  ordinarily  conceived  with  relation  to 
sensible  things,  to  which  nevertheless  in  their  own  nature  they 
bear  no  relation  at  all. 

in.  As  for  Time,  as  it  is  there  taken  in  an  absolute  or  ab- 
stracted sense,  for  the  duration  or  perseverance  of  the  existence 
of  things,  I  have  nothing  more  to  add  concerning  it  after  what 
has  been  already  said  on  that  subject.  Sect.  97  and  98.  For  the 
rest,  this  celebrated  author  holds  there  is  an  absolute  Space, 
which,  being  unperceivable  to  sense,  remains  in  itself  similar  and 
immoveable  ;  and  relative  space  to  be  the  measure  thereof,  which, 
being  moveable  and  defined  by  its  situation  in  respect  of  sensible 
bodies,  is  vulgarly  taken  for  immoveable  space.  Place  he  defines 
to  be  that  part  of  space  which  is  occupied  by  any  body;  and 
according  as  the  space  is  absolute  or  relative  so  also  is  the  place. 
Absolute  Motion  is  said  to  be  the  translation  of  a  body  from  ab- 
solute place  to  absolute  place,  as  relative  motion  is  from  one  re- 
lative place  to  another.  [I02]  And,  because  the  parts  of  absolute 
space  do  not  fall  under  our  senses,  instead  of  them  we  are  obliged 
to  use  their  sensible  measures,  and  so  define  both  place  and 
motion  with  respect  to  bodies  which  we  regard  as  immoveable. 
But,  it  is  said  in  philosophical  matters  we  must  abstract  from  our 
senses,  since  it  may  be  that  none  of  those  bodies  which  seem  to 
be  quiescent  are  truly  so,  and  the  same  thing  which  is  moved 
relatively  may  be  really  at  rest;  as  likewise  one  and  the  same 
body  may  be  in  relative  rest  and  motion,  or  even  moved  with 
contrary  relative  motions  at  the  same  time,  according  as  its  place 
is  variously  defined.  All  which  ambiguity  is  to  be  found  in  the 
apparent  motions,  but  not  at  all  in  the  true  or  absolute,  which 
should  therefore  be  alone  regarded  in  philosophy.  And  the  true 
we  are  told  are  distinguished  from  apparent  or  relative  motions 
by  the  following  properties. — First,  in  true  or  absolute  motion  all 
parts  which  preserve  the  same  position  with  respect  of  the  whole, 
partake  of  the  motions  of  the  whole.  Secondly,  the  place  being 
moved,  that  which  is  placed  therein  is  also  moved;  so  that  a  body 
moving  in  a  place  which  is  in  motion  doth  participate  the  motion 
of  its  place.     Thirdly,  true  motion  is  never  generated  or  changed 


256  OF    THE    PRINCIPLES 

otherwise  than  by  force  impressed  on  the  body  itself.  Fourth ly, 
true  motion  is  always  changed  by  force  impressed  on  the  body 
moved.  Fifthly,  in  circular  motion  barely  relative  there  is  no 
centrifugal  force,  which  nevertheless,  in  that  which  is  true  or 
absolute,  is  proportional  to  the  quantity  of  motion. 

112.  But,  notwithstanding  what  has  been  said,  I  must  confess 
it  does  not  appear  to  me  that  there  can  be  any  motion  other  than 
relative**',  so  that  to  conceive  motion  there  must  be  at  least  con- 
ceived two  bodies,  whereof  the  distance  or  position  in  regard  to 
each  other  is  varied.  Hence,  if  there  was  one  only  body  in  being 
it  could  not  possibly  be  moved.  This  to  me  seems  very  evident, 
in  that  the  idea  I  have  of  motion  does  necessarily  include  rela- 
tion.— [9I  Whether  others  can  conceive  it  otherwise,  a  little  atten- 
tion may  satisfy  them.] 

113.  But,  though  in  every  motion  it  be  necessary  to  conceive 
more  bodies  than  one,  yet  it  may  be  that  one  only  is  moved, 
namely,  that  on  which  the  force  causing  the  change  in  the  dis- 
tance or  situation  of  the  bodies,  is  impressed.  For,  however 
some  may  define  relative  motion,  so  as  to  term  that  body  moved 
which  changes  its  distance  from  some  other  body,  whether  the 
force  p2or  action]  causing  that  change  were  impressed  on  it  or 
no,  yet  as  p3I  cannot  assent  to  this ;  for,  since  we  are  told]  rela- 
tive motion  is  that  which  is  perceived  by  sense,  and  regarded  in. 
the  ordinary  affairs  of  life,  it  follows  that  every  man  of  common 
sense  knows  what  it  is  as  well  as  the  best  philosopher.  Now,  I 
ask  any  one  whether,  in  his  sense  of  motion  as  he  walks  along 
the  streets,  the  stones  he  passes  over  may  be  said  to  move,  be- 
cause they  change  distance  with  his  feet  ?  To  me  it  appears  that 
though  motion  includes  a  relation  of  one  thing  to  another,  yet 
it  is  not  necessary  that  each  term  of  the  relation  be  denominated 
from  it.  As  a  man  may  think  of  somewhat  which  does  not 
think,  so  a  body  may  be  moved  to  or  from  another  body  which 


90  On  motion,  cf.  Analyst,  qu.  12,  and  De  Motu.  See  also  Malebranche,  Recherche,  I.  8. 
All  attempts  to  imagine  space  imply  the  thought  of  locomotive  sense-experience — an 
unimpeded,  as  distinguished  from  an  impeded  power  of  locomotion.     Cf.  sect.  116. 

9'  Omitted  in  second  edition. 

9a  Added  in  second  edition. 

93  Omitted  in  second  edition. 


OF   HUMAN   KNOWLEDGE. 


257 


is  not  therefore  itself  in  motion,  [)>4I  mean  relative  motion,  for 
other  I  am  not  able  to  conceive.] 

114.  As  the  place  happens  to  be  variously  defined,  the  motion 
which  is  related  to  it  varies95.  A  man  in  a  ship  may  be  said  to 
be  quiescent  with  relation  to  the  sides  of  the  vessel,  and  yet 
move  with  relation  to  the  land.  Or  he  may  move  eastward  in 
respect  of  the  one,  and  westward  in  respect  of  the  other.  In  the 
common  affairs  of  life  men  never  go  beyond  the  earth  to  define 
the  place  of  any  body ;  and  what  is  quiescent  in  respect  of  that 
is  accounted  absolutely  to  be  so.  But  philosophers,  who  have  a 
greater  extent  of  thought,  and  juster  notions  of  the  system  of 
things,  discover  even  the  earth  itself  to  be  moved.  In  order 
therefore  to  fix  their  notions  they  seem  to  conceive  the  corporeal 
world  as  finite,  and  the  utmost  unmoved  walls  or  shell  thereof  to 
be  the  place  whereby  they  estimate  true  motions.  If  we  sound 
our  own  conceptions,  I  believe  we  may  find  all  the  absolute  mo- 
tion we  can  frame  an  idea  of  to  be  at  bottom  no  other  than  rela- 
tive motion  thus  defined.  For,  as  has  been  already  observed, 
absolute  motion,  exclusive  of  all  external  relation,  is  incompre- 
hensible ;  and  to  this  kind  of  relative  motion  all  the  above-men- 
tioned properties,  causes,  and  effects  ascribed  to  absolute  motion 
will,  if  I  mistake  not,  be  found  to  agree.  As  to  what  is  said  of 
the  centrifugal  force,  that  it  does  not  at  all  belong  to  circular 
relative  motion,  I  do  not  see  how  this  follows  from  the  experi- 
ment which  is  brought  to  prove  it.  See  Philosophiae  Naturalis 
Principia  Mathematica,  in  Schol.  Def.  VIII.  For  the  water  in  the 
vessel  [x°3]  at  that  time  wherein  it  is  said  to  have  the  greatest 
relative  circular  motion,  has,  I  think,  no  motion  at  all;  as  is  plain 
from  the  foregoing  section. 

115.  For,  to  denominate  a  body  moved  it  is  requisite,  first, 
that  it  change  its  distance  or  situation  with  regard  to  some  other 
body;  secondly,  that  the  force  occasioning  that  change  be  im- 
pressed on  it.  If  either  of  these  be  wanting,  I  do  not  think  that, 
agreeably  to  the  sense  of  mankind,  or  the  propriety  of  language, 
a  body  can  be  said  to  be  in  motion.  I  grant  indeed  that  it  is 
possible  for  us  to  think  a  body  which  we  see  change  its  distance 

94  Omitted  in  second  edition. 

95  See  Locke's  Essay,  B.  II.  13.  §  7—10. 

17 


258  OF    THE    PRINCIPLES 

from  some  other  to  be  moved,  though  it  have  no  force  *6 applied 
to  it  (in  which  sense  there  may  be  apparent  motion),  but  then  it 
is  because  the  force  causing  the  change  of  distance  is  imagined 
by  us  to  be  [97 applied  or]  impressed  on  that  body  thought  to 
move;  which  indeed  shews  we  are  capable  of  mistaking  a  thing 
to  be  in  motion  which  is  not,  and  that  is  all,  [98but  does  not 
prove  that,  in  the  common  acceptation  of  motion,  a  body  is 
moved  merely  because  it  changes  distance  from  another;  since 
as  soon  as  we  are  undeceived,  and  find  that  the  moving  force 
was  not  communicated  to  it,  we  no  longer  hold  it  to  be  moved. 
So,  on  the  other  hand,  when  one  only  body  (the  parts  whereof 
preserve  a  given  position  between  themselves)  is  imagined  to 
exist,  some  there  are  who  think  that  it  can  be  moved  all  manner 
of  ways,  though  without  any  change  of  distance  or  situation  to 
any  other  bodies ;  which  we  should  not  deny  if  they  meant  only 
that  it  might  have  an  impressed  force,  which,  upon  the  bare 
creation  of  other  bodies,  would  produce  a  motion  of  some  cer- 
tain quantity  and  determination.  But  that  an  actual  motion 
(distinct  from  the  impressed  force  or  power  productive  of  change 
of  place  in  case  there  were  bodies  present  whereby  to  define  it) 
can  exist  in  such  a  single  body,  I  must  confess  I  am  not  able  to 
comprehend.] 

116.  From  what  has  been  said  it  follows  that  the  philosophic 
consideration  of  motion  does  not  imply  the  being  of  an  absolute 
Space,  distinct  from  that  which  is  perceived  by  sense  and  related 
to  bodies ;  which  that  it  cannot  exist  without  the  mind  is  clear 
upon  the  same  principles  that  demonstrate  the  like  of  all  other 
objects  of  sense.  And  perhaps,  if  we  enquire  narrowly,  we  shall 
find  we  cannot  even  frame  an  idea  of  pure  Space  exclusive  of  all 
body.  This  I  must  confess  seems  impossible^,  as  being  a  most 
abstract  idea.  When  I  excite  a  motion  in  some  part  of  my  body, 
if  it  be  free  or  without  resistance,  I  say  there  is  Space ;  but  if  I 
find  a  resistance,  then  I  say  there  is  Body :  and  in  proportion  as 
the  resistance  to  motion  is  lesser  or  greater,  I  say  the  space  is 
more  or  less  pure.    So  that  when  I  speak  of  pure  or  empty  space, 

9«  '  applied  to' — '  impressed  on' — in  first  edition. 

97  Added  in  second  edition. 

9s  What  follows  to  the  end  of  this  section  is  omitted  in  the  second  edition. 

99  '  seems  impossible' — '  is  above  my  capacity' — in  first  edition. 


OF   HUMAN   KNOWLEDGE. 


259 


it  is  not  to  be  supposed  that  the  word  'space'  stands  for  an  idea 
distinct  from  or  conceivable  without  body  and  motion — though 
indeed  we  are  apt  to  think  every  noun  substantive  stands  for  a 
distinct  idea  that  may  be  separated  from  all  others ;  which  has 
occasioned  infinite  mistakes.  When,  therefore,  supposing  all 
the  world  to  be  annihilated  besides  my  own  body,  I  say  there 
still  remains  pure  Space,  thereby  nothing  else  is  meant  but  only 
that  I  conceive  it  possible  for  the  limbs  of  my  body  to  be  moved 
on  all  sides  without  the  least  resistance ;  but  if  that  too  were 
annihilated  then  there  could  be  no  motion,  and  consequently  no 
Space100.  Some,  perhaps,  may  think  the  sense  of  seeing  does 
furnish  them  with  the  idea  of  pure  space;  but  it  is  plain  from 
what  we  have  elsewhere  shewn,  that  the  ideas  of  space  and 
distance  are  not  obtained  by  that  sense.  See  the  Essay  concern- 
ing Vision. 

117.  What  is  here  laid  down  seems  to  put  an  end  to  all  those 
disputes  and  difficulties  that  have  sprung  up  amongst  the  learned 
concerning  the  nature  oipure  Space.  But  the  chief  advantage  aris- 
ing from  it  is  that  we  are  freed  from  that  dangerous  dilemma,  to 
which  several  who  have  employed  their  thoughts  on  that  subject 
imagine  themselves  reduced,  viz.  of  thinking  either  that  Real 
Space  is  God,  or  else  that  there  is  something  beside  God  which 
is  eternal,  uncreated,  infinite,  indivisible,  immutable.  Both  which 
may  justly  be  thought  pernicious  and  absurd  notions.  It  is  cer- 
tain that  not  a  few  divines,  as  well  as  philosophers  of  great  note, 
have,  from  the  difficulty  they  found  in  conceiving  either  limits  or 
annihilation  of  space,  concluded  it  must  be  divine.  And  some 
of  late  have  set  themselves  particularly  to  shew  the  incommuni- 
cable attributes  of  God  agree  to  it1.  Which  doctrine,  hqw  un- 
worthy soever  it  may  seem  of  the  Divine  Nature,  yet  I  must 
confess  I  do  not  see  how  we  can  get  clear  of  it,  so  long  as  we 
adhere  to  the  received  opinions. 

118.  Hitherto  of  Natural  Philosophy:  we  come  now  to  make 
some  enquiry  concerning  that  other  great  branch  of  speculative 

100  i.e.  pure  Space,  as  immediately  perceived,  is  ultimately  the  sensation  of  an  unresisted 
motion  of  the  body,  or  of  any  of  its  organs.  See  this  less  fully  developed  in  New  Theory 
of  Vision. 

1  Clarke's  Demonstration  of  the  Being  and  Attributes  of  God,  which  appeared  in  1706. 


26o  OF    THE    PRINCIPLES 

knowledge,  to  wit,  Mathematics2.  These,  how  celebrated  soever 
they  may  be  for  their  clearness  and  certainty  of  demonstration, 
which  is  hardly  anywhere  else  to  be  found,  cannot  nevertheless 
be  supposed  altogether  free  from  mistakes,  if  so  be  that  in  their 
principles  there  lurks  some  secret  error  which  is  common  to  the 
professors  of  those  sciences  with  the  rest  of  mankind.  Mathe- 
maticians, though  they  deduce  their  theorems  from  a  great  height 
of  evidence,  yet  their  first  principles  are  limited  by  the  considera- 
tion of  quantity:  and  they  do  not  ascend  into  any  enquiry  con- 
cerning those  transcendental  maxims  which  influence  all  the 
particular  sciences,  each  part  whereof,  Mathematics  not  excepted, 
does  consequently  participate  of  the  errors  involved  in  them. 
That  the  principles  laid  down  by  mathematicians  are  true,  and 
their  way  of  deduction  from  those  principles  clear  and  incon- 
testable, we  do  not  deny;  but,  we  hold  there  may  be  certain 
erroneous  maxims  of  greater  extent  than  the  object  of  Mathe- 
matics, and  for  that  reason  not  expressly  mentioned,  though 
tacitly  supposed  throughout  the  whole  progress  of  that  science ; 
and  that  the  ill  effects  of  those  secret  unexamined  errors  are  dif- 
fused through  all  the  branches  thereof.  To  be  plain,  we  suspect 
the  mathematicians  are  no  less  deeply  concerned  than  other 
men  in  the  errors  arising  from  the  doctrine  of  abstract  general 
ideas,  and  the  existence  of  objects  without  the  mind. 

119.  Arithmetic  has  been  thought  to  have  for  its  object  ab- 
stract ideas  of  Number ;  of  which  to  understand  the  properties 
and  mutual  habitudes,  is  supposed  no  mean  part  of  speculative 
knowledge.  The  opinion  of  the  pure  and  intellectual  nature  of 
numbers  in  abstract  has  made  them  in  esteem  with  those  philos- 
ophers who  seem  to  have  affected  an  uncommon  fineness  and 
elevation  of  thought.  It  hath  set  a  price  on  the  most  trifling 
numerical  speculations  which  in  practice  are  of  no  use,  but  serve 
only  for  amusement;  and  hath  heretofore  so  far  infected  the 
minds  of  some,  that  they  have  dreamed  of  mighty  mysteries 
involved  in  numbers,  and  attempted  the  explication  of  natural 
things  by  them.  But,  if  we  narrowly  inquire  into  our  own 
thoughts,  and  consider  what  has  been  premised,  we  may  perhaps 
entertain  a  low  opinion  of  those  high  flights  and  abstractions, 
a  Sect.  118— 132. 


OF   HUMAN   KNOWLEDGE.  26l 

and  look  on  all  inquiries  about  numbers  only  as  so  many  difficilcs 
nugce,  so  far  as  they  are  not  subservient  to  practice,  and  promote 
the  benefit  of  life.  [IO*] 

1 20.  Unity  in  abstract  we  have  before  considered  in  sect.  13, 
from  which  and  what  has  been  said  in  the  Introduction,  it  plainly 
follows  there  is  not  any  such  idea.  But,  number  being  defined  a 
'collection  of  units,'  we  may  conclude  that,  if  there  be  no  such 
thing  as  unity  or  unit  in  abstract,  there  are  no  ideas  of  number 
in  abstract  denoted  by  the  numeral  names  and  figures.  The 
theories  therefore  in  Arithmetic,  if  they  are  abstracted  from  the 
names  and  figures,  as  likewise  from  all  us.e  and  practice,  as  well 
as  from  the  particular  things  numbered,  can  be  supposed  to  have 
nothing  at  all  for  their  object ;  hence  we  may  see  how  entirely 
the  science  of  numbers  is  subordinate  to  practice,  and  how  jejune 
and  trifling  it  becomes  when  considered  as  a  matter  of  mere 
speculation. 

121.  However,  since  there  may  be  some  who,  deluded  by  the 
specious  show  of  discovering  abstracted  verities,  waste  their  time 
in  arithmetical  theorems  and  problems  which  have  not  any  use, 
it  will  not  be  amiss  if  we  more  fully  consider  and  expose  the 
vanity  of  that  pretence ;  and  this  will  plainly  appear  by  taking  a 
view  of  Arithmetic  in  its  infancy,  and  observing  what  it  was  that 
originally  put  men  on  the  study  of  that  science,  and  to  what 
scope  they  directed  it.  It  is  natural  to  think  that  at  first,  men, 
for  ease  of  memory  and  help  of  computation,  made  use  of  count- 
ers, or  in  writing  of  single  strokes,  points,  or  the  like,  each 
whereof  was  made  to  signify  an  unit,  i.e.  some  one  thing  of  what- 
ever kind  they  had  occasion  to  reckon.  Afterwards  they  found 
out  the  more  compendious  ways  of  making  one  character  stand 
in  place  of  several  strokes  or  points.  And,  lastly,  the  notation 
of  the  Arabians  or  Indians  came  into  use,  wherein,  by  the  repe- 
tition of  a  few  characters  or  figures,  and  varying  the  signification 
of  each  figure  according  to  the  place  it  obtains,  all  numbers  may 
be  most  aptly  expressed ;  which  seems  to  have  been  done  in 
imitation  of  language,  so  that  an  exact  analogy  is  observed  be- 
twixt the  notation  by  figures  and  names,  the  nine  simple  figures 
answering  the  nine  first  numeral  names  and  places  in  the  former, 
corresponding  to  denominations  in  the  latter.     And  agreeably  to 


262  OF    THE    PRINCIPLES 

those  conditions  of  the  simple  and  local  value  of  figures,  were 
contrived  methods  of  finding,  from  the  given  figures  or  marks  of 
the  parts,  what  figures  and  how  placed  are  proper  to  denote  the 
whole,  or  vice  versa.  And  having  found  the  sought  figures,  the 
same  rule  or  analogy  being  observed  throughout,  it  is  easy  to 
read  them  into  words;  and  so  the  number  becomes  perfectly 
known.  For  then  the  number  of  any  particular  things  is  said  to 
be  known,  when  we  know  the  name  or  figures  (with  their  due 
arrangement)  that  according  to  the  standing  analogy  belong  to 
them.  For,  these  signs  being  known,  we  can  by  the  operations 
of  arithmetic  know  the  srgns  of  any  part  of  the  particular  sums 
signified  by  them;  and,  thus  computing  in  signs,  (because  of  the 
connexion  established  betwixt  them  and  the  distinct  multitudes 
of  things  whereof  one  is  taken  for  an  unit),  we  may  be  able  rightly 
to  sum  up,  divide,  and  proportion  the  things  themselves  that  we 
intend  to  number. 

122.  In  Arithmetic,  therefore,  we  regard  not  the  things  but  the 
signs,  which  nevertheless  are  not  regarded  for  their  own  sake,  but 
because  they  direct  us  how  to  act  with  relation  to  things,  and 
dispose  rightly  of  them.  Now,  agreeeably  to  what  we  have 
before  observed  of  words  in  general  (sect.  19,  Introd.)  it  happens 
here  likewise  that  abstract  ideas  are  thought  to  be  signified  by 
numeral  names  or  characters,  while  they  do  not  suggest  ideas  of 
particular  things  to  our  minds.  I  shall  not  at  present  enter  into 
a  more  particular  dissertation  on  this  subject,  but  only  observe 
that  it  is  evident  from  what  has  been  said,  those  things  which 
pass  for  abstract  truths  and  theorems  concerning  numbers,  are  in 
reality  conversant  about  no  object  distinct  from  particular  numer- 
able things,  except  only  names  and  characters,  which  originally 
came  to  be  considered  on  no  other  account  but  their  being  signs, 
or  capable  to  represent  aptly  whatever  particular  things  men 
had  need  to  compute.  Whence  it  follows  that  to  study  them  for 
their  own  sake  would  be  just  as  wise,  and  to  as  good  purpose  as 
if  a  man,  neglecting  the  true  use  or  original  intention  and  sub- 
serviency of  language,  should  spend  his  time  in  impertinent 
criticisms  upon  words,  or  reasonings  and  controversies  purely 
verbal.  [i°s] 

3  Cf.   New  Theory  of  Vision,  sect.  107,  &c. 


OF   HUMAN  KNOWLEDGE.  263 

123.  From  numbers  we  proceed  to  speak  of  Extension*,  which 
is  the  object  of  Geometry.  The  infinite  divisibility  of  finite  ex- 
tension, though  it  is  not  expressly  laid  down  either  as  an  axiom 
or  theorem  in  the  elements  of  that  science,  yet  is  throughout  the 
same  everywhere  supposed  and  thought  to  have  so  inseparable 
and  essential  a  connexion  with  the  principles  and  demonstrations 
in  Geometry,  that  mathematicians  never  admit  it  into  doubt,  or 
make  the  least  question  of  it.  And,  as  this  notion  is  the  source 
from  whence  do  spring  all  those  amusing  geometrical  paradoxes 
which  have  such  a  direct  repugnancy  to  the  plain  common  sense 
of  mankind,  and  are  admitted  with  so  much  reluctance  into  a 
mind  not  yet  debauched  by  learning ;  so  is  it  the  principal  occa- 
sion of  all  that  nice  and  extreme  subtilty  which  renders  the 
study  of  Mathematics  so  very  difficult  and  tedious.  Hence,  if 
we  can  make  it  appear  that  no  finite  extension  contains  innumer- 
able parts,  or  is  infinitely  divisible,  it  follows  that  we  shall  at 
once  clear  the  science  of  Geometry  from  a  great  number  of  diffi- 
culties and  contradictions  which  have  ever  been  esteemed  a 
reproach  to  human  reason,  and  withal  make  the  attainment 
thereof  a  business  of  much  less  time  and  pains  than  it  hitherto 
has  been. 

124.  Every  particular  finite  extension  which  may  possibly  be 
the  object  of  our  thought  is  an  idea  existing  only  in  the  mind, 
and  consequently  each  part  thereof  must  be  perceived.  If,  there- 
fore, I  cannot  perceive  innumerable  parts  in  any  finite  extension 
that  I  consider,  it  is  certain  they  are  not  contained  in  it ;  but,  it 
is  evident  that  I  cannot  distinguish  innumerable  parts  in  any 
particular  line,  surface,  or  solid,  which  I  either  perceive  by  sense, 
or  figure  to  myself  in  my  mind :  wherefore  I  conclude  they  are 
not  contained  in  it.  Nothing  can  be  plainer  to  me  than  that  the 
extensions  I  have  in  view  are  no  other  than  my  own  ideas ;  and 
it  is  no  less  plain  that  I  cannot  resolve  any  one  of  my  ideas  into 
an  infinite  number  of  other  ideas,  that  is,  that  they  are  not  in 
finitely  divisible5.     If  by  finite  extension  be  meant  something 

4  Cf.  New  Theory  of  Vision,  sect.  122 — 125,  149 — 160. 

5  Infinitely  divisible  extension,  being  unperceived,  must  be  non-existent — if  existence 
necessarily  depends  on  a  percipient,  and  must  be  actually  perceived.  The  only  possible 
extension  is  then  sensible  extension,  which  cannot  be  infinitely  divided,  but  only  divided 
down  to  the  point  at  which  its  parts  become  insensible  or  non-existent. 


264  OF    THE    PRINCIPLES 

distinct  from  a  finite  idea,  I  declare  I  do  not  know  what  that  is, 
and  so  cannot  affirm  or  deny  anything  of  it.  [Io6]  But  if  the 
terms  '  extension,'  '  parts,'  &c,  are  taken  in  any  sense  conceiv- 
able, that  is,  for  ideas,  then  to  say  a  finite  quantity  or  extension 
consists  of  parts  infinite  in  number  is  so  manifest  and  glaring  a 
contradiction,  that  every  one  at  first  sight  acknowledges  it  to  be 
so;[107]  and  it  is  impossible  it  should  ever  gain  the  assent  of 
any  reasonable  creature  who  is  not  brought  to  it  by  gentle  and 
slow  degrees,  as  a  converted  Gentile6  to  the  belief  of  transubstan- 
tiation.  Ancient  and  rooted  prejudices  do  often  pass  into  prin- 
ciples ;  and  those  propositions  which  once  obtain  the  force  and 
credit  of  a  principle,  are  not  only  themselves,  but  likewise  what- 
ever is  deducible  from  them,  thought  privileged  from  all  exami- 
nation. And  there  is  no  absurdity  so  gross,  which,  by  this 
means,  the  mind  of  man  may  not  be  prepared  to  swallow. 

125.  He  whose  understanding  is  prepossessed  with  the  doc- 
trine of  abstract  general  ideas  may  be  [7  easily]  persuaded  that 
(whatever  be  thought  of  the  ideas  of  sense)  extension  in  abstract 
is  infinitely  divisible.  And  any  one  who  thinks  the  objects  of 
sense  exist  without  the  mind  will  perhaps  in  virtue  thereof  be 
brought  to  admit  that8  a  line  but  an  inch  long  may  contain  in- 
numerable parts — really  existing,  though  too  small  to  be  dis- 
cerned. These  errors  are  grafted  as  well  in  the  minds  of  geo- 
metricians as  of  other  men,  and  have  a  like  influence  on  their 
reasonings ;  and  it  were  no  difficult  thing  to  shew  how  the 
arguments  from  Geometry  made  use  of  to  support  the  infinite 
divisibility  of  extension  are  bottomed  on  them.  [9But  this,  if  it 
be  thought  necessary,  we  may  hereafter  find  a  proper  place  to 
treat  of  in  a  particular  manner.]  At  present  we  shall  only  ob- 
serve in  general  whence  it  is  the  mathematicians  are  all  so  fond 
and  tenacious  of  that  doctrine. 

126.  It  has  been  observed  in  another  place  that  the  theorems 
and  demonstrations  in  Geometry  are  conversant  about  universal 
ideas  (sect.  15.  Introd.) ;  where  it  is  explained  in  what  sense  this 

6  '  converted  Gentile' — '  pagan  convert' — in  first  edition. 

7  Omitted  in  second  edition. 

8  '  will  perhaps  in  virtue  thereof  be  brought  to  admit  that,"  &c. — '  will  not  stick  to  affirm 
that,'  &c. — in  first  edition. 

9  Omitted  in  second  edition. 


OF   HUMAN   KNOWLEDGE.  26$ 

ought  to  be  understood,  to  wit,  the  particular  lines  and  figures 
included  in  the  diagram  are  supposed  to  stand  for  innumerable 
others  of  different  sizes ;  or,  in  other  words,  the  geometer  con- 
siders them  abstracting  from  their  magnitude — which  does  not 
imply  that  he  forms  an  abstract  idea,  but  only  that  he  cares  not 
what  the  particular  magnitude  is,  whether  great  or  small,  but 
looks  on  that  as  a  thing  indifferent  to  the  demonstration.  Hence 
it  follows  that  a  line  in  the  scheme  but  an  inch  long  must  be 
spoken  of  as  though  it  contained  ten  thousand  parts,  since  it  is 
regarded  not  in  itself,  but  as  it  is  universal ;  and  it  is  universal 
only  in  its  signification,  whereby  it  represents  innumerable  lines 
greater  than  itself,  in  which  may  be  distinguished  ten  thousand 
parts  or  more,  though  there  may  not  be  above  an  inch  in  it. 
After  this  manner,  the  properties  of  the  lines  signified  are  (by  a 
very  usual  figure)  transferred  to  the  sign,  and  thence,  through 
mistake,  thought  to  appertain  to  it  considered  in  its  own  nature. 

127.  Because  there  is  no  number  of  parts  so  great  but  it  is 
possible  there  may  be  a  line  containing  more,  the  inch-line  is 
said  to  contain  parts  more  than  any  assignable  number;  which  is 
true,  not  of  the  inch  taken  absolutely,  but  only  for  the  things 
signified  by  it.  But  men,  not  retaining  that  distinction  in  their 
thoughts,  slide  into  a  belief  that  the  small  particular  line  described 
on  paper  contains  in  itself  parts  innumerable.  There  is  no  such 
thing  as  the  ten  thousandth  part  of  an  inch ;  but  there  is  of  a 
mile  or  diameter  of  the  earth,  which  may  be  signified  by  that 
inch.  When  therefore  I  delineate  a  triangle  on  paper,  and  take 
one  side  not  above  an  inch,  for  example,  in  length  to  be  the 
radius,  this  I  consider  as  divided  into  10,000  or  100,000  parts  or 
more  ;  for,  though  the  ten  thousandth  part  of  that  line  considered 
in  itself  is  nothing  at  all,  and  consequently  may  be  neglected 
without  any  error  or  inconveniency,  yet  these  described  lines, 
being  only  marks  standing  for  greater  quantities,  whereof  it 
may  be  the  ten  thousandth  part  is  very  considerable,  it  follows 
that,  to  prevent  notable  errors  in  practice,  the  radius  must  be 
taken  of  10,000  parts  or  more. 

1 28.  From  what  has  been  said  the  reason  is  plain  why,  to  the 
end  any  theorem  become  universal  in  its  use,  it  is  necessary  we 
speak  of  the  lines  described  on  paper  as  though  they  contained 


266  OF    THE    PRINCIPLES 

parts  which  really  they  do  not.  In  doing  of  which,  if  we  examine 
the  matter  throughly,  we  shall  perhaps  discover  that  we  cannot 
conceive  an  inch  itself  as  consisting  of,  or  being  divisible  into,  a 
thousand  parts,  but  only  some  other  line  which  is  far  greater  than 
an  inch,  and  represented  by  it;  and  that  when  we  say  a  line  is 
infinitely  divisible,  we  must  mean  a  line  which  is  infinitely  great10. 
What  we  have  here  observed  seems  to  be  the  chief  cause  why, 
to  suppose  the  infinite  divisibility  of  finite  extension  has  been 
thought  necessary  in  geometry. 

129.  The  several  absurdities  and  contradictions  which  flowed 
from  this  false  principle  might,  one  would,  think,  have  been 
esteemed  so  many  demonstrations  against  it.  But,  by  I  know  not 
what  logic,  it  is  held  that  proofs  a  posteriori  [10*~\  are  not  to  be 
admitted  against  propositions  relating  to  infinity — as  though  it 
were  not  impossible  even  for  an  infinite  mind  to  reconcile  contra- 
dictions ;  or  as  if  anything  absurd  and  repugnant  could  have  a 
necessary  connexion  with  truth  or  flow  from  it.  But,  whoever 
considers  the  weakness  of  this  pretence  will  think  it  was  contrived 
on  purpose  to  humour  the  laziness  of  the  mind  which  had  rather 
acquiesce  in  an  indolent  scepticism  than  be  at  the  pains  to  go 
through  with  a  severe  examination  of  those  principles  it  has  ever 
embraced  for  true. 

130.  Of  late  [IO°]  the  speculations  about  Infinites  have  run  so 
high,  and  grown  to  such  strange  notions,  as  have  occasioned  no 
small  scruples  and  disputes  among  the  geometers  of  the  present 
age.  Some  there  are  of  great  note  who,  not  content  with  holding 
that  finite  lines  may  be  divided  into  an  infinite  number  of  parts, 
do  yet  farther  maintain  that  each  of  those  infinitesimals  is  itself 
subdivisible  into  an  infinity  of  other  parts  or  infinitesimals  of  a 
second  order,  and  so  on  ad  infinitum.  These,  I  say,  assert  there 
are  infinitesimals  of  infinitesimals  of  infinitesimals,  &c,  without 
ever  coming  to  an  end:  so  that  according' to  them  an  inch  does 
not  barely  contain  an  infinite  number  of  parts,  but  an  infinity  of 
an  infinity  of  an  infinity  ad  infinitum  of  parts.  Others  there  be 
who  hold  all  orders  of  infinitesimals  below  the  first  to  be  nothing 
at  all;  thinking  it  with  good  reason  absurd  to  imagine  there  is 

10  '  we  must  mean  a  line,'  &c. — '  we  mean  (if  we  mean  anything)  a  line,"  &c. — in  first 
edition. 


OF   HUMAN    KNOWLEDGE.  267 

any  positive  quantity  or  part  of  extension  which,  though  mul- 
tiplied infinitely,  can  never  equal  the  smallest  given  extension. 
[IIG]  And  yet  on  the  other  hand  it  seems  no  less  absurd  to  think 
the  square,  cube,  or  other  power  of  a  positive  real  root,  should 
itself  be  nothing  at  all ;  which  they  who  hold  infinitesimals  of 
the  first  order,  denying  all  of  the  subsequent  orders,  are  obliged 
to  maintain. 

131.  Have  we  not  therefore  reason  to  conclude  they  are  both 
in  the  wrong,  and  that  there  is  in  effect  no  such  thing  as  parts 
infinitely  small,  or  an  infinite  number  of  parts  contained  in  any 
finite  quantity  ?  But  you  will  say  that  if  this  doctrine  obtains  it 
will  follow  the  very  foundations  of  Geometry  are  destroyed,  and 
those  great  men  who  have  raised  that  science  to  so  astonishing 
a  height,  have  been  all  the  while  building  a  castle  in  the  air.  To 
this  it  may  be  replied  that  whatever  is  useful  in  geometry,  and 
promotes  the  benefit  of  human  life,  does  still  remain  firm  and 
unshaken  on  our  principles — that  science  considered  as  practical 
will  rather  receive  advantage  than  any  prejudice  from  what  has 
been  said.  But  to  set  this  in  a  due  light,  and  shew  how  lines  and 
figures  may  be  measured,  and  their  properties  investigated,  with- 
out supposing  finite  extension  to  be  infinitely  divisible,  may  be 
the  proper  business  of  another  place".  For  the  rest,  though  it 
should  follow  that  some  of  the  more  intricate  and  subtle  parts 
of  Speculative  Mathematics  may  be  pared  off  without  any  pre- 
judice to  truth,  yet  I  do  not  see  what  damage  will  be  thence 
derived  to  mankind.  On  the  contrary,  I  think  it  were  highly  to 
be  wished  that  men  of  great  abilities  and  obstinate  application12 
would  draw  off  their  thoughts  from  those  amusements,  and  employ 
them  in  the  study  of  such  things  as  lie  nearer  the  concerns  of 
life,  or  have  a  more  direct  influence  on  the  manners. 

132.  If  it  be  said  that  several  theorems  undoubtedly  true  are 
discovered  by  methods  in  which  infinitesimals  are  made  use  of, 
which  could  never  have  been  if  their  existence  included  a  contra- 
diction in  it — I  answer  that  upon  a  thorough  examination  it  will 
not  be  found  that  in  any  instance  it  is  necessary  to  make  use  of 

11  See  Analyst. 

12  '  men  of  great  abilities  and  obstinate  application,'  &c. — '  men  of  the  greatest  abilities 
and  most  obstinate  application,'  &c. — in  first  edition. 


268  OF    THE    PRINCIPLES 

or  conceive  infinitesimal  parts  of  finite  lines,  or  even  quantities 
less  than  the  minimum  scnsibile ;  nay,  it  will  be  evident  this  is 
never  done,  it  being  impossible.  ['3  And,  whatever  mathematicians 
may  think  of  fluxions,  or  the  differential  calculus  and  the  like,  a 
little  reflection  will  shew  them  that,  in  working  by  those  methods, 
they  do  not  conceive  or  imagine  lines  or  surfaces  less  than  what 
are  perceivable  to  sense.  They  may  indeed  call  those  little  and 
almost  insensible  quantities  infinitesimals,  or  infinitesimals  of  in- 
finitesimals, if  they  please ;  but  at  bottom  this  is  all,  they  being 
in  truth  finite — nor  does  the  solution  of  problems  require  the 
supposing  any  other.  But  this  will  be  more  clearly  made  out 
hereafter.] 

133.  By  what  we  have  hitherto  said,  it  is  plain  that  very 
numerous  and  important  errors  have  taken  their  rise  from  those 
false  Principles  which  were  impugned  in  the  foregoing  parts  of 
this  treatise ;  and  the  opposites  of  those  erroneous  tenets  at  the 
same  time  appear  to  be  most  fruitful  Principles,  from  whence 
do  flow  innumerable  consequences  highly  advantageous  to  true 
philosophy,  as  well  as  to  religion.  Particularly  Matter,  or  the  ab- 
solute1* existence  of  corporeal  objects,  hath  been  shewn  to  be  that 
wherein  the  most  avowed  and  pernicious  enemies  of  all  knowledge, 
whether  human  or  divine,  have  ever  placed  their  chief  strength 
and  confidence.  And  surely,  if  by  distinguishing  the  real  exist- 
ence of  unthinking  things  from  their  being  perceived,  and  allow- 
ing them  a  subsistence  of  their  own  out  of  the  minds  of  spirits, 
no  one  thing  is  explained  in  nature,  but  on  the  contrary  a  great 
many  inexplicable  difficulties  arise  ;  if  the  supposition  of  Matter's 
is  barely  precarious,  as  not  being  grounded  on  so  much  as  one 
single  reason ;  if  its  consequences  cannot  endure  the  light  of 
examination  and  free  inquiry,  but  screen  themselves  under  the 
dark  and  general  pretence  of  infinites  being  incomprehensible;' 
if  withal  the  removal  of  this  Matter**  be  not  attended  with  the 
least  evil  consequence ;  if  it  be  not  even  missed  in  the  world, 

»3  What  follows  to  the  end  of  this  section  is  omitted  in  the  second  edition. 

M  '  absolute,'  i.  e.  unperceived  or  irrelative  existence — supposed  to  be  either  something 
extended,  or  something  of  which  we  have  no  positive  conception  at  all. 

•5  i.  e.  absolute  or  unperceived  Matter,  but  not  the  relative  or  perceived  material  world 
of  the  senses. 


OF   HUMAN   KNOWLEDGE.  269 

but  everything  as  well,  nay  much  easier  conceived  without  it; 
if,  lastly,  both  Sceptics  and  Atheists  are  for  ever  silenced  upon 
supposing  only  spirits  and  ideas,  and  this  scheme  of  things  is 
perfectly  agreeable  both  to  Reason  and  Religion — methinks  we 
may  expect  it  should  be  admitted  and  firmly  embraced,  though 
it  were  proposed  only  as  an  hypothesis,  and  the  existence  of 
Matter15  had  been  allowed  possible,  which  yet  I  think  we  have 
evidently  demonstrated  that  it  is  not. 

134.  True  it  is  that,  in  consequence  of  the  foregoing  principles, 
several  disputes  and  speculations  which  are  esteemed  no  mean 
parts  of  learning,  are  rejected  as  useless  [l6and  in  effect  conversant 
about  nothing  at  all].  But,  how  great  a  prejudice  soever  against 
our  notions  this  may  give  to  those  who  have  already  been  deeply 
engaged,  and  made  large  advances  in  studies  of  that  nature,  yet 
by  others  we  hope  it  will  not  be  thought  any  just  ground  of  dislike 
to  the  principles  and  tenets  herein  laid  down — that  they  abridge 
the  labour  of  study,  and  make  human  sciences  far  more  clear, 
compendious,  and  attainable  than  they  were  before. 

135.  Having  despatched  what  we  intended  to  say  concerning 
the  knowledge  of  Ideas,  the  method  we  proposed  leads  us  in  the 
next  place  to  treat  of  Spirits17 — with  regard  to  which,  perhaps, 
human  knowledge  is  not  so  deficient  as  is  vulgarly  imagined. 
The  great  reason  that  is  assigned  for  our  being  thought  ignorant 
of  the  nature  of  spirits  is — our  not  having  an  idea  of  it.  But, 
surely  it  ought  not  to  be  looked  on  as  a  defect  in  a  human  under- 
standing that  it  does  not  perceive  the  idea  of  spirit,  if  it  is  mani- 
festly impossible  there  should  be  any  such  idea.  And  this  if  I 
mistake  not  has  been  demonstrated  in  section  27;  to  which  I  shall 
here  add — that  a  spirit  has  been  shewn  to  be  the  only  substance 
or  support  wherein  unthinking  beings  or  ideas  can  exist;  but 

JS  See  note  15  on  previous  page. 

16  Omitted  in  second  edition. 

«7  Sect.  135—156  treat  of  the  consequences  of  the  new  Principles  of  Human  Knowl- 
edge, in  their  application  to  Spirits  or  Minds — the  second  of  the  two  correlatives  in  the 
dualism  of  Berkeley.  This  dualism  Berkeley  does  not  sufficiently  explain.  When  he 
speaks  of  Mind  as  a  Substance,  and  of  minds  in  the  plural,  he  cannot  mean  by  '  substance' 
what  Spinoza  means — that  which  for  its  existence  needs  nothing  beyond  itself.  Mind, 
with  Berkeley,  needs  ideas,  and  must  be  conscious ;  and  finite  minds  are  dependent  on 
God,  in  a  relation  which  he  does  not  define. 


270 


OF    THE    PRINCIPLES 


that  this  substance  which  supports  or  perceives  ideas  should  itself 
be  an  idea  or  like  an  idea  is  evidently  absurd. 

136.  It  will  perhaps  be  said  that  we  want  a  sense  (as  some 
have  imagined18)  proper  to  know  substances  withal,  which,  if 
we  had,  we  might  know  our  own  soul  as  we  do  a  triangle.  To 
this  I  answer,  that,  in  case  we  had  a  new  sense  bestowed  upon 
us,  we  could  only  receive  thereby  some  new  sensations  or  ideas 
of  sense.  But  I  believe  nobody  will  say  that  what  he  means  by 
the  terms  soid  and  substance  is  only  some  particular  sort  of  idea 
or  sensation.  We  may  therefore  infer  that,  all  things  duly  con- 
sidered, it  is  not  more  reasonable  to  think  our  faculties  defective, 
in  that  they  do  not  furnish  us  with  an  idea  of  spirit  or  active 
thinking  substance,  than  it  would  be  if  we  should  blame  them 
for  not  being  able  to  comprehend  a  round  square. 

137.  From  the  opinion  that  spirits  are  to  be  known  after  the 
manner  of  an  idea  or  sensation  have  risen  many  absurd  and 
heterodox  tenets,  and  much  scepticism  about  the  nature  of  the 
soul.  It  is  even  probable  that  this  opinion  may  have  produced 
a  doubt  in  some  whether  they  had  any  soul  at  all  distinct  from 
their  body,  since  upon  inquiry  they  could  not  find  they  had  an 
idea  of  it.  That  an  idea  which  is  inactive,  and  the  existence 
whereof  consists  in  being  perceived,  should  be  the  image  or 
likeness  of  an  agent  subsisting  by  itself,  seems  to  need  no  other 
refutation  than  barely  attending  to  what  is  meant  by  those  words. 
But,  perhaps  you  will  say  that  though  an  idea  cannot  resemble 
a  spirit  in  its  thinking,  acting,  or  subsisting  by  itself,  yet  it  may 
in  some  other  respects ;  and  it  is  not  necessary  that  an  idea  or 
image  be  in  all  respects  like  the  original. 

1 38.  I  answer,  if  it  does  not  in  those  mentioned,  it  is  impossible 
it  should  represent  it  in  any  other  thing.  Do  but  leave  out  the 
power  of  willing,  thinking,  and  perceiving  ideas,  and  there  re- 
mains nothing  else  wherein  the  idea  can  be  like  a  spirit.  For, 
by  the  word  spirit  we  mean  only  that  which  thinks,  wills,  and 
perceives ;  this,  and  this  alone,  constitutes  the  signification  of 
that  term.  If  therefore  it  is  impossible  that  any  degree  of  those 
powers  should  be  represented  in  an  idea  ['^or  notion],  it  is  evident 
there  can  be  no  idea  [I9or  notion]  of  a  spirit. 

18  Locke.  «»  Omitted  in  second  edition.    Cf.  sect.  14a. 


OF   HUMAN   KNOWLEDGE.  2Jl 

139.  But  it  will  be  objected  that,  if  there  is  no  idea  signified  by 
the  terms  soul,  spirit,  and  substance,  they  are  wholly  insignificant, 
or  have  no  meaning  in  them.  I  answer,  those  words  do  mean  or 
signify  a  real  thing — which  is  neither  an  idea  nor  like  an  idea, 
but  that  which  perceives  ideas,  and  wills,  and  reasons  about  them. 
What  I  am  myself — that  which  I  denote  by  the  term  / — is  the 
same  with  what  is  meant  by  soul  or  spiritual  substance.  [2°But  if 
I  should  say  that  /was  nothing,  or  that  /was  an  idea  or  notion, 
nothing  could  be  more  evidently  absurd  than  either  of  these  pro- 
positions.] If  it  be  said  that  this  is  only  quarrelling  at  a  word, 
and  that,  since  the  immediate  significations  of  other  names  are  by 
common  consent  called  ideas,  no  reason  can  be  assigned  why 
that  which  is  signified  by  the  name  spirit  or  soul  may  not  par- 
take in  the  same  appellation,  I  answer,  all  the  unthinking  objects 
of  the  mind  agree  in  that  they  are  entirely  passive,  and  their 
existence  consists  only  in  being  perceived ;  whereas  a  soul  or 
spirit  is  an  active  being,  whose  existence  consists,  not  in  being 
perceived,  but  in  perceiving  ideas  and  thinking21.  It  is  therefore 
necessary,  in  order  to  prevent  equivocation  and  confounding 
natures  perfectly  disagreeing  and  unlike,  that  we  distinguish 
between  spirit  and  idea.     See  sect.  27. 

140.  In  a  large  sense  indeed,  we  may  be  said  to  have  an  idea 
[22or  rather  a  notion]  of  spirit;  that  is,  we  understand  the  mean- 
ing of  the  word,  otherwise  we  could  not  affirm  or  deny  anything 
of  it.  Moreover,  as  we  conceive  the  ideas  that  are  in  the  minds 
of  other  spirits  by  means  of  our  own,  which  we  suppose  to  be 
resemblances  of  them ;  so  we  know  other  spirits  by  means  of 
our  own  soul — which  in  that  sense  is  the  image  or  idea  of  them  ; 
it  having  a  like  respect  to  other  spirits  that  blueness  or  heat  by 
me  perceived  has  to  those  ideas  perceived  by  another23. 

20  Omitted  in  second  edition.     Cf.  sect.  142. 

81  If  the  existence  of  a  mind  consists  in  perceiving,  it  follows  that  mind  is  as  dependent 
on  ideas  (of  some  sort)  as  ideas  are  on  mind. 

22  Introduced  in  second  edition,  in  which  he  professes  to  apply  the  term  notion  exclu- 
sively to  our  knowledge  of  the  Ego,  and  to  our  knowledge  of  relations  among  our  ideas. 
Sect.  142. 

*3  We  know  other  minds  or  Egos  phenomenally,  i.  e.  through  phenomena,  or  by  infer- 
ence from  them,  but  not  as  ideas  or  phenomena  of  which  we  ourselves  are  conscious.  Cf. 
sect.  148.  It  is  thus  a  phenomenal  knowledge  that  we  have  of  other  finite  minds — of  Ego 
viewed  empirically  and  in  plurality.     The  real  meaning  of  Ego  in  the  plural  number,  dis- 


2?2 


OF    THE    PRINCIPLES 


141.  [24The  natural  immortality  of  the  soul[1"]  is  a  neces- 
sary consequence  of  the  foregoing  doctrine.  But  before  we  at- 
tempt to  prove  this,  it  is  fit  that  we  explain  the  meaning  of  that 
tenet.]  It  must  not  be  supposed  that  they  who  assert  the  natural 
immortality  of  the  soul25  are  of  opinion  that  it  is  absolutely  in- 
capable of  annihilation  even  by  the  infinite  power  of  the  Creator 
who  first  gave  it  being,  but  only  that  it  is  not  liable  to  be  broken 
or  dissolved  by  the  ordinary  laws  of  nature  or  motion.  They 
indeed  who  hold  the  soul  of  man  to  be  only  a  thin  vital  flame,  or 
system  of  animal  spirits,  make  it  perishing  and  corruptible  as  the 
body ;  since  there  is  nothing  more  easily  dissipated  than  such  a 
being,  which  it  is  naturally  impossible  should  survive  the  ruin  of 
the  tabernacle  wherein  it  is  inclosed.  And  this  notion  has  been 
greedily  embraced  and  cherished  by  the  worst  part  of  mankind, 
as  the  most  effectual  antidote  against  all  impressions  of  virtue 
and  religion.  [II2]  But  it  has  been  made  evident  that  bodies,  of 
what  frame  or  texture  soever,  are  barely  passive  ideas  in  the 
mind — which  is  more  distant  and  heterogeneous  from  them  than 
light  is  from  darkness26.  We  have  shewn  that  the  soul  is  indi- 
visible, incorporeal,  unextended,  and  it  is  consequently  incorrupt- 
ible. Nothing  can  be  plainer  than  that  the  motions,  changes, 
decays,  and  dissolutions  which  we  hourly  see  befal  natural 
bodies  (and  which  is  what  we  mean  by  the  course  of  nature)  can- 
not possibly  affect  an  active,  simple,  uncompounded  substance: 
such  a  being  therefore  is  indissoluble  by  the  force  of  nature ; 
that  is  to  say,  '  the  soul  of  man  is  naturally  immortal27.' 

142.  After  what  has  been  said,  it  is,  I  suppose,  plain  that  our 
souls  are  not  to  be  known  in  the  same  manner  as  senseless,  inac- 
tive objects,  or  by  way  of  idea.  Spirits  and  ideas  are  things  so 
wholly  different,  that  when  we  say  'they  exist,'  'they  are  known,' 

tinguished  from  the  absolute  or  transcendental  Ego,  is  a  question  which  Berkeley  has  not 
discussed. 

*4  Omitted  in  second  edition. 

*5  '  the  soul,'  i.  e.  the  finite  mind  or  empirical  Ego. 

36  Tli is  is  an  emphatic  assertion  of  the  dualism  of  Berkeley — Minds  or  Egos  being  dis- 
tinguished from  their  ideas  or  objects. 

*i  Although  minds  are  dependent  on  ideas,  as  well  as  ideas  on  minds,  yet  minds  are 
not,  by  any  abstract  necessity,  dependent  on  sense-ideas  or  physical  organization.  Hence, 
while  pure  materialism  is,  on  Berkeley's  principles,  a  contradiction,  the  continued  exist- 
ence of  a  disembodied  spirit  involves  no  necessary  absurdity. 


OF   HUMAN   KNOWLEDGE. 


273 


or  the  like,  these  words  must  not  be  thought  to  signify  anything 
common  to  both  natures28.  There  is  nothing  alike  or  common 
in  them  ;  and  to  expect  that  by  any  multiplication  or  enlarge- 
ment of  our  faculties  we  may  be  enabled  to  know  a  spirit  as  we 
do  a  triangle29,  seems  as  absurd  as  if  we  should  hope  to  see  a 
sound.  This  is  inculcated  because  I  imagine  it  may  be  of  mo- 
ment towards  clearing  several  important  questions,  and  prevent- 
ing some  very  dangerous  errors  concerning  the  nature  of  the 
soul.  [3°We  may  not,  I  think,  strictly  be  said  to  have  an  idea 
of  an  active  being,  or  of  an  action31,  although  we  may  be  said  to 
have  a  notion  of  them.  I  have  some  knowledge  or  notion  of  my 
mind,  and  its  acts  about  ideas — inasmuch  as  I  know  or  under- 
stand what  is  meant  by  these  words.  What  I  know,  that  I  have 
some  notion  of.  I  will  not  say  that  the  terms  idea  and  notion 
may  not  be  used  convertibly,  if  the  world  will  have  it  so ;  but 
yet  it  conduceth  to  clearness  and  propriety  that  we  distinguish 
things  very  different  by  different  names.  It  is  also  to  be  re- 
marked that,  all  relations  including  an  act  of  the  mind32,  we  can- 
not so  properly  be  said  to  have  an  idea,  but  rather  a  notion  of 
the  relations  and  habitudes  between  things.  But  if,  in  the  mod- 
ern way,  the  word  idea  is  extended  to  spirits,  and  relations,  and 
acts,  this  is,  after  all,  an  affair  of  verbal  concern.] 

143.  It  will  not  be  amiss  to  add,  that  the  doctrine  of  abstract 
ideas  has  had  no  small  share  in  rendering  those  sciences  intricate 
and  obscure  which  are  particularly  conversant  about  spiritual 
things.     Men  have  imagined  they  could  frame  abstract  notions 

28  The  objective  essence  of  matter,  or  the  sense-given  non-ego,  is,  with  Berkeley,  purely 
phenomenal  or  ideal ;  the  essence  of  mind — the  Ego — is  substantial  and  causal.  Sense- 
ideas  or  phenomena  are  at  once  dependent  on  mind,  and  symbolical  of  the  intentions  of 
mind.  Mind  and  its  ideas  are,  in  short,  at  the  opposite  poles  of  existence — being  related 
as  subject  knowing  and  object  known,  as  cause  and  effects,  as  substance  and  phenomenon. 
But  he  does  not  say  that  these  poles,  thus  opposed,  are  numerically  distinguishable  as 
things  independent  of  each  other. 

=9  i.  e.  objectively — as  an  object  or  idea. 

3°  What  follows  was  introduced  in  the  second  edition,  in  which  the  term  notion  is 
denned,  and  assists  to  express  Berkeley's  duality  in  things. 

31  Yet  he  speaks  elsewhere  (sect.  1,  &c.)  of  ideas  formed  by  attending  to  the  '  operations' 
of  the  mind.  He  probably  refers  to  the  effects  of  the  operations,  holding  that  the  effects, 
but  not  their  cause,  are  ideal. 

3*  Here  is  the  germ  of  Kantism.  But  Berkeley  has  not  analysed  that  activity  of  mind 
which  constitutes  relation,  as  distinguished  from  the  personal  acting  of  will.  Cf.  remarka- 
ble passages  in  Siris,  sect.  297,  308,  &c. 

18 


274  OF    THE    PRINCIPLES 

of  the  powers  and  acts  of  the  mind,  and  consider  them  prescinded 
as  well  from  the  mind  or  spirit  itself,  as  from  their  respective 
objects  and  effects.  ["3]  Hence  a  great  number  of  dark  and  am- 
biguous terms,  presumed  to  stand  for  abstract  notions,  have  been 
introduced  into  metaphysics  and  morality,  and  from  these  have 
grown  infinite  distractions  and  disputes  amongst  the  learned. 

144.  But,  nothing  seems  more  to  have  contributed  towards 
engaging  men  in  controversies  and  mistakes  with  regard  to  the 
nature  and  operations  of  the  mind,  than  the  being  used  to  speak 
of  those  things  in  terms  borrowed  from  sensible  ideas.  For  ex- 
ample, the  will  is  termed  the  motion  of  the  soul :  this  infuses  a 
belief  that  the  mind  of  man  is  as  a  ball  in  motion,  impelled  and 
determined  by  the  objects  of  sense,  as  necessarily  as  that  is  by 
the  stroke  of  a  racket.  Hence  arise  endless  scruples  and  errors 
of  dangerous  consequence  in  morality.  All  which,  I  doubt  not, 
may  be  cleared,  and  truth  appear  plain,  uniform,  and  consistent, 
could  but  philosophers  be  prevailed  on  to  [33 depart  from  some 
received  prejudices  and  modes  of  speech,  and]  retire  into  them- 
selves, and  attentively  consider  their  own  meaning.  [33But  the 
difficulties  arising  on  this  head  demand  a  more  particular  disqui- 
sition than  suits  with  the  design  of  this  treatise.] 

145.  From  what  has  been  said,  it  is  plain  that  we  cannot  know 
the  existence  of  other  spirits  otherwise  than  by  their  operations, 
or  the  ideas  by  them  excited  in  us.  I  perceive  several  motions, 
changes,  and  combinations  of  ideas,  that  inform  me  there  are  cer- 
tain particular  agents,  like  myself,  which  accompany  them  and 
concur  in  their  production. [II4]  Hence,  the  knowledge  I  have 
of  other  spirits  is  not  immediate,  as  is  the  knowledge  of  my 
ideas ;  but  depending  on  the  intervention  of  ideas,  by  me  referred 
to  agents  or  spirits  distinct  from  myself,  as  effects  or  concomitant 
signs34. 

33  Omitted  in  second  edition. 

34  This  is  one  of  the  most  important  sections  in  the  book.  It  has  been  common  (see 
Reid's  Essays,  VI.  5,  &c.)  to  allege  that,  on  Berkeley's  principles,  I  have  no  reason  to  be- 
lieve in  the  existence  of  other  minds  or  wills — a  plurality  of  Egos,  or  at  any  rate  in  other 
Egos  than  my  own,  and  the  Supreme  or  Absolute.  I  can  design  or  intend  ;  all  the  rest  is 
God's — my  volitions  and  His  determine  the  phenomenal  universe.  Now,  Berkeley  holds 
that  we  have  the  same  sort  of  reason  to  believe  in  the  existence  of  other  human  minds  that 
we  have  to  believe  in  the  existence  of  God,  viz.  the  sense-symbolism  which  implies  the 
existence  of  other  finite  minds,  embodied  like  our  own,  as  its  only  reasonable  interpreta- 


OF   HUMAN   KNOWLEDGE.  27$ 

146.  But,  though  there  be  some  things  which  convince  us 
human  agents  are  concerned  in  producing  them,  yet  it  is  evident 
to  every  one  that  those  things  which  are  called  the  Works  of 
Nature,  that  is,  the  far  greater  part  of  the  ideas  or  sensations 
perceived  by  us,  are  not  produced  by,  or  dependent  on,  the  wills 
of  men.  There  is  therefore  some  other  Spirit  that  causes  them ; 
since  it  is  repugnant  that  they  should  subsist  by  themselves. 
See  sect.  29.  But,  if  we  attentively  consider  the  constant  re- 
gularity, order,  and  concatenation  of  natural  things,  the  surprising 
magnificence,  beauty  and  perfection  of  the  larger,  and  the  exqui- 
site contrivance  of  the  smaller  parts  of  the  creation,  together 
with  the  exact  harmony  and  correspondence  of  the  whole,  but 
above  all  the  never-enough-admired  laws  of  pain  and  pleasure, 
and  the  instincts  or  natural  inclinations,  appetites,  and  passions 
of  animals — I  say  if  we  consider  all  these  things,  and  at  the  same 
time  attend  to  the  meaning  and  import  of  the  attributes  One, 
Eternal,  Infinitely  Wise,  Good,  and  Perfect,  we  shall  clearly  per- 
ceive that  they  belong  to  the  aforesaid  Spirit,  'who  works  all  in 
all,'  and  'by  whom  all  things  consist.' 

147.  Hence,  it  is  evident  that  God  is  known  as  certainly  and 
immediately  as  any  other  mind  or  spirit  whatsoever  distinct  from 
ourselves.  We  may  even  assert  that  the  existence  of  God  is  far 
more  evidently  perceived  than  the  existence  of  men  ;  because  the 
effects  of  nature  are  infinitely  more  numerous  and  considerable 
than  those  ascribed  to  human  agents35.  There  is  not  any  one 
mark  that  denotes  a  man,  or  effect  produced  by  him,  which  does 
not  more  strongly  evince  the  being  of  that  Spirit  who  is  the 
Author  of  Nature.  For,  it  is  evident  that  in  affecting  other  per- 
sons the  will  of  man  has  no  other  object  than  barely  the  motion 
of  the  limbs  of  his  body;   but  that  such  a  motion  should  be 

tion.  Cf.  sect.  147,  148.  Both  are  beliefs  gathered  from  the  suggestions  of  experience. 
This  enables  us  to  infer  the  existence  not  merely  of  other,  and  by  us,  at  present,  unper- 
ceived  phenomena,  in  our  own  past  or  future  experience;  and  phenomena  in  the  present, 
past,  or  future  experience  of  other  minds  ;  but  also,  as  implied  in  the  latter,  the  existence 
of  other  minds — other  selfs.  His  mode  of  looking  at  the  universe  leaves  the  evidence  for 
the  existence  of  other  men  as  it  was  before  (although  our  ideas  and  those  of  other  men  are 
with  him  not  numerically  identical,  but  only  in  a  harmony  of  similarity) ;  while  his 
theory  was  believed  by  him  to  intensify  the  evidence  of  Divine  Presence  and  Providence. 
See  Alciphron,  Dial.  IV.,  and  Vindication  of  New  Theory  of  Vision,  sect.  8,  38,  &c. 
35  Cf.  Alciphron,  Dial.  IV.  8 — 14;    Vindication  of  New  Theory  of  Vision,  sect.  8. 


276  OP    THE    PRINCIPLES 

attended  by,  or  excite  any  idea  in  the  mind  of  another,  depends 
wholly  on  the  will  of  the  Creator.  He  alone  it  is  who,  '  uphold- 
ing all  things  by  the  word  of  His  power,'  maintains  that  inter- 
course between  spirits  whereby  they  are  able  to  perceive  the 
existence  of  each  other36.  And  yet  this  pure  and  clear  light 
which  enlightens  every  one  is  itself  invisible  [37to  the  greatest 
part  of  mankind]. 

148.  It  seems  to  be  a  general  pretence  of  the  unthinking  herd 
that  they  cannot  see  God.  Could  we  but  see  Him,  say  they,  as 
we  see  a  man,  we  should  believe  that  He  is,  and  believing  obey 
His  commands.  But  alas,  we  need  only  open  our  eyes  to  see  the 
Sovereign  Lord  of  all  things,  with  a  more  full  and  clear  view 
than  we  do  any  one  of  our  fellow-creatures.  Not  that  I  imagine 
we  see  God  (as  some  will  have  it)  by  a  direct  and  immediate 
view;  or  see  corporeal  things,  not  by  themselves,  but  by  seeing 
that  which  represents  them  in  the  essence  of  God,  which  doctrine 
is38,  I  must  confess,  to  me  incomprehensible.  [II5]  But  I  shall 
explain  my  meaning : — A  human  spirit  or  person  is  not  perceived 
by  sense,  as  not  being  an  idea  ;  when  therefore  we  see  the  colour, 
size,  figure,  and  motions  of  a  man,  we  perceive  only  certain 
sensations  or  ideas  excited  in  our  own  minds ;  and  these  being 
exhibited  to  our  view  in  sundry  distinct  collections,  serve  to  mark 
out  unto  us  the  existence  of  finite  and  created  spirits  like  our- 
selves. Hence  it  is  plain  we  do  not  see  a  man — if  by  man  is 
meant  that  which  lives,  moves,  perceives,  and  thinks  as  we  do — 
but  only  such  a  certain  collection  of  ideas  as  directs  us  to  think 
there  is  a  distinct  principle  of  thought  and  motion,  like  to  our- 

36  God  so  regulates  the  sense-given  phenomena  or  ideas  of  which  spirits  are  individually 
conscious,  as  that  these  phenomena,  while  numerically  different  in  each  mind,  are  never- 
theless a  practical  medium  of  intercourse  between  minds.  Egoism  is  seen  not  to  be  a  ne- 
cessary result  of  the  fact  that  no  one  but  myself  can  be  conscious  of  m>  own  experience, 
when  we  recognise  that  persons  only  are  powers,  and  that  /  am  not  the  cause  of  all  the 
changes  which  my  ideas  or  phenomena  exhibit.  Without  being  themselves  conscious  of 
my  consciousness,  we  may  infer  that  other  persons  or  minds  arc  at  work  to  modify  it.  In 
short,  our  experience  of  power  or  volition,  and  of  our  own  limited  power,  is  essential  to 
Berkeley's  recognition  of  a  plurality  of  minds  or  substances — to  his  escape  from  the  unity 
of  Absolute  Egoism,  and  to  his  scientific  recognition  of  his  external  world. 

37  Omitted  in  second  edition. 

38  Malebranche,  as  understood  by  Berkeley.  According  to  Malebranche  we  see  mate- 
rial or  sensible  things  in  God,  who  transcends,  and  in  transcending  unites  the  substantial 
antithesis  of  Mind  and  Matter.     See  Recherche,  liv.  III.  p.  ii.  ch.  6,  &c. 


OF   HUMAN   KNOWLEDGE. 


'■77 


selves,  accompanying  and  represented  by  it.  And  after  the  same 
manner  we  see  God ;  all  the  difference  is  that,  whereas  some  one 
finite  and  narrow  assemblage  of  ideas  denotes  a  particular  human 
mind,  whithersoever  we  direct  our  view,  we  do  at  all  times  and 
in  all  places  perceive  manifest  tokens  of  the  Divinity — everything 
we  see,  hear,  feel,  or  anywise  perceive  by  sense,  being  a  sign  or 
effect  of  the  power  of  God ;  as  is  our  perception  of  those  very 
motions  which  are  produced  by  men39. 

149.  It  is  therefore  plain  that  nothing  can  be  more  evident  to 
any  one  that  is  capable  of  the  least  reflection  than  the  existence 
of  God,  or  a  Spirit  who  is  intimately  present  to  our  minds, 
producing  in  them  all  that  variety  of  ideas  or  sensations  which 
continually  affect  us,  on  whom  we  have  an  absolute  and  entire 
dependence,  in  short  '  in  whom  we  live,  and  move,  and  have  our 
being.'  That  the  discovery  of  this  great  truth,  which  lies  so  near 
and  obvious  to  the  mind,  should  be  attained  to  by  the  reason  of 
so  very  few,  is  a  sad  instance  of  the  stupidity  and  inattention  of 
men,  who,  though  they  are  surrounded  with  such  clear  manifest- 
ations of  the  Deity,  are  yet  so  little  affected  by  them  that  they 
seem,  as  it  were,  blinded  with  excess  of  light. 

150.  But  you  will  say,  Hath  Nature  no  share  in  the  production 
of  natural  things,  and  must  they  be  all  ascribed  to  the  immediate 
and  sole  operation  of  God  ?  I  answer,  if  by  Nature  is  meant 
only  the  visible  series  of  effects  or  sensations  imprinted  on  our 
minds,  according  to  certain  fixed  and  general  laws,  then  it  is  plain 
that  Nature,  taken  in  this  sense,  cannot  produce  anything  at  all4°. 
But,  if  by  Nature  is  meant  some  being  distinct  from  God,  as  well 
as  from  the  laws  of  nature,  and  things  perceived  by  sense,  I  must 
confess  that  word  is  to  me  an  empty  sound  without  any  intelli- 
gible meaning  annexed  to  it.  Nature,  in  this  acceptation,  is  a 
vain  chimera,  introduced  by  those  heathens  who  had  not  just 
notions  of  the  omnipresence  and  infinite  perfection  of  God.  But, 
it  is  more  unaccountable  that  it  should  be  received  among  Chris- 

39  Cf.  Alciphron,  Dial.  IV.  and  Vindication  of  New  Theory  of  Vision,  sect.  8,  38,  &c. 
The  eternal  existence  of  conscious  Mind,  and  the  present  existence  of  other  finite  minds 
than  my  own,  are  both  inferences,  according  to  Berkeley.  The  former,  however,  follows 
from  the  assumption  that  something  must  be  eternal,  because  something  now  exists; 
seeing  that  this  '  something,"  as  existing,  must  be  a  mind  conscious  of  ideas  or  objects. 

4°  Cf.  sect.  25,  51—53,  60— 66,  &c. 


278  OF    THE    PRINCIPLES 

tians,  professing  belief  in  the  Holy  Scriptures,  which  constantly 
ascribe  those  effects  to  the  immediate  hand  of  God  that  heathen 
philosophers  are  wont  to  impute  to  Nature.  'The  Lord  He  causeth 
the  vapours  to  ascend;  He  maketh  lightnings  with  rain;  He 
bringeth  forth  the  wind  out  of  his  treasures.'  Jerem.  x.  13.  '  He 
turneth  the  shadow  of  death  into  the  morning,  and  maketh  the 
day  dark  with  night.'  Amos  v.  8.  '  He  visiteth  the  earth,  and 
maketh  it  soft  with  showers :  He  blesseth  the  springing  thereof, 
and  crowneth  the  year  with  His  goodness ;  so  that  the  pastures 
are  clothed  with  flocks,  and  the  valleys  are  covered  over  with  corn.' 
See  Psal.  lxv.  But,  notwithstanding  that  this  is  the  constant 
language  of  Scripture,  yet  we  have  I  know  not  what  aversion 
from  believing  that  God  concerns  Himself  so  nearly  in  our  affairs. 
Fain  would  we  suppose  Him  at  a  great  distance  off,  and  substitute 
some  blind  unthinking  deputy  in  His  stead,  though  (if  we  may 
believe  Saint  Paul)  '  He  be  not  far  from  every  one  of  us.' 

151.  It  will,  I  doubt  not,  be  objected,  that  the  slow,  gradual, 
and  roundabout  methods  observed  in  the  production  of  natural 
things  do  not  seem  to  have  for  their  cause  the  immediate  hand 
of  an  Almighty  Agent41.  Besides,  monsters,  untimely  births, 
fruits  blasted  in  the  blossom,  rains  falling  in  desert  places,  mis- 
eries incident  to  human  life,  and  the  like,  are  so  many  arguments 
that  the  whole  frame  of  nature  is  not  immediately  actuated  and 
superintended  by  a  Spirit  of  infinite  wisdom  and  goodness.  But 
the  answer  to  this  objection  is  in  a  good  measure  plain  from 
sect.  62;  it  being  visible  that  the  aforesaid  methods  of  nature  are 
absolutely  necessary,  in  order  to  working  by  the  most  simple  and 
general  rules,  and  after  a  steady  and  consistent  manner;  which 
argues  both  the  wisdom  and  goodness  of  God.  [«*  For,  it  doth 
hence  follow  that  the  finger  of  God  is  not  so  conspicuous  to  the 
resolved  and  careless  sinner,  which  gives  him  an  opportunity  to 
harden  in  his  impiety  and  grow  ripe  for  vengeance.  (Vid.  sect. 
57.)]  Such  is  the  artificial  contrivance  of  this  mighty  machine 
of  nature  that,  whilst  its  motions  and  various  phenomena  strike 
on  our  senses,  the  hand  which  actuates  the  whole  is  itself  unper- 
ceivable  to  men  of  flesh  and  blood.  '  Verily'  (saith  the  prophet) 
'  thou  art  a  God  that  hidest  thyself.'   Isaiah  xlv.  1 5.    But,  though 

*»  Cf.  sect.  60 — 66.  **  Omitted  in  second  edition. 


OF   HUMAN   KNOWLEDGE.  279 

the  Lord  conceal  Himself  from  the  eyes  of  the  sensual  and  lazy, 
who  will  not  be  at  the  least  expense  of  thought,  yet  to  an  un- 
biassed and  attentive  mind  nothing  can  be  more  plainly  legible 
than  the  intimate  presence  of  an  All-wise  Spirit,  who  fashions,  regu- 
lates, and  sustains  the  whole  system  of  beings43.  [^Secondly.]  It 
is  clear,  from  what  we  have  elsewhere  observed,  that  the  operating 
according  to  general  and  stated  laws  is  so  necessary  for  our 
guidance  in  the  affairs  of  life,  and  letting  us  into  the  secret  of 
nature,  that  without  it  all  reach  and  compass  of  thought,  all 
human  sagacity  and  design,  could  serve  to  no  manner  of  purpose; 
it  were  even  impossible  there  should  be  any  such  faculties  or 
powers  in  the  mind.  See  sect.  31.  Which  one  consideration 
abundantly  outbalances  whatever  particular  inconveniences  may 
thence  arise. 

152.  But,  we  should  further  consider  that  the  very  blemishes- 
and  defects  of  nature  are  not  without  their  use,  in  that  they  make 
an  agreeable  sort  of  variety,  and  augment  the  beauty  of  the  rest 
of  the  creation,  as  shades  in  a  picture  serve  to  set  off  the  brighter 
and  more  enlightened  parts.  We  would  likewise  do  well  to  ex- 
amine whether  our  taxing  the  waste  of  seeds  and  embryos,  and 
accidental  destruction  of  plants  and  animals,  before  they  come  to 
full  maturity,  as  an  imprudence  in  the  Author  of  nature,  be  not 
the  effect  of  prejudice  contracted  by  our  familiarity  with  impotent 
and  saving  mortals45.  In  man  indeed  a  thrifty  management  of 
those  things  which  he  cannot  procure  without  much  pains  and 
industry  may  be  esteemed  wisdom.  But,  we  must  not  imagine 
that  the  inexplicably  fine  machine  of  an  animal  or  vegetable  costs 
the  great  Creator  any  more  pains  or  trouble  in  its  production 
than  a  pebble  does ;  nothing  being  more  evident  than  that  an 
Omnipotent  Spirit  can  indifferently  produce  everything  by  a  mere 
fiat  or  act  of  his  will.  Hence,  it  is  plain  that  the  splendid  pro- 
fusion of  natural  things  should  not  be  interpreted  weakness  or 
prodigality  in  the  agent  who  produces  them,  but  rather  be  looked 
on  as  an  argument  of  the  riches  of  his  power. 

153.  As  for  the  mixture  of  pain  or  uneasiness  which  is  in  the 
world  pursuant  to  the  general  laws  of  nature,  and  the  actions  of 

43  So  Pascal  in  the  Pensees.  **  Omitted  in  second  edition. 

43  So  Butler,  in  his  Analogy.    Also  cf.  sect.  60 — 66. 


28o  OF   THE  PRINCIPLES 

finite,  imperfect  spirits,  this,  in  the  state  we  are  in  at  present,  is 
indispensably  necessary  to  our  well-being.  But  our  prospects 
are  too  narrow.  We  take,  for  instance,  the  idea  of  some  one 
particular  pain  into  our  thoughts,  and  account  it  evil ;  whereas, 
if  we  enlarge  our  view,  so  as  to  comprehend  the  various  ends, 
connexions,  and  dependencies  of  things,  on  what  occasions  and 
in  what  proportions  we  are  affected  with  pain  and  pleasure,  the 
nature  of  human  freedom,  and  the  design  with  which  we  are  put 
into  the  world ;  we  shall  be  forced  to  acknowledge  that  those 
particular  things  which,  considered  in  themselves,  appear  to  be 
evil,  have  the  nature  of  good,  when  considered  as  linked  with 
the  whole  system  of  beings 4S. 

154.  From  what  has  been  said,  it  will  be  manifest  to  any  con- 
sidering person,  that  it  is  merely  for  want  of  attention  and  com- 
prehensiveness of  mind  that  there  are  any  favourers  of  Atheism 
or  the  Manichean  Heresy  to  be  found.  Little  and  unreflecting 
souls  may  indeed  burlesque  the  works  of  Providence46 — [II6]  the 
beautyand  order  whereof  they  have  not  capacity,  or  will  not  be 
at  the  pains,  to  comprehend ;  but  those  who  are  masters  of  any 
justness  and  extent  of  thought,  and  are  withal  used  to  reflect, 
can  never  sufficiently  admire  the  divine  traces  of  Wisdom  and 
Goodness  that  shine  throughout  the  Economy  of  Nature.  But 
what  truth  is  there  which  glares  so  strongly  on  the  mind  that  by 
an  aversion  of  thought,  a  wilful  shutting  of  the  eyes,  we  may  not 
escape  seeing  it,  at  least  with  a  full  and  direct  view  ?  Is  it  there- 
fore to  be  wondered  at,  if  the  generality  of  men,  who  are  ever 
intent  on  business  or  pleasure,  and  little  used  to  fix  or  open  the 
eye  of  their  mind,  should  not  have  all  that  conviction  and  evi- 
dence of  the  Being  of  God  which  might  be  expected  in  reason- 
able creatures  ? 

155.  We  should  rather  wonder  that  men  can  be  found  so  stupid 
as  to  neglect,  than  that  neglecting  they  should  be  unconvinced 
of  such  an  evident  and  momentous  truth.  And  yet  it  is  to  be 
feared  that  too  many  of  parts  and  leisure,  who  live  in  Christian 


*S  So  Butler,  in  his  Analogy. 

*6  A  constant  Divine  Thought  and  Providence  in  the  changes  of  the  phenomena]  world, 
rather  than  the  original  creation  of  finite  minds  and  of  their  ideas  or  phenomena,  is  the 
conception  which  runs  through  Berkeley's  philosophy,  conspicuously  in  Siris. 


OF  HUMAN  KNOWLEDGE.  28 1 

countries,  are,  merely  through  a  supine  and  dreadful  negligence, 
sunk  into  [47  a  sort  of  Demy-]  Atheism.  [43  They  cannot  say  there 
is  not  a  God,  but  neither  are  they  convinced  that  there  is.  For 
what  else  can  it  be  but  some  lurking  infidelity,  some  secret  mis- 
givings of  mind  with  regard  to  the  existence  and  attributes  of 
God,  which  permits  sinners  to  grow  and  harden  in  impiety?] 
Since  it  is  downright  impossible  that  a  soul  pierced  and  enlight- 
ened with  a  thorough  sense  of  the  omnipresence,  holiness,  and 
justice  of  that  Almighty  Spirit  should  persist  in  a  remorseless 
violation  of  His  laws.  We  ought,  therefore,  earnestly  to  meditate 
and  dwell  on  those  important  points ;  that  so  we  may  attain  con- 
viction without  all  scruple  '  that  the  eyes  of  the  Lord  are  in  every 
place  beholding  the  evil  and  the  good;  that  He  is  with  us  and 
keepeth  us  in  all  places  whither  we  go,  and  giveth  us  bread  to 
eat  and  raiment  to  put  on ;'  that  He  is  present  and  conscious  to 
our  innermost  thoughts;  in  fine,  that  we  have  a  most  absolute 
and  immediate  dependence  on  Him.  A  clear  view  of  which  great 
truths  cannot  choose  but  fill  our  hearts  with  an  awful  circum- 
spection and  holy  fear,  which  is  the  strongest  incentive  to  Virtue, 
and  the  best  guard  against  Vice, 

156.  For,  after  all,  what  deserves  the  first  place  in  our  studies 
is  the  consideration  of  God  and  our  Duty;  which  to  promote, 
as  it  was  the  main  drift  and  design  of  my  labours,  so  shall  I 
esteem  them  altogether  useless  and  ineffectual  if,  by  what  I  have 
said,  I  cannot  inspire  my  readers  with  a  pious  sense  of  the  Presence 
of  God  ;  and,  having  shewn  the  falseness  or  vanity  of  those  barren 
speculations  which  make  the  chief  employment  of  learned  men, 
the  better  dispose  them  to  reverence  and  embrace  the  salutary 
truths  of  the  Gospel,  which  to  know  and  to  practise  is  the  highest 
perfection  of  human  nature. 

47  Omitted  in  second  edition.  Our  alleged  necessary  ignorance  of  the  ultimate  cause 
and  meaning  of  the  Universe  in  which  we  find  ourselves  is,  in  the  present  day,  a  common 
objection  to  the  assumption  that  its  phenomena  may  be  interpreted  as  significant  of  Su- 
preme or  Absolute  Mind.  As  Hume  or  Comte  would  have  it,  the  Universe  is  a  singular 
effect  or  complement  of  phenomena,  which  we  can  interpret  only  so  far  as  our  secular 
wants  and  duties  are  concerned.  They  look  to  the  physical  or  phenomenal,  and  not  to  the 
moral  and  spiritual  evidence. 

4s  Omitted  in  second  edition. 


APPENDIX. 


A. 


BERKELEY'S    ROUGH   DRAFT   OF   THE    INTRODUCTION 
TO  THE  PRINCIPLES  OF  HUMAN  KNOWLEDGE. 


[After  the  Principles  of  Human  Knowledge  had  passed  through  the 
press,  I  found  Berkeley's  autograph  of  a  rough  draft  of  the  Introduction, 
in  the  manuscript  department  of  the  Library  of  Trinity  College,  Dublin. 
It  seems  to  have  been  written  in  November  and  December,  1708.  I 
here  present  it  to  the  reader,  who  will  find  that  it  varies  considerably 
from  the  published  version,  besides  containing  erasures  and  interlinea- 
tions which  have  a  biographical  and  literary,  as  well  as  a  philosophical 
interest.  As  this  Introduction  forms  Berkeley's  early  attack  upon 
metaphysical  abstractions,  and  his  reasoned  exposition  of  what  has  since 
been  called  his  Nominalism,  it  may  be  well  to  have  so  important  a  part 
of  his  philosophy  placed  before  us  in  various  verbal  forms  which  it 
successively  assumed  when  it  was  struggling  into  the  final  expression. 
The  student  of  his  mind  may  like  also  to  compare  these  with  still 
earlier  illustrative  fragments  in  the  Commonplace  Book,  appended  to 
his  Life  and  Letters,  as  well  as  with  the  theory  of  universals  in  Alciphron 
and  especially  in  Sin's.  What  Berkeley  here  means  to  deny  is  the  ex- 
istence of  any  physical  reality,  corresponding  to  general  names,  apart 
from  actual  or  imagined  sensible  phenomena.  In  this  early  attack 
upon  'abstract  ideas,'  his  characteristic  ardour  carried  him  in  appear- 
ance to  the  extreme  of  rejecting  the  universalizing  element,  by  which 
Mind  constitutes  and  gives  objectivity  to  things,  and  of  resting  knowl- 
edge on  the  shifting  foundation  of  phenomena  or  ideas  —  particular, 
contingent,  and  subjective.  But  if  he  seems  to  do  this  in  the  Intro- 
duction, he  virtually  proceeds  in  the  body  of  the  Principles  upon  the 
assumption  that  personal  substantiality  and  efficient  or  voluntary  cau- 
sality are  universal  and  uncreated  necessities  of  Being — axiomatic  truths 
involved  in  all  concrete  consciousness  of  phenomena.  This  assumption 
(along  with  the  assumed  general  fact  of  established  cosmical  order) 
redeems  his  philosophy  from  subjectivity,  and  gives  cohesion  and  fixed- 
ness to  knowledge.  This  stable  intellectuality  is  more  manifest  in  Siris. 
But  he  everywhere  leans  on  living  acts,  not  verbal  formulas. 

A.  C.  F.] 
285 


286  APPENDIX  A. 


Philosophy  being  nothing  else  but  the  study  of  wisdom  and 
truth,  it  may  seem  strange  that  they  who  have  spent  much  time 
and  pains  in  it,  do  usually  find  themselves  embarrass'd  with  more 
doubts  and  difficulties  than  they  were  before  they  ['came  to  that 
study.  There  is  nothing  these  men  can  [2  touch]  with  their  hands 
or  behold  with  their  eyes  but  has  its  inaccessible  and  dark  sides. 
Something]  they  imagine  to  be  in  every  drop  of  water,  every 
grain  of  sand  which  can  puzzle  [3and  confound]  the  most  clear  and 
[4elevated]  understanding,  and  are  often  by  their  principles  led 
into  a  necessity  of  admitting  the  most  irreconcilable  opinions  for 
true,  or  (which  is  worse)  of  sitting  down  in  a  forlorn  scepticism. 

The  cause  of  this  is  thought  to  be  the  obscurity  of  things, 
together  with  the  natural  weakness  and  imperfection  of  our  under- 
standing. It  is  said  the  senses  we  have  are  few,  and  these  design'd 
by  nature  only  for  the  support  of  life,  and  not  to  penetrate  into 
the  constitution  and  inward  essence  of  things.  Besides,  the  mind 
of  man  being  finite  when  it  treats  of  things  which  partake  of 
infinity,  it  is  not  to  be  wonder'd  at  if  it  run  into  absurdities  5  and 
contradictions,  out  of  which  it  is  [3  absolutely]  impossible  it  should 
ever  extricate  itself,  it  being  of  the  nature  of  Infinite  not  to  be 
comprehended  by  that  which  is  finite 6. 

But  I  cannot  think  our  faculties  are  so  weak  and  inadequate  in 
respect  of  things,  as  these  men  would  make  us  believe.  I  cannot 
be  brought  to  suppose  that  right  deductions  from  true  principles 
should  ever  end '  in  consequences  which  cannot  be  maintain'd  or 
made  consistent.  We  should  believe  that  God  has  dealt  more 
bountifully  with  the  sons  of  men  than  to  give  them  a  strong 
desire  for  that  which  he  had  placed  quite  out  of  their  reach,  and 
so  made  it  impossible  for  them  to  obtain.  Surely  our  wise  and 
good  Creatour  would  never  have  made  us  so  eager  in  the  search 

1  On  the  opposite  page  of  the  MS.,  instead  of  what  follows  within  brackets — '  meddled 
with  that  study.  To  them  the  most  common  and  familiar  things  appear  intricate  and 
perplex'd,  there's  nothing  but  has  its  dark  sides.     Somewhat' 

*  '  handle.' 
3  Erased. 

*  '  comprehensive.' 

5  '  absurdities'  instead  of '  inconsistencys'  erased. 

6  on  the  margin  of  this  paragraph  is  written — '  Nov.  15,  1708.' 

7  '  end'  instead  of  '  terminate'  erased. 


PRINCIPLES    OF   HUMAN   KNOWLEDGE.     287 

of  truth  meerly  to  baulk  and  perplex  us,  to  make  us  blame  our 
faculties,  and  bewail  our  inevitable  ignorance.  This  were  not 
agreeable  to  the  wonted  indulgent  methods  of  Providence,  which, 
whatever  appetites  it  may  have  implanted  in  the  creatures,  doth 
usually  furnish  them  with  such  means  as,  if  rightly  made  use  of, 
will  not  fail  to  satisfy  them.  Upon  the  whole  my  opinion  is,  that 
the  far  greatest  part,  if  not  all,  of  those  difficultys  which  have 
hitherto  amus'd  philosophers,  and  block'd  up  the  way  to  knowl- 
edge, are  entirely  owing  to  themselves.  That  they  have  first  rais'd 
a  dust,  and  then  complain  they  cannot  see. 

My  purpose  therefore  is,  to  [8  try  if  I  can]  discover  p  and  point 
out]  what  those  principles  are  which  have  introduc'd  all  that 
doubtfulness  and  uncertainty,  those  absurditys  and  contradictions 
into  the  several  sects  of  philosophy,  insomuch  that  the  wisest 
men  have  thought  our  ignorance  incurable,  conceiving  it  to  arise 
from  the  natural  dulness  and  limitation  of  our  faculties.  And  at 
the  same  time  to  establish  such  principles  in  their  stead,  as  shall 
be  free  from  the  like  consequences,  and  lead  the  mind  into  a  clear 
view  of  truth.  And  surely  it  is  a  work  well  deserving  of  our 
pains,  to  try  to  extend  the  limits  of  our  knowledge,  and  [IO  do 
right  to]  human  understanding,  by  making  it  to  appear  that  those 
lets  and  difficultys  which  stay  and  embarrass  the  mind  in  its 
enquirys  ["  after  truth]  do  not  spring  from  any  darkness  and 
intricacy  in  the  objects,  or  [I2  natural]  defect  in  the  intellectual 
powers,  so  much  as  from  false  principles  which  have  been  insisted 
on,  and  might  have  been  avoided. 

How  difficult  and  discouraging  soever  this  attempt  may  seem, 
when  I  consider  what  a  number  of  men  of  very  great  and  extra- 
ordinary abilitys  have  gone  before  me,  [9and  miscarry'd]  in  the 
like  [I3  designs,  yet]  I  am  not  without  some  hopes,  upon  the  con- 
sideration that  the  largest  views  are  not  always  the  clearest,  and 
that  he  who  is  shortsighted  will  be  apt  to  draw  the  object  nearer, 
and  by  a  close  and  narrow  survey  may  perhaps  discern  that  which 
had  escaped  far  better  eyes. 

8  Instead  of '  endeavour  to.'  »  Erased. 

10  Instead  of  'beat  down  those  mounds  and  barriers  that  have  been  put  to.' 
«  Within  brackets  in  the  MS. 
•»  Instead  of  incurable'  erased. 
"3  Instead  of  '  undertakings." 


288  APPENDIX   A. 

["» In  my  entrance  upon  this  work]  I  think  it  necessary  to  take 
notice  of  [IS  that  wch  seems  to  have  been  the  source  of  a  great  many 
errours,  and  to  have  made  the  way  to  knowledge  very  intricate 
and  perplex'd,  that  wch  seems  to  have  had  a  chiefe  part  in  ren- 
dering speculation  intricate  and  perplex'd,  and  to  have  been  the 
source  of  innumerable  errours  and  difficulties  in  almost  all  parts 
of  knowledge] — and  that  is  the  opinion  that  there  are  Abstract 
Ideas  or  General  Conceptions  of  Things.  He  who  is  not  a  per- 
fect stranger  to  the  writings  and  [l6  notions]  of  philosophers  must 
needs  acknowledge  that  [I7no  small]  part  of  [l8them]  are  spent 
J9 about  Abstract  Ideas.  These  are,  in  a  more  special  manner, 
thought  to  be  the  objects  of  those  sciences  that  go  by  the  name 
of  logic  and  metaphysics,  and  of  all  that  which  passes  under  the 
notion  of  the  most  abstracted  and  sublime  philosophy.  In  all 
which  [20speculative  sciences]  you  shall  scarce  find  any  question 
handled  [2°by  the  philosophers]  in  such  a  manner  as  does  not 
suppose  their  existence  in  the  mind,  and  that  it  is  very  well 
acquainted  with  them ;  [2°so  that  these  parts  of  learning  must  of 
necessity  be  overrun  with  [very  much]  useles  wrangling  and 
jargon,  [innumerable]  absurdities  and  contradictions  [opinions], 
if  so  be  that  Abstract  General  Ideas  are  perfectly  inconceivable, 
as  I  am  well  assur'd  they  [never  were — cannot  be]  conceived  by 
me,  [2I  nor  do  I  think  it  possible  they  should  be  conceiv'd  by 
any  one  else].] 

By  abstract  idea,  genera,  species,  universal  notions,  all  which 
amount  to  the  same  thing,  as  I  find  these  terms  explain'd  by  the 
best  and  clearest  writers,  we  are  to  understand  ideas  which  equally 

*4  Instead  of  '  But  here  in  the  entrance,  before  I  proceed  any  further.'  On  the  blank 
page  opposite  we  have — '  In  my  entrance  upon  this  work  [before  I  descend  to  more  par- 
ticular subjects]  [and]  [to  more  particular  enquirys].' 

'5  Instead  of—'  y*  wh  seem  to  me  [one]  very  powerful  and  universal  cause  of  error  and 
confusion  throughout  the  philosophy  of  all  sects  and  ages'— and  the  opposite  page,  '  that 
which  seems  to  me  a  wide-spread  [in  philosophical  enquirys]  throughout  the  philosophy 
of  all  sects  and  ages.' 

»«  Brackets  in  the  MS. 

«7  Instead  of '  very  great." 

18  Instead  of  their  disputes  and  contemplations  [speculations].' 

'9  '  concerning'  instead  of '  about'  erased. 

*>  Erased. 

«  On  opposite  page—'  and  I  very  much  question  whether  they  ever  were  or  can  oe  by 
any  one  else.' 


PRINCIPLES    OF   HUMAN    KNOWLEDGE.        289 

represent  the  particulars  of  any  sort,  and  are  made  by  the  mind 
which,  observing  that  the  individuals  of  each  kind  agree  in  some 
things  and  differ  in  others,  takes  out  and  singles  from  the  rest 
that  which  is  common  to  all,  making  thereof  one  abstract  general 
idea;  which  ["general  idea]  contains  all  those  ideas  wherein  the 
particulars  of  that  kind  agree  [22and  partake],  separated  from 
and  exclusive  of  all  those  other  concomitant  ideas  whereby  they 
[22  individuals]  are  distinguished  [22from  each  other]  one  from 
another.  [22To  this  abstract  general  idea  thus  framed  the  mind 
gives  a  general  name,  and  lays  it  up  and  uses  it  as  a  standard 
whereby  to  judge  what  particulars  are  and  what  are  not  to  be 
accounted  of  that  sort,  those  onely  which  contain  every  part  of 
the  general  idea  having  a  right  to  be  admitted  into  that  sort  and 
by  that  name.] 

For  example,  the  mind  having  observed  that  Peter,  James,  and 
John,  &c,  resemble  each  other  in  certain  common  agreements  of 
shape  and  other  quality,  leaves  out  of  the  complex  idea  it  has  of 
Peter,  James,  &c,  that  which  is  peculiar  to  each,  retaining  onely 
that  which  is  common  to  all.  And  so  it  makes  one  [23  abstract] 
complex  idea,  wherein  all  the  particulars  partake,  abstracting 
entirely  from  and  cutting  off  all  those  circumstances  and  differ- 
ences which  might  determine  it  to  any  particular  existence :  and 
after  this  manner  you  come  by  [24the]  precise  abstract  idea  of 
[22a]  man.  In  which  [22  idea]  it  is  true  there  is  included  colour 
because  there  is  no  man  but  hath  some  colour,  but  then  it  can  be 
neither  white  [22  colour]  nor  black  [22  colour]  nor  any  particular 
colour,  but  colour  in  general,  because  there  is  no  one  particular 
colour  wherein  all  men  partake.  In  like  manner  you  will  tell  me 
there  is  included  stature,  but  it  is  neither  tall  stature  nor  low 
stature,  nor  yet  middling  stature,  but  stature  in  general.  And  so 
of  the  rest.  [25  Suppose  now  I  should  ask  whether  you  compre- 
hended, in  this  your  abstract  idea  of  man,  the  ideas  of  eyes,  or 
ears,  or  nose,  or  legs,  or  arms  [this  might  perhaps  put  you  to  a 
stand  for  an  answer,  for]  you  will  own  it  to  be  an  odd  and  mu- 

»  Erased.  =3  Instead  of  general.'  24  Instead  of '  a  clear.' 

a5  Erased.     On  opposite  page,  but  erased,  are  the  words — '  an  odd  and  mutilated  idea, 

that  of  man  without  all  these.'     And  on  the  same  page — '  it  must  needs  [make  an  odd  and 

frightful  figure  the  idea]  of  [a]  man  without  all  these,'  also  erased. 

19 


290 


APPENDIX   A. 


tilated  idea  of  a  man  \vch  is  without  all  these.  Yet  it  must  be 
so  to  make  it  consistent  with  the  doctrine  of  abstract  ideas,  there 
being  particular  men  that  want,  some  arms,  some  legs  [some 
noses,  &c.]] 

[27  But  supposing  the  abstract  idea  of  men  to  be  very  conceiv- 
able, let  us  proceed  to  see  [26how]  it  comes  to  be  enlarg'd  into 
the  more  general  and  comprehensive  idea  of  animal.]  There 
being  a  great  variety  of  other  creatures  [27as  birds]  that  partake 
in  some  parts,  but  not  all,  of  the  complex  idea  of  man,  the  mind 
leaving  out  those  parts  which  are  peculiar  to  men,  and  retaining 
those  onely  which  are  common  to  all  the  living  creatures,  frames 
the  idea  of  animal,  [27  which  is  more  general  than  that  of  man, 
it  comprehending  not  only  all  particular  men,  but  also  all  birds, 
beasts,  fishes,  and  insects.]  The  constituent  parts  whereof  [27 of 
the  complex  idea  of  animal]  are  body,  life,  sense,  and  spontaneous 
motion.  By  body  is  meant  body  [27in  general],  without  any  par- 
ticular shape  or  figure,  there  being  no  one  shape  or  figure  common 
to  all  animals,  without  covering  either  of  hair,  or  feathers,  or 
[28  scales],  and  yet  it  is  not  naked.  Hair,  feathers  [28  scales],  and 
nakedness  being  peculiar  distinguishing  properties  of  [27the]  par- 
ticular animals,  and  for  that  reason  left  out  of  the  [29 abstract] 
idea.  Upon  the  same  account,  the  spontaneous  motion  must  be 
neither  walking  nor  flying  nor  creeping,  it  is  nevertheless  a  motion, 
but  what  that  motion  is  it  is  not  easy  to  say. 

In  like  manner  a  man  [27  having  seen  several  lines]  by  leaving 
out  of  his  idea  of  a  line  [3°the  particular  colour  and  length] 
comes  by  the  idea  of  a  line  which  is  neither  black,  nor  white, 
nor  red,  &c,  nor  long  nor  short,  which  he  calls  the  abstract  idea 
of  a  line,  and  which,  for  ought  that  I  can  see,  is  just  nothing. 
[27  For  I  ask  whether  a  line  has  any  more  than  one  particular 
colour  and  one  particular  length,  which  [when  they  are]  being 
left  out,  I  beseech  any  3Ione  to  consider  what  it  is  that  remains.] 

Whether  others  have  this  [3a  wonderful]  faculty  of  abstracting 
their  ideas,  they  can  [33best]  tell.     For  myself,  I  dare  be  con- 

36  Instead  of  '  by  what  steps  and  abstractions.'  »7  Erased. 

38  Instead  of  '  fins.'  ^  Instead  of '  general.' 

3°  Instead  of  '  all  particular  colour,  and  all  particular  length.' 

3'  '  one'  instead  of '  man.'  3»  Instead  of  '  marvellous.' 

33  Instead  of  better.' 


PRINCIPLES    OF  HUMAN  KNOWLEDGE.       29 1 

fident  I  have  it  not;  [3(5and  I  am  apt  to  think  that  some  of  those 
who  fancy  themselves  to  enjoy  that  privilege,  would,  upon  look- 
ing narrowly  into  their  own  thoughts,  find  they  wanted  it  as  much 
as  I.  For  there  was  a  time  when,  being  banter'd  and  abus'd  by 
words,  I  did  not  in  the  least  doubt  my  having  it.  But  upon  a 
strict  survey  of  my  abilitys,  I  not  only  discover  my  own  deficiency 
in  that  point,  but  also  cannot  conceive  it  possible  that  such  a 
person  should  be  even  in  the  most  perfect  and  exalted  under- 
standing.] I  find  I  have  a  faculty  of  imagining,  conceiving,  or 
representing  to  myself  the  ideas  of  those  particular  things  I  have 
perceiv'd,  and  of  variously  compounding  and  dividing  them.  I 
can  imagine  a  man  with  two  heads,  or  the  upper  parts  of  a  man 
joyn'd  to  the  body  of  a  horse.  I  can  consider  the  hand,  the 
eye,  the  nose  each  by  itself  [34  abstracted  or]  separated  from  the 
rest  of  the  body.  But  then  whatever  eye  or  nose  I  imagine,  they 
must  have  some  particular  shape  and  colour.  The  idea  of  man 
that  I  frame  to  myself  must  be  either  of  a  white,  or  a  black,  or  a 
tawny,  a  straight  or  a  crooked,  a  tall  or  a  low  or  a  middling  sized 
man.  I  cannot  by  any  effort  of  [3S  thought]  frame  to  myself  an 
idea  of  man  [36 prescinding  from  all  particulars]  that  shall  have 
nothing  particular  in  it.  [36For  my  life  I  cannot  comprehend 
abstract  ideas3?.] 

And  there  are  grounds  to  think  [38most]  men  will  acknowledge 
themselves  to  be  in  my  case.  The  generality  of  men,  which  are 
simple  and  illiterate,  never  pretend  to  abstract  notions.  It  is  said 
they  are  difficult  and  not  to  be  attained  without  much  study  and 
speculation,  we  may  therefore  reasonably  conclude  that,  if  such 
there  be,  they  are  altogether  confin'd  to  the  learned. 

But  it  must  be  confess'd,  I  do  not  see  what  great  advantage 
they  give  them  above  the  rest  of  mankind.  He  who  considers 
that  whatever  has  any  existence  in  nature  and  can  any  wise  affect 
or  concern  [36is]  him  is  particular,  will  not  find  great  cause  to  be 
discontent  with  his  facultys,  if  [39they]  cannot  reach  a  piece  of 
knowledge  as  useless  as  it  is  refin'd ;  [3<5and]  which  whether  it 

34  Instead  of  '  singled  out  and.'  35  Instead  of  '  imagination."  36  Erased. 

37  On  opposite  page  the  words — '  I  can  conceive  well  enough  what  is  meant  by  ade- 
quate and  inadequate,  clear  and  obscure,  distinct  and  confus'd  [ideas],  but' — are  written 
and  erased. 

38  Instead  of  '  the  far  greatest  part  of.'  39  Instead  of  '  he.' 


292 


APPENDIX   A. 


be  to  be  found  even  in  those  deep  thinkers  may  well  be  made  a 
question. 

For  besides  the  [4°incomprehensibleness]  of  abstract  ideas  to 
my  understanding  (which  may  pass  for  an  argument,  since  those 
gentlemen  do  not  pretend  to  any  new  facultys  distinct  from  those 
of  ordinary  men),  there  are  not  wanting  other  proofs  against  them. 
[4IIt  is,  I  think,  a  receiv'd  axiom  that  an  impossibility  cannot  be 
conceiv'd.  For  what  created  intelligence  will  pretend  to  conceive 
that  which  God  cannot  cause  to  be  ?  Now  it  is  on  all  hands 
agreed,  that  nothing  abstract  or  general  can  be  made  really  to 
exist;  whence  it  should  seem  to  follow,  that  it  cannot  have  so 
much  as  an  ideal  existence  in  the  understanding.] 

[42 1  do  not  think  it  necessary  to  insist  on  any  more  proofs, 
against  the  doctrine  of  abstraction  in  this  place,  especially  for  that 
the  absurditys,  which  in  the  progress  of  this  work  I  shall  observe 
to  have  sprung  from  that  doctrine,  will  yield  plenty  of  arguments 
a  posteriori  against  it.]  I  proceed  [42  therefore]  to  examine  what 
can  be  alleged  in  defence  [43of  the  doctrine  of  abstraction],  and 
try  if  I  can  discover  what  it  is  that  [44 inclines]  the  men  of  specu- 
lation to  embrace  an  opinion  so  pregnant  of  absurditys,  and  so 
remote  from  common  sense  as  that  seems  to  be. 

There  has  been  a  late  excellent  and  deservedly  esteem'd  phi- 
losopher, to  whose  judgment,  so  far  as  authority  is  of  any  weight 
with  me,  I  would  pay  the  utmost  deference.  This  great  man,  no 
doubt,  has  very  much  countenanc'd  the  doctrine  of  abstraction 
by  seeming  to  think  [45it]  is  that  which  puts  the  widest  difference 
in  point  of  understanding  betwixt  man  and  beast.  Thus  speaks 
he :  '  The  having  of  general  ideas  is  that  which  puts  a  perfect 
distinction  betwixt  man  and  brutes,  and  is  an  excellency  which 
the  facultys  of  brutes  do  by  no  means  attain  unto.  For  it  is  evi- 
dent we  observe  no  footsteps  in  them  of  making  use  of  general 
signs  for  [46 making]  universal  ideas;  from  which  we  have  reason 

4°  Instead  of  '  incomprehensibility,'  and  on  opposite  page,  but  erased — '  incomprehen- 
sibleness  to  my  understanding  by  any  [intellect — understanding]  whatsoever.1 

4'  Erased.  On  opposite  page — '  That  a  contradiction  cannot  be  conceiv'd  by  any  human 
anding  whatsoever  is,  I  think,  agreed  on  all  hands.  And  to  me  it  is  no  less  clear 
that  the  description  of  an  abstract  idea  doth  include  a  contradiction  in  it.' 

42  Erased.  «  Instead  of  '  thereof.'  4*  Instead  of  '  has  inclined.' 

45  Instead  of  'the  having  abstract  ideas.'  4«  Within  brackets  in  the  MS. 


PRINCIPLES    OF   HUMAN   KNOWLEDGE.      293 

to  imagine  that  they  have  not  the  faculty  of  abstracting,  or  making 
general  ideas,  since  they  have  no  use  of  words  or  any  other  gen- 
eral signs.'  And  a  little  lower:  '  Therefore  I  think  we  may  sup- 
pose that  'tis  in  this  that  the  species  of  brutes  are  discriminated 
from  men,  and  'tis  that  proper  difference  wherein  they  are  wholly 
separated,  and  which  at  last  widens  to  so  wide  a  distance.  For 
if  they  have  any  ideas  at  all  and  are  not  bare  machines  (as  some 
would  have  them),  we  cannot  deny  them  to  have  some  reason. 
It  seems  as  evident  to  me,  that  they  do  some  of  them  in  certain 
instances  reason,  as  that  they  have  sense,  but  it  is  only  in  partic- 
ular ideas,  just  as  they  receiv'd  them  from  their  senses.  They 
are  the  best  of  them  tied  up  within  those  narrow  bounds,  and 
have  not  (as  I  think)  the  faculty  to  enlarge  them  by  any  kind  of 
abstraction.'  [Essay  on  Human  Understanding,  Book  2,  chap  11. 
s.  10,  11.)  I  readily  agree  with  this  authour  that  the  faculties  of 
brutes  can  by  no  means  attain  to  the  making  of  abstract  general 
ideas.  But  then  if  that  inability  to  abstract  be  made  the  distin- 
guishing property  of  that  sort  of  animals,  I  fear  a  great  many  of 
those  that  now  pass  for  men  must  be  reckon'd  into  their  number. 
The  reason  which  is  here  assign'd  why  we  have  no  grounds  to 
think  that  brutes  have  general  ideas,  is  that  we  observe  in  them 
no  use  of  words  or  any  other  general  signs — which  is  built  on 
this  supposition — that  the  making  use  of  words  implys  the  having 
of  general  ideas,  and  that  [47on  the  other  hand]  those  who  have 
general  ideas  fail  not  to  make  use  of  words,  or  other  universal 
signs,  [48 whereby]  to  express  [48and  signify  them],  [4*That  this 
is  the]  From  which  it  must  follow,  that  men  who  use  language 
are  able  to  abstract  and  generalize  their  ideas,  but  brutes  [49that] 
use  it  not  are  destitute  of  that  faculty.  That  this  is  the  sense 
and  arguing  of  the  authour  of  the  Essay,  will  farther  appear,  by 
his  answering  the  question  he  in  another  place  puts.  Since  all 
things  that  exist  are  only  particulars,  how  come  we  by  general 
terms  ?  His  answer  is — '  Words  become  general  by  being  made 
the  signs  of  general  ideas.'  (Essay  on  Humaii  Understanding,  b. 
3.  c.  3.  s.  6.)  From  which  assertion  I  must  crave  leave  to  dissent, 
being  of  opinion  that  a  word  becomes  general  by  being  [5°the] 

*7  Instead  of  '  reciprocally."  4s  Erased. 

«  Instead  of  '  who.'  5°  Within  brackets  in  the  MS. 


294 


APPENDIX   A. 


made  the  sign,  not  of  a  general  idea,  but  of  many  particular 
ideas.  Sure  I  am,  as  to  what  concerns  myself,  when  I  say  the 
word  Socrates  is  a  proper  [52or  particular]  name,  and  the  word 
man  an  appellative  or  general  name,  I  mean  no  more  than  this, 
viz.  that  the  one  is  peculiar  and  appropriated  to  one  particular 
person,  the  other  common  to  a  great  many  particular  persons, 
each  [5Iof  which]  has  an  equall  right  in  propriety  of  language  to 
be  called  by  the  name  man.  [52This,  I  say,  is  the  whole  truth 
of  the  matter,  and  not  that  I  make  any  incomprehensible  abstract 
idea  whereunto  I  annex  the  name  man.  That  were  to  [make] 
my  words  stand  for  I  know  not  what.] 

That  great  man  seems  to  think  the  necessary  ends  of  language 
could  not  be  attain'd  [;2to]  without  the  use  of  abstract  ideas.  B. 
3.  c.  6.  s.  39  [52he  shews  it]  and  elsewhere  he  shews  it  to  be  his 
opinion  that  they  are  made  in  order  to  naming.  B.  3.  c.  1.  s.  3 
he  has  these  words  :  '  It  is  not  enough  for  the  perfection  of  lan- 
guage that  sounds  can  be  made  signs  of  ideas,  unless  those  signs 
can  be  so  made  use  of  as  to  comprehend  several  particular  things  : 
for  the  multiplication  of  words  would  have  perplex'd  their  use, 
had  every  particular  thing  need  of  a  distinct  name  to  be  signified 
by.  To  remedy  this  inconvenience  language  had  yet  a  farther 
improvement  in  the  use  of  general  terms  whereby  one  word  was 
made  to  mark  a  number  of  particular  existences,  which  advan- 
tageous use  of  sounds  was  obtained  only  by  the  difference  of  the 
ideas  they  were  made  signs  of.  Those  names  becoming  general 
which  are  made  to  stand  for  general  ideas,  and  those  remaining 
particular  where  the  ideas  they  are  used  for  are  particular.'  Now 
I  would  fain  know  why  a  word  may  not  be  made  to  comprehend 
a  great  number  of  particular  things  in  its  signification,  without  the 
[S3help]  of  a  general  idea?  Is  it  not  possible  to  give  the  name 
[S4  colour  to  black,  white,  and  red,  &c]  without  having  first  made 
that  strange  and  to  me  incomprehensible  idea  of  ["colour  in 
abstract]  ?  Or  must  we  imagine  that  a  child  upon  sight  of  a  par- 
ticular body,  and  being  told  it  is  called  an  apple,  must  first  frame 
to  himself  an  abstract  general  idea  [s6 exclusive  of]  all  particular 

51  Instead  of 'whereof.'  5»  Erased.  53  Instead  of  '  interposition.' 

54  [nstead  of  '  man  to  Peter,  James,  and  John." 

55  Instead  of  '  man  which  shall  have  nothing  particular  in  it.' 

56  Instead  of  '  thereof,  abstracting  from.' 


PRINCIPLES    OF   HUMAN    KNOWLEDGE.       295 

colour,  tast,  and  figure  before  he  can  attain  to  the  use  of  the  word 
apple,  and  apply  it  to  all  the  particulars  of  that  sort  of  fruit  that 
come  in  his  way?  [s8This  surely  is  a  task  too  hard  and  meta- 
physical to  be  perform'd  by  an  infant  just  beginning  to  speak.] 
Nay,  I  appeal  to  the  experience  of  any  grown  man,  whether  this 
be  the  course  he  takes  in  acquainting  himself  with  the  [" right] 
use  and  signification  of  any  word  ?  Let  any  man  take  a  fair  and 
impartial  view  of  his  own  thoughts,  and  then  determine  whether 
his  general  words  do  not  become  so  only  by  being  made  to  mark 
a  number  of  particular  existences,  without  any  the  least  thought 
of  abstraction.  For  what,  I  pray,  are  words  but  signs  of  our 
thoughts  ?  and  how  are  signs  of  any  sort  render'd  universal  other- 
wise than  by  being  made  to  signify,  or  represent  indifferently,  a 
multitude  of  particular  things? 

The  ideas  that  are  in  every  man's  mind  ly  hid  [58den],  and 
cannot  of  themselves  be  brought  into  the  view  of  another.  It 
was  therefore  necessary,  for  discourse  and  communication,  that 
men  should  institute  sounds  to  be  signs  of  their  ideas,  which 
being  [^excited]  in  the  mind  of  the  hearer  [^ might]  bring 
along  with  them  [s8into  his  understanding]  such  ideas  as  in  the 
propriety  of  any  language  were  annex'd  to  them.  But  because 
of  the  almost  infinite  number  and  variety  of  our  [6l  ideas],  it  is 
impossible,  and  if  it  were  possible  would  yet  be  a  useless  thing, 
to  appropriate  a  particular  [s8word  to  a]  sign  or  name  to  every 
one  of  them.  From  which  it  must  necessarily  follow,  that  one 
word  be  made  the  sign  of  a  great  number  of  particular  ideas, 
between  which  there  is  some  likeness  and  which  are  said  to  be 
of  the  same  sort.  [62  But  then  these  sorts  are  not  determin'd  and 
set  out  by  nature,  as  was  thought  by  most  philosophers.  Nor  yet 
are  they  limited  by  any  precise  abstract  ideas  settl'd  in  the  mind, 
with  the  general  name  annexed  to  them,  as  is  the  opinion  of  the 
authour  of  the  Essay,  nor  do  they  in  truth  seem  to  me  to  have  any 
precise  bounds  or  limits  at  all.     For  if  [there  were]  they  had  I 

57  Instead  of  '  proper.'  58  Erased.  59  Instead  of  '  raised.' 

60  Instead  of  '  shall.'  <>'  Instead  of  '  thoughts.' 

62  Erased.  On  the  opposite  page  we  have — '  Every  one's  experience  may  convince  him 
that  this  is  all  that's  meant  by  general  names,  and  that  they  do  not  stand  either  for  universal 
natures  distinct  from  our  conceptions  as  was  held  by  the  Peripatetics  and  generality  of  the 
Schoolmen,  nor  yet  for  universal  notions  or  ideas  as  is  the  opinion  of  that  sort  of  School- 
men called  Nominals  and  of  the  authour  of  the  Essay.' 


296  APPENDIX   A. 

do  not  see  how  there  could  be  those  doubts  and  scruples  about 
the  sorting  of  particular  beings  which  [that  authour  insists  on  as 
a  good  proof]  are  observ'd  sometimes  to  have  happen'd.  Neither 
do  I  think  it  necessary  the  kinds  or  species  of  things  should  be 
so  very  accurately  bounded  and  marked  out,  language  being 
made  by  and  for  the  common  use  of  men,  who  do  not  ordinarily 
take  notice  of  the  minuter  and  less  considerable  differences  of 
things.]  From  [63all]  which  to  me  it  seems  evident  that  the 
having  of  general  names  does  not  imply  the  having  of  general 
ideas,  but  barely  the  marking  by  them  a  number  of  particular 
ideas,  and  that  all  the  ends  of  language  may  be  and  are  attain'd 
without  the  help  of  any  such  faculty  as  abstraction. 

Which  will  be  made  yet  more  manifest  if  we  consider  the 
different  manners  wherein  words  [63and  ideas  [are]  do  stand  for 
and  represent  things]  represent  ideas,  and  ideas  things.  There 
is  no  similitude  or  resemblance  betwixt  words  and  the  ideas  that 
are  marked  by  them.  Any  name  may  be  used  indifferently  for 
the  sign  of  any  idea,  or  any  number  of  ideas,  it  not  being  deter- 
min'd  by  any  likeness  to  represent  one  more  than  another.  But 
it  is  not  so  with  ideas  in  respect  of  things,  of  which  they  are 
suppos'd  to  be  the  copies  and  images.  They  are  not  thought  to 
represent  them  [63any]  otherwise  than  as  they  resemble  them. 
Whence  it  follows  that  an  idea  is  not  capable  of  representing 
indifferently  anything  [^whatsoever],  it  being  limited  by  the 
likeness  it  beares  to  some  particular  [6s  thing]  to  represent  it 
rather  than  any  other.  The  word  man  may  equally  be  put  to 
signify  any  particular  man  I  can  think  of.  But  I  cannot  frame 
an  idea  of  man  which  shall  equally  represent  and  correspond  to 
each  particular  of  that  sort  of  creatures  that  may  possibly  exist. 

I  shall  [63only]  add  one  more  passage  out  of  the  Essay  on 
Human  Understanding,  which  is  as  follows :  '  Abstract  ideas  are 
not  so  obvious  or  easy  to  children  or  the  yet  unexercised  mind 
as  particular  ones.  If  they  seem  so  to  grown  men  'tis  only 
because  by  constant  and  familiar  use  they  are  made  so.  For 
when  we  nicely  reflect  upon  them  we  shall  find  that  general 
ideas  are  fictions  and  contrivances  of  the  mind  that  carry  diffi- 
culty with  them  and  do  not  so  easily  offer  themselves  as  we  are 

63  Erased.  6*  Instead  of  '  or  number  of  things.'  6s  Instead  of  '  existence.' 


PRINCIPLES    OF   HUMAN   KNOWLEDGE.       297 

apt  to  imagine.  For  example,  does  it  not  require  some  pains 
and  skill  to  form  the  general  idea  of  a  triangle  (which  is  yet  none 
of  the  most  abstract,  comprehensive  and  difficult),  for  it  must  be 
neither  oblique  nor  rectangle,  neither  equilateral,  equicrural,  nor 
scalenon,  but  all  and  none  of  these  at  once  ?  In  effect,  it  is  some- 
thing imperfect,  that  cannot  exist ;  an  idea  wherein  some  parts 
of  several  different  and  inconsistent  ideas  are  put  together.  'Tis 
true  the  mind  in  this  imperfect  state  has  need  of  such  ideas, 
and  makes  all  the  hast  to  them  it  can,  for  the  conveniency  of 
communication  and  enlargement  of  knowledge,  to  both  which 
it  is  naturally  very  much  enclin'd  ;  but  yet  one  has  reason  to 
suspect  such  ideas  are  marks  of  our  imperfection.  At  least  this 
is  enough  to  shew  that  the  most  abstract  and  general  ideas  are 
not  those  that  the  mind  is  first  and  most  easily  acquainted  with, 
nor  such  as  its  earlyest  knowledge  is  conversant  about.'  B.  4.  c.  7. 
s.  9.  If  any  man  has  the  faculty  of  framing  in  his  mind  such  an 
idea  of  a  triangle  as  is  here  describ'd,  it  is  in  vain  to  pretend  to 
dispute  him  out  of  it,  nor  would  I  go  about  it.  All  I  desire  is 
that  every  one  would  fully  and  certainly  inform  himself  whether 
he  has  such  an  idea  or  no.  And  this,  methinks,  can  be  no  hard 
task  for  any  one  to  perform.  What  more  easy  than  for  any  one 
to  look  a  little  into  his  own  understanding,  and  there  try  whether 
he  has,  or  can  attain  to  have,  an  idea  that  shall  correspond  with 
the  description  here  given  of  the  general  idea  of  a  triangle  which 
is  neither  oblique  nor  rectangle,  neither  equilateral,  equicrural, 
nor  scalenon,  but  all  and  none  of  these  at  once  ?  He  that  can 
conceive  such  manifest  contradictions  and  inconsistencys,  'tis  fit 
he  enjoy  his  privilege.  For  my  part  [66I  am  well  assur'd]  6?l 
have  not  the  power  of  so  doing,  nor  consequently  of  making  to 
myself  these  general  ideas ;  neither  do  I  find  that  I  have  any 
need  of  them  either  for  the  conveniency  of  communication  or  the 
enlargement  of  knowledge  [66  for  the  conveniency  of  communi- 
cation and  enlargement  of  knowledge.  For  which  I  am  not 
sorry,  because  it  is  here  said  one  has  reason  to  suspect  such 
ideas  are  marks  of  our  imperfection.     Tho',  I  must  own,  I  do  not 

66  Erased. 

67  On  opposite  page — erased — '  I  must  own  I  have  so  much  ol  the  brute  in  my  under- 
standing, that.' 


298  APPENDIX   A. 

see  how  this  agrees  with  what  has  been  above  quoted  [out  of  the 
same  authour],  viz.  the  having  of  general  ideas  is  that  which  puts 
a  perfect  distinction  betwixt  man  and  brutes,  and  is  an  excellency 
which  the  faculties  of  brutes  do  by  no  means  attain  unto.] 

It  is  observable  [68what  it  is  here  said]  of  the  difficulty 
that  abstract  ideas  carry  with  them,  and  the  pains  and  skill  that 
is  requisite  to  the  forming  [66of]  them.  To  the  same  purpose 
Aristotle  (who  was  certainly  a  great  admirer  and  promoter  of  the 
doctrine  of  abstraction)  has  these  words  :  %eddv  de  xai  ^ah-wraza 
yvaipi'etv  Tu'iq  avOpdrxoiq  Vr^  ret  paha-a  r.aOoXou  izoppwrazia  yap  raiv  ai<;- 
ffTJaetuv  Wc.  There  is  scarce  anything  so  incomprehensible  to  men 
as  the  most  universal  notions,  because  they  are  most  remote  from 
sense.  Metaph.  lib.  i.  cap.  2  ^.  It  is  on  all  hands  agreed,  that 
there  is  need  of  great  pains  and  toil  and  labour  of  the  mind,  to 
emancipate  [7°our  thoughts]  from  particular  ideas  such  as  are 
taken  in  by  the  senses,  and  raise  [7°  them]  to  those  lofty  specu- 
lations [j1  which]  are  conversant  about  abstract  and  universal 
ones. 

From  all  which  the  natural  consequence  should  seem  to  be, 
that  so  difficult  a  thing  as  the  forming  of  abstract  ideas  is  not 
necessary  for  communication,  which  is  so  easy  and  familiar  to  all 
sorts  of  men,  even  the  most  barbarous  and  unreflecting.  But  we  are 
told,  if  they  seem  obvious  and  easy  to  grown  men, 'tis  only  because 
by  constant  and  familiar  use  they  are  made  so.  Now  I  would  fain 
know  at  what  time  it  is  men  are  employ'd  in  surmounting  that 
difficulty,  and  furnishing  themselves  with  those  necessary  [^ma- 
terials] of  discourse.  It  cannot  be  when  they  are  grown  up,  for 
then  they  are  not  conscious  of  any  such  pains-taking.  It  re- 
mains therefore  to  be  the  business  of  their  childhood.  And 
surely  the  great  and  multiply'd  labour  of  framing  general  no- 
tions will  be  found  a  hard  task  for  that  tender  age.  Is  it  not  a 
hard  thing  to  imagine  that  a  couple  of  children  cannot  commune 
one  with  another  of  their  sugar-plumbs  and  rattles,  and  the  rest 
of  their  little  trinkets,  till  they  have  first  tack'd  together  number- 
's Instead  of '  that  which  is  [here]  said  by  that  authour  on  this  occasion." 
*9  Text  as  in  Schwegler — ax^bv  6e  /cat  ^aAe7rwrara  ravra  yvupi&iv  role  uvdpunoic,  rH 
UuTuara  KaOo?.ov  noppuTuru  yup  tCiv  aioQijaeuv  iartv. 
7°  Instead  of  '  it.'  7*  Instead  of  '  that.' 

7a  Instead  of  '  praeliminarys.' 


PRINCIPLES    OF   HUMAN   KNOWLEDGE. 


299 


less  inconsistencys,  and  so  framed  in  their  minds  general  abstract 
ideas,  and  annex'd  them  to  every  common  name  they  make  use 
of? 

Nor  do  I  think  they  are  a  whit  more  needful  for  enlargement 
of  knowledge,  than  for  communication.  For  tho'  it  be  a  point 
much  insisted  on  in  the  Schools  that  all  knowledge  is  about  uni- 
versal, yet  I  [73can  by  no  means  see  the  necessity  of]  this  doc- 
trine. It  is  acknowledg'd  that  nothing  has  a  fairer  title  to  the 
name  of  knowledge  or  science  than  geometry.  Now  I  appeal  to 
any  man's  thoughts  whether,  upon  the  entrance  into  that  study, 
the  first  thing  to  be  done  is  to  try  to  conceive  a  circle  that  is 
neither  great  nor  small,  nor  of  any  determinate  radius,  or  to  make 
ideas  of  triangles  and  parallelograms  that  are  neither  rectangular 
nor  obliquangular,  &c.  ?  It  is  [74  true]  one  thing  for  a  proposition 
to  be  universally  true,  and  another  for  it  to  be  about  universal 
natures  or  notions.  ["Because]  that  the  three  angles  of  a  tri- 
angle are  equal  to  two  right  ones  is  granted  to  be  a  proposition 
universally  true,  it  will  not  therefore  follow  that  we  are  to  under- 
stand it  of  universal  triangles,  or  universal  angles.  It  will  suffice 
that  it  be  true  of  [ 74  any  particular  tri]  the  particular  angles  of 
any  particular  triangle  whatsoever. 

But  here  it  will  be  demanded,  how  we  can  know  any  proposition 
to  be  true  of  all  particular  triangles,  except  we  have  first  seen  it 
demonstrated  of  the  general  idea  of  a  triangle,  which  equally 
agrees  to  and  represents  them  all  ?  For  because  a  property  may 
be  demonstrated  to  belong  to  some  one  particular  triangle,  it  will 
not  thence  follow  that  it  equally  belongs  to  [74some]  any  other 
triangle  which  in  all  respects  is  not  the  same  with  the  former. 
For  instance,  having  demonstrated  that  the  three  angles  of  an 
isosceles,  rectangular  triangle  are  equal  to  two  right  ones,  I  can- 
not therefore  conclude  this  affection  agrees  to  all  other  triangles 
which  have  neither  a  right  angle  nor  two  equal  sides.  It  seems 
therefore,  that  to  be  certain  this  proposition  is  universally  true, 
we  must  either  make  a  particular  demonstration  for  every  partic- 
ular triangle,  which  is  impossible,  or  else  we  must,  once  for  all, 
demonstrate  it  of  the  general  idea  of  a  triangle  in  which  all  the 

73  Instead  of  [could  never]  bring  myself  to  comprehend.' 

7*  Erased.  75  Instead  of  '  Thus  [notwithstanding].' 


3oo  APPENDIX   A. 

particulars  do  indifferently  partake,  and  by  which  they  are  all 
equally  represented. 

To  which  I  answer,  that  notwithstanding  the  idea  I  have  in  my 
mind,  whilst  I  make  the  demonstration,  be  that  of  some  partic- 
ular triangle,  e.  g.  an  isosceles,  rectangular  one  whose  sides  are 
of  a  determinate  length,  I  may  nevertheless  be  certain  that  it 
extends  to  all  other  rectilinear  triangles  of  what  sort  or  bigness 
soever.  And  that  because  neither  the  right  angle,  nor  the 
equality,  nor  determinate  length  of  the  legs  are  at  all  concern'd 
in  the  demonstration.'  Tis  true  the  diagram  I  have  in  my  view 
does  include  these  particulars,  but  then  there  is  not  the  least  men- 
tion made  of  them  in  the  proof  of  the  proposition.  It  is  not  said 
the  three  angles  are  equal  to  two  right  ones,  because  one  of  them 
is  a  right  angle,  or  because  the  legs  comprehending  it  are  [7<5  equal] 
of  the  same  length  ;  which  sufficiently  shews  that  the  right  angle 
might  have  been  oblique  and  the  sides  unequal,  and  yet  the  dem- 
onstration have  held  good.  And  for  this  reason  it  is  that  I  con- 
clude that  to  be  true  of  any  obliquangular  or  scalenon  which  I 
had  demonstrated  of  a  particular  right  angled  equicrural  triangle  ; 
and  not  because  I  demonstrated  the  proposition  of  the  general 
idea  of  a  triangle  which  was  all  and  none,  it  not  being  possible 
for  me  to  conceive  any  triangle  whereof  I  cannot  delineate  the 
like  on  paper.  But  I  believe  no  man,  whatever  he  may  conceive, 
will  pretend  to  describe  a  general  triangle  with  his  pencill.  This 
being  rightly  consider'd,  I  believe  we  shall  not  be  found  to  have 
any  great  [76want]  need  of  those  eternal,  immutable,  universal 
ideas  about  which  the  philosophers  keep  such  a  stir,  and  without 
which  they  think  there  can  be  no  silence  at  all. 

But  what  becomes  of  these  general  maxims,  these  first  principles 
of  knowledge,  [77so  frequently  in  the  mouths]  of  [76the]  meta- 
physicians, all  wch  are  suppos'd  to  be  about  abstract  and  universal 
ideas  ?  To  which  all  the  answer  I  can  make  is,  that  whatsoever 
proposition  is  made  up  of  terms  standing  for  general  notions  or 
ideas,  the  same  is  to  me,  so  far  forth,  [?6 absolutely]  unintelligible  : 
and  whether  it  be  that  those  speculative  gentlemen  have  by  earnest 
and  profound  study  attain'd  to  an  elevation  of  thought  above  the 
reach  of  ordinary  capacities  and  endeavours,  or  whatever  else  be 

76  Erased.  n  Instead  of  '  these  curious  speculations.' 


PRINCIPLES    OF   HUMAN   KNOWLEDGE.       301 

the  cause,  sure  I  am  there  are  in  their  writings  many  things  which 
I  now  find  myself  unable  to  understand.  Tho'  being  accustom  d 
to  those  forms  of  speech,  I  once  thought  there  was  no  difficulty 
in  them.  But  this  one  thing  seems  [8lto  me]  pretty  plain  and 
certain.  How  high  soever  that  goodly  fabrick  of  metaphysics 
might  have  been  rais'd,  and  by  what  venerable  names  soever  it 
may  be  supported,  yet  if  [8lwithall]  it  be  built  on  [?8no  other] 
foundation  [79than]  inconsistency  and  contradictions,  it  is  after 
all  but  a  castle  in  the  air8°. 

It  were  an  endless  as  well  as  an  useless  thing  to  trace  the 
Schoolmen,  those  great  masters  of  abstraction,  and  all  others 
whether  ancient  or  modern  logicians  and  metaphysicians,  thro' 
those  numerous  inextricable  labyrinths  of  errour  and  dispute, 
which  their  doctrine  of  abstract  natures  and  notions  seems  to  have 
led  them  into.  What  bickerings  and  controversys,  and  what  a 
learned  dust  has  been  rais'd  about  those  matters,  and  what 
[8l  great]  mighty  advantage  has  been  from  thence  deriv'd  to 
mankind,  are  things  at  this  day  too  clearly  known  to  need  to  be 
insisted  on  by  me.  Nor  has  that  doctrine  been  confin'd  to  those 
two  sciences,  that  make  the  most  avowed  profession  of  it.  The 
contagion  thereof  has  spread  through  [8lout]  all  the  parts  of 
philosophy.  It  has  invaded  and  overrun  those  usefull  studys  of 
physic  and  divinity,  and  even  the  mathematicians  themselves 
have  had  their  full  share  of  it. 

When  men  consider  the  great  pain,  industry  and  parts  that  have 
[8lin]  for  so  many  ages  been  lay'd  out  on  the  cultivation  and 
advancement  of  the  sciences,  and  that  [^notwithstanding]  all 
this,  the  far  greatest  part  of  them  remain  full  of  doubts  and 
uncertainties,  and  disputes  that  are  like  never  to  have  an  end, 
and  even  those  that  are  thought  to  be  supported  by  the  most  clear 
and  cogent  demonstrations  do  contain  in  them  paradoxes  that  are 
perfectly  irreconcilable  to  the  understandings  of  men,  and  that 
taking  all  together  a  very  small  portion  of  them  does  supply  any 
real  benefit  to  mankind,  otherwise  than  by  being  an  innocent 
diversion  and  amusement — I  say  upon  the  consideration  of  all 
this,  men  are  wont  to  be  cast  into  an  amazement  and  despondency, 

78  Instead  of  '  the  sandy."  Tt  Instead  of  '  of.' 

80  On  margin,  'Dec.  1.'  Sl  Erased.  8s  Instead  of  '  for.' 


302 


APPENDIX   A. 


and  perfect  contempt  of  all  study.  But  that  wonder  and  despair 
may  perhaps  cease  upon  a  view  of  the  false  principles  and  wrong 
foundations  of  science  [86 which]  that  have  been  made  use  of. 
Amongst  all  which  there  is  none,  methinks,  of  a  more  wide  and 
universal  sway  over  the  thoughts  of  studious  men  than  that  we 
have  been  endeavouring  to  detect  and  overthrow.  [86To  me 
certainly  it  does  not  seem  strange  that  unprofitable  debates  and 
absurd  and  extravagant  opinions  should  abound  in  the  writings 
of  those  men  who,  disdaining  the  vulgar  and  obvious  informations 
of  sense,  do  in  the  depth  of  their  understanding  contemplate 
abstract  ideas83.] 

I  come  now  to  consider  the  [84 source]  of  this  prevailing 
[8s  notion],  and  that  seems  to  me  most  evidently  to  be  language. 
And  surely  nothing  of  less  extent  than  reason  itself  could  have 
been  the  source  of  an  opinion,  as  epidemical  as  it  is  absurd. 
That  [86  words  are]  the  conceit  of  abstract  idea  ows  its  birth 
and  origine  to  words,  will  appear,  as  from  other  reasons,  so  also 
from  the  plain  confession  of  the  ablest  patrons  of  yl  doctrine, 
who  [86do]  acknowledge  that  they  are  made  in  order  to  naming  ; 
from  which  it  is  a  clear  consequence  that  there  had  been  no  such 
thing  as  speech,  or  universal  signs,  there  never  had  been  [^ab- 
stract ideas]  any  thought  of  abstract  ideas.  I  find  it  also  declared 
in  express  terms  that  general  truths  can  never  be  well  made  known, 
and  are  very  seldom  apprehended  but  as  conceived  and  expressed 
in  words;  all  which  doth  plainly  set  forth  the  inseparable  con 
nexion  and  mutual  dependence  [86on  each  other]  that  is  thought 
to  be  between  words  and  abstract  ideas.  For  whereas  it  is  else- 
where said  [86 there  could  be  no  communication  by  general  names 
[8?vvithout  there  being]  also  general  ideas  of  which  they  were  to 
be  signs ;  we  are  here,  on  the  other  hand,  told  that]  that  general 
ideas  [88are]  necessary  for  communication  by  general  names; 
here,  on  the  other  hand,  we  are  told  that  names  are  needfull  for 
the  understanding  of  [86abstract  notions]  general  truths.  Now 
by  the  bye,  I  would  fain  know  how  it  is  possible  for  words  to 
make  a  man  apprehend  that  which  he  cannot  apprehend  without 

83  On  margin — '  Dec.  2.'  **  Instead  of  '  cause.' 

8s  Instead  of  '  imagination  in  the  minds  of  men.'  8*  Erased. 

*7  Instead  of  '  except  there  were.'  n  Instead  of  '  were.' 


PRINCIPLES    OF   HUMAN  KNOWLEDGE.        303 

them.  I  do  not  deny  they  are  necessary  for  communication,  and 
so  making  me  know  the  ideas  that  are  in  the  mind  of  another. 
But  when  any  truth,  whether  [89 about  general  or  part]  about 
general  or  particular  ideas,  is  once  made  known  to  me  by  words, 
[89l  cannot  see  any  manner  of]  so  that  I  rightly  apprehend  the 
ideas  contained  in  it,  I  see  no  manner  of  reason  why  I  may  not 
omit  the  words,  and  yet  retain  as  full  and  clear  a  conception 
of  the  ideas  themselves,  as  I  had  [89of  them]  while  they  were 
cloathed  with  words.  Words  being,  so  far  as  I  can  see,  of  use 
only  for  recording  and  communicating,  but  not  absolutely  appre- 
hending [89  of]  ideas.  [89 1  know  there  be  some  things  which  pass 
for  truths  that  will  not  bear  this  [stripping — being  stript]  of  the 
attire  of  words,  but  this  I  always  took  for  a  sure  and  certain  sign 
that  there  were  no  clear  and  determinate  ideas  underneath.]  I 
proceed  to  show  the  manner  wherein  words  have  contributed  to 
the  growth  and  origine  of  that  mistake. 

That  which  seems  [89to  me  principally]  in  a  great  measure  to 
have  drove  men  into  the  conceit  of  [^abstract]  ideas,  is  the 
opinion,  that  every  name  has,  or  ought  to  have,  one  only  precise 
and  settl'd  signification:  which  inclines  pmen]  them  to  think 
there  are  certain  abstract,  determinate,  general  ideas  that  make 
the  true  and  only  immediate  signification  of  each  general  name, 
and  that  it  is  by  the  mediation  of  these  abstract  ideas  that  a  gen- 
eral name  comes  to  signify  any  particular  thing.  Whereas  there 
is  in  truth  [9Ia]  diversity  of  significations,  in  every  general  name 
whatsoever  [89  except  only  the  proper  names].  Nor  is  there  any 
such  thing  as  one  precise  and  definite  signification  annexed  to  each 
[89 appellative]  name.  All  which  does  evidently  follow  from  what 
has  been  already  said,  and  will  [89be]  clearly  appear  to  any  one 
by  a  little  reflexion. 

But  [89here]  to  this,  I  doubt  not,  it  will  be  objected  that  every 
name  that  has  a  definition  is  thereby  tied  down  and  restrain'd  to 
p2one  certain]  signification,  e.  g.  a  triangle  is  defin'd  to  be  a  plain 
surface  comprehended  by  three  right  lines,  by  which  that  name 
is  limited  to  denote  one  certain  idea,  and  no  other.  To  which  I 
answer,  that  in  the  definition  it  is  not  said,  whether  the  surface 

89  Erased.  9°  Instead  of  '  general.' 

91  Instead  of  '  an  homonomy  or.'  9*  Instead  of  '  a  particular.' 


304 


APPENDIX   A. 


be  great  or  small,  black  or  white  or  transparent,  or  whether  the 
sides  are  long  or  short,  equal  or  unequal,  or  with  what  angles  they 
are  inclin'd  to  each  other.  In  all  which  there  may  be  great 
variety,  and  consequently  there  Js  no  one  settled  idea  which  limits 
the  signification  of  the  word  triangle.  Tis  one  thing  for  to  keep 
a  word  [^everywhere]  constantly  to  the  same  definition,  and 
another  to  make  it  stand  everywhere  for  the  same  idea:  [93that] 
is  necessary,  but  [94this]  is  useless  and  impracticable.  [^Nor 
does  it  avail  to  say  the  abstract  idea  of  a  triangle,  which  bounds 
the  signification  of  that  name,  is  itself  determin'd,  tho'  the  angles, 
sides,  &c.  are  not.  For  besides  the  absurdity  of  such  an  idea, 
which  has  been  already  shown,  it  is  evident  that  if  the  simple 
ideas  or  parts,  i.  e.  the  lines,  angles,  and  surface,  are  themselves 
various  and  undetermin'd,  the  complex  idea  or  whole  triangle 
cannot  be  one  settled  determinate  idea.] 

[95But  to  give  a  farther  account,  how  words  came  to  introduce 
the  doctrine  of  universal  ideas,  it  will  be  necessary  to  observe 
there  is  a  notion  current  among  those  that  pass  for  the  deepest 
thinkers,  that  every  significant  name  stands  for  an  idea.     It  is 

93  Instead  of  '  the  former.'  94  Instead  of  '  the  latter.' 

95  On  the  opposite  page,  we  have,  instead  of  this  paragraph,  the  following: — '  But  to 
give  a  farther  account  how  words  came  to  introduce  the  doctrine  of  general  ideas,  it 
[*  must  be  observ'd]  that  [s  it  is  a  receiv'd  opinion]  that  language  hath  no  other  end  than 
the  communicating  our  ideas,  and  that  every  significant  name  stands  for  an  idea.  This 
being  so,  and  it  being  withall  certain  that  names  which  yet  are  not  thought  altogether 
insignificant,  do  not  always  mark  out  particular  ideas,  it  is  straightway  concluded  that  they 
stand  for  general  ones. 

'  That  there  are  many  names  in  use  amongst  speculative  men,  which  do  not  always  sug- 
gest to  others  determinate,  particular  ideas,  or  in  truth  anything  at  all,  is  what  nobody  will 
deny.  [3  And  that  there  are  significant  names  denoting  things,  whereof  it  is  a  direct  repug- 
nancy that  any  idea  should  be  form'd  by  any  understanding  whatsoever,  I  shall  in  its  due 
place  endeavour  to  demonstrate  that  it  is]  not  necessary  (even  in  the  strictest  reasonings) 
that  significant  names  which  [3  are  marks  of  ideas]  stand  for  ideas  shou'd  every  time  they 
are  used  excite  in  the  understanding  the  ideas  they  are  made  to  [3  signify]  stand  for.  In 
reading  and  discoursing  names  are  for  the  [3  thinking  on]  most  part  us'd  as  [3  figures  in 
casting  up  a  sum  in  which  to  compute  exactly  is  not  necessary]  letters  are  in  Algebra,  in 
which,  tho'  a  particular  quantity  be  mark'd  by  each  letter,  yet  to  proceed  right  it  is  not 
requisite  that  in  every  step  [3  you  have  these  particular  quantitys  in  y  view.  Tho'  you 
regard  only  the  letters  themselves  without  ever  thinking  on  what  was  denoted  by  them, 
yet  if  you  work  according  to  rule,  you  will  come  to  a  true  solution  of  the  question]  each 
letter  suggest  to  your  thoughts  that  particular  quantity  [*  which]  it  was  appointed  to 
[5  stand  for]. 

i  Instead  of  '  Is  necessary  to  observe."  a  Instead  of  '  the  common  opinion  of  philosophers  It,' 

■?  Erased.  4  Instead  of  '  whereof.'  5  Instead  of  '  be  the  fi^re  tu  make— denote." 


PRINCIPLES    OF   HUMAN   KNOWLEDGE. 


305 


said  by  them  that  a  proposition  cannot  otherwise  be  understood 
than  by  perceiving  [96the  agreement  or  disagreement  of]  the 
ideas  marked  by  the  terms  [97 thereof]  of  it.  Whence  it  follows, 
that  according  to  those  men  every  proposition  that  is  not  jargon 
must  consist  of  terms  or  names  that  carry  along  with  them  each 
a  determinate  idea.  This  being  so,  and  it  being  [certain]  withal! 
certain  that  names  which  yet  are  not  thought  altogether  insig- 
nificant do  not  always  mark  out  particular  ideas,  it  is  straightway 
concluded  that  they  stand  for  general  ones. 

In  answer  to  this  I  say,  that  names,  significant  names,  do  not 
always  stand  for  ideas,  but  that  they  may  be  and  are  often  used 
to  good  purpose  [tho'  they  are]  without  being  suppos'd  to  stand 
for  or  represent  any  idea  at  all.  And  as  to  what  we  are  told  of 
understanding  propositions  by  [perceiving]  the  agreement  or  dis- 
agreement of  the  ideas  marked  by  their  terms,  this  to  me  in  many 
cases  seems  absolutely  false.  For  the  better  clearing  and  demon- 
strating of  all  which  I  shall  make  use  of  some  particular  instances. 
Suppose  I  have  the  idea  of  some  one  particular  dog  to  which  I 
give  the  name  Melampus,  and  then  frame  this  proposition — 
Melampus  is  an  animal.  Where  'tis  evident  the  name  Melampus 
denotes  one  particular  idea.  And  as  for  the  other  name  or  term 
of  the  proposition,  there  are  a  sort  of  philosophers  will  tell  you 
thereby  is  meant  not  only  a  universal  conception,  but  also  [cor- 
responding thereto]  a  universal  nature  or  essence  really  existing 
without  the  mind,  whereof  Melampus  doth  partake,  as  tho'  it 
were  possible  that  even  things  themselves  could  be  universal. 
And  [But]  this  with  reason  is  exploded  as  nonsensical  and  ab- 
surd. But  then  those  men  who  have  so  clearly  and  fully  detected 
the  emptyness  and  insignificancy  of  that  wretched  jargon  [of 
S.G.W.(?)],  are  themselves  to  me  equally  unintelligible.  For  they 
will  have  it  that  if  I  understand  what  I  say  I  must  make  the  name 
animal  stand  for  an  abstract  general  idea  which  agrees  to  and 
corresponds  with  the  particular  idea  marked  by  the  name  Melam- 
pus. But  if  a  man  may  be  allow'd  to  know  his  own  meaning,  I 
do  declare  that  in  my  thoughts  the  word  animal  is  neither  sup- 
pos'd to  stand  for  an  universal  nature,  nor  yet  for  an  abstract  idea, 
which  to  me  is  at  least  as  absurd  and  incomprehensible  as  the  other. 

96  Erased.  97  This  and  some  words  that  follow  are  within  brackets  in  the  MS. 

20 


3o6  APPENDIX   A. 

Nor  does  it  indeed  in  that  proposition  stand  for  any  idea  [at  all] 
at  all.  All  that  I  intend  to  signify  thereby  being  only  this — that 
the  particular  [creature]  thing  I  call  Melampus  has  a  right  to  be 
called  by  the  name  animal.  And  I  do  intreat  any  one  to  make 
this  easy  tryal.  Let  him  but  cast  out  of  his  [thoughts]  the  words 
of  the  proposition,  and  then  see  whether  two  clear  and  determi- 
nate ideas  remain  [98in  his  understanding]  whereof  he  finds  one 
to  be  conformable  to  the  other.  I  perceive  it  evidently  in  myself 
that  upon  laying  aside  all  thought  of  the  words  '  Melampus  is  an 
animal,'  I  have  remaining  in  my  mind  one  only  naked  and  bare 
idea,  viz.  that  particular  one  to  which  I  gave  the  name  Melampus. 
Tho'  some  there  be  that  pretend  they  have  also  a  general  idea 
signified  by  the  word  animal,  which  they  perceive  to  agree  with 
the  particular  idea  signified  by  the  word  Melampus,  [which  idea 
is  made  up  of  inconsistencys  and  contradictions,  as  has  been 
already  shown.]  Whether  this  or  that  be  the  truth  of  the  matter, 
I  desire  every  particular  person  to  consider  and  conclude  for 
himself] 

And  this  methinks  may  pretty  clearly  inform  us  how  men 
might  first  have  come  to  think  there  was  a  general  idea  of  animal. 
For  in  the  proposition  we  have  instanc'd  in,  it  is  plain  the  word 
animal  is  not  suppos'd  to  stand  for  the  idea  of  any  one  particular 
[anima]  [creature]  animal.  For  if  it  be  made  stand  for  another 
different  from  that  is  marked  by  the  name  Melampus,  the 
proposition  is  false  and  includes  a  contradiction  ;  and  if  it  be 
made  signify  the  very  same  individual  that  Melampus  doth,  it  is 
a  tautology.  But  it  is  presumed  that  every  name  stands  for  an 
idea.  It  remains  therefore  that  the  word  animal  stands  for  [the] 
general  abstract  idea  [of  animal].  In  like  manner  we  may  be  able 
with  a  little  attention  to  discover  how  other  general  ideas  [of  all 
sorts]  might  at  first  have  stolen  into  the  thoughts  of  man. 

But  farther  to  make  it  evident  that  words  may  be  used  to  good 
purpose  without  bringing  into  the  mind  determinate  ideas,  I  shall 
add  this  instance.  We  are  told  [that]  the  good  things  which  God 
hath  prepared  for  them  that  love  him  are  such  as  eye  hath  not 
seen  nor  ear  heard,  nor  hath  it  enter'd  into  the  heart  of  man  to 
conceive.     What  man  will  pretend  to  say  these  words  of  the 

98  Erased. 


PRINCIPLES    OF   HUMAN    KNOWLEDGE.       ^07 

inspir'd  writer  are  empty  and  [sesf?)]  insignificant  ?  And  yet 
who  is  there  that  can  say  they  bring  into  his  mind  [determi]  clear 
and  determinate  ideas,  or  in  truth  any  ideas  at  all  [ideas]  of  the 
good  things  [pre]  in  store  for  them  that  love  God  ?  It  may  per- 
haps be  said  that  those  words  lay  before  us  the  clear  and  deter- 
minate abstract  ideas  of  good  in  general  and  thing  in  general ; 
but  I  am  afraid  it  will  be  found  that  those  very  abstract  ideas  are 
every  whit  as  remote  from  the  comprehension  of  men  as  the 
particular  pleasures  of  the  saints  in  heaven.  But,  say  you,  those 
words  of  the  Apostle  must  have  some  import.  They  cannot  be 
suppos'd  to  have  been  utter'd  without  all  meaning  and  design 
whatsoever.  I  answer,  the  saying  is  very  weighty,  and  carrys 
with  it  a  great  design,  but  it  is  not  to  raise  in  the  minds  of  men 
the  abstract  ideas  of  thing  or  good,  nor  yet  the  particular  ideas 
of  the  joys  of  the  blessed.  The  design  is  to  make  them  more 
chearfull  and  fervent  in  their  duty ;  and  how  this  may  be  com- 
pass'd  without  making  the  words  good  things  [to  be]  stand  for 
and  mark  out  to  our  understandings  any  ideas  either  general  or 
particular,  I  proceed  to  show. 

Upon  mention  of  a  reward  to  a  man  for  his  pains  and  perse- 
verance in  any  occupation  whatsoever,  it  seems  to  me  that  divers 
things  do  ordinarily  ensue.  For  there  may  be  excited  in  his 
understanding  an  idea  of  the  particular  good  thing  to  him  pro- 
posed for  a  reward.  There  may  also  ensue  thereupon  an  alacrity 
and  steddiness  in  fulfilling  those  conditions  on  which  it  is  to  be 
obtain'd,  together  with  a  zealous  desire  of  serving  and  pleasing 
the  person  in  whose  power  it  is  to  bestow  that  good  thing.  All 
these  things,  I  say,  may  and  often  do  follow  upon  the  pronuncia- 
tion of  those  words  that  declare  the  recompence.  Now  I  do  not 
see  any  reason  why  the  latter  may  not  happen  without  the  former. 
What  is  it  that  hinders  why  a  man  may  not  be  stirr'd  up  to  dili- 
gence and  zeal  in  his  duty,  by  being  told  he  shall  have  a  good 
thing  for  his  reward,  tho'  at  the  same  time  there  be  excited  in  his 
mind  no  other  idea  than  barely  those  of  sounds  or  characters  ? 
When  he  was  a  child  he  had  frequently  heard  those  words  used 
to  him  to  create  in  him  an  obedience  to  the  commands  of  those 
that  spoke  them,  and  as  he  grew  up  he  has  found  by  experience 
that  upon  the  mentioning  of  those  words  by  an  honest  man  it  has 


3o8 


APPENDIX   A. 


been  his  interest  to  have  doubled  his  zeal  and  activity  for  the 
service  of  that  person.  Thus  there  having  grown  up  in  his  mind 
a  customary  connexion  betwixt  the  hearing  that  proposition  and 
being  disposed  to  obey  with  cheerfulness  the  injunctions  that 
accompany  it,  methinks  it  might  be  made  use  of,  tho'  not  to  intro- 
duce into  his  mind  any  idea  marked  by  the  words  good  thing, 
yet  to  excite  in  him  a  willingness  to  perform  that  which  is  requir'd 
of  him.  And  this  seems  to  me  all  that  is  design'd  by  the  speaker, 
except  only  when  he  intends  those  words  shall  [be  the  mark  of] 
signifie  the  idea  of  some  particular  thing:  e.  g.  in  the  case  I  men- 
tion'd  'tis  evident  the  Apostle  never  intended  the  words  [good 
things]  should  [mark  out  to]  our  understandings  the  ideas  of 
those  particular  things  our  faculties  never  attain'd  to.  And  yet  I 
cannot  think  that  he  used  them  at  random  and  without  design  ;  on 
the  contrary,  it  is  my  opinion  that  he  used  them  to  very  good 
purpose,  namely,  to  beget  in  us  a  cheerfulness  and  zeal  and  per- 
severance in  well-doing,  without  any  thought  of  introducing  into 
our  minds  the  abstract  idea  of  a  good  thing.  If  any  one  will 
joyn  ever  so  little  reflexion  of  his  own  to  what  has  been  said,  I 
doubt  not  it  will  evidently  appear  to  him  that  general  names  are 
often  used  in  the  propriety  of  language  without  the  speaker's 
designing  them  for  marks  of  ideas  in  his  own  which  he  would 
[them]  have  them  raise  in  the  understanding  of  the  hearer. 

[99  Even]  proper  names  themselves  are  not  always  spoken  with 
a  design  to  bring  into  our  view  the  ideas  of  those  particular 
things  that  are  suppos'd  to  be  annex'd  to  them.  For  example, 
when  a  Schoolman  tells  you  that  Aristotle  hath  said  it,  think  you 
that  he  intends  ['thereby]  to  [ra]  excite  in  your  imagination  the 
idea  of  that  particular  man  ?  All  he  means  by  it  is  only  to  dis- 
pose you  to  receive  his  opinion  with  that  deference  and  submis- 
sion that  custom  has  annex'd  to  that  name.  When  a  man  that 
has  been  accustom'd  to  resign  his  judgment  [of]  to  the  authority 
of  that  philosopher  [shall]  [upon]  in  reading  of  a  book  meet  with 
the  letters  that  compose  his  name,  he  forthwith  yields  his  assent 
to  the  doctrine  it  was  brought  to  support,  and  that  with  such  a 
quick  and  sudden  [2 glance  of  thought]  as  it  is   impossible  any 

99  '  Nor  is  it  less  certain  that'  erased.  *  Erased. 

a  '  action  of  the  mind' — on  opposite  page. 


PRINCIPLES  OF  HUMAN  KNOWLEDGE. 


309 


idea  either  of  the  person  or  writings  of  that  man  should  go  before 
— so  close  and  immediate  a  connexion  has  long  custom  establish'd 
betwixt  the  very  word  Aristotle  and  the  motions  of  assent  and 
reverence  in  the  minds  of  some  men. 

I  intreat  the  reader  to  reflect  with  himself,  and  see  if  it  does  not 
oft  happen,  either  in  hearing,  or  reading  a  discourse,  that  the 
passions  of  delight,  love,  hatred,  admiration,  disdain,  &c.  ["do 
not]  arise  immediately  in  his  mind  upon  the  perception  of  certain 
words  without  any  ideas  coming  between.  At  first,  indeed,  the 
words  might  have  occasion'd  ideas  that  may  be  apt  to  produce 
those  emotions  of  mind.  But  if  I  mistake  not,  it  will  be  found 
that  when  language  is  once  grown  familiar,  3to  a  man  the  hearing 
of  the  sound  or  sight  of  the  characters  is  oft  immediately  attended 
with  those  passions  which  at  first  were  wont  to  be  produc'd  by 
the  intervention  of  ideas  that  are  now  quite  omitted. 

[4 Further],  the  communicating  of  ideas  marked  bywords  is 
not  the  chief  and  only  end  of  language,  as  is  commonly  suppos'd. 
There  are  other  ends,  as  the  raising  of  some  passion,  the  exciting 
to  or  deterring  from  an  action.5  To  which  the  former  is  in  many 
cases  barely  subservient,  and  sometimes  6 entirely  omitted  when 
these  can  be  obtain'd  without  it,  as  I  think  does  not  infrequently 
happen  in  the  familiar  use  of  language. 

I  ask  any  man  whether  [7  every  time]  he  tells  another  that  such 
an  action  is  honourable  and  vertuous,  with  an8 intention  to  excite 
him  to  the  performance  of  it,  he  has  at  that  instant  ideas  of  honour 
and  virtue9  in  his  [thoug]  view,  and  whether  in  reality  his  inten- 
tion be  to  raise  [zothat]  idea,  together  with  their  agreement  to  the 
["particular]  idea  of  that  particular  action,  in  the  understanding 
of  him  he  speaks  to  ["or  rather  whether  this  be  not  his  full  pur- 
pose, namely,  that  those  words  should  excite  in  the  mind  of  the 
hearer  an  esteem  of  that  particular  action,  and  stir  him  up  to  the 
performance  of  it]. 

3  '  to  a  man"  erased.  *  '  From  which  it  follows,  that'  erased. 

5  On  opposite  page — '  the  putting  the  mind  in  some  particular  disposition.  Hence  we 
may  conceive  how  it  is  possible  for  the  promise  that  is  made  us  of  the  good  things  of 
another  life  excite  in  us  suitable  dispositions,  tho'  the  words  good  things  do  not  bring  into 
our  minds  particular  ideas  of  the  pleasures  of  heaven,  nor  yet  the  ideas  of  good  in  general 
or  things  in  general.' 

6  '  entirely'  erased.  7  '  when'  erased. 

8  '  vertuous,  with  an'  substituted  for  '  vertuous.'  9  '  virtue'  substituted  for  '  vertue.' 

10  '  those  abstract'  erased.  ™  Erased. 


3"> 


APPENDIX  A. 


[I5Upon  hearing  the  words  lie  [&]  rascal,  indignation,  revenge, 
and  the  suddain  motions  of  anger  do  instantly  [ensue]  in  the 
minds  of  some  men,  without  our  attending  to  the  definition  of 
those  names  or  concerning  the  ideas  they  are  suppos'd  to  stand 
for — all  that  passion  and  resentment  having  been  by  custom  con- 
nected to  those  very  sounds  themselves  and  the  manner  of  their 
utterance 12.] 

It  is  plain  therefore  that  a  man  may  understand  what  is  said  to 
him  without  having  a  clear  and  determinate  idea  annexed  to  and 
marked  by  every  particular  [I3  word]  in  the  discourse  he  hears. 
Nay,  he  may  perfectly  understand  it.  For  what  is  it,  I  pray,  to 
understand  perfectly,  but  only  to  understand  all  that  is  meant  by 
the  person  that  speaks  ?  which  very  oft  is  nothing  more  than 
barely  to  excite  in  [I4his  mind]  certain  emotions  without  any 
thought  of  those  ideas  so  much  talk'd  of  and  so  little  understood. 
For  the  truth  whereof  I  appeal  to  every  [man's]  one's  experi- 
ence. 

I  know  not  how  this  doctrine  will  go  down  with  those  [philos- 
ophers] who  may  be  apt  to  give  the  titles  of  gibberish  and  jargon 
to  all  discourse  whatsoever  so  far  forth  as  the  words  contained 
in  it  are  not  made  the  signs  of  clear  and  determinate  ideas,  who 
think  it  nonsense  for  a  man  to  assent  to  any  proposition  each 
term  whereof  doth  not  bring  into  his  mind  a  clear  and  distinct 
idea,  and  tell  us  [I5over  and  over]  that  every  pertinent  [l6word] 
[17hath  an  idea  annexed  unto]  which  never  fails  to  accompany  it 
where  'tis  rightly  understood.  Which  opinion  of  theirs,  how 
plausibly  soever  it  might  have  been  maintain'd  by  some,  seems  to 
me  to  have  introduced  a  great  deal  of  difficulty  and  nonsense  into 
the  reasonings  of  men.  Certainly  nothing  could  be  fitter  to  bring 
forth  and  cherish  the  doctrine  of  abstract  ideas.  For  when  men 
were  indubitably  conscious  to  themselves  that  many  [l8  words] 
they  used  did  not  denote  any  particular  ideas,  lest  they  should 

13  On  opposite  page — '  Innumerable  instances  of  this  kind  may  be  given — arise.  But 
why  should  I  be  tedious  in  enumerating  these  things,  which  every  one's  observation  will, 
I  doubt  not,  plentifully  suggest  unto  him?' 

'3  '  name' — on  opposite  page.  **  '  the  hearer' — on  opposite  page. 

'5  Erased.  x6  '  name' — on  opposite  page. 

«7  '  is  the  mark  of  an  idea' — on  opposite  page. 

,8  '  names' — on  opposite  page. 


PRINCIPLES   OF  HUMAN  KNOWLEDGE.       3II 

be  thought  altogether  insignificant,  they  were  of  necessity  driven 
into  the  opinion  that  they  stood  for  [^  general  ones]. 

But  more  effectually  to  show  the  absurdity  of  an  opinion  that 
carrys  with  it  so  great  an  appearance  of  [clearness  and  strength 
of]  reason,  but  is  [2°in  fact]  most  dangerous  and  destructive  both 
to  reason  and  religion,  I  shall,  if  I  mistake  not,  in  the  progress 
of  this  work  demonstrate  there  be  names  well  known  and  familiar 
to  men,  which  tho'  they  mark  and  [stand]  and  signify  things, 
cannot  be  suppos'd  to  signifie  ideas  of  any  sort,  either  general  or 
particular,  without  the  greatest  nonsense  and  contradiction  ;  it 
being  absolutely  impossible,  and  a  direct  repugnancy,  that  any 
intellect,  how  exalted  and  comprehensive  soever,  should  frame 
ideas  of  these  things. 

We  have,  I  think,  shown  the  impossibility  of  abstract  ideas. 
We  have  consider'd  what  has  been  said  in  behalf  of  them  by 
their  ablest  patrons,  and  endeavour'd  to  demonstrate  they  are  of 
no  use  for  those  ends  to  which  they  "are  thought  necessary. 
And,  lastly,  we  have  traced  them  to  the  source  from  whence  they 
flow,  which  appears  evidently  to  be  language. 

Since  therefore  words  have  been  discover'd  to  be  so  very  apt 
to  impose  on  the  understandings  of  men,  .1  am  resolv'd  in  my 
["inquiries]  to  make  as  little  use  of  them,  as  possibly  I  can. 
Whatever  ideas  I  consider,  I  shall  endeavour  to  take  them  bare 
and  naked  into  my  view,  keeping  out  of  my  thoughts,  so  far  as  I 
am  able,  those  names  which  long  and  constant  use  hath  so  strictly 
united  to  them. 

Let  us  conceive  a  solitary  man,  one  born  and  bred  in  such  a 
place  of  the  world,  and  in  such  circumstances,  as  he  shall  never 
have  had  occasion  to  make  use  of  universal  signs  for  his  ideas. 
That  man  shall  have  a  constant  train  of  particular  ideas  passing 
in  his  mind.  Whatever  he  sees,  hears,  imagines,  or  anywise  con- 
ceives, is  on  all  hands,  even  by  the  patrons  of  abstract  ideas, 
granted  to  be  particular.  Let  us  withall  suppose  him  under  no 
necessity  of  labouring  to  secure  himself  from  hunger  and  cold, 
but  at  full  ease,  naturally  of  good  facultys,  [23and]  contemplative. 
Such  a  one  I  should  take  to  be  nearer  the  discovery  of  certain 

»9  '  good  sense  and  sound' — on  opposite  page.  *>  Instead  of  '  withall.' 

21  '  are'  instead  of  '  were.'  **  Instead  of  '  reasonings.'  23  '  but"  erased. 


312  APPENDIX  A. 

great  and  excellent  truths  yet  unknown,  than  he  that  has  had 
the  education  of  schools,  [24has  been  instructed  in  the  ancient 
and  modern  philosophy],  and  by  much  reading  and  conversation 
has  [furnish'd  his  head]  attain'd  to  the  knowledge  of  those  arts 
and  sciences  that  make  so  great  a  noise  in  the  [24  learned]  world. 
It  is  true,  the  knowledge  of  our  solitary  philosopher  is  not  like 
to  be  so  very  wide  and  extended,  it  being  confin'd  to  those  few 
particulars  that  come  within  his  own  observation.  But  then,  if 
he  is  like  to  have  less  knowledge,  he  is  withall  like  to  have  fewer 
mistakes  than  other  men. 

It  cannot  be  deny'd  that  words  are  of  excellent  use,  in  that  by 
their  means  all  that  stock  of  knowledge,  which  has  been  pur- 
chas'd  by  the  joynt  labours  of  inquisitive  men  in  all  ages  and  na- 
tions, may  be  drawn  into  the  view,  and  made  the  possession  of 
one  [24  particular]  single  person.  But  there  [25are  some]  parts  of 
learning  which  contain  the  knowledge  of  things  the  most  noble 
and  important  of  any  within  the  reach  of  human  reason,  that  have 
had  the  ill  fate  to  be  so  signally  perplex'd  and  darken'd  by  the 
abuse  of  words  and  general  ways  of  speech  wherein  they  are 
deliver'd,  that  in  the  study  [26  of  them]  a  man  cannot  be  too 
much  upon  his  guard,  [27  whether]  in  his  private  meditations,  or 
in  reading  the  writings  or  hearing  the  discourses  of  other  men,  to 
prevent  his  being  cheated  [24  by  the  glibness  and  familiarity  of 
speech]  into  a  belief  that  those  words  stand  for  ideas  which,  in 
truth,  stand  for  none  at  all :  which  grand  mistake  it  is  almost 
incredible  what  a  mist  and  darkness  it  has  cast  over  the  under- 
standings of  men,  otherwise  the  most  rational  and  clear-sighted. 

I  shall  therefore  endeavour,  so  far  as  I  am  able,  [28  to  put 
myself  in  the  posture  of  the  solitary  philosopher.  I  will  confine 
my  thoughts  and  enquiries,  to  the  naked  scene  of  my  own  par- 
ticular ideas,]  from  which  I  may  expect  to  derive  the  following 
advantages. 

First.  I  shall  be  sure  to  get  clear  of  all  [29  verbal]  controversies 
purely  verbal.  The  [3°  springing  up  of]  which  weeds  in  almost 
all  the  sciences  has  been  [2?  the]  a  most  fatal  obstruction  to  the 

*4  Erased.        "S  Instead  of '  is  one.'        »*  Instead  of  '  thereof.'        »7  Instead  of  '  cither.' 
28  Erased.     On  the  opposite  page — '  to  take  off  the  mask  of  words,  and  obtain  a  naked 
view  of  my  own  particular  ideas.' 
*9  Erased.  3°  Instead  of '  insisting  on.' 


PRINCIPLES  OF  HUMAN  KNOWLEDGE. 


31, 


growth  of  true  and  sound  knowledge:  and  accordingly  is  at  this 
day  esteem'd  as  such,  and  made  the  great  and  just  complaint  of 
the  wisest  men. 

Secondly.  'Tis  reasonable  to  expect  that  [3I  by  this]  the  trouble 
of  sounding,  or  examining,  or  comprehending  any  notion  may 
be  very  much  abridg'd.  For  it  oft  happens  that  a  notion,  when 
it  is  cloathed  with  words,  seems  tedious  and  operose,  and  hard  to 
be  conceiv'd,  which  yet  being  stript  of  that  garniture,  the  ideas 
shrink  into  a  narrow  compass,  and  are  view'd  almost  by  one 
glance  of  thought. 

Thirdly.  I  shall  have  fewer  objects  to  consider  than  other  men 
seem  to  have  had.  [32  Because]  I  find  myself  to  want  several 
of  those  supposed  ideas,  in  contemplating  of  which  the  philoso- 
phers do  usually  spend  much  pains  and  study.  [29  nay,  even 
of  those  (which  without  doubt  will  appear  very  surprising)  that 
pass  for  simple,  particular  ideas.  It  [is  inconceivable  what]  can- 
not be  believ'd  what  a  wonderfull  emptyness  and  scarcity  of  ideas 
that  man  shall  descry  who  will  lay  aside  all  use  of  words  in  his 
meditations. 

Fourthly.  Having  remov'd  the  veil  of  words,  I  may  expect  to 
have  a  clearer  prospect  of  the  ideas  that  remain  in  my  under- 
standing. To  behold  the  deformity  of  errour  we  need  only  un- 
dress it.] 

Fifthly.  This  seemeth  to  be  a  sure  [33  way]  to  extricate  myself 
out  of  that  fine  and  subtile  net  of  abstract  ideas ;  which  has  so 
miserably  perplex'd  and  entangled  the  minds  of  men,  and  that 
with  this  peculiar  circumstance,  that  by  how  much  the  finer  and 
the  more  curious  was  the  wit  of  any  man,  by  so  much  the  deeper 
was  he  like  to  be  ensnar'd  and  faster  held  therein. 

Sixthly.  So  long  as  I  confine  my  [34  thoughts]  to  my  own  ideas 
divested  of  words,  I  do  not  see  how  I  can  easily  be  mistaken. 
The  objects  I  consider  I  [35  clearly]  and  adequately  know.  I  can- 
not be  deceiv'd  in  thinking  I  have  an  idea  which  I  have  not. 
Nor,  on  the  other  hand,  can  I  be  ignorant  of  any  idea  that  I 
have.     It  is  not  possible  for  me  to  think  any  of  my  own  ideas  are 

31  Instead  of '  hereby.'  32  Instead  of '  For  that.' 

33  Instead  of '  means  whereby.'  34  Instead  of '  contemplations.' 

35  Instead  of '  perfectly.' 


3*4 


APPENDIX  A. 


alike  or  unlike  which  are  not  truly  so.  To  discern  the  agree- 
ments and  disagreements  there  are  between  my  ideas,  to  see  what 
simple  ideas  are  included  in  any  [36  compound]  idea,  and  what 
not,  [37  there  is  nothing  requisite  but]  an  attentive  perception  of 
what  passes  in  my  own  understanding. 

But  the  attainment  of  all  these  advantages  does  presuppose 
an  entire  deliverance  from  the  deception  of  words,  which  I  dare 
scarce  promise  myself.  So  difficult  a  thing  it  is  to  dissolve  a 
union  so  early  begun,  and  confirm'd  by  so  long  a  habit,  as  that 
betwixt  words  and  ideas. 

Which  difficulty  seems  to  have  been  very  much  encreas'd  by 
the  [38  doctrine  of  abstraction].  For  so  long  as  men  thought 
abstract  ideas  were  annex'd  to  their  words,  it  does  not  seem 
strange  they  should  use  words  for  ideas.  It  being  found  an  im- 
practicable thing  to  lay  aside  the  word  and  retain  the  abstract 
idea  in  the  mind,  which  in  itself  was  perfectly  inconceivable. 
This  made  it  necessary  for  them  to  reason  and  meditate  about 
words,  to  which  they  suppos'd  abstract  ideas  were  connected, 
and  by  means  whereof  they  thought  those  ideas  could  be  con- 
ceiv'd,  tho'  they  could  not  without  them.  [39  But  surely  those 
ideas  ought  to  be  suspected  that  cannot  endure  the  light  without 
a  covering.] 

Another  thing  which  makes  words  and  ideas  thought  much 
[4°  harder  to  separate]  than  in  truth  they  are,  is  the  opinion  that 
every  name  stands  for  an  idea.  [4l  For]  it  is  no  wonder  that  men 
should  fatigue  themselves  in  vain,  and  find  it  a  very  difficult 
undertaking,  when  they  endeavour'd  to  [42  obtain  a  clear  and 
naked]  view  of  [43  those]  the  ideas  marked  by  those  words,  which 
in  truth  mark  none  at  all ;  [43  as  I  have  already  shown  many 
names  often  do  not,  even  when  they  are  not  altogether  [insignifi- 
cant], and  I  shall  more  fully  show  it  hereafter]. 

[44This]  seems  to  me  the  principal  cause  why  those  men  that 

3«  Instead  of '  complex.' 

37  Erased  here — '  all  this  I  can  do  without  being  taught  by  [another],  there  being  requi- 
site thereto  nothing  more  than.'  Also — ['  the  writings  and  discoveries  of  other  men  or 
without  having  any  great  parts  of  my  own]  thece  is  nothing  more  requisite.' 

38  Instead  of 'opinion  of  abstract  ideas."  »  Erased. 

4°  Instead  of  more  inseparable.'  *«  Instead  of  '  Now.' 

+»  Instead  of  '  strip  and  take  a.'  «  Erased.  **  Instead  of '  These.' 


PRINCIPLES  OF  HUMAN  KNOWLEDGE. 


315 


have  so  emphatically  recommended  to  others  the  laying  aside 
the  use  of  words  in  their  meditations,  and  contemplating  their 
bare  ideas,  have  yet  been  so  little  able  to  perform  it  themselves. 
Of  late  many  have  been  very  sensible  of  the  absurd  opinions, 
and  insignificant  disputes,  that  grow  out  of  the  abuse  of  words. 
In  order  to  redress  these  evils,  they  advise  well  that  we  attend 
to  the  ideas  that  are  signified,  and  draw  off  our  attention  from 
the  words  that  signify  them.  But  how  good  soever  this  advice 
may  be  that  they  have  given  others  45  men,  it  is  plain  they  little 
regarded  it  themselves,  so  long  as  they  thought  the  only  imme- 
diate use  of  words  was  to  signifie  ideas,  and  that  the  immediate 
signification  of  every  general  name  was  a  determinate  abstract 
idea. 

Which  having  been  shown  to  be  mistakes,  a  man  may  now, 
with  much  greater  ease,  deliver  himself  from  the  imposture  of 
words.  Pie  that  knows  he  hath  no  other  than  particular  ideas, 
will  not  puzzle  himself  in  vain  to  find  out  and  conceive  the  ab- 
stract idea  annexed  to  any  name.  And  he  that  knows  names 
[5°when  made  use  of  in  the  propriety  of  language]  do  not  always 
stand  for  ideas,  will  spare  himself  the  labour  of  looking  for  ideas 
where  there  are  none  to  be  had.  Those  obstacles  being  now 
remov'd,  I  earnestly  desire  that  every  one  would  use  his  utmost 
endeavour  to  attain  a  clear  and  naked  view  of  [46  the]  ideas  he 
would  consider  [4?  by  separating]  from  them  all  that  varnish  and 
mist  of  words,  which  so  fatally  blinds  the  judgment  and  dissi- 
pates the  attention  of  men. 

This  is,  I  am  confident,  the  shortest  way  to  knowledge,  and 
cannot  cost  too  much  pains  in  coming  at.  In  vain  do  we  extend 
our  views  into  the  heavens,  and  rake  into  the  entrails  of  the  earth. 
In  vain  do  we  consult  the  writings  and  discourses  of  learned  men, 
and  trace  the  dark  footsteps  of  antiquity.  We  need  only  draw 
the  curtain  of  words,  to  behold  the  fairest  tree  of  knowledge, 
whose  fruit  is  excellent  and  within  the  reach  of  [48our  hand]. 

Unless  we  take  care  to  clear  the  first  principles  of  knowledge 
from  the  [49 incumbrance  and  delusion]  of  words,  [s°the  conse- 
quences we  draw  from  them]  we  may  make  infinite  reasonings 

4S  '  men'  erased.  *f>  Instead  of '  his  own."  *i  Instead  of  '  having  separated.' 

4s  Instead  of  '  [any  man]  to  pluck  it.'  «  Instead  of  '  cheat.'  s°  Erased. 


3i6  APPENDIX   A. 

upon  them  to  no  purpose.  We  may  [5I  deduce  consequences 
from]  consequences,  and  be  never  the  wiser.  The  farther  we  go, 
we  shall  only  lose  ourselves  the  more  irrecoverably,  and  be  the 
deeper  entangled  in  difficulties  and  mistakes. 

I  do  therefore  intreat  whoever  designs  to  read  the  following 
sheets,  that  he  would  make  my  words  the  occasion  of  his  own 
thinking,  and  endeavour  to  attain  the  same  train  of  thoughts  in 
reading  that  I  had  in  writing  them.  By  this  means  it  will  be 
easy  for  him  [52to  discover  the  truth  or  falsity  of  what  I  say]. 
He  will  be  out  of  all  danger  of  being  deceiv'd  by  my  words. 
And  I  do  not  see  what  inducement  he  can  have  to  err  in  consid- 
ering his  own  naked,  undisguised  ideas. 

That  I  may  contribute,  so  far  as  in  me  lies,  to  expose  my 
thoughts  [s°  to  the]  fairly  to  the  understanding  of  the  reader,  I 
shall  throughout  endeavour  to  express  myself  in  the  clearest, 
plainest,  and  most  familiar  "manner,  abstaining  from  [5°all  flourish 
and  pomp  of  words],  all  hard  and  unusual  terms  which  are 
[s°  commonly]  pretended  by  those  that  use  them  to  cover  a  sense 
[5° intricate  and]  abstracted  and  sublime. 

[5°I  pretend  not  to  treat  of  anything  but  what  is  obvious  and 
[s°accommodated  to]  the  understanding  of  every  reasonable 
man.] 

5°  Erased.  5»  Instead  of  '  lose  ourselves  in.' 

S»  Instead  of  'whatever  mistakes  I  might  have  committed.' 
53  After  '  manner'  '  I  shall'  erased. 


ARTHUR    COLLIER. 

The  simultaneous  publication  of  a  conception  of  the  nature  of  sensi- 
ble reality  so  far  accordant  as  that  of  Berkeley  and  Collier  has  been 
considered  by  historians  of  philosophy  so  curious  that  I  am  induced 
here  to  reprint  the  Introduction  to  Collier's  Clavis  Universalis :  or,  a 
?iew  Inquiry  after  Truth,  being  a  Demo?istration  of  the  Non-existence, 
or  Impossibility,  of  an  External  World  *.  The  reader  of  Berkeley  may 
thus  conveniently  compare,  with  what  Berkeley  taught,  Collier's  thesis 
regarding  the  inexistence  of  the  material  world. 

Arthur  Collier  was  born  on  the  12th  of  October,  1680 — more  than 
four  years  before  Berkeley — at  the  rectory  of  Langford  Magna  in  Wilt- 
shire. He  entered  Pembroke  College,  Oxford,  in  July  1697.  He 
succeeded  his  father  as  rector  of  Langford  Magna  in  1 704,  and  continued 
to  hold  that  living  till  his  death  in  1732.  One  of  his  near  neighbours, 
during  the  first  years  of  his  incumbency,  was  John  Norris,  the  English 
Malebranche,  rector  of  Bemerton,  author  of  Ati  Essay  towards  the 
Theory  of  the  Ideal  or  Intelligible  World  (1701 — 4),  who  died  in  171 1. 

From  his  own  account,  Collier  seems  to  have  adopted  his  new 
thought  regarding  the  meaning  of  sensible  existence  or  reality  about 
1703,  though  he  did  not  publish  it  till  1713,  in  the  early  part  of  which 
year  the  Clavis  Universalis  appeared. 

Five  interesting  letters  of  Collier,  in  exposition  and  defence  of  his 
notion  of  Matter,  are  given  in  Benson's  Memoirs.  Two  of  them  were 
written  in  1714,  and  the  others  in  1715,  1720,  and  1722.  That  written 
in  1 715  is  addressed  to  Dr.  Samuel  Clarke.  Two  of  the  others  are  to 
Samuel  Low,  a  grammarian  ;  another  was  sent  to  Dr.  Waterland  ;  and 
the  last  is  addressed  to  Mr.  Shepherd,  Fellow  of  Trinity  College,  Oxford. 

Collier  seems  to  have  been  more  disposed  than  Berkeley  to  apply 
philosophical  speculation  directly  to  Christian  theology.    His  theologi- 

1  The  motto  of  this  work,  taken  from  Malebranche,  is  Vulgi  assensns  et  approbatio, 
circa  materiam  difficilem,  est  certum  argumentum  fahitatis  istius  opinionis  cui  assentitur. 
— De  Inquir.  Verit.    Lib.  III.  p.  194. 

317 


3H 


APPENDIX    B 


cal  speculations  occupied  a  considerable  share  of  his  life,  and  involved 
a  subtle  modification  of  Arianism — according  to  which  the  sensible 
world  exists  in  the  mind  of  man  ;  the  mind  of  man  exists  in  Christ ; 
and  Christ  exists  in  God — all  exemplifying  what  he  calls  '  in-existence,' 
or  dependent  existence.  This  chain  of  inexistcnt  being  he  deduces 
from  speculative  reason,  and  also  from  the  words  of  Scripture.  Collier 
was  a  friend  and  correspondent  of  Whiston,  whose  theory  of  '  Primitive 
Christianity'  was  discussed  about  that  time. 

Collier  was  a  Tory  and  High  Churchman,  and  curiously,  like  Berke- 
ley, he  published  a  sermon  on  the  Christian  obligation  of  submission 
to  the  higher  powers,  founded  on  Romans  xiii.  i. 

It  does  not  appear  that  Berkeley  and  Collier  ever  met,  nor  is  he 
once  named  by  Berkeley,  though  Berkeley  is  more  than  once  named 
by  him. 


THE   INTRODUCTION  TO   THE   CLAVIS   UNIVERSALIS, 

'  Wlierein  the  Question  in  General  is  explained  and  stated,  and  the  whole 
subject  divided  into  two  particular  heads. 

Though  I  am  verily  persuaded  that,  in  the  whole  course  of  the 
following  treatise,  I  shall  or  can  have  no  other  adversary  but  prejudice  ; 
yet,  having  by  me  no  mechanical  engine  proper  to  remove  it ;  nor 
being  able  to  invent  any  other  method  of  attacking  it,  besides  that  of 
fair  reason  and  argument;  rather  than  the  world  should  finish  its 
course  without  once  offering  to  enquire  in  what  manner  it  exists,  ( and 
for  one  reason  more,  which  I  need  not  name,  unless  the  end  desired 
were  more  hopeful) ;  I  am  at  last,  after  a  ten  years  pause  and  deliber- 
ation, content  to  put  myself  upon  the  trial  of  the  common  reader, 
without  pretending  to  any  better  art  of  gaining  him  on  my  side,  than 
that  of  dry  reason  and  metaphysical  demonstration. 

The  Question  I  am  concerned  about  is  in  general  this — Whether 
there  be  any  such  thing  as  an  External  World.  And  my  title  will 
suffice  to  inform  my  reader,  that  the  negative  of  this  question  is  the 
point  I  am  to  demonstrate. 

In  order  to  which,  let  us  first  explain  the  terms. 

Accordingly,  by  World,  I  mean  whatsoever  is  usually  understood  by 
the  terms  body,  extension,  space,  matter,  quantity,  &c,  if  there  be 
any  other  word  in  our  English  tongue  which  is  synonymous  with  all  or 
any  of  these  terms. 

And  now  nothing  remains  but  the  explication  of  the  word  External. 


ARTHUR    COLLIER. 


319 


By  this,  in  general,  I  understand  the  same  as  is  usually  understood 
by  the  words,  absolute,  self-existent,  independent,  &c.  ;  and  this  is 
what  I  deny  of  all  matter,  body,  extension,  &c. 

If  this,  you  will  say,  be  all  that  I  mean  by  the  word  external,  I  am 
like  to  meet  with  no  adversary  at  all,  for  who  has  ever  affirmed,  that 
matter  is  self- existent,  absolute,  or  independent  ? 

To  this  I  answer,  What  others  hold,  or  have  held  in  times  past,  I 
shall  not  here  inquire.  On  the  contrary,  I  should  be  glad  to  find  by 
the  event,  that  all  mankind  were  agreed  in  that  which  I  contend  for  as 
the  truth,  viz.  that  matter  is  not,  cannot  be,  independent,  absolute,  or 
self-existent.  In  the  mean  time,  whether  they  are  so  or  no,  will  be 
tried  by  this. 

Secondly,  and  more  particularly,  That  by  not  independent,  not 
absolutely  existent,  not  external,  I  mean  and  contend  for  nothing  less 
than  that  all  matter,  body,  extension,  &c.  exists  in,  or  in  dependence 
on,  mind,  thought,  or  perception  ;  and  that  it  is  not  capable  of  an 
existence,  which  is  not  thus  dependent. 

This  perhaps  may  awaken  another  to  demand  of  me,  How?  to  which 
I  as  readily  answer — just  how  my  reader  pleases,  provided  it  be  some- 
how. As  for  instance,  we  usually  say,  An  accident  exists  in,  or  in 
dependence  on,  its  proper  subject;  and  that  its  very  essence,  or  reality 
of  its  existence,  is  so  to  exist.  Will  this  pass  for  an  explication  of  my 
assertion?  If  so,  I  am  content  to  stand  by  it,  in  this  sense  of  the 
words.  Again,  we  usually  say  (and  fancy  too  we  know  what  we  mean 
in  saying,)  that  a  body  exists  in,  and  also  in  dependence  on,  its  proper 
place,  so  as  to  exist  necessarily  in  some  place  or  other.  Will  this 
description  of  dependence  please  my  inquisitive  reader  ?  If  so,  I  am 
content  to  join  issue  with  him,  and  contend  that  all  matter  exists  in, 
or  as  much  dependently  on,  mind,  thought,  or  perception,  to  the  full, 
as  any  body  exists  in  place.  Nay,  I  hold  the  description  to  be  so  just 
and  apposite  as  if  a  man  should  say,  A  thing  is  like  itself:  for,  I  sup- 
pose I  need  not  tell  my  reader  that  when  I  affirm  that  all  matter  exists 
in  mind,  after  the  same  manner  as  body  exists  in  place,  I  mean  the 
very  same  as  if  I  had  said,  that  mind  itself  is  the  place  of  body,  and  so 
its  place,  as  that  it  is  not  capable  of  existing  in  any  other  place,  or  in 
place  after  any  other  manner.  Again,  lastly,  it  is  a  common  saying, 
that  an  object  of  perception  exists  in,  or  in  dependence  on,  its  respect- 
ive faculty.  And  of  these  objects  there  are  many  who  will  reckon  with 
me,  light,  sounds,  colours,  and  even  some  material  things,  such  as 
trees,  houses,  &c,  which  are  seen,  as  we  say,  in  a  looking-glass,  but 
which  are,  or  ought  to  be,  owned  to  have  no  existence  but  in,  or 
respectively  on,  the  minds  or  faculties  of  those  who  perceive  them.  But, 
to  please  all  parties  at  once,  I  affirm  that  I  know  of  no  manner  in  which 
an  object  of  perception  exists  in,  or  on,  its  respective  faculty,  which  I 
will  not  admit  in  this  place  to  be  a  just  description  of  that  manner  of 
in-existence  after  which  all  matter  that  exists  is  affirmed  by  me  to  exist 
in  mind.  Nevertheless,  were  I  to  speak  my  mind  freely  I  should 
choose  to  compare  it  to  the  in-existence  of  some,  rather  than  some 
other  objects  of  perception — particularly  such  as  are  objects  of  the 


320  APPENDIX    B. 

sense  of  vision  ;  and  of  these,  those  more  especially  which  are  allowed 
by  others  to  exist  wholly  in  the  mind  or  visive  faculty;  such  as  objects 
seen  in  a  looking-glass,  by  men  distempered,  light-headed,  ecstatic, 
&c,  where  not  only  colours,  but  entire  bodies,  are  perceived  or  seen. 
For  these  cases  are  exactly  parallel  with  that  existence  which  I  affirm 
of  all  matter,  body,  or  extension  whatsoever. 

Having  endeavoured,  in  as  distinct  terms  as  I  can,  to  give  my  reader 
notice  of  what  I  mean  by  the  proposition  I  have  undertaken  the  defence 
of,  it  will  be  requisite  in  the  next  place,  to  declare  in  as  plain  terms, 
what  I  do  not  mean  by  it. 

Accordingly,  I  declare  in  the  first  place,  That  in  affirming  that  there 
is  no  external  world,  I  make  no  doubt  or  question  of  the  existence  of 
bodies,  or  whether  the  bodies  which  are  seen  exist  or  not.  It  is  with 
me  a  first  principle,  that  whatsoever  is  seen,  is.  To  deny  or  doubt  of 
this  is  errant  scepticism,  and  at  once  unqualifies  a  man  for  any  part  or 
office  of  a  disputant,  or  philosopher ;  so  that  it  will  be  remembered 
from  this  time,  that  my  enquiry  is  not  concerning  the  existence,  but 
altogether  concerning  the  ^ra-existence  of  certain  things  or  objects; 
or,  in  other  words,  what  I  affirm  and  contend  for,  is  not  that  bodies 
do  not  exist,  or  that  the  external  world  does  not  exist,  but  that  such 
and  such  bodies,  which  are  supposed  to  exist,  do  not  exist  externally ; 
or  in  universal  terms,  that  there  is  no  such  thing  as  an  external  world. 

Secondly,  I  profess  and  declare  that,  notwithstanding  this  my  asser- 
tion, I  am  persuaded  that  I  see  all  bodies  just  as  other  folks  do ;  that 
is,  the  visible  world  is  seen  by  me,  or,  which  is  the  same,  seems  to 
me,  to  be  as  much  external  or  independent,  as  to  its  existence,  on  my 
mind,  self,  or  visive  faculty,  as  any  visible  object  does,  or  can  be  pre- 
tended to  do  or  be,  to  any  other  person.  I  have  neither,  as  I  know 
of,  another  nature,  nor  another  knack  of  seeing  objects,  different  from 
other  persons,  suitable  to  the  hypothesis  of  their  existence  which  I  here 
contend  for.  So  far  from  this,  that  I  believe,  and  am  very  sure,  that 
this  seeming,  or  (as  I  shall  desire  leave  to  call  it)  quasi  cxterneity  of 
visible  objects,  is  not  only  the  effect  of  the  Will  of  God,  (as  it  is  his 
Will  that  light  md  colours  should  seem  to  be  without  the  soul,  that 
heat  should  seem  to  be  in  the  fire,  pain  in  the  hand,  &c.)  but  also  that 
it  is  a  natural  and  necessary  condition  of  their  visibility :  I  would  say 
that  though  God  should  be  supposed  to  make  a  world,  or  any  one 
visible  object,  which  is  granted  to  be  not  external,  yet,  by  the  condition 
of  its  being  seen,  it  would,  and  must  be,  quasi  externa/  to  the  percep- 
tive faculty ;  as  much  so  to  the  full,  as  is  any  material  object  usually 
seen  in  this  visible  world. 

Moreover,  thirdly,  When  I  affirm  that  all  matter  exists  dependently 
on  mind,  I  am  sure  my  reader  will  allow  me  to  say,  I  do  not  mean  by 
this — that  matter  or  bodies  exist  in  bodies.  As  for  instance,  when  I 
affirm  or  say,  that  the  world,  which  I  see,  exists  in  my  mind,  1  cannot 
be  supposed  to  mean  that  one  body  exists  in  another,  or  that  all  the 
bodies  which  I  see  exist  in  that  which  common  use  has  taught  me  to 
call  my  body.     I  must  needs  desire  to  have  this  remembered,  because 


ARTHUR    COLLIER. 


321 


experience  has  taught  me  how  apt  persons  are,  or  will  be,  to  mistake 
me  in  this  particular. 

Fourthly,  When  I  affirm  that  this  or  that  visible  object  exists  in,  or 
dependently  on,  my  mind,  or  perceptive  faculty,  I  must  desire  to  be 
understood  to  mean  no  more  than  I  say,  by  the  words  mind  and  per- 
ceptive faculty.  In  like  manner  I  would  be  understood,  when  I  affirm 
in  general,  that  all  matter  or  body  exists  in,  or  dependently  on,  mind. 
I  say  this  to  acquit  myself  from  the  imputation  of  holding  that  the 
mind  causes  its  own  ideas,  or  objects  of  perception ;  or,  lest  any  one 
by  a  mistake  should  fancy  that  I  affirm — that  matter  depends  for  its 
existence  on  the  will  of  man,  or  any  creature  whatsoever.  But  now, 
if  any  such  mistake  should  arise  in  another's  mind,  he  has  wherewith 
to  rectify  it ;  in  as  much  as  I  assure  him,  that  by  mind,  I  mean  that 
part,  or  act,  or  faculty  of  the  soul  which  is  distinguished  by  the  name 
intellective  or  perceptive ;  as  in  exclusion  of  that  other  part  which  is 
distinguished  by  the  term  will. 

Fifthly,  When  I  affirm  that  all  matter  exists  in  mind,  or  that  no 
matter  is  external,  I  do  not  mean  that  the  world,  or  any  visible  object 
of  it,  which  I  (for  instance)  see,  is  dependent  on  the  mind  of  any 
other  person  besides  myself;  or  that  the  world,  or  matter,  which  any 
other  person  sees,  is  dependent  on  mine,  or  any  other  person's  mind, 
or  faculty  of  perception.  On  the  contrary,  I  contend  as  well  as  grant, 
that  the  world  which  John  sees  is  external  to  Peter,  and  the  world  which 
Peter  sees  is  external  to  John.  That  is,  I  hold  the  thing  to  be  the 
same  in  this  as  in  any  other  case  of  sensation ;  for  instance,  that  of 
sound.  Here  two  or  more  persons,  who  are  present  at  a  concert  of 
music,  may  indeed  in  some  sense  be  said  to  hear  the  same  notes  or 
melody ;  but  yet  the  truth  is,  that  the  sound  which  one  hears,  is  not 
the  very  same  with  the  sound  which  another  hears — because  the  souls 
or  persons  are  supposed  to  be  different ;  and  therefore,  the  sound  which 
Peter  hears  is  external  to,  or  independent  on,  the  soul  of  John,  and 
that  which  John  hears  is  external  to  the  soul  or  person  of  Peter. 

Lastly,  When  I  affirm  that  no  matter  is  altogether  external,  but 
necessarily  exists  in  some  mind  or  other,  exemplified  and  distinguished 
by  the  proper  names  of  John,  Peter,  &c,  I  have  no  design  to  affirm 
that  every  part  or  particle  of  matter,  which  does  or  can  exist,  must 
needs  exist  in  some  created  mind  or  other.  On  the  contrary,  I  believe 
that  infinite  worlds  might  exist,  though  not  one  single  created,  (or  rather 
merely  created,)  mind  were  ever  in  being.  And,  as  in  fact  there  are 
thousands  and  ten  thousands,  I  believe,  and  I  even  contend,  that  there 
is  an  Universe,  or  Material  World  in  being,  which  is,  at  least,  numeri- 
cally different  from  every  material  world  perceived  by  mere  creatures. 
By  this,  I  mean  the  great  Mundane  Idea  of  created  (or  rather  twice 
created)  matter,  by  which  all  things  are  produced  ;  or  rather,  (as  my 
present  subject  leads  me  to  speak,)  by  which  the  great  God  gives  sen- 
sations to  all  his  thinking  creatures,  and  by  which  things  that  are  not 
are  preserved  and  ordered  in  the  same  manner  as  if  they  were. 

And   now  I   presume  and  hope,  that  my  meaning   is   sufficiently 


322 


APPENDIX   B. 


understood,  when  I  affirm,  That  all  matter  which  exists,  exists  in,  or 
dependently  on,  mind ;  or,  that  there  is  no  such  thing  as  an  External 
World. 

Nevertheless,  after  all  the  simplicity  to  which  this  question  seems 
already  to  be  reduced,  I  find  myself  necessitated  to  divide  it  into  two. 
For,  in  order  to  prove  that  there  is  no  External  World,  it  must  needs 
be  one  article  to  shew  that  the  visible  world  is  not  external ;  and  when 
this  is  done,  though  in  this  all  be  indeed  done  which  relates  to  any 
opinion  yet  entertained  by  men,  yet  something  still  is  wanting  towards 
a  full  demonstration  of  the  point  at  large,  and  to  come  up  to  the 
universal  terms  in  which  the  question  is  expressed. 

Accordingly,  I  shall  proceed  in  this  order.  First,  to  shew  that  the 
visible  world  is  not  external.  Secondly,  to  demonstrate  more  at  large, 
or  simply,  that  an  external  world  is  a  being  utterly  impossible.  Which 
two  shall  be  the  subjects  of  two  distinct  Parts  or  Books.' 

Collier  in  the  end  resolves  the  difference  between  sense-perception 
and  imagination  into  a  difference  in  degree  merely.  To  imagine  an 
object  is  to  perceive  it  less  vividly  than  we  perceive  it  in  the  senses.  'I 
can  no  more,'  he  says,  'understand  how  we  can  create  the  objects  we 
imagine  than  the  objects  we  are  said  to  see.'  What  is  imagined  'exists 
as  much,  to  all  appearance,  without,  or  external  to,  the  mind  which 
perceives  it  as  any  of  those  objects  usually  called  visible — but  not  so 
vividly ;  and  this  is  that  whereby  I  distinguish  the  act  which  we  call 
imagination  from  the  act  which  we  call  vision  :  but  why  is  this,  but 
because  the  common  cause  of  both,  viz.  God,  does  not,  in  the  former 
act,  impress  or  act  so  strongly  upon  my  mind  as  in  the  latter.  If  He 
did,  both  acts  would  become  one,  or  require  the  same  name;  and  there 
would  be  no  difference  between  seeing  and  imagining2.'  So  Hume 
afterwards.  Berkeley's  position  in  relation  to  the  difference  between 
sense-perception  and  mere  imagination  I  have  elsewhere  noted. 

The  difference  is  surely  more  than  one  of  degree.  There  is  a  differ- 
ence in  kind  between  real  existence  in  place,  and  a  subjective  imagi- 
nation, peculiar  to  an  individual  mind.  Is  not  this  difference  consistent 
with  the  real  things  present  in  sense,  and  also  the  space  or  place  in 
which  they  exist,  being  alike  dependent  for  their  actual  existence  on 
Mind — in  short,  with  their  being  grounded  on  Knowing,  and  not  on 
an  abstracted  Unknown  ?  May  not  space  be  the  uncreated  or  necessary 
condition  of  the  possibility  of  all  sense-experience  like  ours,  but  yet 
dependent  for  its  actual  existence  upon  the  existence  of  the  sense- 
experience?  This  is  not  to  make  it  the  abstract  space  against  which 
Berkeley  argues,  nor  need  it  involve  quantitative  infinity. 

a  See  Benson's  Memoirs  of  Collier,  pp.  26,  27. 


c. 

THE  THEORY  OF  VISION  VINDICATED. 

Experience  of  Persons  born  blind. 

In  the  last  Section  of  the  Vindication  (p.  299),  Berkeley  refers  to 
the  now  well-known  experiment  of  Cheselden,  in  which  sight  was 
given  to  a  boy  born  blind.  As  this  case  is  described  imperfectly  in 
the  Vindication,  and  as  it  is  often  referred  to  in  the  controversy  as  to 
whether  our  power  of  interpreting  the  tactual,  muscular,  and  locomo- 
tive meaning  of  visual  signs  is,  on  the  one  hand,  original  and  instinct- 
ive, or,  on  the  other  hand,  the  acquired  result  of  mental  association 
and  habit,  I  here  reprint  the  entire  Communication,  given  in  the 
Philos.  Trans.,  No.  402  : — 

'  An  account  of  some  observations  made  by  a  young  gentleman,  who 
was  born  blind,  or  who  lost  his  sight  so  early,  that  he  had  no  rettiembrance 
of  ever  having  seen,  and  was  couched  between  13  and  14  years  of  age. 
By  Mr.  Will.  Chesselden,  F.R.S.,  Surgeon  to  Her  Majesty,  and  to  St. 
Thomas's  Hospital. 

Tho'  we  say  of  the  gentleman  that  he  was  blind,  as  we  do  of  all 
people  who  have  ripe  cataracts,  yet  they  are  never  so  blind  from  that 
cause  but  that  they  can  discern  day  from  night ;  and  for  the  most  part 
in  a  strong  light  distinguish  black,  white,  and  scarlet ;  but  they  can- 
not perceive  the  shape  of  anything; — for  the  light  by  which  these 
perceptions  are  made,  being  let  in  obliquely  through  the  aqueous 
humour,  or  the  anterior  surface  of  the  chrystalline  (by  which  the  rays 
cannot  be  brought  into  a  focus  upon  the  retina),  they  can  discern  in 
no  other  manner,  than  a  sound  eye  can  thro'  a  glass  of  broken  jelly, 
where  a  great  variety  of  surfaces  so  differently  refract  the  light  that  the 
several  distinct  pencils  of  rays  cannot  be  collected  by  the  eye  into  their 
proper  foci ;  wherefore  the  shape  of  an  object  in  such  a  case,  cannot 
be  at  all  discern'd,  tho'  the  colour  may.  And  thus  it  was  with  this 
young  gentleman,  who  though  he  knew  these  colours  asunder  in  a  good 
light,  yet  when  he  saw  them  after  he  was  couch'd,  the  faint  ideas  he 
had  of  them  before  were  not  sufficient  for  him  to  know  them  by  after- 

323 


324 


APPENDIX    C. 


wards;  and  therefore  he  did  not  think  them  the  same,  which  he  had 
before  known  by  those  names.  Now  scarlet  he  thought  the  most 
beautiful  of  all  colours,  and  of  others  the  most  gay  were  the  most 
pleasing,  whereas  the  first  time  he  saw  black,  it  gave  him  great  uneasi- 
ness, yet  after  a  little  time  he  was  reconcil'd  to  it;  but  some  months 
after,  seeing  by  accident  a  Negroe  woman,  he  was  struck  with  great 
horror  at  the  sight. 

When  he  first  saw,  he  was  so  far  from  making  any  judgment  about 
distances,  that  he  thought  all  objects  whatever  touched  his  eyes  (as  he 
express'd  it)  as  what  he  felt  did  his  skin  ;  and  thought  no  objects  so 
agreeable  as  those  which  were  smooth  and  regular,  tho'  he  could  form 
no  judgment  of  their  shape,  or  guess  what  it  was  in  any  object  that  was 
pleasing  to  him :  he  knew  not  the  shape  of  anything,  nor  any  one 
thing  from  another,  however  different  in  shape  or  magnitude;  but 
upon  being  told  what  things  were,  whose  form  he  knew  before  from 
feeling,  he  would  carefully  observe,  that  he  might  know  them  again  ; 
but,  having  too  many  objects  to  learn  at  once,  he  forgot  many  of  them; 
and  (as  he  said)  at  first  he  learn'd  to  know,  and  again  forgot  a  thousand 
things  in  a  day.  One  particular  only  (tho'  it  may  appear  trifling)  I 
will  relate : — having  forgot  which  was  the  cat  and  which  the  dog,  he 
was  asham'd  to  ask ;  but  catching  the  cat  (which  he  knew  by  feeling) 
he  was  observ'd  to  look  at  her  steadfastly,  and  then  setting  her  down, 
said,  '  So,  Puss  !  I  shall  know  you  another  time.'  He  was  very  much 
surpris'd  that  those  things  which  he  had  lik'd  best  did  not  appear  most 
agreeable  to  his  eyes,  expecting  those  persons  would  appear  most 
beautiful  that  he  lov'd  most,  and  such  things  to  be  most  agreeable  to 
his  sight  that  were  so  to  his  taste.  We  thought  he  soon  knew  what 
pictures  represented  which  were  shew'd  to  him,  but  we  found  after- 
wards we  were  mistaken;  for  about  two  months  after  he  was  couch'd, 
he  discovered  at  once,  they  represented  solid  bodies;  when  to  that 
time  he  consider'd  them  only  as  party-colour' d  planes  or  surfaces  diver- 
sified with  variety  of  paint;  but  even  then  he  was  no  less  surpris'd, 
expecting  the  pictures  would  feel  like  the  things  they  represented,  and 
was  amaz'd  when  he  found  those  parts,  which  by  their  light  and  shadow 
appear'd  now  round  and  uneven,  felt  only  flat  like  the  rest;  and  ask'd 
which  was  the  lying  sense, — feeling  or  seeing? 

Being  shewn  his  father's  picture  in  a  locket  at  his  mother's  watch, 
and  told  what  it  was,  he  acknowledged  a  likeness,  but  was  vastly  sur- 
pris'd ;  asking  how  it  could  be  that  a  large  face  could  be  express'd  in 
so  little  room,  saying,  it  should  have  seem'd  as  impossible  to  him  as  to 
put  a  bushel  of  anything  into  a  pint. 

At  first  he  could  bear  but  very  little  sight,  and  the  things  he  saw  he 
thought  extreamly  large;  but  upon  seeing  things  larger,  those  first  seen 
he  conceiv'd  less,  never  being  able  to  imagine  any  lines  beyond  the 
bounds  he  saw;  the  room  he  was  in,  he  said,  he  knew  to  be  but  part 
of  the  house,  yet  he  could  not  conceive  that  the  whole  house  could 
look  bigger.  Before  he  was  couch'd  he  expected  little  advantage  from 
seeing,  worth  undergoing  an  operation  for,  except  reading  and  writing; 
for  he  said  he  thought  he  could  have  no  more  pleasure  in  walking 


THE    THEORY  OF   VISION   VINDICATED. 


325 


abroad  than  he  had  in  the  garden,  which  he  could  do  safely  and  readily. 
And  even  blindness,  he  observ'd,  had  this  advantage,  that  he  could  go 
anywhere  in  the  dark  much  better  than  those  who  can  see ;  and  after 
he  had  seen,  he  did  not  soon  lose  this  quality,  nor  desire  a  light  to  go 
about  the  house  in  the  night.  He  said  every  new  object  was  a  new 
delight,  and  the  pleasure  was  so  great  that  he  wanted  ways  to  express 
it;  but  his  gratitude  to  his  operator  he  could  not  conceal,  never  seeing 
him  for  some  time  without  tears  of  joy  in  his  eyes,  and  other  marks  of 
affection  ;  and  if  he  did  not  happen  to  come  at  any  time  when  he  was 
expected,  he  would  be  so  griev'd  that  he  could  not  forbear  crying  at 
his  disappointment.  A  year  after  first  seeing,  being  carried  upon 
Epsom  Downs,  and  observing  a  large  prospect,  he  was  exceedingly 
delighted  with  it,  and  called  it  a  new  kind  of  seeing.  And  now  being 
lately  couch' d  of  his  other  eye,  he  says  that  objects  at  first  appeared 
large  to  this  eye,  but  not  so  large  as  they  did  at  first  to  the  other ;  and 
looking  upon  the  same  object  with  both  eyes,  he  thought  it  look'd  about 
twice  as  large  as  with  the  first  couch'd  eye  only,  but  not  double,  that 
we  can  anyways  discover.' 

No  very  satisfactory  inference  can  be  drawn  from  a  narrative  so 
deficient  in  the  refinement  of  thought  and  expression  which  the  subject 
requires.  The  question  is  too  subtle  for  experiments  conducted  in  this 
fashion.  Nor  can  more  be  said  in  favour  of  a  succession  of  somewhat 
similar  experiments  recorded  in  the  Philosophical  Transactions.  The 
most  important  are  the  following : — 

1.  Case  described  by  Mr.  Ware,  Surgeon,  in  the  Philos.  Trans. 
(1801). 

2.  Two  cases  described  by  Mr.  Home,  in  the  Thilos.  Trans.  (1807). 

3.  Case  of  the  lady  described  by  Mr.  Wardrop,  Surgeon,  in  the 
Philos.  Trans.  (1826). 

To  these  maybe  added  Stewart's  'Account  of  James  Mitchell,  a  boy 
born  deaf  and  blind,'  in  the  seventh  volume  of  the  Transactions  of 
the  Royal  Society  of  Edinburgh.  See  Hamilton's  Edition  of  Stewart's 
Works,  Vol.  III.     Appendix,  pp.  300 — 370;  also  p.  388. 

As  I  have  quoted  one  of  the  earliest  described  cases — that  of  Ches- 
elden,  I  shall  end  by  giving  the  following,  which  is  one  of  the  last 
and  most  philosophically  described  of  any  I  have  met  with.  It  is  con- 
tained in  Mr.  Nunnely's  valuable  scientific  treatise  on  The  Organs  of 
Vision  :  their  Anatomy  and  Physiology  (1858)  : — 

'  The  case  was  that  of  a  fine  and  most  intelligent  boy,  nine  years  of 
age,  who  had  congenital  cataract  of  both  eyes,  in  whom  the  retina  was 


326  APPENDIX    C. 

more  perfect  than  it  commonly  is  at  so  advanced  an  age,  as  shown  by 
the  excellent  sight  he  subsequently  acquired.  He  had  always  lived  in 
a  very  large  manufacturing  village,  about  sixteen  miles  from  Leeds. 
He  could  find  his  way  all  about  this  place.  Walking  along  the  middle 
of  the  road,  when  he  heard  any  object  approaching,  he  at  once  stopped, 
groped  his  way  to  the  side  of  the  road,  and  remained  perfectly  still  until 
it  had  passed.  Any  one  whom  he  knew  he  was  able  to  recognise  by 
the  sound  of  the  voice,  and  by  passing  his  hands  over  the  face  and 
body  of  the  person.  He  could  perceive  the  difference  between  a 
bright,  sunny,  and  a  dark,  cloudy  day,  and  could  follow  the  motions 
of  a  candle  without  discerning  what  it  was.  He  had  been  sent  to 
school  for  some  time,  and  by  means  of  models  and  a  raised  alphabet, 
could  by  touch  alone  arrange  the  different  letters  into  short  words.  I 
presented  to  him  in  succession  a  great  number  of  different  objects,  each 
one  of  which  he  took  into  both  hands,  felt  it  most  carefully  over  with 
both,  then  with  equal  minuteness  with  one,  turning  the  object  over  and 
over  again,  in  every  direction ;  the  tongue  was  next  applied  to  it ;  and 
lastly,  he  applied  it  so  near  to  the  eye  as  to  touch  the  eyelids,  when 
he  pronounced  his  opinion  upon  it,  and  generally  with  correctness,  as 
to  the  nature  and  form  of  the  object,  when  these  were  distinct.  Thus 
he  recognised  books,  stones,  small  boxes,  pieces  of  wood  and  bone  of 
different  shapes,  a  broken  piece  of  hard  biscuit.  A  cube  and  a  sphere 
he  could  readily  recognise,  saying  the  one  was  square  and  the  other 
round,  and  that  both  were  made  of  wood;  but  a  sphere  which  was 
made  of  perfectly  smooth,  hard  wood,  he  was  very  confident  was  bone. 
In  an  object  where  the  angles  were  not  very  distinct,  he  made  con- 
stant mistakes  in  the  shape,  first  saying  that  it  was  square,  then  that 
it  was  round.  Very  bright  light  colours,  when  touching  the  eyelids, 
he  could  at  once  recognise,  calling  them  all  white ;  all  dull  and  dark 
colours  he  said  were  black.  Between  a  thin  circle  of  wood  and  a 
sphere  or  a  cube  he  instantly  decided  by  the  hand  alone.  On  putting 
half-a-crown  piece  into  his  hands  he  immediately  said  it  was  money ; 
but  for  long  was  undecided  whether  it  was  half-a-crown  or  a  penny ; 
however,  after  carefully  turning  it  over  for  some  time,  so  as  frequently 
to  bring  every  part  into  contact  with  the  hand,  then  putting  it  to  the 
tongue,  and  afterwards  so  close  to  the  eye  that  it  touched  the  eyeball 
itself,  he  said  decidedly,  "  It  is  half-a-crown." 

The  lenses  were  very  large,  milky,  with  caseous  particles,  quite  white 
and  opaque,  the  capsules  being  clear  and  transparent.  As  is  well 
known,  in  most  cases,  before  this  period  of  life,  the  lens  itself  has  been 
absorbed,  leaving  only  a  leathery,  opaque  capsule,  and,  of  course,  not 
nearly  so  favourable  for  such  observations  as  this  one.  After  keeping 
him  in  a  dark  room  for  a  few  days,  until  the  opaque  particles  of  lenses 
were  nearly  absorbed,  and  the  eyes  clear,  the  same  objects,  which  had 
been  kept  carefully  from  him,  were  again  presented  to  his  notice.  He 
could  at  once  perceive  a  difference  in  their  shapes ;  though  he  could 
not  in  the  least  say  which  was  the  cube  and  which  the  sphere,  he  saw 
they  were  not  of  the  same  figure.  It  was  not  until  they  had  many  times 
been  placed  in  his  hands  that  he  learnt  to  distinguish  by  the  eye  the 


THE   THEORY  OF   VISION    VINDICATED. 


327 


one  which  he  had  just  had  in  his  hands,  from  the  other  placed  beside 
it.  He  gradually  became  more  correct  in  his  perception,  but  it  was 
only  after  several  days  that  he  could  or  would  tell  by  the  eyes  alone, 
which  was  the  sphere  and  which  the  cube ;  when  asked,  he  always, 
before  answering,  wished  to  take  both  into  his  hands ;  even  when  this 
was  allowed,  when  immediately  afterwards  the  objects  were  placed  before 
the  eyes,  he  was  not  certain  of  the  figure.  Of  distance  he  had  not  the 
least  conception.  He  said  everything  touched  his  eyes,  and  walked 
most  carefully  about,  with  his  hands  held  out  before  him,  to  prevent 
things  hurting  his  eyes  by  touching  them.  Great  care  was  requisite 
to  prevent  him  falling  over  objects,  or  walking  against  them.  Im- 
provement gradually  went  on,  and  his  subsequent  sight  was,  and  now 
is,  comparatively  perfect.' 

None  of  these  experiments,  taken  by  themselves,  unequivocally  de- 
termine the  question — Whether  the  power  of  interpreting  the  visual 
signs  of  real  or  tangible  extension  is  inspired,  or  is,  on  the  contrary, 
acquired  by  association  and  constructive  activity  of  intellect.  But 
they  confirm  the  conclusion,  that  visible  signs  are  not  less  indispensable 
to  an  imagination  of  trinal  extension  than  the  artificial  signs  of  lan- 
guage are  necessary  to  abstract  thought  and  reasoning — that  one  born 
blind  can  have  only  a  vague  perception  of  an  external  world.  More- 
over, when  once  we  are  experimentally  acquainted  with  distances,  a 
mathematical  analysis  of  the  perspective  lines  leading  from  any  object 
to  the  eye  is  possible,  with  an  involved  sense  of  necessity,  which  seems 
to  presuppose  relations  common  to  the  visible  signs  and  the  felt  reality. 
The  difficulty  which  confronts  Berkeley  is,  that  on  his  theory  space 
and  its  mathematical  relations  are  relative  to  sensations  which,  per  se, 
are  contingent  and  phenomenal,  and  thus  wanting  in  the  element 
which  alone  gives  absolute  stability  to  mathematical  science :  quanti- 
tative infinity  disappears,  and  space  and  its  relations  are  the  real  but 
arbitrary  results  of  creation  or  the  voluntary  activity  of  God. 


ANNOTATIONS 

ON 

BERKELEY'S    PRINCIPLES, 


CONTAINING 


UEBERWEG'S  NOTES  ENTIRE, 

WITH    ADDITIONS,  TRANSLATED,  SELECTED,  AND 
ORIGINAL. 


329 


ANNOTATIONS. 


[i]     Idea. — Abstract  ideas. 

Berkeley,  Intr.,  §  6  :  'the  opinion  that  the  mind  (Geist)  hath  a 
power  (Vermogen)  of  framing  abstract  ideas  or  notions  (Begriffe)  of 
things.' 

Ueberweg:  '"Idea"  was  used  by  Plato  in  the  objective  sense,  as 
designation  of  the  pure,  archetypal  essence  of  homogeneous  things.  In 
the  course  of  time,  mainly  because  of  the  Aristotelian  Scholastic  doc- 
trine that  the  human  mind,  in  the  act  of  perceiving  things,  receives  into 
itself  the  form  or  shape  (Idia,  eldos)  without  the  matter  of  them,  the 
word  came  to  have  a  subjective  force  as  well  as  an  objective  one.  In 
the  subjective  sense  it  denotes  the  psychical  image  of  the  objective 
form,  and  consequently  came  to  be  more  and  more  limited  to  the  sub- 
jective sense.  It  thus  came  in  Descartes,  and  still  more  in  Spinoza 
and  Locke,  to  have  the  meaning  '  psychical  image'  or  conception 
(Vorstellung),  in  the  wide  sense  of  that  word  which  embraces  the 
image  in  sense-perception.  In  this  sense  some  recent  psychologists 
have  employed  it. 

'  In  Berkeley,  who  did  not  regard  the  subjective  forms  as  images  of 
objective  forms,  "idea"  has  exclusively  the  sense  "psychical  image." 
As  he  uses  the  term,  "ideas"  exist  partly  through  sense-perception, 
partly  through  reflection  on  the  psychical  antecedents,  partly  through 
the  reproduction,  decompounding,  and  combining  of  the  conceptions 
which  have  risen. 

f  In  the  translation  of  Berkeley's  work  we  retain  the  term  "  idea."  In 
this  use  of  it  we  must  guard  against  the  mistake  of  supposing  that  the 
word  refers  merely  to  reproduced  images,  or  to  mere  images  of  the 
fancy  at  all. 

'  This  mistake  would  be  most  effectually  guarded  against,  if,  as  has 
been  suggested  by  T.  Collyns  Simon,  one  of  Berkeley's  adherents,  the 
term  phenomenon  (Erscheinung)  were  used. 

33* 


332 


ANN  OTA  TIONS. 


'The  objections  to  this  rendering  are: 

'  i.  That  "  Erscheinung"  is  a  translation  of  phenomenon  rather  than 
of  idea,  and  would  consequently  be  a  displacement  of  the  word  "  idea" 
rather  than  a  rendering  of  it. 

'  2.  That  exactly  the  opposite  mistake  would  be  encouraged,  as  if 
the  conceptions  of  the  imagination  were  not  included. 

'3.  That  "Erscheinung"  rather  denotes  a  complex  of  sense-ideas 
than  the  separate  constituents  of  this  complex. 

'  4.  That  the  being  in  the  subject,  or  that  "esse,"  which  is  the  same 
as  "percipi,"  indubitably  presents  itself  in  the  word  "idea,"  not  in 
the  word  "Erscheinung"  (phenomenon). 

'5.  That  "Erscheinung"  (phenomenon)  either  presupposes  a  "thing 
in  itself,"  of  which  it  is  the  phenomenon  (a  supposition  which  Berkeley 
rejects),  or,  as  Berkeley  himself  uses  the  word  phenomenon,  stands  in 
antithesis  to  the  "essence"  or  "law,"  whose  cognoscibility  Berkeley 
does  not  deny.' 

Editor  :  1  :  Berkeley  discusses  abstract  ideas  in  the  New  Theory  of 
Vision : 

§  122  :  'I  find  it  proper  to  take  into  my  thoughts  extension  in  ab- 
stract.' 123  :  'I  do  not  find  that  I  can  perceive,  imagine,  or  anywise 
frame  in  my  mind  such  an  abstract  idea  as  is  here  spoken  of.'.  .  .  124: 
'  It  is  commonly  said  that  the  object  of  geometry  is  abstract  extension.' 
125  :  '  After  reiterated  endeavours  to  apprehend  the  general  idea  of  a 
triangle,  I  have  found  it  altogether  incomprehensible.' 

Alciphron,  Dial.  vii.  5-7 :  '  May  not  words  become  general  by 
being  made  to  stand  indiscriminately  for  all  particular  ideas,  which, 
from  a  mutual  resemblance,  belong  to  the  same  kind,  without  the  in- 
tervention of  any  abstract  general  idea?  May  we  not  admit  general 
ideas  though  we  should  not  admit  them  to  be  made  by  abstraction,  or 
though  we  should  not  allow  of  general  abstract  ideas?  .  .  .  A  particular 
idea  may  become  general  by  being  used  to  stand  for  or  represent  other 
ideas,  and  that  general  knowledge  is  conversant  about  signs  or  general 
ideas  made  such  by  their  signification.' 

A  Defence  of  Free-thinking  in  Mathematics  (§  45-48):  '  I  hold  that 
there  are  general  ideas,  but  not  formed  by  abstraction  in  the  manner 
set  forth  by  Mr.  Locke.  .  .  .  According  to  Locke,  the  general  name 
colour  stands  for  an  idea  which  is  neither  blue,  red,  green,  nor  any 
other  particular  colour,  but  somewhat  distinct  and  abstracted  from 
them  all.  To  me  it  seems  the  word  colour  is  only  a  more  general  name 
applicable  to  all  and  each  of  the  particular  colours;  while  the  other 
specific  names,  as  blue,  .  .  .  and  the  like,  are  each  restrained  to  a 


ABSTRACTION.  333 

more  limited  signification.  .  .  .  Nothing  is  easier  than  to  define  in 
terms  or  words  that  which  is  incomprehensible  in  idea;  forasmuch 
as  any  words  can  be  either  separated  or  joined  as  you  please,  but  ideas 
always  cannot.  It  is  as  easy  to  say  a  round  square  as  an  oblong  square, 
though  the  former  be  inconceivable.' 

2  :  Berkeley  has  noted  the  difference  between  Plato's  use  of  '  idea' 
and  his  own  (Siris,  §  335):  'In  Plato's  style  the  term  idea  doth  not 
merely  signify  an  inert  inactive  object  of  the  understanding,  but  is  used 
as  synonymous  with  ahiov  and  dp^vj,  cause  and  principle.' 

[2]     Locke. 

Berkeley,  Intr.,  §  11:  'There  has  been  a  late  excellent  and  de- 
servedly esteemed  philosopher. ' 

Ueberweg  :  John  Locke,  b.  1632,  d.  1704.  His  chief  work  is  'An 
Essay  concerning  Human  Understanding,'  in  four  books.  First  edit., 
London:   1690. 

[3]     Brutes. 

Berkeley,  Intr.,  §  11  (quoting  Locke):  'For  if  they  (the  brutes) 
have  any  ideas  (Vorstellungen),  and  are  not  bare  machines  (as  some 
would  have  them).' 

Ueberweg  :  '  The  reference  is  to  the  Cartesians,  followers  of  the 
system  of  Ren6  Descartes,  b.  1596,  d.  1650. 

'  The  bold  separation  which  Descartes  made  between  spirit  and 
matter,  which  allowed  of  their  having  nothing  in  common,  led  to  the 
alternative  either  of  ascribing  to  brutes  souls,  which  like  those  of  men 
are  spiritual  in  kind,  and  consequently  independent  of  the  body  and 
separable  from  it,  or  the  entire  denial  of  their  possessing  souls,  and 
the  conceding  that  they  had  nothing  more  than  "vital  spirits,"  which 
were  capable  of  none  of  the  psychical  functions,  no  sensation,  no  per- 
ception, or  the  like.  Descartes  accepted  the  second  horn  of  the 
dilemma.  He  also  ascribed  to  man  material  vital  spirits,  which  he 
supposed  to  be  the  medium  of  the  relation  between  the  soul  and  the 
grosser  parts  of  the  body.' 

[4] 

Berkeley,  §  13  :   'The  Essay  on  the  Human  Understanding.' 

Ueberweg  :  See  Note  2. 

[5]     Abstraction. 
Berkeley,  §  16:   'And  here  it  must  be  acknowledged  that  a  man 
may  consider  a  figure  merely  as  triangular,  without  attending  to  the 
particular  qualities  of  the  angles  or  relations  of  the  sides.' 


334  ANNO  TA  TIONS. 

Uererweg  :  '  This  admission  on  the  part  of  Berkeley  is  sufficient  to 
secure  for  abstraction  rightly  understood  its  full  value  in  scientific  in- 
vestigation.   His  discussion  of  abstraction  at  this  point  is  of  great  value. 

'  No  contradiction  arises  unless  it  be  maintained  that  an  idea  can  be 
entirely  definite  and  at  the  same  time  be  abstract ;  for  universal  defini- 
tiveness,  as  the  Leibnitzians  correctly  maintained,  is  the  distinguishing 
character  of  the  individual  conceptions.  By  abstraction  is  to  be  under- 
stood no  more  than  the  exclusive  consideration  of  that  in  which  the 
entire  ideas  of  a  particular  group  coincide  with  one  another. 

'  In  a  certain  measure  the  process  of  abstraction  is  completed  inde- 
pendently of  our  conscious  concurrence,  because  of  the  predominance 
which  the  concurrent  marks,  in  consequence  of  their  frequent  occur- 
rence, have  over  the  marks  which  differ  and  which  are  presented  singly. 
Abstraction  is  aided  by  the  use  of  the  common  term  which  is  associated 
with  every  idea  of  the  group  involved ;  it  comes  to  completeness  by 
means  of  the  conscious  logical  formation  of  definitions,  in  which  the 
common  element  is  brought  to  consciousness  in  a  complete  and  well- 
arranged  order,  and  is  distinguished  from  the  differing  elements. 

'  Abstraction  involves  the  power  of  attributing  common  predicates 
to  all  the  objects  of  a  group,  in  such  a  way  that  through  what  is  defined, 
and  by  means  of  the  highest  development  of  the  definitory  conscious- 
ness in  regard  to  the  common  marks  of  this  group,  it  is  accurately 
bounded.  Such,  for  example,  is  the  power  of  making  assertions  in 
regard  to  conic  sections  which  hold  good  of  every  particular  figure 
of  this  kind,  so  that  by  means  of  the  consciousness  we  have  of  the 
marks  of  a  conic  section,  all  figures  which  are  conic  sections  are  accu- 
rately distinguished  from  all  others. 

'This  capacity  is  in  fact  a  prerogative  of  man,  and  in  its  highest 
degree  a  prerogative  of  the  man  of  scientific  culture.  Without  it 
there  would  be  no  scientific  knowledge.' 

[6]     Tricks  of  phrase. 

Berkeley,  Intr.,  §  20  :  '  those  things  which  every  one's  experience 
will,  I  doubt  not,  plentifully  suggest  unto  him  ?'  (ins  Bewusstsein 
ruft  ?) 

Ueberweg  :  '  Berkeley  here  admirably  characterizes  the  mystery  of 
phrase,  of  that  false  rhetoric,  the  aim  of  which  is  to  produce  great  effects 
upon  the  minds  of  the  uneducated  and  half-educated,  at  the  expense 
of  truth  and  rectitude. 

'Where  reasons  are  wanting,  the  Shibboleth  is  still  mighty.  The 
commonplace,  the  formulary,  still  stirs  men  like  the  roll  of  the  drum 


OBJECTS    OF    KNOWLEDGE:    IDEAS.  335 

or  the  ensnaring  tinkling  of  the  lute.     The  feelings  carry  away  the 
judgment.' 

[7]     Words. 

Berkeley,  Intr.,  §23:  'they  advise  well  that  we  attend  to  the 
ideas  signified,  and  draw  off  our  attention  from  the  words  which  signify 
them. ' 

Ueberweg:  'Locke  says:  "I  endeavour  as  much  as  I  can  to  deliver 
myself  from  those  fallacies  which  we  are  apt  to  put  upon  ourselves  by 
taking  words  for  things.  It  helps  not  our  ignorance  to  feign  a  knowl- 
edge where  we  have  none,  by  making  a  noise  with  sounds  without  clear 
and  distinct  significations."     (Ess.  of  Human  Underst.,  11.  xiii.  18.) 

'  "  Men  who  abstract  their  thoughts  and  do  well  examine  the  ideas  of 
their  own  minds,  cannot  much  differ  in  thinking,  however  they  may 
perplex  themselves  with  words,  according  to  the  way  of  speaking  of 
the  several  schools  or  sects  they  have  been  bred  up  in."  (lb.  28.)' 

[8]     Objects  of  knowledge  :  ideas. 

Berkeley,  Principles,  §  1 :  *  It  is  evident  to  any  one  who  takes  a 
survey  of  the  objects  (Gegenstande)  of  human  knowledge.' 

Ueberweg  :  'As  Berkeley  here  designates  "  ideas"  as  the  objects  of 
human  knowledge,  he  assumes  the  very  thing  he  ought  first  to  prove, 
and,  without  this,  is  guilty  of  begging  the  question. 

'  By  ideas  he  means  phenomena  which  exist  in  our  consciousness, 
sensations,  and  the  complex  of  perceptions,  and  that  which  proceeds 
from  them. 

'Anyone  disposed  to  dispute  the  truth  of  Berkeley's  assertion  might 
reply  that  ideas  are  not  the  objects  of  our  knowledge,  but  the  means  of 
it.  We  have  cognition  by  means  of  our  ideas.  Our  ideas  have  actual 
existence  in  our  souls,  or  are  something  subjectively  real  or  psychically 
real.  By  means  of  our  ideas  we  have  cognition  of  the  objectively  real 
external  world  standing  over  against  us,  inasmuch  as  a  primitive  think- 
ing (primitives  Denken)  coalesces  with  sensation  (sinnlichen  Empfin- 
dung)  and  in  conjunction  with  it  forms  the  sense-perception  (seeing, 
hearing,  etc.).  See  Ueberweg's  System  der  Logik,  §  41,  seq.  45-47, 
etc.  (tr.  by  Lindsay,  London). 

'  This  primitive  thinking,  not  reflecting  upon  its  separate  elements 
(Momente),  but  bringing  only  the  results  to  consciousness,  interprets 
the  image  furnished  in  perception,  and  has  the  power  to  give  it  shape, — 
for  example,  to  bear  its  part  in  determining  the  form  of  the  firmament, 
a  power  not  possessed  by  the  subsequent  reflective  thinking,  which 
meets  shapes  already  fixed. 


336  A  NNO  TA  TI O  NS. 

'  The  complexes  of  sensations  or  ideas  co-determined  or  shaped  by 
the  primary  thinking  are  subjective  images,  or  at  least  subjective  signs, 
of  the  external  world. 

'  But  to  these  complexes  of  sensations  Berkeley  assigns  names,  such  as 
apple,  tree,  mountain,  house,  which,  according  to  the  usage  of  lan- 
guage and  the  popular  consciousness  on  which  that  usage  rests,  desig- 
nate external  objects,  by  which  apparently,  but  only  apparently,  it  is 
proven  that  the  so-called  "external  objects"  exist  in  the  spirit,  for 
"ideas"  (phenomena)  have  no  other  existence  than  in  the  percipient 
spirit. 

'  The  fixing  on  the  complexes  of  sensations  the  names  which  pertain 
to  the  external  objects  wears  an  appearance  of  truth,  because  of  an 
error  in  which  the  common  view  is  involved. 

'  The  common  view  is  that  what  is  in  fact  our  sensation,  that  is  our 
psychical  reaction  toward  the  operation  proceeding  ffom  the  external 
thing,  the  operation  exercised  directly  or  by  certain  media  upon  our 
senses,  that  this  is  an  attribute  of  the  outer  thing  as  such ;  as,  for  ex- 
ample, it  supposes  the  green  colour  to  be  a  quality  of  the  leaf  as  such, 
the  warmth  a  quality  of  the  fire  as  such. 

'  Now  as  Berkeley  considers  and  treats  this  error  as  if  it  were  a  truth, 
in  accepting  the  inseparableness  of  the  object  from  these  qualities,  and 
consequently,  in  accordance  with  the  popular  consciousness,  refers  the 
names  of  the  things  to  those  objects  to  which  these  qualities  pertain, 
and  as  he  then  goes  on  to  show  that  these  qualities  consist  of  sensa- 
tions of  the  subject,  in  Berkeley's  view  those  objects  (as  the  apple, 
etc.)  are  identified  with  these  sensations  as  something  existing  in  the 
subject. 

'The  popular  apprehension  considers  these  sensations  as  outward, 
inasmuch  as  it  considers  our  sensations  as  qualities  of  objects,  and  not 
our  own  sensations,  which  are  only  possible  in  the  subject. 

'Berkeley  considers  the  objects  as  internal,  that  is,  in  the  subject,  in- 
asmuch as  he  considers  our  sensations  as  qualities  of  the  objects  (to  wit, 
ideas),  but  at  the  same  time  apprehends  these  (qualities)  as  our  own 
sensations. 

'But  the  argument  of  Berkeley  presents  the  fittest  occasion  to  sepa- 
rate in  the  distinctest  manner  the  correct  and  incorrect  in  the  popular 
opinion  as  regards  the  existence  and  qualities  of  external  objects, 
and  not  simply  to  claim  concession  for  what  is  really  scientifically 
justified,  but  over  against  Berkeley's  very  thorough  and  acute  negation 
to  seek  proofs  of  it.  In  this  lie  the  suggestiveness  and  the  abiding 
scientific  value  of  the  paradox  of  Berkeley.     Cf.  notes  10  and  90.' 


OBJECTS    OF  KNOWLEDGE:    IDEAS.  337 

Editor:  i  :  Ueberweg,  in  his  Logic,  treating  of  the  'Combination 
of  Internal  and  External  Perceptions,'  says,  §  41  :  '  The  knowledge  of 
the  outer  world  depends  upon  the  combination  of  external  with  internal 
perceptions.  Our  corporeal  circumstances,  sensibly  perceived  by  our- 
selves, are  in  orderly  coherence  with  circumstances  belonging  to  our 
internal  perceptions.'  §  42  :  '  Extending  his  consideration  of  the  ex- 
ternal world,  man  recognizes  the  internal  characters  of  other  things 
chiefly  by  means  of  the  related  sides  of  his  own  inner  existence.'  §  43  : 
'  Every  phenomenon  objectively  founded,  as  this  very  act  of  becoming  a 
phenomenon  testifies,  and  as  the  scientific  investigation  of  the  laws  of 
nature  makes  evident,  is  to  be  traced  back  to  some  active  power  as  its 
real  basis.'  §  44:  'The  order  in  space  and  time  belonging  to  real 
objects  mirrors  itself  in  the  order  in  space  and  time  of  external  and 
internal  perception.  Sense-qualities,  however,  colours,  sounds,  etc. 
are  as  such  subjective  only.  They  are  not  copies  of  motions,  but  are 
regularly  and  connectedly  related  to  determinate  motions  as  their  sym- 
bols.' §  45  :  'The  individual  conception,  or  intuition,  is  the  mental 
image  of  the  individual  existence,  which  is  objective  or  at  least  is 
imagined  to  be.'  §  46  :  'Individual  intuitions  gradually  arise  out  of  the 
original  confused  aggregate  image  of  perception,  when  man  first  begins 
to  recognize  himself  an  individual  being  in  antithesis  to  the  outer 
world.'  §  47:  'As  the  individual  conception  corresponds  generally  to 
the  individual  existence,  so  its  different  kinds  or  forms  correspond  to 
the  different  kinds  ox  forms  of  individual  existence.'' 

2  :  By  '  objects  of  knowledge '  Berkeley  means  the  objects  of  un- 
mediated  cognition.  For  the  objector  to  say  that  the  ideas  are  not  the 
objects  but  the  means  of  knowing  the  objects,  is  to  admit  that  the 
objects,  in  the  objector's  sense,  are  not  known  except,  through  a 
medium,  to  wit,  the  ideas.  This  means  that  the  medium  is  itself  known 
directly,  and  that  the  object  whose  medium  it  is  is  known  mediately. 
But  it  is  immediate  knowledge  of  which  alone  Berkeley  is  speaking,  so 
that  the  opponent  meets  him  by  repeating  his  affirmation  with  a  change 
of  phrase. 

3  :  The  Cartesian  and  post-Cartesian  definitions  of  '  idea  '  illustrate 
both  the  usage  and  the  argument  of  Berkeley.  Syrbius  (d.  1738) 
defines  idea :  exemplar  rei  in  cogitante, — the  copy  of  the  thing  in  the 
thinker.  Locke  (1.  i.  8)  defines  it  'whatsoever  is  the  object  of  the 
understanding  when  a  man  thinks;  whatever  is  meant  by  phantasm, 
notion,  species,  or  whatever  it  is  which  the  mind  can  be  employed 
about  in  thinking.'  In  the  Letter  to  the  Bishop  of  Worcester:  'the 
things  signified  by  ideas  are  nothing  but  the  immediate  objects  of  our 


338 


A  XX  OTA  TIOXS. 


minds  in  thinking.  Ke  that  thinks  must  have  some  immediate  object 
of  his  mind  in  thinking,  i.e.  must  have  ideas.1  Le  Clerc  defines  idea 
'the  immediate  object  of  the  mind.' 

Schubert  :  '  Representation  in  the  soul  is  that  operation  by  which 
the  characters  of  any  object  are  expressed  in  the  soul.  That  state  of 
soul  which  arises  from  this  operation  is  called  idea,  and  if  the  object 
of  representation  be  a  universal  entity  it  is  called  notion.' 

4:  Kant  regarded  the  fixing  of  the  proper  sense  of  the  word 
'  idea'  as  of  great  importance.  '  I  beseech  those  who  have  the  in- 
terests of  philosophy  at  heart, — and  this  involves  more  than  is  com- 
monly imagined, — .  .  .  to  protect  the  term  idea  in  its  original  sense, 
so  that  it  be  not  confused  among  the  words  with  which,  in  careless 
disorder,  all  kinds  of  mental  representations  (Vorstellungen)  are 
ordinarily  designated,  to  the  great  detriment  of  science.  There  is  no 
want  of  appellations  adapted  to  every  species  of  mental  representa- 
tion, completely  obviating  any  necessity  of  encroaching  on  the  proper 
province  of  others." 

Kant  then  gives  these  terms  in  a  graduated  list,  which  Mellin*  has 
reduced  to  a  very  convenient  tabular  form : 

GRADUATED   LIST   OF  THE  MENTAL   REPRESENTATIONS    (Vorstellungen). 


without  Consciousness. 


with  Consciousness. 
Perception. 


Subjective, 
Sensation, 
Empfindung. 


Objective, 
Cognition, 
Erkenntniss. 


I 
immediate, 

Intuition, 

Anschauung, 


mediate, 
Concept, 
Begriff. 


Empirical, 


Pure  Sense, 
reiner  Sinnlichkeit. 


The  Understanding, 
Verstande, 
Notion. 


Pure, 
proceeding  from 

L 


The  Reason, 
Vernunft, 
Idea. 


•  Krit.  d.  rein.  Vern.,  II.  Th.  ii.  Abt.  1.  Buch. 


Marginalim  (1794).  87. 


OBJECTS    OF   KNOWLEDGE:    IDEAS.  339 

5.  Among  the  most  serious  difficulties  which  the  English  reader  and 
translator  of  German  metaphysics  encounters  is  the  perplexity  he  rinds 
in  the  use  of  the  terms  Vorstellung,  Begriff,  and  Idee.  The  perplexity 
arises  from  the  shifting  senses  attached  to  these  words  by  the  various 
schools  of  philosophy.  In  ordinary  life  a  German  will  say,  '  I  can  form 
no  Begriff,  no  Idee,  no  Vorstellung  of  it,'  just  as  we  say  in  English,  'I 
can  form  no  notion,  no  idea,  no  conception  of  it.'  The  three  terms 
have  this  in  common,  that  they  involve  the  activity  of  a  thinking  being. 
Each  of  them  is  sometimes  used  to  translate  idea,  notion,  and  concep- 
tion, and  those  three  terms  are  used  in  translating  each  one  of  the 
German  words. 

Vorstellung  is  generally  used  as  equivalent  to  Reprsesentatio  and 
Perceptio,  and  covers  everything  which  is  wrought  by  the  activity  of 
the  mind.  It  is  a  generic  term  for  mental  operation,  mental  presenta- 
tion, and  representation,  external  and  internal  perception.  It  is  often 
best  rendered  in  a  translation  by  Conception.  '  Under  the  term  Vor- 
stellung,' says  Krug,  'may  be  embraced  everything  which  we  call 
Intuition,  Sensation,  Notion,  Thought,  and  Idea.  Consequently,  all 
our  Cognitions  rest  on  Vorstellungen.' 

Begriff  is  an  element  of  a  judgment.  Kant  and  his  school  depart 
from  the  common  usage  by  confining  Begriff  to  the  allgemeinen 
Begriffe,  the  universal  Notions.  They  give  the  name  Begriff  simply 
to  the  Verstandes  Begriff,  the  Concept  of  the  Understanding,  the 
Notion. 

Those  who  call  the  Vorstellung  of  individual  things  a  Begriff  do  so 
on  the  ground  that  there  are  also  single  judgments,  which  present  a 
logical  relation  between  individual  things.1 

The  most  generally  available  English  representative  of  Begriff  is 
Notion. 

Hamilton  says,  'The  distinction  of  ideas,  strictly  so  called,  and 
notions,  under  the  contrast  of  Anschauungen  and  Begriffe,  has  long 
been  .  .  .  established  with  the  philosophers  of  Germany.'  'No  longer 
Begriffe,  but  Anschauungen ;  i)0  longer  Notions  or  Concepts,  but  images.'' 
'The  terms  Begriffe  (Conceptions),  etc.'2 

The  term  Representation  as  a  translation  of  Vorstellung  does  not 
correspond  with  Hamilton's  usage.  '  The  term  Representation  I 
employ  always  strictly  as  in  contrast  to  Presentation,  and,  therefore, 
with  exclusive  reference  to  individual  objects,  and  not  in  the  vague 
generality  of  Representatio,  or  Vorstellung,  in  the  Leibnitzian  and  sub- 

1  Synonymik  :  Eberhard,  Maas  und  Gruber,  1826,  vi.  168. 
»  Reid's  Works,  291,  365,  407. 


340 


ANNOTATIONS. 


sequent  philosophies  of  Germany,  where  it  is  used  for  any  cognitive 
act,  considered,  not  in  relation  to  what  it  knows,  but  to  what  is  known  ; 
that  is,  as  the  genus  including  under  it  Intuitions,  Perceptions,  Sensa- 
tions, Conceptions,  Notions,  Thoughts  proper,  etc.  as  species.'1  See 
Schubert's  definition  under  3  in  this  note.  As  a  rule  the  translator 
of  Ueberweg's  notes  represents  Begriff  by  'Notion,'  Vorstellung  by 
'Conception,'  Idee  by  'Idea.'     See  Index. 

[9]     Esse — percipi. 

Berkeley,  §  3 :  '  Their  esse  is  percipi.  Nor  is  it  possible  they  should 
have  any  existence  out  of  the  minds  or  thinking  things  which  perceive 
them.' 

Ueberweg  :  '  Beyond  question  the  being  (esse)  of  ideas  (phenom- 
ena) is  identical  with  their  being  perceived  (percipi) ;  but  it  does  not 
follow  from  this  that  there  are  not  other  things,  "unthinking  things," 
which  condition  the  existence  of  ideas  (phenomena),  things  whose 
existence  is  independent  of  the  percipient  subject,  an  existence  in 
itself,  and  not  a  mere  being  perceived. 

'Such  "things  in  themselves"  must  be  accepted,  if  a  connection  of 
natural  phenomena  in  accordance  with  natural  laws  is  not  merely  to 
be  asserted  but  actually  demonstrated.'  (See  further  in  notes  which 
follow.) 

Editor  :  If  the  esse  is  percipi,  the  percipi  is  also  esse ;  that  is,  the 
thing  perceived  is  the  thing  that  is,  and  the  thing  as  it  is.  Then  arises 
the  difficulty  in  regard  to  the  mistakes  in  sense-perception.  The  one 
percipi  in  which  a  bush  is  taken  for  a  man  is  corrected  by  a  second 
percipi,  in  which  the  man  is  cognized.  Is  each  percipi  in  this  case  the 
esse? 

[10]     Things  perceived. 

Berkeley,  §  4:  'And  is  it  not  plainly  repugnant  that  any  one  of 
these,  or  any  combination  of  them,  should  exist  unperceived  ?' 

Ueberweg  :  'The  first  thing  necessary  in  the  investigation  is  clearly 
to  fix  what  is  meant  by  the  expression  "things  perceived"  (as  an  apple, 
tree,  etc.).  In  popular  language,  by  such  terms  are  meant  things  which 
exist  outside  of  our  mind,  and  which  yet  have  qualities,  such  as 
greenness,  warmth,  and  such  like,  which  can  only  be  sensations  of  the 
percipient  subject. 

'  If  it  be  acknowledged  that  there  is  a  contradiction  in  this,  it  is  only 
possible  to  retain  one  of  the  two  elements  which  are  united  in  popular 
language  in  the  same  expression. 

1  Reid's  Works,  805,  n. 


ABSTRACTION.  34I 

'As  essential  to  this  we  must  avoid  the  paralogism  into  which  Berke- 
ley himself  has  fallen,  of  accepting  as  truths  in  this  old  and  common 
sense  of  the  word  what  can  be  established  only  in  the  new  sense  of  the 
word. 

'  Either  one  sense  or  the  other  must  be  taken,  to  the  exclusion  of  the 
other  in  the  argument.  If,  on  the  one  hand,  we  take  the  "things  per- 
ceived" as  meaning  the  complexes  of  sensation,  images  in  perception, 
we  do  what  Berkeley  does.  In  this  case  it  is  not  only  true,  but  it  is  a 
truism,  that  these  are  in  our  consciousness  only ;  but  it  is  false  to  hold 
this  as  proven  in  regard  to  what  is  understood  in  popular  language  by 
the  "thing  perceived;"  for  example,  the  apple  which  I  see,  feel,  and 
eat;  in  this  usage  "the  thing  perceived"  means  a  real  thing  external  to 
my  mind,  and  that  this  thing  is  in  fact  reducible  to  a  mere  complex  of 
sensation  is  what  Berkeley  has  not  proved.  Or  if,  on  the  other  hand, 
we  must,  as  in  correspondence  with  the  general  tendency  of  language, 
understand  by  the  "things  perceived"  external  things,  in  this  must  also 
be  conceded  that  in  perception  is  involved  a  primary  thinking,  which 
blends  with  sensation,  through  which  we  infer  (schliessen)  (cf.  Obs.  8) 
the  external  things;  but  from  this  would  follow  no  more  than  this, 
that  the  external  things  do  not  exist  wholly  as  we  perceive  them,  but 
not  that  they  do  not  exist  at  all. 

'  As  we  do  not  call  the  knowledge  which  we  have  of  the  intellectual 
life  of  our  friend  his  intellectual  life  itself  which  is  known,  just  as  little 
do  we  call  the  image  in  our  perception  of  an  object  the  object  per- 
ceived. 

1  By  the  object  perceived  we  understand  the  external  thing  itself, 
whose  non-existence  has  been  demonstrated  by  no  proof. ' 

[n]     Abstraction. 
Berkeley,  §  5  :   'So  as  to  conceive  them  existing  unperceived.' 
Ueberweg  :   *  Not  to  them,  but  to  those  external  things,  is  directed 
the  supposition  of  existence  in  itself. 

'  The  error  designated  by  Berkeley  lies  not  in  abstraction  as  such,  but 
in  the  supposition  that  by  means  of  abstraction  distinct  things  (such  as 
the  existence  of  the  idea,  and  its  being  perceived)  can  really  be  sep- 
arated. Abstraction  (a<paipt<rt^),  rightly  understood  and  properly 
applied,  is  thoroughly  proper  and  indispensable.  (See  Obs.  5.)  The 
fault  which  has  most  commonly  characterized  its  use  (the  fault  which 
Aristotle  calls  ^«//>j<7//o?,  separation)  has  no  necessary  connection 
with  it.' 


342  A  NN  OTATIO  NS. 


[12]     Abstraction. 

Berkeley,  5  :  'But  my  conceiving  or  imagining  power  (Fahigkeit 
zu  denken  oder  vorzustellen)  does  not  extend  beyond  the  possibility 
of  real  existence  or  perception.' 

Ueberweg  :   '  The  possibility  of  Abstraction  stretches  itself,  however, 

in  fact  beyond  this,  for  we  are  able  to  consider  separately  what  in 

every  act  of  perception  is  united  with   something  else.     This   takes 

place,  for  example,  in  forming  the  notion  (Begriff)  of  a  mathematical 

body.' 

[13]     Being  and  Perception. 

Berkeley,  §  6:  'To  be  convinced  of  which,  the  reader  need  only 
reflect,  and  try  to  separate  in  his  own  thoughts  the  being  (Sein)  of  a 
sensible  (sinnlich  wahrnehmbaren)  thing  from  its  being  perceived.' 

Ueberweg  :  '  Correct  as  is  that  which  Berkeley  says  in  reference  to 
our  complexes  of  sensation  or  images  in  perception,  he  has  not  proven 
that  there  are  not  things  existing  in  themselves  which  operate  in  such 
a  way  upon  our  senses  that,  in  consequence  of  the  excitation  thus 
received,  the  psychical  principle  dwelling  within  our  organism  begets 
the  sensations  and  their  regular  complexes  (the  images  in  perception); 
and  to  those  things  existing  in  themselves— which,  as  the  correlates  of 
our  perceptions,  maybe  called  the  "  objects  perceived,"  so  far  as  in  the 
course  of  investigation  sufficient  grounds  for  accepting  them  are  fur- 
nished—is to  be  ascribed  an  existence  independent  of  the  act  of  per- 
ception itself. 

'  This  independence  of  the  act  of  perception  does  not,  however,  ex- 
clude the  supposition  that  between  the  things  existing  in  themselves 
and  perceptible,  and  the  mind  capable  of  perception,  there  exists  a 
primitive  affinity  and  correlation.  Those  things  are  the  fore-steps  of 
the  mind  ;  they  condition  it  genetically,  as  on  their  side  they  are  con- 
ditioned by  it  teleologically  ;  by  means  of  them  the  mind  has  intel- 
lectual existence  and  perceives :  they  exist,  at  the  most,  for  the  sake 
of  the  mind.     By  no  means,  however,  do  they  exist  in  our  mind.' 

[14]     Spirit  the  only  Substance. 

Berkeley,  §  7  :  '  From  what  has  been  said,  it  is  evident  there  is  not 
any  other  substance  than  spirit,  or  that  which  perceives.' 

Ueberweg  :  '  This  would  only  follow  if  the  things  in  themselves 
were  identical  with  the  images  in  perception,  which  they  are  not.' 


THE    PERCEIVABLE.  343 

[15]     An  Idea  like  an  Idea. 

Berkeley,  §  8  :  'An  idea  can  be  like  nothing  but  an  idea.' 
Ueberweg  :  '  This  proposition  is  not  proven,  and  is  false.  There  is 
nothing  to  prevent  our  supposing  that  the  figure  of  an  image  in  per- 
ception— for  example,  the  image  we  get  of  the  course  of  a  stream,  or 
of  the  path  of  a  planet — is  like  the  figure  of  the  course  or  path  itself, 
although  the  one  figure  exists  in  the  mind,  the  other  outside  of  it. 

'  Not  every  figure  is  an  "idea,"  although  every  colour  is  an  "  idea" 
(something  purely  subjective).     See  Obser.  17.' 

[16]     The  Perceivable. 

Berkeley,  §  8  :  '  I  appeal  to  any  one  whether  it  be  sense  to  assert  a 
colour  is  like  something  which  is  invisible ;  hard  or  soft,  like  some- 
thing which  is  intangible ;  and  so  of  the  rest.' 

Ueberweg:  'Only  the  double  use  of  the  word  perceivable  (to 
which  we  have  already  alluded)  leads  to  this  dilemma. 

'  The  originals  are  not  perceivable  in  such  sense  that  they  can  them- 
selves be  perceptions,  but  in  this  sense  that  they  by  means  of  our 
perception  come  to  our  consciousness. 

'When,  through  touch  and  the  eye,  with  the  co-operation  of  the 
primitive  mental  action  (Denken),  which  consists  of  involuntary  asso- 
ciations, we  obtain  a  perceptive  image  of  the  stream,  we  call  this  result 
"perceiving  the  stream." 

'  I  see,  feel,  perceive,  not  the  image,  and  not  the  constituents  of  the 
image  (the  ideas),  but  the  external  object  by  means  of  the  image. 

'  On  the  other  side,  it  must  be  conceded  that  usage  does  not  designate 
exclusively  the  external  things, — what  is  seen,  heard,  perceived, — but 
also  the  particular  qualities,  as,  for  example,  redness,  sound  (as  we  say, 
I  see  the  redness  of  the  cheeks,  I  hear  a  sound),  which  are,  in  fact, 
purely  sub^ctive. 

'  This  language  is  used,  however,  only  on  the  erroneous  supposition 
that  they  are  objective,  so  that  the  tendency  of  the  language  here  also 
remains  unchanged ;  that  is,  to  conjoin  the  objective  as  grammatical 
object  with  the  verb  "perceive."  What  is  manifestly  subjective,  as, 
for  example,  a  "pain,"  is  not  perceived,  but  is  felt — is  not  the  object 
of  sense-perception,  but  of  sensation  (nicht  "  sinnlich  wahrgenommen," 
sondern  "empfunden").' 


344 


ANNOTATIONS. 


[17]     Primary  and  Secondary. 

Berkeley,  §  9  :  '  Some  there  are  who  make  a  distinction  betwixt 
primary  and  secondary  qualities.' 

Ueberweg  :  'This  distinction,  which  is  drawn  by  Locke,  is  a  cor- 
rect one;  only  it  would  be  better  to  style  them  Qualities  in  the  pri- 
mary sense  (inhering  in  the  object  itself),  and  Qualities  in  the  second- 
ary sense  (operations  of  the  things  on  us;  qualities  of  sensation,  which 
they,  the  things,  excite  in  us). 

'  The  Geometrical  is  both  objective  and  subjective.  Everything  else 
in  the  sense-perception  is  purely  subjective,  but  linked  with  the  object- 
ive, in  conformity  with  laws :  for  example,  every  separate  sound  and 
every  separate  colour  is  linked  with  vibrations  of  a  separate  kind.' 

Editor:  See  Hylas  and  Philonous.  First  Dialogue.  Works  (Fraser), 
i.  279. 

Locke's  Essay,  B.  II.  ch.  viii. 

Hamilton's  Reid,  pp.  313-318,  and  Note  D,  pp.  825-875. 

[18]     Matter. 

Berkeley,  §  9  :  'By  Matter,  therefore,  we  are  10  understand  an 
inert  (trage),  senseless  (empfindungslose)  substance,  in  which  exten- 
sion, figure,  and  motion  do  actually  subsist.' 

Ueberweg  :  '  It  is  entirely  unnecessary  to  conceive  of  matter  as 
purely  "inert,"  without  force.  Something  internal,  on  which  rest  its 
motions  (its  forces,  the  analogues  of  our  conceptions),  may  and  must 
be  conceded  to  matter.' 

Editor  :  Leibnitz  was  the  first  thoroughly  to  bring  to  scientific 
consciousness  '  force'  or  power  as  an  essential  element  of  matter. 

[19]     Only  Ideas. 
Berkeley,  §  9  :     'Are  only  ideas.' 
Ueberweg:   'The  "only"  is  not  proven.' 

[20]     Matter  or  Corporeal  Substance. 

Berkeley,  §  9 :  '  Hence  it  is  plain  (offenbar)  that  the  very  notion 
( der  Begriff )  of  what  is  called  matter  or  corporeal  substance  involves  a 
contradiction  in  it.' 

Ueberweg  :  '  This  would  be  plain  (offenbar)  only  in  case  the  un- 
proved assertion  were  true,  that  a  figure  can  be  only  an  "  idea." 

'The  true  proposition — that  those  figures  which  are  in  our  perceptive 
images  are  something  psychical — Berkeley  has  incorrectly  converted 
into  the  proposition  that  figures  exist  only  in  the  mind.' 


QUALITIES    OF  MATTER.  345 

[21]     Extension  and  Movement. 

Berkeley,  §  10:  'to  reflect  (nachzudenken),  .  .  try  (erproben),  .  . 
abstraction  of  thought  (Vorstellungszerlegung),  .  .  without  all  other 
sensible  (sinnlichen)  qualities.' 

Ueberweg  :  'That  extension  and  movement  which  is  in  the  per- 
ceptive image  (Wahrnehmungsbilde)  can  certainly  not  exist  outside  of 
the  mind  sundered  from  the  other  constituents  of  the  perceptive  image. 
This  requires  no  argument.  The  real  question  is,  Is  there  anything 
eke  ? — to  wit,  is  there  an  objective  extension  existing  outside  the  mind, 
with  figures  and  movements  which  are  similar  to  the  subjective  ? 
That  this  is  impossible  Berkeley  has  affirmed,  but  has  not  proved.' 

Editor  :  Much  of  the  difficulty  of  this  question  has  arisen  from  the 
loose  and  conflicting  senses  in  which  the  terms  '  similar '  and  '  like '  are 
used. 

Strictly  or  materially  taken,  the  external  objective  cannot  be  'like' 
the  subjective, — matter  cannot  be  '  like '  a  condition  of  mind, — but 
the  differences  between  the  mental  states  produced  by  different  objects 
really  correspond  with,  have  real  analogues  in,  the  objects  differing. 
With  refere?ice  to  each  other,  objects  have  a  relative  likeness  to  the 
subjective  state  they  produce.  A  real  lion  has  this  sort  of  likeness  to 
the  mental  image  of  a  lion, — it  is  like  the  mental  lion  in  a  sense  in 
which  an  ox  or  a  flower  is  not.  So,  too,  the  picture  of  a  lion  is 
materially  neither  like  a  real  lion  nor  the  mental  image  of  a  lion,  but 
it  has  a  relative  likeness  to  both — such  a  likeness  as  the  picture  of  an 
ox  has  not. 

[22]     Qualities  of  Matter. 

Berkeley,  §  10 :  '  which  is  acknowledged  to  exist  only  in  the 
mind  (Geiste).' 

Ueberweg  :  '  It  has  already  been  observed  that  matter  to  which  the 
objectively  real  extension,  figure,  and  motion  belong  is  not  to  be  con- 
ceived of  as  having  no  other  qualities. 

'  But  the  nature  of  these  other  qualities  is  not  as  readily  and  as  surely 
known  as  the  nature  of  the  geometrical  qualities  of  matter. 

'  If  they  are  analogues  of  our  conceptions,  they  are  nevertheless  cer- 
tainly not  in  our  mind,  and  are  not  identical  with  its  sensations  (sinn- 
lichen Empfindungen).  The  questions  bearing  on  this  point  will  not 
come  up  in  a  methodical  discussion  until  the  problems  relating  to  the 
primary  qualities  are  solved.' 


346  A  NN  0TAT10  NS. 

[23]     Great  and  Small. 

Berkeley,  §11:  'The  extension,  therefore,  which  exists  without 
the  mind  is  neither  great  nor  small,  the  motion  neither  swift  nor  slow; 
that  is,  they  are  nothing  at  all.' 

Ueberweg  :  '  This  false  inference  is  reached  by  confounding  the 
position  of  scientific  observation  with  that  of  the  popular  view.  Scien- 
tific observation  shows  that  great  and  little  are  relative  conceptions ; 
that  consequently  where  no  relation  exists  we  can  no  longer,  in  the 
strict  sense,  speak  of  greatness  or  littleness;  from  the  fact  that  what 
only  in  this  strict  sense  can  be  called  neither  great  nor  little  is  to  be 
taken  for  something  which  is  neither  large  nor  small  in  the  popular 
sense  (and  consequently  where  the  comparison  is  complete),  the  infer- 
ence is  drawn  that  an  extension  which  is  neither  great  nor  little  is 
"  nothing  at  all." 

'  The  fallacy  is  the  same  as  in  the  Thesis  (which  has  often  been 
adduced,  and  may  be  justified  by  the  relativity  of  the  notion  of  poison), 
"Aut  omnia  aut  nulla  venena,"  with  which  is  linked  the  inference  that 
it  makes  no  difference  whether  we  eat  bread  or  arsenic. 

'  Every  real  extension  is  one  distinct  extension  and  no  other  (not  at 
all,  however,  as  Berkeley  immediately  after  imputes  it  to  the  defend- 
ers of  the  objectivity,  "extension  in  general").  But  the  notion  of 
greatness  or  littleness  cannot  be  applied  to  it  without  a  comparison 
which  we  ourselves  make. 

'  The  same  is  true  of  motion.  A  planet  moves  around  the  centre  of 
its  system  in  a  certain  path,  which,  by  means  of  a  particular  motion 
(not  "  motion  in  general"),  can  be  measured.  Whether  the  motion  is 
to  be  called  swift  or  slow  depends  upon  the  comparison  which  we  make. 

'The  motion  of  Mars,  for  example,  is  slow  in  comparison  with  the 
motion  of  the  earth,  but  swift  in  comparison  with  the  motion  of 
Uranus;  in  itself,  not  compared  with  other  motions,  it  is  neither  swift 
nor  slow.  But  this  would  not  justify  us  in  saying  "that  as  it  is  in  itself 
neither  swift  motion  nor  slow  motion  it  is  nothing  at  all." 

'  The  setting  aside  of  antithetical  predicates,  which  apart  from  com- 
parison have  no  meaning,  does  not  set  aside  the  thing  itself.  Nor 
indeed  is  the  comparison  always  a  purely  subjective  one,  but  in  many 
cases,  and  those  of  the  highest  scientific  importance,  it  is  brought  out 
in  objective  connections.' 

[24]     Unity. 

Berkeley,  §12:  'in  each  instance,  it  is  plain,  the  unit  relates  to 
some  particular  combination  of  ideas  arbitrarily  (willkiirlich)  put  to- 
gether by  the  mind.' 


COLD    AND    WARM.  347 

Ueberweg  :  '  The  mind  proceeds  not  arbitrarily,  but  in  conformity 
with  objective  relations,  when  it  considers  three  persons  or  three  trees 
as  three  entities,  and  not  as  ten  or  twenty  cubic  unities,  the  size  of  each 
of  which  is  taken  into  consideration. 

'  Number  as  number  is  a  structure  of  the  mind  which  summarizes  what 
is  homogeneous ;  but  the  unity  of  measure  is  only  in  certain  cases 
and  in  a  certain  degree  arbitrary.  So  far  as  individuals  exist  it  is  object- 
ively grounded.' 

[25]     Unity:  Locke. 

Berkeley,  §  13:  'all  the  ways  of  sensation  and  reflection  (der  sinn- 
lichen  und  inneren  Wahrnehmung).' 

Ueberweg  :  '  Locke  says  (Ess.  on  H.  U.,  11.  xiii.  26),  "There  is  not 
any  object  of  sensation  or  reflection  (sinnlichen  und  inneren  Wahrneh- 
mung) which  does  not  carry  with  it  the  idea  of  one."  He  maintains 
(do.,  11.  xvi.  1)  that  no  idea  is  so  simple  as  that  of  unity,  and  that  it  is 
most  intimately  interwoven  with  all  our  thoughts.  This  proposition 
of  Locke  is  here  controverted  by  Berkeley.' 

[26]     Cold  and  Warm. 

Berkeley,  §  14:  'the  same  body  which  appears  cold  to  one  hand 
seems  warm  to  another.' 

Ueberweg  :  '  This  argument  (as  Berkeley  himself  grants)  is  not  in 
itself  sufficient  to  prove  that  there  is  no  particular  grade  of  caloric  in 
the  external  object  itself, — a  grade  which  may  be  ascertained  objectively 
by  the  thermometer.  The  argument  does  no  more  than  bring  before  us 
the  obvious  fact  that  the  expressions  "hot"  and  "cold,"  as  they  involve 
a  comparison  with  the  grades  of  warmth  in  parts  of  our  body,  cannot  be 
used  without  a  subjective  reference.  We  cannot,  therefore,  just  "  as 
well,"  but  rather  can  just  "  as  little"  infer  that  there  is  no  particular 
figure  and  no  particular  extension  belonging  in  every  case  to  the  external 
object  involved.  The  conclusion,  however,  that  the  sensation  of 
warmth  cannot  be  an  image  of  an  objective  quality  of  caloric,  while 
yet  the  perception  of  a  form  can  be  an  image  of  the  perceived  form  of 
the  external  object,  rests  upon  different  premises. 

'All  the  qualities  of  sensation  can  be  excited  by  processes  of  motion. 
These  latter  must  as  sUch  be  objective,  for  otherwise  the  presupposition 
of  an  objective,  causal  (nexus),  a  thing  established  by  all  the  results  of 
physical  investigation,  falls  away  with  them.     See  (45).' 


348 


ANNOTATIONS. 


[27]     Substance. 

Berkeley,  §  17  :  'but  the  idea  of  being  (Wesens,  eines  Etwas,  eines 
Seienden)  in  general  (liberhaupt),  together  with  the  relative  notion 
(Begriff)  of  its  supporting  (Tragens)  accidents.' 

Ueberweg:  'Locke  (H.  Und.,11.  xii.  3-6)  reduces  complex  ideas 
(zusammengesetzten  Vorstellungen)  to  three  classes:  1.  Modes  (Acci- 
dentien),  2.  Substances,  3.  Relations  (Verhaltnisse).  Under  modes  or 
accidents  he  understands  "complex  ideas  which  contain  not  in  them 
the  supposition  of  subsisting  by  themselves  (fur  sich  bestehend),  but  are 
considered  as  dependencies  on  or  affections  of  substances"  inhering  in 
certain  substances. 

'  "  The  ideas  of  substances,"  says  Locke,  "are  such  combinations  of 
simple  ideas  (Vorstellungen)  as  are  taken  to  represent  distinct  particular 
things  subsisting  by  themselves"  (fur  sich  bestehende).  The  "relation 
consists  in  the  comparing  one  idea  (Vorstellung)  with  another." 

•  "Under  accidents"  says  Locke  (H.  U.,  II.  xiii.  19),  "  is  understood 
a  sort  of  real  beings  that  needed  something  to  inhere  in," — something 
real,  which  of  necessity  presupposes  some  other  thing  in  which  it  sub- 
sists. "Substance  is  that  which  supports  accidents," — their  substratum. 
He  adds,  "  Of  substance  we  have  no  idea  what  it  is,  but  only  a  con- 
fused, obscure  one  of  what  it  does."  "The  idea  of  substance  we  neither 
have  nor  can  have  by  sensation  or  reflection  (aussere  innere  Wahrneh- 
mung)  (1.  iv.  18);  it  is  furnished  to  us  only  by  the  constant  association 
of  certain  simple  ideas.  As  we  are  unable  to  conceive  how  these  can 
subsist  in  themselves,  we  are  accustomed  to  suppose  some  certain 
substratum  wherein  they  do  subsist  and  from  which  they  do  result  j 
which,  therefore,  we  call  substance'  (H.  U.,  II.  xxiii.  1). 

'Only  the  constant  combination  of  properties  is  given  to  us;  the 
nature  of  substance  is  hidden  from  us  (do.  do.,  3-6). 

'  "  He  has  the  perfectest  idea  of  any  of  the  particular  sorts  of  sub- 
stances who  has  gathered  and  put  together  most  of  the  simple  ideas 
which  do  exist  in  it"  (do.  do.,  7). 

'  It  is  true  Locke  would  have  been  more  logical,  without,  however,  on 
that  account  by  any  means  reaching  Berkeleyanism,  if  he  had  rejected 
as  an  empty  fiction  the  conception  of  substance  as  a  something  distinct 
from  qualities,  and  had  acknowledged  only  the  reciprocal  combination 
of  qualities  as  real.  As  he,  however,  regarded  this  inference  (sub- 
sequently drawn  by  Hume)  as  doubtful,  he  confined  himself  to  charac- 
terizing as  dark  and  of  little  use  the  idea  of  substance  as  something 
distinct  from  all  qualities. 


IDEAS   AS    OBJECTS.  349 

'  In  the  Platonic  Aristotelian  view  of  material  substance  extension  is 
embraced. 

1  By  Berkeley's  negation  of  the  existence  of  extension  extra  mentem 
the  notion  of  material  substance  is,  as  he  justly  says,  also  taken  away ; 
but  the  converse  is  by  no  means  true,  that  the  negation  of  that  dark 
something  necessarily  involves  the  negation  of  the  objective  reality  of 
extension.' 

[28]     Ideas  as  Objects. 

Berkeley,  §  18:  'Reason  (Denken),  Sensations  (Sinnesempfind- 
ungen),  immediately  perceived  by  sense  (unmittelbar  sinnlich  wahr- 
genommen  werden) :  but  they  do  not  inform  us  that  things  exist 
without  the  mind,  or  unperceived,  like  to  those  which  are  perceived.' 

Ueberweg:  'We  have  here  again  a  return  to  the  terminology  which 
has  already  been  objected  to,  in  which  "ideas"  are  designated  as  the 
objects  of  knowledge  and  of  sense-perception;  indeed,  as  "the  objects 
immediately  perceived." 

1  In  fact,  ideas  are  only  objects  of  contemplation  in  internal  percep- 
tion ;  that  is,  in  reflection  on  an  internal  psychical  image. 

'  Berkeley  is  indeed  so  far  entirely  right  that  it  is  actually  only  these 
complexes  of  sensation  (perception)  which  are  immediately  in  our 
consciousness;  the  reference  of  them  to  the  corresponding  external 
objects  takes  place  by  means  of  an  accessory  primitive  thinking,  which 
presupposes  partly  nearer,  partly  more  remote  analogues  of  our  own 
existence,  of  which  we  know  by  internal  perception  on  occasion  of 
those  complexes  of  sensation,  and  indeed  as  the  external  causes  of 
them  ;  the  perception  (sight,  touch,  etc.),  to  the  extent  to  which  it  is 
more  than  mere  sensation,  already  involves  that  primitive  act  of 
thinking. 

'  But  the  complexes  of  sensation,  though  alone  immediately  in  our 
consciousness,  are  not  therefore  necessarily  the  immediate  object  of 
sense-perception,  to  wit,  if  they  be  at  all  not  the  object  but  the  means 
of  it ;  our  attention,  in  the  case  of  the  complexes  of  sensation,  is 
directed  entirely  to  the  external  things  manifested  to  us  through  them  ; 
the  external  thing  is  that  which  I  see,  handle,  perceive. 

'  The  complexes  of  sensation  are,  as  such,  late  in  becoming  the  object 
of  psychological  reflection. 

'  The  act  of  thinking  which  enters  into  the  sense-perception  itself, 
and  forms  a  constituent  part  of  it,  is  an  elementary  one,  through  which, 
it  is  true,  the  existence  of  external  objects  is  known ;  but  the  distinction 
is  by  no  means  yet  consummated,  which  shows  what  constituents  of 
the  complex  of  sensation  correspond  in  a  fuller  and  what  in  a  more 


35o 


A  XX  OTA  TIONS. 


restricted  measure  with  the  particular  nature  of  their  objects;  this  dis- 
tinction (which  Descartes  and  Locke  have  in  the  main  correctly  carried 
through)  only  takes  place  as  the  product  of  a  far-advanced  scientific 
penetration.' 

[29]      Materialists. 

Berkeley,  §  18:   'The  Materialists.' 

Ueberweg:  'That  is,  those  who  hold  to  the  existence  of  a  matter 
external  to  the  mind, — defenders  of  the  doctrine  of  matter.' 

[30]     Dreams. 

Berkeley,  §  18:   'With  all  the  ideas.' 

Ueberweg  :  '  With  all  ?  In  accordance  with  the  order  of  natural 
laws,  assuredly  not ! 

'  Consequently  no  more  follows  than  what  is  beyond  doubt,  aside  from 
the  facts  here  urged  by  Berkeley,  that  the  inference  as  to  the  existence 
of  external  objects  is  in  certain  cases  deceptive,  and  that  the  condi- 
tions under  which  the  inference  holds  good  must  be  ascertained.  The 
images  in  dreams  and  visions  would  not  be  possible  without  antecedent 
affections  made  through  actual  external  objects ;  they  are  the  result  of 
a  reproduction  and  metamorphosis  of  the  presentations  furnished  by 
memory.  If  Berkeley's  argument  held  good,  the  existence  of  other 
persons — which  can  also  be  dreamed  of — would,  equally  with  the  ex- 
istence of  "unthinking  objects,"  be  taken  away.  The  weakness  of  the 
argument  is  shown  in  its  proving  too  much. ' 

[31]     Materialists. 

Berkeley,  §  19  :   '  The  Materialists.' 

Ueberweg  :  '  Here  appears  yet  more  clearly  than  above  (29)  that 
Berkeley  uses  the  term  "Materialist"  in  a  sense  different  from  the 
received  one. 

'The  ordinary  meaning  of  " Materialist"  is  one  who  believes  that 
nothing  exists  but  material  substance.  Berkeley  applies  it  to  all  who 
hold  that  material  substances  exist,  although  at  the  same  time  they  may 
hold  to  the  existence  of  spiritual  substances.' 

[32]     Intercourse. 
Berkeley,  §  19 :   'And  serve  to  no  manner  of  purpose.' 
Ueberweg:   'They  serve  at  least  to  render  possible,  in  a  manner 
conformed  to  natural  laws,  the  intercourse  between  intellectual  beings, 
if  indeed  the  very  possibility  of  the  existence  of  conscious  being  be  not 
conditioned  through  them. 


A    POSTERIORI.  351 

'Language  is  the  medium  through  which  thought  is  imparted.  Grant 
that  the  word  spoken  by  me  can  exist  only  in  certain  ideas  linked  to 
my  thoughts,  which  ideas,  like  the  word  itself,  exist  purely  in  the 
mind ;  and  grant  that  the  air  itself  exists  only  as  the  complex  of  ideas 
in  illocal  essence  or  spirits,  yet  it  would  still  be  inconceivable  why 
similar  ideas  should  be  aroused  by  that  word  in  the  mind  of  another 
who  is  near  me  (the  nearness  itself  cannot  be  one  of  a  local  kind,  on 
this  system),  and  still  less  would  it  be  intelligible  how  a  writing,  long 
after  the  death  of  its  author,  could  continue  to  produce  the  same  kind 
of  effects. 

'All  conformity  to  law  would  be  the  mere  association  of  ideas  in  the 
individual  subject ;  for  all  relations  between  persons  we  must  have 
recourse  to  the  immediate  or  miraculous  working  of  the  divine  Omnipo- 
tence. But  if  outside  of  the  mind  of  the  person  who  speaks  or  who 
writes,  and  of  the  mind  of  the  hearer  or  reader,  the  air  and  other 
material  media  have  an  existence,  the  intermediation  can  be  explained 
by  physics  and  the  other  natural  sciences  in  a  manner  which  cannot 
be  contemptuously  set  aside. 

'  It  is  true  that  something  still  remains  unexplained  ;  but  the  path 
to  the  explanation  is  broken,  and  the  difficulty  made  so  prominent  by 
Berkeley  is  diminished,  if  we  do  not  regard  matter  and  spirit  as  so 
utterly  heterogeneous  as  Descartes  and  even  Locke,  and  their  cotem- 
poraries,  have  done. 

'  The  view  of  Berkeley,  on  the  other  hand,  removes  all  possibility 
of  an  explanation  based  upon  natural  science.' 

[  33  ]     Dreaming. 

Berkeley,  §  20:  'That  you  can  possibly  have  for  believing  the 
same  thing.' 

Ueberweg  :  '  Undoubtedly  ;  and  in  dreaming  we  actually  have  the 
very  belief  without  any  grounds  for  it.  But  the  supposition  that  waking 
is  but  dreaming  with  open  eyes  can  only  be  carried  through  by  the 
removal  of  all  objective  order  of  nature,  of  everything  which  goes 
beyond  the  bare  association  of  ideas  in  the  individual  subject.' 

[34]     A  Posteriori. 

Berkeley,  §  21  :   'Arguments  a  posteriori.' 

Ueberweg:  "'Arguments  a  posteriori"  in  the  old  Aristotelian  Scho- 
lastic sense  of  the  term,  according  to  which  the  argumentation  a  priori 
(to  wit,  ad  posterius)  implies  the  inference  from  the  cause,  as  that 
which  in  its  nature  is  earlier  (<p wet  npdrspov)  to  the  operation  or  effect, 


352 


ANN  OTA  TIONS. 


or  that  which  in  nature  is  later  {<pb<su  uff-spnv),  while  the  argument  a 
posteriori  (to  wit,  ad  prius  natura)  implies  the  inference  from  the  opera- 
tions or  effects  to  the  cause, — the  inference  from  the  fuazt  uarepuv  to  the 

<pb<T£l   -pOTSpOV. 

'  In  the  inference  a  posteriori,  the  later  (the  operations)  is,  according 
to  natural  sequence,  the  nearer  to  us  (xpoTepov  xpds  rjpas),  or  that  which 
is  earlier  and  more  easily  recognizable  by  us, — yvwpipwzepov  ijfitv, — from 
whence  we  go  back  to  the  earlier, — the  Causes ;  we  argue  in  this  case 
regressively,  while  in  the  a  priori  (ad  posterius)  we  argue  progress- 
ively. For  the  use  of  the  terms  a  priori  and  a  posteriori  which  has 
reference  to  the  Course  of  Argumentation,  Kant,  partly  following 
Hume  and  others,  has  substituted  a  completely  heterogeneous  use. 
According  to  Kant's  use  the  distinction  of  a  priori  and  a  posteriori  is 
referred  to  the  judgment  as  such;  by  knowledge  a  posteriori  he  means 
the  knowledge  derived  from  experience,  empirical ;  by  knowledge  a 
priori,  the  knowledge  (erroneously  assumed  by  him  as  possible  and 
actual)  which  we  have  apart  from  experience.' 

[35]     Extended  Substance. 

Berkeley,  §22:  'If  you  can  but  conceive  it  possible  for  one  ex- 
tended moveable  substance,  or,  in  general,  for  any  one  idea.' 

Ueberweg  :  '  The  subsumption  of  "  extended  moveable  substance," 
under  the  term  "  idea,"  already  implies  the  Berkeleyan  doctrine.  The 
opponent  of  the  view  must  consequently  challenge  this  questionable 
position  itself,  and  must  refuse  to  concede  what  it  tacitly  assumes. 
Nego  suppositum.  As  Berkeley  here,  however,  simply  repeats  his 
former  positions,  we  could  do  no  more  than  repeat  our  former  objec- 
tions, which  is  unnecessary.' 

[36]  External  Things. 
Berkeley,  §  23  :  'Which  is  a  manifest  repugnancy.' 
Ueberweg  :  '  The  existence  of  external  things  without  my  thinking 
of  them  can  very  well  be  granted,  but  my  consciousness  that  external 
things  can  exist  is  not  possible,  unless  I  am  thinking  of  these  very  things. 
The  periods  of  the  formation  of  the  earth,  during  which  there  were 
no  living  creatures,  have  existed  without  being  perceived  by  men  ;  but 
we  can  know  or  conjecture  that  they  existed,  in  no  other  way  than  by 
having  them  in  our  thought.  Berkeley  does  not  separate  the  two 
things.  While  the  Opponent,  whom  he  supposes  to  present  himself, 
directs  his  reflection  only  to  the  existence  of  the  external  object, 
Berkeley  makes  this  very  reflection  of  the  thinking  subject  upon  the 


THINGS  IN  THEMSELVES. 


153 


object  the  starting-point  of  his  argument,  and  in  the  abstraction  of 
the  object  from  the  subject,  made  by  the  Opponent,  does  not  follow 
him.  Berkeley  is  undoubtedly  right  in  maintaining  that  the  possibility 
of  performing  this  abstraction  does  not  in  itself  demotistrate  that  things 
in  themselves  exist ;  but  he  is  not  justified  in  maintaining  that  this 
possibility  does  not  exist,  because  we,  when  we  reflect  upon  it,  do  then 
certainly  (in  addition)  think  about  the  Things.' 

[37]     Representation. 

Berkeley,  §  23  :  '  Though  at  the  same  time  they  are  apprehended 
by  (vorgestellt)  or  exist  in  itself?' 

Ueberweg  :  '  Not  the  things,  but  only  a  representation  (Vorstellung) 
of  them,  exists  in  me,  just  as,  when  I  think  of  a  psychical  being  dis- 
tinct from  myself,  it  is  not  this  being,  but  a  representation  of  it,  which 
exists  in  me.' 

[38]     Things  in  themselves. 

Berkeley,  §  24 :  '  Those  words  mark  out  either  a  direct  contradic- 
tion or  else  nothing  at  all.' 

Ueberweg  :  '  The  alleged  contradiction,  as  we  have  before  shown, 
does  not  exist. 

'Were  there  such  contradiction,  there  would  be  equally  a  contra- 
diction in  supposing  that  there  was  a  time  previous  to  my  own  exist- 
ence. For  to  suppose  this  I  must  think  of  that  time;  it  is  consequently 
in  me  ;  consequently  it  does  not  exist  without  me,  or  outside  of  me  ; 
consequently  not  before  my  existence :  for  that  anything  should  be  in 
me,  without  myself  being,  is  a  palpable  contradiction. 

'  The  solution  of  Berkeley's  argument  is  the  same  as  that  of  the  paral- 
ogism just  given.  I  think  of  the  past  now  as  I  now  generate  an  image 
of  it  in  me, — not  the  past  itself,  but  an  image  of  it,  is  now  in  me ; 
but  the  past  itself  has  existed  without  me.  I  cannot  know  that  it  has 
existed  without  me  without  (now  in  addition)  thinking  of  it ;  but  it 
can  have  existed,  and  has  existed,  without  this  thinking  of  mine. 

'  In  the  same  way,  things  which  exist  in  themselves  are  thought  of  by 
me  when  I  generate  in  me  an  image,  more  or  less  accurate,  of  them : 
the  things  themselves  are  not  in  me,  but  this  image  of  them  is  in 
me ;  but  they  themselves  exist  independently  of  my  image.  I  cannot 
know  that  they  exist  in  themselves  without  thinking  of  them,  but  they 
can  exist,  and  many  of  them  do,  in  fact,  exist,  indubitably,  without 
this  thinking  of  mine.  The  objection  made  by  Berkeley  is  brought 
up  again  by  Fichte,  who  denies  Kant's  assumption  of  "Things  in 
themselves"  (Dingen  an  sich).     The  same  thing  is  done  by  Reinhold 

23 


354 


ANN  OTA  TIONS. 


Hoppe.  In  his  work  on  the  Sufficiency  of  the  Empirical  Method 
in  Philosophy  ("  Zulanglichkeit  des  Empirismus  in  der  Philosophic," 
Berlin,  1852),  he  argues  for  a  doctrine  allied  to  that  of  Berkeley. 
Hoppe  shapes  his  statement  in  this  form, — that  the  opposition  be- 
tween Actuality  and  Cognition  involves  a  contradiction,  for  in  as  far 
as  Actuality  is  discussed,  investigated,  brought  into  contrast,  so  far 
is  it  thought  of;  from  which  he  infers  that  everything  we  affirm  of 
it  relates,  in  fact,  only  to  our  own  thinking. 

'  The  objection,  however,  in  this  mode  of  conception,  is  that  it 
involves  a  mingling  of  two  grades  of  thinking, — to  wit,  that  in  which 
thinking  is  simply  concerned  with  the  truth  (meaning  that  there  is  a 
harmony  of  our  subjective  apprehension  with  the  objective  Actuality ; 
as,  for  example,  the  harmony  of  our  apprehension  of  the  assassination 
of  Csesar  with  the  assassination  as  it  actually  occurred),  and  that  in 
which  it  is  concerned  with  our  insight  into  the  essence  of  the  truth. 
Our  notion  of  objective  actuality  belongs  only  to  the  second  grade  (in 
its  antithesis  to  the  subjective  apprehension).  To  this  grade,  too, 
exclusively  belongs  the  notion  of  cognition,  and  it  is  a  matter  of 
course  that  we  cannot  have  these  notions  without  thinking  them.  It 
is  the  first  grade,  indeed,  which  alone  enables  us  to  account  for  the 
second ;  and  in  connection  with  this  first  grade  we  have  to  do  merely 
with  the  existence  of  that  harmony,  not  with  our  knowing  of  its 
existence ;  and  in  this  it  is  not  our  thinking  of  the  Actuality,  but  the 
Actuality  itself,  which  is  determinative, — that  is  to  say,  the  thing 
which  exists  or  which  has  happened,  which  is  not  dependent  on  my 
knowledge  of  it  (or  is,  in  other  words,  "  the  thing  in  itself" — "  an  sich 
ist"),  but  which  conditions  my  knowing.' 

Editor  :  It  can  exist  without  my  knowing  it,  but  I  cannot  know  it 
without  its  existing. 

[39]     Incitement  of  Ideas. 

Berkeley,  §  25:  'or  pattern  of  any  active  being,  as  is  evident 
from  §  8.' 

Ueberweg:  'The  argument  in  §  8  has  already  been  met.  The 
inactivity  of  ideas  is  by  no  means  established  by  self-observation  :  the 
association  of  ideas  testifies  to  exactly  the  opposite.  The  supposition 
that  our  ideas  are  incited  by  external  objects  has  not  been  proven  false 
by  Berkeley. 

'  It  is  indeed  false  to  suppose  such  a  relation  between  mind  and  the 
external  world  as  imputes  all  the  activity  to  the  external  world  and 
considers  the  mind  as  a  passive  substratum,  like  a  writing-tablet  or  a 


SOLIPSISM. 


355 


piece  of  wax ;  but  just  as  false  is  the  opposite  theory,  which  claims  all 
activity  for  the  mind  exclusively.  The  expression  "  incitement"  (Anre- 
gung)  or  "affection"  marks  the  actual  relation  most  accurately 

[40]     Substance. 

Berkeley,  §  27:   'only  by  the  effects  which  it  produceth.' 

Ueberweg  :  'Locke  says  (Hum.  Und.,  11.  xxiii.  5),  "  the  operations 
of  the  mind,  viz.,  thinking,  reasoning,  fearing,  etc.,  ...  we  concluding 
not  to  subsist  of  themselves,  nor  apprehending  how  they  can  belong  to 
body,  or  be  produced  by  it,  are  apt  to  think  them  the  actions  of  some 
other  substance,  which  we  call  Spirit." 

'According  to  Locke,  we  think  of  Spirit  as  the  substratum  of  activi- 
ties which  we  perceive  in  our  own  (psychical)  internal  nature,  as  we 
conceive  of  bodies  as  the  substratum  of  qualities  which  affect  our 
senses. 

'  We  have,  according  to  Locke,  no  distinct  idea  either  of  corporeal 
or  of  spiritual  substance,  but  can  on  this  account  no  more  deny  the 
existence  of  one  than  of  the  other. 

'  Berkeley  denies  corporeal  substance  in  behalf  of  spiritual  substance ; 
but  at  a  later  period  Hume  denied  both,  or,  at  least,  declared  them 
equally  doubtful,  and  adopted  a  self-dependent  subsistence  of  concep- 
tions in  their  reciprocal  connection. 

'  Kant  explained  the  notion  of  substance  as  an  original  notion  of  the 
understanding,  which,  just  because  of  this  its  subjective  origin,  is 
applicable  only  to  phenomenal  objects,  which  are  in  our  consciousness. 
By  this  view  the  skepticism  is  not  confuted,  but  rather  strengthened. 
In  fact,  we  form  the  notion  of  substance  on  the  ground  of  the  knowl- 
edge of  ourself  (in  virtue  of  internal  perception),  as  of  an  individual, 
by  transferring  the  notion  thus  formed  to  personal  and  impersonal 
objects.' 

[41]     Subject. 

Berkeley,  §  27  :  'of  its  supporting  or  being  the  subject  (zu  tragen 
oder  ihr  Substrat  zu  sein).' 

Ueberweg  :  '"  Subject"  in  the  ancient  Aristotelian  Scholastic  sense 
(unoxet/xevov,  substratum).' 

[42]     Solipsism. 

Berkeley,  §  27:  'Though  it  must  be  owned  at  the  same  time  that  we 
have  some  notion  (Begriff )  of  soul,  spirit,  and  the  operations  of  the 
mind  (den  psychischen  Thatigkeiten),  such  as  willing,  loving,  hating, 
inasmuch  as  we  know  or  understand  the  meaning  of  these  words.' 

Ueberweg  :   '  Whether  our  consciousness  of  the  psychical  should  be 


356 


ANNOTATIONS. 


designated  by  the  term  "idea"  or  "notion,"  is  rather  a  question  of 
verbal  than  of  practical  interest.  It  is  worthy  of  remark,  however,  that 
if  we  propose  to  designate  the  "  notions"  of  the  mind  in  regard  to  other 
minds  and  their  operations,  as  objects  of  cognition,  in  the  manner  in 
which  Berkeley  in  the  case  of  sense-perception  designates  "  ideas'"  as 
the  objects  perceived,  using  in  part  the  same  arguments  on  which  he  has 
grounded  the  conclusion  that  we  know  only  our  own  ideas,  and  not 
bodies,  which  are  external  to  our  mind,  it  would  warrant  the  inference 
that  we  know  only  our  own  "  notions"  of  spirits,  and  not  spirits  them- 
selves, which  have  an  existence  outside  of  our  own.  Berkeley's  argu- 
ments would  lead  to  the  acceptance  of  the  sole  existence  of  the  person 
arguing, — to  what  is  called  "theoretic  Egoism,"  or  "Solipsism," — and 
as  it  proves  too  much  must  be  faulty.' 

[43]     Senses. 

Berkeley,  §  29 :  '  But  whatever  power  I  may  have  over  my  own 
thoughts,  I  find  the  ideas  actually  perceived  by  Sense  have  not  a  like 
dependence  on  my  will.' 

Ueberweg  :  '  Locke,  in  his  "  Essay  concerning  Human  Under- 
standing," treats  in  Book  iv.  chap.  xi.  "of  our  knowledge  of  the  ex- 
istence of  other  things,"  external  to  us.  He  supposes  that  we  are 
compelled  to  trust  our  senses,  which  give  us  notice  of  the  existence  of 
other  things,  by  which  the  senses  are  affected.  No  man  can  be  so  skep- 
tical as  to  doubt  of  the  existence  of  these  things  (do.,  §  3).  Among 
the  grounds  of  conviction  he  reckons  also  the  circumstance  which 
Berkeley  here  mentions,  that  when  our  eyes  are  open  we  cannot  avert 
the  entrance  of  the  ideas  (Vorstellungen)  which  sun  and  light  occasion 
in  us.  Locke  draws  the  inference  (§  5)  that  the  thing  which  evokes  in 
me  ideas  of  this  or  that  kind  must  be  the  impression  of  an  external 
object  affecting  my  senses.  In  place  of  this  cause  Berkeley  substitutes 
the  immediate  operation  of  Deity  on  our  souls.' 

[44]     Activity  and  Passivity. 
Berkeley,  §  28  :   '  When  in  broad  daylight  I  open  my  eyes — ' 
'  There  is,  therefore,  some  other  Will  or  Spirit  that  produces  them.' 
Ueberweg  :   '  If  our  spirit  is  susceptible  of  an  operation,  through 
which  another  being  calls  forth  ideas  in  it,  it  follows  that  it  is  not  in 
its  own  nature  a  perpetually  active  being,  but  is  also  capable  of  pas- 
sivity.    It  is  worth  giving  prominence  here  to  the  fact  that  by  this 
view  the  distinction  between  Activity  and  Passivity  is  shown  to  be  a 
relative  one.' 


CAUSALITY.  357 

[45]     Laws  of  Nature. 

Berkeley,  §  30 :  <  Now  the  set  rules  or  established  methods  wherein 
the  mind  we  depend  on  excites  in  us  the  ideas  of  sense,  are  called  the 
laws  of  nature. ' 

Ueberweg  :  '  From  the  position  of  Berkeley,  an  order  conformable 
to  the  laws  of  nature,  inasmuch  as  he  interprets  this  as  the  order  of  our 
own  ideas,  may  be  maintained ;  but  no  laws  of  nature  can  be  actually 
demonstrated,  so  that  by  them  we  can  explain  the  natural  phenomena. 
If,  for  example,  the  course  of  the  planets  is  to  be  explained,  that  is,  re- 
ferred to  laws  universally  holding  good,  it  is  impossible  to  do  so  by 
merely  taking  into  account  our  own  perceptions  in  their  mutual  rela- 
tions. For  in  these  perceptions,  if  they  be  regarded  in  themselves,  a 
precise  fixed  order  does  not  reveal  itself.  Such  an  order  can  only  be 
found  if  we  suppose  a  causality  which  limits  the  subject  (in  the  act  of 
seeing)  with  material  objects  external  to  the  subject,  to  wit,  the  heavenly 
bodies,  which  carry  on  their  movements  in  consonance  with  the  laws 
of  gravitation,  the  laws  which  Newton  discovered.  They  carry  them 
on,  not  within  our  consciousness,  but  independently  of  it,  and  did 
carry  them  on  probably  long  before  human  consciousness  existed, 
though  we  are  able  to  develop  our  consciousness  supplementally 
concerning  them.  It  is  not  this  supplemental  consciousness  which 
works  upon  our  eyes,  but  the  real  external  course  of  the  planets.' 

[46]     Causality. 

Berkeley,  §31:  'This  gives  us  a  sort  of  foresight,  .  .  .  and  a 
grown  man  no  more  know  how  to  manage  himself  in  the  affairs  of  life 
than  an  infant  just  born.' 

Ueberweg :  ' Locke  says  (Hum.  Und. ,  B.  11.  xxvi.  1) :  "In  the  notice 
that  our  senses  take  of  the  constant  vicissitude  of  things,  we  cannot  but 
observe  that  several  particular,  both  qualities  and  substances,  begin  to 
exist,  and  that  they  receive  this  their  existence  from  the  due  application 
and  operation  of  some  other  being.  From  this  observation  we  get  our 
ideas  of  cause  and  effect. ' '  He  gives  as  an  example  that  in  the  sub- 
stance we  call  wax,  fluidity  is  constantly  produced  by  the  application 
of  a  certain  degree  of  heat ;  we  call  fluidity  therefore  the  effect  and  heat 
the  cause.  Locke  concedes  that,  in  this,  the  manner  in  which  cause 
brings  forth  effect  remains  unknown. 

'Berkeley's  theory  of  cause  and  effect  is  an  application,  in  the  most 
subjective  shape,  of  this  doctrine  of  Locke.  Hume's  sceptical  Reflec- 
tions on  the  Notion  of  Cause,  which  he  traces  to  our  habitually  finding 


358 


ANNOTATIONS. 


certain  perceptions  linked  with  certain  others,  found  here  a  point  of 
connection,  as  his  sceptical  reflections  found  their  point  of  attachment 
in  sections  xvi.,  xvii.,  and  xxvii.  In  the  internal  perception  of  our  will 
and  of  the  effort  we  make  in  overcoming  obstacles,  Reid  and  some 
others  of  the  Scotch  school  found  the  solution  of  our  notion  of  causality, 
and  among  French  thinkers  Maine  de  Biran  adopted  this  view.  Kant 
on  the  contrary  regarded  this  notion  and  that  of  substance  as  a  primary 
notion,  originally  immanent  in  the  mind,  "a  category."  With  this 
view  he  imagined  that  he  had  vanquished  the  scepticism  of  Hume, 
while  in  fact  he  had  only  promoted  the  extremest  subjectivism, — a 
subjectivism  which  soon  emerged  in  Fichte's  doctrine  of  the  Ego,  but 
shifted  round  into  the  objectivism  of  Schelling,  which  objectivism  in 
turn  has  led  to  new  attempts  at  solution.     Adhuc  sub  judice  lis  est.' 

[47]     Causal  Connection. 

Berkeley,  §  32:  'Perceiving  (wenn  wir  wahrnehmen)  the  motion 
(die  Bewegung)  and  collision  (Zusammenstoss)  of  bodies  to  be  attended 
with  sound,  we  are  inclined  to  think  the  latter  the  effect  (Wirkung)  of 
the  former.' 

Ueberweg  :  '  Here  again  holds  good  what  was  observed  before,  that 
the  Causal  Connection,  if  it  be  apprehended  as  merely  the  order  estab- 
lished by  God  in  the  ideas  which  are  in  the  subject,  can  merely  be 
asserted,  not  actually  demonstrated  and  formulated.  But  if  the  Causal 
Connection  be  associated  with  the  external  things,  it  is  explained  in 
conformity  with  mathematical  mechanical  laws.  For  example,  the 
union  of  collision  with  sound  is  explained  by  the  displacement  con- 
nected with  the  visible  motion  of  bodies  in  the  motions  of  the  minute 
parts  of  body.' 

[48]     Prejudice. 

Berkeley,  §  34 :  'It  will  be  objected  that  by  the  foregoing  princi- 
ples all  that  is  real  and  substantial  in  nature  is  banished  out  of  the 
world,  and  instead  thereof  a  chimerical  scheme  of  ideas  takes  place.' 

Ueberweg  :  '  Berkeley  has  only  too  much  to  justify  him  in  believing 
that  the  first  objections  urged  against  a  theory  which  departs  from  the 
current  opinion  will  be  of  the  kind  he  here  describes.  As  children 
are  wont  to  say  No,  when  anything  is  demanded  of  them  which  they 
have  not  themselves  imagined  or  desired,  so  adults  thrust  away  what  is 
strange  to  them,  simply  because  it  is  strange.  They  cry  out  that  it  is 
odd  and  absurd,  while  the  only  real  question  is  whether  it  is  asserted 


EATING   AND    DRINKING    IDEAS.  359 

on  sufficient  grounds.     Berkeley's  task  is  easy  enough  with  this  class 
of  objections ;  there  is  another  class  which  has  more  weight.' 

[49]     Reality. 

Berkeley,  §  36 :  'If  any  man  thinks  this  detracts  from  the  existence 
or  reality  of  things,  he  is  very  far  from  understanding  what  hath  been 
premised  in  the  plainest  terms  I  could  think  of.' 

Ueberweg  :  'As  Locke,  who  (iv.  xi.  8)  characterizes  the  negation 
of  the  corporeal  world  as  a  view  according  to  which  "all  we  see  and 
hear,  feel  and  taste,  think  and  do,  during  our  whole  being,  is  but  the 
series  and  deluding  appearances  of  a  long  dream,  whereof  there  is  no 
reality."  ' 

[50]     Substance. 

Berkeley,  §  37:  'If  it  (substance)  be  taken  in  a  philosophic  sense 
for  the  support  (Trager)  of  accidents  or  qualities  (Eigenschaften)  with- 
out the  mind,  then  indeed  I  acknowledge  that  we  take  it  away,  if  one 
may  be  said  to  take  that  away  which  never  had  any  existence,  not  even 
in  the  imagination  (blossen  Vorstellung).' 

Ueberweg  :  '  The  two  questions  are  not  identical,  whether  there  be 
extended  things  without  our  minds,  and  whether  there  be  substance 
which  is  the  support  of  qualities.  It  is  not  true  that  Berkeley  simply 
contests  the  second  supposition,  and  is  on  other  points  in  unison  with 
the  common  view.  The  existence  of  extension,  figure,  magnitude,  and 
impenetrability,  and  also  of  gravitation  and  of  forces  in  general,  with- 
out the  percipient  mind,  is  the  very  essence  of  the  question.  Locke's 
notion  of  substance  can  be  denied  without  denying  that  existence 
without  the  percipient  mind.  He  who  denies  this  existence  denies 
indeed  of  necessity,  at  the  same  time,  the  notion  of  corporeal  sub- 
stances, but  not  merely  this.  To  this  add  that  Berkeley  himself 
acknowledges  spiritual  substances  as  the  supports  of  the  inherent.' 

[51]     Eating  and  Drinking  Ideas. 

Berkeley,  §  38 :  'It  sounds  very  harsh  to  say,  we  eat  and  drink 
ideas,  and  are  clothed  with  ideas.  I  acknowledge  it  does  so, — the 
word  idea  not  being  used  in  common  discourse  to  signify  the  several 
combinations  of  sensible  qualities  which  are  called  things.'' 

Ueberweg  :  '  Were  this  the  only  ground,  it  would  sound  less  harsh 
to  say  that  we  eat  and  drink  sense-perceptions.  The  true  ground  is 
that  the  things  we  eat  and  drink  are  things  existing  without  our  con- 
sciousness (in  themselves),  and  are  not  ideas  in  the  mind  of  the  per- 
cipient subject,  and  are  regarded  as  such  by  the  non-philosophic  also. 


360 


ANNOTATIONS. 


The  theory  of  Berkeley  does  not  deviate  from  the  ordinary  use  of 
language  merely,  but  from  the  conviction  which  lies  at  the  root  of  this 
usage.  To  be  sure,  this  is  no  proof  that  Berkeley's  theory  is  not  right; 
but  the  deviation  is  unmistakable. 

'  Berkeley  himself  not  only  acknowledges  that  he  deviates  from  the 
ordinary  use  of  language,  but  subsequently  (§  39,  with  which  compare 
the  beginning  of  §  56)  acknowledges  his  deviation  from  the  common 
supposition  on  which  the  usage  of  language  rests.  With  this  is  not  in 
consonance  the  assertion  made  in  §  35,  and  frequently  elsewhere,  "the 
only  thing  whose  existence  we  deny  is  that  which  philosophers  call 
matter  or  corporeal  substance."  Berkeley's  assertion,  moreover,  that 
we  eat  and  drink  ideas,  is  not  only  opposed  to  the  usage  of  language 
and  the  common  presuppositions  on  which  that  usage  rests,  but  to 
Berkeley's  own  position,  which  is  at  once  necessary  on  the  one  side 
and  untenable  on  the  other.  Nothing  of  the  colour  and  taste  of  the 
apple  or  of  wine  enters  into  the  stomach, — the  stomach  neither  sees 
nor  tastes;  the  processes  of  assimilation  run  through  their  normal 
course  with  scarcely  any  recognition  on  the  part  of  consciousness. 
How,  consequently,  can  "ideas,"  or  sensations,  or  sensible  qualities,  be 
eaten  ?  The  chemical  processes  which  science  has  gradually,  in  part, 
discovered,  are  known  only  in  their  effects.  So  long  as  they  are 
unperceived,  they  are  upon  the  one  side,  according  to  Berkeley's 
principles,  nothing,  and  on  the  other  side,  as  they  are  associated  with 
operations,  they  are  something, — which  is  a  complete  contradiction. 
Consequently,  the  negation  of  things  which  exist  without  the  con- 
sciousness (and  of  whose  existence  we  can  only  gradually  attain  a  con- 
sciousness) is  untenable.     See  the  note  on  §  52.' 

Editor:  Schulze,1  who  rejects  Berkeley's  view,  says,  'The  system 
seems  ludicrous  only  because  our  modes  of  speech  and  of  thought  are 
not  in  conformity  with  it.'  It  may  be  said,  however,  that  the  language 
which  Berkeley  uses  is  not  self-consistent,  for  the  eating  is  as  ideal  as 
the  thing  eaten.  We  have  the  eating-idea  of  the  apple-idea,  the 
dressing-idea  of  the  raiment-idea.  The  relation  in  Berkeley  is  not 
that  of  an  objective  act  brought  to  bear  on  an  ideal  thing,  but  of  ideal 
on  ideal.  On  the  other  hand,  if  the  idea  is,  the  thing,  the  idea  is  the 
apple,  the  idea  is  the  eating.  Strictly  speaking,  the  apple  of  Berkeley 
is  not  the  idea  of  an  apple,  but  is  an  idea-apple ;  the  eating  is  not  the 
idea  of  eating,  but  is  the  idea-eating.  Berkeley  himself  falls  into 
the  trap  of  the  every-day  formulary  in  the  first  part  of  the  phrase. 
As  he  defines  reality,  the  idea-eating  of  the  idea-apple  is  a  real  eating 

»  Grundr.  d.  philosoph.  Wissenschaft,  2  v.,  1788,  i.  23. 


THE   SENSORIUM.  361 

of  a  real  apple  5  but  this  makes  our  psychical  activity  depend  on  God 
as  much  as  our  psychical  passivity,  and  overthrows  the  infallibility  of 
our  consciousness  to  our  own  mental  acts.  My  idea  that  I  am  eating 
is  not  a  mere  sense-impression,  but  a  consciousness  of  will. 

[52]     Testimony  of  the  Senses. 

Berkeley,  §  40 :  '  But,  say  what  we  can,  some  one  perhaps  may 
be  apt  to  reply,  he  will  still  believe  his  senses,  and  never  suffer  any 
arguments,  how  plausible  soever,  to  prevail  over  the  certainty  of  them.' 

Ueberweg  :  'Compare  Locke,  iv.  xi.  3:  "This  is  certain,  the 
confidence  that  our  faculties  do  not  herein  deceive  us  is  the  greatest 
assurance  we  are  capable  of  concerning  the  existence  of  material  beings. 
.  .  .  Our  senses  do  not  err  in  the  information  they  give  us  of  the 
existence  of  things  without  us,  when  they  are  affected  by  them." 

'He  says  further  (§8),  "the  certainty  of  things  existing  in  rerum 
natura,  when  we  have  the  testimony  of  our  senses  for  it,  is  not  only  as 
great  as  our  frame  can  attain  to,  but  as  our  condition  needs."  ' 

[53]     Fire  and  the  Idea  of  Fire  :  Locke. 

Berkeley,  §  41 :  'if  you  suspect  it  to  be  only  the  idea  of  fire  which 
you  see,  do  but  put  your  hand  into  it  and  you  will  be  convinced  with 
a  witness.' 

Ueberweg:  'Locke  (iv.  xi.  7):  "He  that  sees  a  fire  may,  if  he 
doubt  whether  it  be  anything  more  than  a  bare  fancy,  feel  it  too"  ;  (§  8) : 
"  if  our  dreamer  pleases  to  try  whether  the  glowing  heat  of  a  glass 
furnace  be  barely  a  wandering  imagination  in  a  drowsy  man's  fancy, 
by  putting  his  hand  into  it  he  may  perhaps  be  wakened  into  a  certainty 
greater  than  he  could  wish."  ' 

[54]     The  Sensorium. 

Berkeley,  §  42  :  '  In  a  dream  we  do  oft  perceive  things  as  existing 
at  a  great  distance  off,  and  yet,  for  all  that,  those  things  are  acknowl- 
edged to  have  their  existence  only  in  the  mind.' 

Ueberweg  :  '  It  must  undoubtedly  be  acknowledged  that  all  the 
perception-images  which  are  outside  the  perception-image  of  our  own 
body  are  by  no  means  on  that  account  without  our  mind.  But  this 
does  not  forbid  that  there  should  be  without  the  entire  sphere  of  the 
perception-images  those  real  objects  which  affect  our  senses,  and  that 
there  should  be  organs  of  sense  which  are  affected,  from  which  organs, 
by  means  of  the  sensible  nerves,  the  affections  are  conveyed  to  the 
central  parts,  in  which  we  are  to  look  for  the  seat  of  the  sensorium 


362 


ANNOTATIONS. 


commune,  and  the  seat  consequently,  also,  of  the  perception-images 
themselves.  The  following  figure  may  be  of  service  in  elucidating  the 
statement  just  made : 


'  AB  is  the  external  object ;  ba  is  the  image  of  AB  in  the  right  and 
in  the  left  eye ;  b'd  is  the  image  of  AB  in  the  sensorium  commune ; 
Od  is  the  right  eye ;  Os  is  the  left  eye  ;  C  is  the  brain  (linear,  half  the 
natural  size) ;  od,  os,  c,  the  represented  (vorgestellten)  places  of  the 
right  and  left  eye  and  of  the  brain. 

'  The  sensorium  lies  within  the  real  brain  C,  but  within  the  sensorium, 
in  addition  to  images  of  the  rest  of  objects,  lie  the  images  of  our  eyes, 
of  our  head,  of  our  retina,  of  our  optic  nerves,  and  of  the  brain  itself, 
so  far  as  we  know  them  by  anatomy;  it  is  a  mistake  to  seek  the  objects 
here.' 

[55]     'New  Theory  of  Vision.' 

Berkeley,  §  43:  'The  consideration  (Erwagung)  of  this  difficulty 
it  was  that  gave  birth  to.  my  Essay  towards  a  New  Theory  of  Vision 
(Sehens),  which  was  published  not  long  since.' 

Ueberweg  :  •  "  An  Essay  towards  a  New  Theory  of  Vision"  appeared 
1709.  In  this  Essay  Berkeley  maintained  that  we  do  not  estimate  the 
remoteness  of  the  object  by  the  "optic  axes,"  or  the  lines  from  the  two 
eyes  to  the  object  seen,  and  the  angle  which  they  form  with  each  other 
by  their  concurring  at  the  object. 

'  In  defence  of  this  opinion  he  advanced  three  arguments : 

1 1.  We  do  not  perceive  these  lines  and  angles,  and  yet  our  estima- 
tion of  distance  can  only  rest  on  what  is  perceived. 

'2.  These  lines  and  angles  have  no  real  existence  in  nature,  but  are 
merely  a  geometrical  hypothesis  (Voraussetzung). 


'NEW   THEORY    OF    VISION.'  363 

'3.  Though  we  should  grant  their  real  existence,  and  that  it  is 
possible  for  the  mind  to  perceive  them,  they  would  yet  be  insufficient 
to  explain  the  phenomena  of  distance. 

'  In  accordance  with  the  clearness  or  confusion  of  the  perceptions  of 
colours,  and  in  accordance  with  other  changes  which  associate  them- 
selves with  certain  sensations  of  touch  (Tastempfindungen),  the  person 
seeing  judges  in  regard  to  distances,  judges,  consequently,  on  the 
ground  of  experience. 

'  From  this  Berkeley  draws  the  conclusion  that  if  a  person  born  blind 
should  recover  his  sight  by  an  operation,  he  would  at  first  have  no  idea 
of  distance,  and  that  sun  and  stars,  and  all  the  remotest  objects, 
equally  with  the  nearest,  "would  all  seem  to  be  in  his  eye,  or  rather  in 
his  mind."  (Essay,  §  41.)  This  supposition  of  Berkeley's  has  been 
confirmed  by  the  fact  that  persons  born  blind  who  have  obtained  sight 
by  an  operation  do  not  at  first  know  how  to  estimate  distances,  but 
are  obliged  to  learn  to  do  it  gradually.  Such  persons,  also,  while  they 
can  distinguish  forms  from  each  other,  as,  for  example,  a  dog  from  a  cat, 
are  not  able  at  once  to  connect  with  them  the  shapes  which  had  pre- 
viously become  familiar  by  touch.  Berkeley  is  undoubtedly  right  in 
maintaining  that  we  judge  of  the  third  dimension — Depth — only  accord- 
ing to  certain  signs,  though  many  other  signs  are  to  be  added  to  those 
which  he  makes  prominent.  This  judging  takes  place  through  that 
primary  thinking  which  is  performed  by  virtue  of  associations  involun- 
tarily arising,  a  thinking  which  exercises  an  essential  influence  in 
shaping  the  perception-image, — for  example,  in  producing  the  form  of 
the  firmament.  There  is  another  question,  however,  Whether  the 
shaping  in  vision  in  general  rests  only  in  this  primary  thinking,  or 
whether  a  beginning  of  the  shaping  already  lies  in  the  original  sensa- 
tion (Empfindung)  itself.  The  great  physiologist  John  Muller 
(1 801-185  8)  adopted  the  latter  view,  as  he  grants  that  the  superficial 
shape  of  the  image  on  the  retina  (or  of  a  representation  of  it  within 
the  sensorium?)  immediately,  as  such,  reaches  the  consciousness. 

'Others,  for  example  Lotze,  suppose  that  no  shape  as  such  enters 
immediately  into  the  consciousness,  but  that  all  apprehension  of  form 
fashions  itself  in  us  out  of  qualitative  distinctions ;  the  theory  of  the 
punctual  existence  of  the  soul  necessitates  this  latter  assumption  ;  and 
this  assumption  seems  also  on  its  part  necessarily  to  presuppose  that 
punctual  position  of  the  soul,  inasmuch  as  in  a  soul  not  punctual  there 
must  of  necessity  already  be  some  grouping  in  the  Sensations  (Empfind- 
ungen)  themselves. 

'The  "Empiristic  (Empiristische)  theory"  represented  by  Helm- 


364  A  NNO  TA  TIO  NS. 

holtz,  which  aims  at  reducing  all  apprehension  of  form  to  uncon- 
scious inferences,  must  either  advance  to  the  doctrine  of  punctual 
position  or  return  to  Muller's  doctrine.  The  controversy  is  still 
undecided.' 

Editor  :  Berkeley's  New  Theory  is  generally  regarded  as  a  discovery. 
Such  it  is  in  the  only  sense  in  which  anything  intellectual  is  a  discovery : 
it  is  the  actualizing  and  culmination  of  a  series  of  efforts.  There  are 
hints  of  the  theory  in  Descartes,  dim  anticipations  of  it  in  Malebranche 
(Rech.  d.  1.  Verite,  i.,  ch.  9),  and  in  Glanville's  Scepsis  Scientifica 
(ch.  5),  and  a  nearer  approach  in  Molyneux's  Dioptrics  (1690),  and  in 
Locke's  Essay  (4th  ed.,  1694),  B.  11.,  ch.  ix.  §  8. 

[56]     Constant  Creation. 

Berkeley,  §  45:  'Fourthly,  it  will  be  objected  (eingewandt)  that 
from  the  foregoing  principles  it  follows  things  are  every  moment  anni- 
hilated (vernichtet)  and  created  anew.' 

Ueberweg  :  '  This  objection  to  Berkeley's  doctrine  is  well  grounded : 
the  objection  is  but  a  special  form  of  the  more  general  one,  that  the 
actual  existence  of  any  causality  of  nature  is  not  compatible  with 
Berkeley's  view.  The  opening  and  shutting  of  the  eyes  produces  in 
the  same  person,  at  the  same  place,  and  at  the  same  time,  and  accord- 
ingly under  the  same  psychical  conditions,  entirely  different  results 
according  as  long  ago  a  gardener  or  a  carpenter  has  or  has  not  bestowed 
a  certain  activity  on  the  place  which  lies  before  his  eyes,  according  as 
a  storm  or  a  fire  has  or  has  not  destroyed  the  results  of  that  activity. 
This  can  only  be  explained  in  conformity  with  natural  laws,  if  the 
results  of  that  activity  relate  to  objects,  which  exist  in  themselves  with- 
out the  consciousness,  experience  changes  by  the  labours  of  certain 
persons,  or  by  the  operations  of  external  circumstances,  and  in  con- 
formity with  these  operate  on  the  senses  of  other  persons.  If  such 
objects  are  wanting,  then  there  is  wanting  between  the  earlier  and  later 
processes  the  connection  established  by  the  laws  of  nature,  and  the 
sequence  of  our  ideas,  which  in  dreaming  is  explained  by  the  images 
stored  in  memory  and  by  subjective  laws  of  association,  can  in  our 
waking  time  be  explained  only  by  an  interference  of  divine  Omnipo- 
tence at  once  immediate  and  without  order.' 

[57]     Existence  of  an  Idea. 
Berkeley,  §  45 :  '  I  .  .  .  desire  he  (the  reader)  will  consider  whether 
he  means  anything  by  the  actual  existence  of  an  idea  distinct  from  its 
being  perceived.' 


INFINITE   DIVISIBILITY.  365 

Ueberweg:  'By  the  actual  existence  of  an  idea  (perception,  or 
representation  of  imagination)  certainly  not,  but  by  the  existence  of  the 
object,  through  whose  operation  on  us  the  idea  is  excited  in  us.' 

[58.] 

Berkeley,  §  46 :  '  Philosophers  .  .  .  agree  on  all  hands  that  light 
and  colours,  which  alone  are  the  proper  and  immediate  objects  of  sight, 
are  mere  sensations  (sinnliche  Empfindungen),  that  exist  no  longer 
than  they  are  perceived.' 

Ueberweg  :  '  But  that  which  can  excite  these  sensations  continues, 
according  to  the  common  doctrine,  to  exist.' 

[590 

Berkeley,  do.  :  '  that  things  should  be  every  moment  creating 
...  is  very  commonly  taught  in  the  schools.' 

Ueberweg  :  '  This  is  taught  only  so  far  as  the  subsistence  of  matter 
is  regarded  as  a  preservation  of  it  by  God,  and  this — as  Augustine  had 
taught — is  compared  to  a  constant  creation ;  but  not  in  such  sense  as 
to  involve  an  interruption  of  existence.' 

[60.] 

Berkeley,  §  48 :  '  Though  we  allow  the  existence  of  Matter  or  Cor- 
poreal Substance,  yet  it  will  follow  from  the  principles  which  are  now 
generally  admitted  that  the  particular  bodies  of  what  kind  soever  do 
none  of  them  exist  whilst  they  are  not  perceived.' 

Ueberweg  :  '  If,  to  wit,  these  bodies  be  connected  with  the  Berke- 
leyan  subjectivating  of  magnitude,  form,  and  motion.' 

[61.] 

Berkeley,  do. :  '  Hence  (from  the  infinite  divisibility  of  matter)  it 
follows  that  there  is  an  infinite  number  of  parts  in  each  particle  of 
matter  which  are  not  perceived  by  sense.' 

Ueberweg:  'To  wit,  potentially,  not  actually;  that  is,  matter  is 
infinitely  divisible,  but  not  actually  infinitely  divided.  It  lies  in  the 
very  nature  of  infinite  division  that  it  shall  never  be  completed,  and 
that  every  actual  division  can  be  carried  yet  further.' 

[62]     Infinite  Divisibility. 

Berkeley,  do. :  '  but  because  the  sense  is  not  acute  enough  to  dis- 
cern them.' 

Ueberweg  :  *  And  because  the  parts  are  not  actually  sundered  one 


366  A  NNO  TA  TIONS. 

from  another  into  an  infinite  number, — for  even  on  the  Atomistic 
theory  they  are  divided  only  into  a  very  great  number, — that  rather 
only  the  divisibility  is  unlimited.' 

[63]  Sense  infinitely  acute. 
Berkeley,  do.  :  'that  is,  the  object  appears  greater.' 
Ueberweg  :  'This  does  not  necessarily  follow,  if  the  parts  as  they 
grow  in  number  diminish  in  bulk  in  the  same  ratio.  A  "sense  in- 
finitely acute"  would  know  the  "infinitely  small  parts"  as  infinitely 
small,  while  our  senses  cannot  pass  beyond  the  "sensible  minima. ' '  The 
eye,  for  example,  can  perceive  two  points  separated,  only  by  means  of  a 
certain  extremely  minute  angle  of  vision.  The  microscope  does  not 
change  this  angle  of  vision  at  all,  but  only  allows  other  points  of  the 
object  to  form  it  with  our  eye.' 

[64]     Sense  infinitely  acute. 

Berkeley,  do.  :  '  When  the  sense  becomes  infinitely  acute  the  body 
shall  seem  infinite.' 

Ueberweg  :  '  Entirely  wrong ;  because  it  wholly  leaves  out  of  con- 
sideration the  diminution  in  the  size  of  the  parts,  which  takes  place  in 
inverse  proportion  to  the  increase  of  their  number.' 

[65]     Infinite  Extension. 
Berkeley,  do. :   '  is  infinitely  extended.' 
Ueberweg  :  '  For  this  assertion  not  even  a  show  of  proof  is  adduced.' 

[66]     Intervals  of  Perception. 

Berkeley,  §  58 :  'or  exist  not  at  all  during  the  intervals  between 
our  perception  of  them.' 

Ueberweg:  'This  reply  to  the  objection  involves  the  supposition 
that  one  uniform  object  subsists.  But  in  fact  if  the  being  of  the  object 
in  itself  be  set  aside,  and  no  existence  be  ascribed  to  it  beyond  that 
which  it  has  in  individual  percipient  spirits,  what  we  call  a  house  is 
rather  a  number  of  houses,  each  one  of  which  exists  in  a  single  percip- 
ient spirit.  Each  single  one  of  this  multitude  is  certainly  annihilated 
and  created  anew  with  the  closing  and  re-opening  of  the  eyes.  Add 
to  this  that  there  are  frequently  intervals  during  which  no  one  pen  rives 
particular  objects.  Are  we,  for  instance,  to  say  that  the  Herculanean 
Manuscripts  did  not  exist  during  the  centuries  through  which  they 
remained  buried,  and  that  God  at  a  later  period  created  them  anew  ? 
The  restoration  is  certainly  not  to  be  explained  by  an  order  established 


SUBSTANCE   AND  ESSENCE.  367 

by  natural  laws.  This  order  subsists  only  in  case  that  there  is  an  ex- 
istence without  all  (finite)  minds  during  the  interval.  The  existence 
in  the  divine  mind  cannot  explain  the  permanence  of  the  object,  inas- 
much as  this  supposition  would  involve  too  much,  to  wit,  an  eternal 
existence  of  the  object,  which  nevertheless  has  a  beginning  and  an 
end  in  time;  there  must,  consequently,  be  an  object  distinct  from 
God's  idea  of  the  object,  which  subsists  during  the  interval  in  which 
no  finite  spirit  perceives  it.' 

[67]     Subject. 

Berkeley,  §  49  :  '  Since  extension  is  a  mode  or  attribute  which  (to 
speak  with  the  schools)  is  predicated  of  the  subject  (Substrat)  in  which 
it  exists.' 

Ueberweg  :  'The  term  "subject"  is  not  used  here  in  the  special 
sense  given  it  in  modern  philosophy,  as  designating  merely  the  sub- 
stratum of  the  psychical  phenomena.  Berkeley  uses  it  in  the  older 
sense,  in  which  it  corresponds  with  the  Greek  vnoxst/ievov,  designating 
the  substratum  in  general.  It  is  a  term  which  can  also  be  employed 
to  designate  the  grammatical  subject  in  a  sentence.  This  paragraph 
shows  very  clearly  how,  out  of  the  original  use  of  the  word,  has 
grown  on  the  one  side  the  grammatical  sense,  and  on  the  other  the 
prevalent  philosophical  one.' 

[68]     Extended  Idea. 

Berkeley,  do.  :   '  but  only  by  way  of  idea.' 

Ueberweg:  '  How  an  extended  "idea"  can  be  in  an  unextended 
being  is  absolutely  inconceivable,  and  is  not  in  the  least  explained  by 
Berkeley,  or  even  made  plausible.  An  object  may  have  in  it  objects 
which  are  red  or  blue,  without  at  the  same  time  being  itself  as  a  whole 
red  or  blue ;  but  it  cannot  have  extended  objects  in  it  without  itself 
being  extended.  If  the  meaning  is  that  the  idea  of  a  thing  extended 
is  not  itself  extended,  that  would  be  in  part  false,  in  part  in  conflict 
with  Berkeley's  principles,  according  to  which  there  is  no  extended 
different  from  the  idea  of  the  extended,  but  that  idea  is  itself  the  ex- 
tended.' 

[69]     Substance  and  Essence. 

Berkeley,  do. :  '  but  only  an  explication  of  the  meaning  of  the 
word  die.' 

Ueberweg  :  '  The  Aristotelians  understand  by  the  subject  or  sub- 
stratum (vTzoxstp.evov')  the  support  of  the  qualities.  By  substance  (obaia 
or  t(  ioTtv),  they  meant  in  addition  to  this  substratum  the  complex  of 


368  A NN OTA  riO NS. 

the  essential ;  that  in  virtue  of  which  the  thing  is  what  it  is,  and  which 
is  consequently  stated  in  its  definition  (6pt<r/i6<;).  This  essential  with- 
out the  substratum  is  essence  abstractly  conceived,  what  Aristotle  calls 
to  ti  7tv  eivat.  To  the  constituents  of  -this  essence — the  essentialia — 
are  yet  to  be  added,  according  to  Aristotle  and  his  followers,  the 
<Tu/j.jslirix6ra,  the  accidentia  or  modi.  These  definitions  Berkeley  rejects.' 

[70]     Natural  Science. 

Berkeley,  §  50 :  'as  might  easily  be  made  appear  by  an  induction 
of  particulars.' 

Ueberweg:  'This  is  an  assertion  unproven  and  false.  Not  a  solitary 
fact  is  adduced  to  support  it,  and  it  is  in  conflict  with  the  entire  con- 
dition of  the  physical  sciences.  The  mathematico-physical  explanation 
of  the  mechanical  operations  in  the  stricter  sense,  of  the  acoustic  and 
optical  processes,  of  electricity  and  of  magnetism,  rests  entirely  upon 
the  supposition  that  certain  movements  exist  without  our  minds,  which 
stand  partly  in  a  causal  connection  with  each  other,  partly  so  operate 
upon  our  senses  as  to  affect  the  optic,  the  auditory,  and  other  nerves ; 
and  in  consequence  of  these  affections  there  rises  in  us  a  consciousness 
partly  of  shapes  and  movements  as  such,  partly  of  colours,  sounds,  et 
cetera.  And  here  come  in,  in  a  pre-eminent  sense,  what  Berkeley 
could  not  know,  as  they  belong  to  the  most  recent  scientific  discoveries, 
the  facts  that  mechanical  movements  can  be  transmuted  into  heat  and  the 
converse,  by  virtue  of  the  transposition  of  the  movement  of  entire  bodies 
into  the  movement  of  molecules,  and  the  converse,  and  in  general  the 
explanation  of  the  transposition  of  one  group  of  physical  phenomena 
into  another  group,  in  conformity  with  the  laws  of  the  conservation  of 
force.  In  what  manner  the  movements  result  has  been  differently  ex- 
plained by  the  physicists  in  the  time  of  Berkeley  and  of  a  later  period ; 
as,  for  example,  whether  the  ray  of  light  is  to  be  regarded  as  the  recti- 
linear progress  of  a  material  object  or  as  the  transmission  of  undulatory 
movements,  in  which  the  material  particles  have  a  vibratory  motion. 
The  next  assertion  of  Berkeley  is  certainly  correct,  that  the  operation 
of  matter  on  spirit  has  remained  unexplained.  The  Cartesian  theory  of 
a  complete  heterogeneousness  between  the  two  substances  rendered  im- 
possible any  attempt  at  an  explanation  of  the  matter  which  rested  upon 
the  connection  of  the  processes  of  nature.  But  the  true  inference  from 
this  was  that  the  Cartesian  philosophy  needed  a  reshaping  of  principles, 
and  not  that  the  results  of  natural  science  reached  by  mathematico- 
mechanical  investigations  should  be  despised,  or  that  a  new  path  which 
no  one  had  actually  struck  out  should  be  entered  on.' 


ASTRONOMICAL    MOVEMENTS.  369 

[71]     Occasionalists. 

Berkeley,  §  53  :   '  These  men.' 

Ueberweg:  'The  "Occasionalists"  Geulinx  and  Malebranche, who, 
proceeding  from  the  Cartesian  view  of  the  complete  heterogeneousness 
of  soul  and  body,  denied  that  a  reciprocal  operation  exists  between  the 
two,  and  supposed  that  on  occasion  of  the  one  process  God  wrought  the 
other ;  for  example,  that  God  takes  the  occasion  of  an  affection  of  my 
senses  to  call  forth  the  corresponding  perception,  and  takes  the  occa- 
sion of  my  desire  and  moves  my  arm.  Bodies  can  only  operate  on 
bodies,  and  conceptions  can  only  operate  on  conceptions  (Vorstel- 
lungen).  From  occasionalism,  and  especially  from  the  doctrine  of 
Malebranche,  that  we  know  objects  by  means  of  the  representation  of 
their  essence  in  the  divine  mind,  and  that  we  behold,  in  general,  all 
things  in  God,  the  transition  was  easy  to  the  Berkeleyan  view.' 

[72]     The  Ninth  Objection. 

Berkeley,  §  58:   'Tenthly.' 

Ueberweg  :   'What  has  become  of  the  ninth  objection?     It  must  lie 
in  §  56,  and  §  54  should  begin,  "  In  the  eighth  and  ninth  place."  ' 
Editor:   The  ninth  objection  is  stated  and  answered  in  §§  56,  57. 

[73]  Astronomical  Movements. 
Berkeley,  §  58  :  '  and  appearing  in  all  respects  like  one  of  them.' 
Ueberweg  :  '  Berkeley  here  seems  in  two  respects  to  lower  the  sig- 
nificance of  the  question.  First,  with  respect  to  the  processes  of 
movement  as  such;  secondly,  with  respect  to  the  forces  on  which 
these  processes  depend.  In  the  first  respect,  and  still  more  in  the 
second,  the  actual  view,  taken  by  the  artificial  aids  which  astronomy 
calls  into  its  service,  the  view  from  a  fixed  position,  has  an  advantage 
of  completer  truth,  as  compared  with  the  view  from  a  second  position. 
This  better  view  Berkeley  has  not  touched.  The  advantage  it  presents 
is  of  the  same  kind  as  the  view  that  the  dancer  moves  round  the  room, 
has  over  the  view  that  the  room  moves  round  the  dancer.  The  first 
theory  can  only  be  maintained  under  distinctly  subjective  determina- 
tions ;  the  second  is  not  bound  in  the  same  way  to  such  determinate 
conditions,  and  does  not  offer  itself,  therefore,  in  the  same  isolated 
way,  but  holds  equally  good  in  the  main  under  an  infinite  diversity  of 
conditions,  and  in  this  very  way  demonstrates  its  objective  superiority. 
If,  however,  we  consider  the  movements  with  respect  also  to  the  forces 
by  which  they  are  produced,  in  conformity  with  the  Newtonian  law  of 

24 


3  y0  A  NN  OTATIO  NS. 

gravity,  we  reach  the  certainty  that  only  the  one  view  holds  good  object- 
ively, that  is,  is  in  harmony  with  the  process  as  it  takes  place  in  itself, 
in  the  material  world  apart  from  our  consciousness  of  it ;  for  the  earth 
has  not  the  force  to  move  daily  the  universe  around  it,  and  in  addition 
give  to  the  sun  its  annual  course.  The  other  conception,  on  the  con- 
trary, solves  the  processes  by  the  mathematical  mechanical  explanation. 
See  Note  103.' 

[74]  Order  of  Nature. 
Berkeley,  §  59:  'or  any  other  discoveries  in  astronomy  or  nature.' 
Ueberweg  :  '  We  can  reply  to  this  in  a  similar  manner.  The  pos- 
sibility of  forming  well-grounded  anticipations  cannot  be  explained 
merely  by  the  laws  of  the  association  of  ideas,  but  requires  the  refer- 
ence of  the  Subject  to  1  normal  order  of  nature,  an  order  which  com- 
prehends objects  existent  without  the  Subject.' 

[75]     Proofs  untenable. 
Berkeley,  §  61 :   '  which  may  be  proved  a  priori.' 
Ueberweg:   'Were  it  not  that  the  "proofs,"  as  we  have  seen,  are 
entirely  untenable.' 

[76]     Begging  the  Question. 

Berkeley,  do.  :   '  for  it  has  been  made  evident.' 

Ueberweg  :  'As  if  this  proof  (given  in  §  25)  did  not  rest  upon  the 
very  supposition  which  his  opponent  contests,  that  figure,  etc.,  can 
exist  only  as  an  idea  in  the  mind  of  the  Subject.' 

[77]     Order  of  Nature. 

Berkeley,  §  62  :   '  the  laws  of  nature.' 

Ueberweg  :  '  This  answer  of  Berkeley's  is  in  itself  admirable  ;  it  is 
the  very  one  which  must  also  be  given  from  the  point  of  view  opposed 
to  his  own.  But  this  very  answer,  run  out  into  its  consequences,  can 
be  turned  against  Berkeley  himself.  If  he  made  no  appeal  to  an  order 
conformed  to  the  laws  of  nature,  and  if  he  ascribed  to  his  God  an 
operation  without  order,  a  thing  of  freak,  as  it  were  (as  if  He  were 
like  Setebos,  the  god  of  Caliban's  dam,  in  Shakspeare's  Tempest),  his 
view  might  perhaps  be  beyond  confutation,  though  it  would  be  com- 
pletely unproven  and  totally  destitute  of  probability.  But  the  moment 
he  concedes  the  order  of  nature  his  position  becomes  untenable,  as 
from  it  the  conformity  with  natural  laws,  as  we  have  seen,  may  indeed 
be  asserted,  but  cannot  be  carried  out.  If  I  take  my  watch  to  be  put  in 
order,  and  when  I  get  it  back  find  that  it  keeps  good  time,  the  pro- 


THE    WATCH.  37 1 

cesses  in  my  consciousness  have  been  taken  for  themselves  alone,  and 
manifestly  not  in  connection  with  the  result  fixed  by  the  laws  of  nature. 
For,  instead  of  the  perception  that  my  watch  goes  right,  which  followed 
taking  it  away  and  returning  it,  there  might  just  as  readily  have  been 
the  exactly  opposite  result ;  if,  for  instance,  the  watchmaker  had  been 
unskilful  or  had  put  the  watch  into  the  hands  of  a  bungling  workman. 
With  the  conceptions  and  operations  of  this  zvorkman,  however,  my 
ideas  stand  in  no  normal  connection,  unless  this  connection  be  brought 
about  by  an  external  object,  which,  from  the  consciousness  of  the  one 
(the  workman),  experiences  effects,  and  which,  when  it  is  afterwards 
brought  to  the  other  (the  owner),  produces  effects  on  his  consciousness. 
But  this  is  the  very  thing  which  Berkeley  denies.  His  negation  is 
consequently  untenable.' 

[78]     The  Watch. 

Berkeley,  §  62  :  '  As,  also,  that  any  disorder  in  them  be  attended 
with  the  perception  (Wahrnehmung)  of  some  corresponding  disorder 
in  the  movements,  which  being  once  corrected  all  is  right  again.' 

Ueberweg  :  '  According  to  this,  the  irregularity  we  perceive  in  the 
movement  of  the  hands  seems  to  be  the  prior  and  conditioning  thing, 
and  the  derangement  in  the  interior  of  the  watch,  which,  on  Berkeley's 
principles,  does  not  exist  until  it  is  perceived,  is  the  subsequent  and 
conditional  thing;  the  natural  mechanical  connection,  however,  is 
exactly  the  reverse.  By  what  antecedent  perceptions  or  "signs"  is 
the  irregularity  of  the  whole  conditioned?  If,  for  example,  a  little 
dust,  which  no  one  has  perceived,  has  got  into  the  watch  and  put  it 
out  of  order,  the  result  is  linked  with  something  unperceived  in  the  in- 
terior of  the  watch.  This  thoroughly  unperceived  something,  of  which 
not  even  a  dim  suspicion  exists,  is,  according  to  Berkeley,  a  nothing, 
and  out  of  the  nothing  comes  the  change  in  the  running  of  the  watch. 
But  that  this,  as  a  thing  self-contradictory,  is  not  possible,  must,  to 
adopt  Berkeley's  way  of  speaking,  be  clear  to  any  one  who  will  reflect 
even  a  little.  The  recognition  of  the  fact,  therefore,  that  nature  is 
regulated  by  law,  draws  with  it  irresistibly  the  inference  that  material 
objects  exist  without  the  mind.  What  we  see  to  be  true  in  the  com- 
paratively simple  relations  of  the  parts  of  a  watch  holds  good  in  a  yet 
stronger  degree  in  complex  organisms,  where  none  of  the  subtler  pro- 
cesses are  perceived,  and  where  they  yet  are  the  conditions  of  processes 
which  are  palpable.  Between  the  perceptions  we  have,  for  example, 
of  the  taking  of  food  and  drink,  and  those  we  have  of  the  growth  of 
the  body,  there  lie  not  only  certain  sensations,  but  a  multitude  of  pro- 


372  A  NNO  TA  TIONS. 

cesses  also,  which,  though  not  perceived,  are  not  nothing,  but  must  be 
acknowledged  to  be  processes  which  go  on  without  all  finite  conscious- 
ness. Of  existence  in  the  consciousness  of  God,  we  have  spoken  in 
Note  66.' 

[79]     Miracles. 

Berkeley,  §  63  :  '  otherwise  there  is  a  plain  reason  why  they  should 
fail  of  that  effect.' 

Ueberweg  :  '  It  cannot  be  denied  that  Berkeley  succeeds,  by  this 
reflection,  in  harmonizing  the  recognition  both  of  the  laws  of  nature 
and  of  miracles;  but  it  is  manifest  that  in  attaining  this  end  he  presses 
the  analogy  of  the  divine  education  of  our  race,  so  as  to  bring  it  very 
close  to  the  style  of  thinking  natural  to  a  schoolmaster.' 

[80]     Sign  and  Link. 

Berkeley,  §  64 :  'it  not  (being  credible)  that  He  would  be  at  the 
expense  (Aufwand)  (if  one  may  so  speak)  of  all  that  art  and  regu- 
larity to  no  purpose.' 

Ueberweg:  'The  difficulty  does  not  lie  in  the  fact  that  these  groups 
of  ideas  come  forth  at  a  later  period,  and  that  we  consequently  are  also 
able  to  base  anticipations  on  them,  but  rather  in  this  fact,  that  they  did 
not  come  forth  at  an  earlier  period,  were  not  in  our  consciousness,  when 
they  must  yet  have  served  as  intermediate  links  between  our  earlier  and 
our  later  ideas,  so  that  they  consequently  must  have  existed  before  they 
existed.  This  is  the  contradiction  involved,  and  the  solution  of  it  can 
hardly  be  any  other  than  this,  that  what  becomes  by  degrees  better 
known — as,  for  example,  the  chemical  process  connected  with  the  act  of 
digestion — must  have  previously  existed,  and  consequently  have  existed 
without  the  consciousness ;  in  which  case  it  could  not  have  served  as  a 
sign,  for  that  which  is  unknown  to  us  cannot  be  a  sign  to  us,  but  must 
have  been  a  link  in  the  chain  of  mechanical  causes.' 

[81]     Analogues. 

Berkeley,  §  67  :  '  or  at  the  presence  whereof  God  is  pleased  to  ex- 
cite ideas  in  us.' 

Ueberweg:  'It would  have  been  more  correct  to  proceed  in  exactly 
the  opposite  way,  to  drop  the  negative  determinations  and  to  hold  fast 
to  the  positive  mark  extension  (by  which  the  question  as  to  the  where 
is  decided;  a  question  which,  from  the  Berkeleyan  position,  also  exists 
in  reference  to  other  minds),  and  at  the  same  time  to  ascribe  to 
substances,  by  whose  movements  our  senses  are  affected,  operativeness, 
power,  and,  indeed  (unconscious),  analogues  of  our  conscious  concep- 


THINGS   IN    THEMSELVES.  373 

tions.  In  a  certain  respect  Leibnitz  had  struck  into  this  path  ;  but 
Leibnitz  supposes  each  of  his  "monads"  to  have  merely  representations 
(Vorstellungen)  and  forces,  a  place  also,  but  not  extension  and  form. 
The  view  of  Herbart  is  in  affinity  with  that  of  Leibnitz.  Nor  is  the 
view  of  Spinoza  remote  from  it,  so  far  as  with  this  philosopher  we 
have  in  view  less  the  uniform  substance  than  the  individual  as  imma- 
nent modes  of  it  down  to  the  minutest  corpuscles ;  in  all  of  which, 
according  to  the  fundamental  doctrine  of  Spinoza,  in  virtue  of  the 
inseparable  union  of  the  attributes  extension  and  cogitation,  there 
must  exist,  at  the  same  time  with  size  and  form,  an  internal  something, 
a  mode  of  "cogitation,"  consequently  an  analogue  of  our  conceptions. 
To  the  method  of  Berkeley,  which  proposed  the  aggregation  of  mere 
negations,  lies  nearest  that  which  Kant  struck  out  in  his  doctrine  of 
the  "thing  in  itself."  The  difference  is  this,  that  Kant  denies  exten- 
sion to  the  "things  in  themselves,"  but  does  not  expressly  mention 
the  existence  of  the  sensitive  faculty,  though  he  is  inclined  to  recog- 
nize it.  Kant's  view  rests  on  his  a  priori  method,  which  has  been 
disputed  by  Beneke,  Ueberweg,  v.  Kirchmann  and  others,  and  in 
certain  respects  by  Herbart  and  his  school.  Fichte's  rejection  of 
the  "thing  in  itself"  brings  his  doctrine  very  close  to  Berkeley's; 
but  Fichte  considers  the  Ego  itself  as  the  Producer  of  the  Non-Ego. 
The  philosophy  of  Schelling  and  Hegel  throws  out  the  problem  en- 
tirely by  objectivating  the  subjective,  etc. ;  as,  for  example,  in  optics, 
by  adopting  Goethe's  theory  of  colours,  in  this  respect  returning  to 
the  simple  hypotheses.' 

[82]     Occasion. 

Berkeley,  §  69  :  '  what  is  meant  by  occasion  (Veranlassung), — the 
agent  which  produces  any  effect  (Erfolg),  or  else  something  that  is  ob- 
served to  accompany  or  go  before  it  in  the  ordinary  course  of  things.' 

Ueberweg  :  '  Not  the  being  observed  as  accompanying  the  effect  or 
as  going  before  it,  but  the  presence  of  it  as  the  condition  of  the  effect, 
is  its  characteristic.  That  which  is  to  God  the  occasion  need  not  in 
every  case  fall  into  the  sphere  of  our  observation.  We  may  also 
venture  to  speak  of  an  occasion  where  we  cannot  directly  observe  it, 
but  can  only  in  some  way  reach  it  by  inference.' 

[83]     Things  in  themselves  and  Ideas  of  God. 

Berkeley,  §  71  :  'as  the  notion  (Begriff)  of  matter  is  here  stated 
(gefasst)  ...  in  the  mind  (Geiste)  of  God,  which  are  so  many  marks 
(Merkmale)  or  notes  (Zeichen)  .   .   .  sensations  (Sinnesempfindungen) 


374 


ANNOTATIONS. 


.   .   .  tune  (Tonstuck)  .   .   .  perceive  (wahrnehmen)  .   .   .  extravagant 
(ausschweiffend)  .   .   .  senseless  (empfindungslose).' 

Ueberweg  :  '  This  is  the  shape  which  the  question  assumes  on 
Berkeley's  principles,  while  those  whom  he  supposes  to  combat  his 
views  by  no  means,  from  their  own  position,  regard  of  necessity  the 
"things  in  themselves"  as  ideas  of  God.  The  aim  of  the  assumption 
is,  in  fact,  rather  the  very  reverse :  its  aim  is  to  restore  between  our 
earlier  and  later  perceptions  a  normal  causal  connection  by  means  of 
natural  media  which  exist  in  themselves,  without  our  mind.  The  ideas 
of  God  are  eternal,  the  objects  of  nature  are  temporal.  But  even  the 
doctrine  which  concedes  that  the  things  in  themselves  are  ideas  of  God, 
is  by  no  means  as  extravagant  and  baseless  as  Berkeley  would  represent 
it.  The  comparison  with  the  musician  suggests  the  idea  that  God 
needs  some  mnemonic  aid,  an  idea  whose  inadequacy  is  instantly  felt 
by  every  one;  but  it  does  not  follow  that  the  same  is  true  of  a  hypoth- 
esis which  is  built  upon  a  speculation  not  in  regard  to  God's  power, 
but  in  regard  to  his  will,  his  volition  to  act  in  accordance  with  a 
natural  order  or  normal  regularity.  This  order,  however,  demands 
those  intermediate  links  which,  as  they  do  not  exist  in  our  conscious- 
ness, must  either  exist  in  themselves  or  in  the  mind  of  God.  So  much, 
however,  is  to  be  conceded,  that  as  this  hypothesis  in  both  forms,  in 
regard  to  the  "things  in  themselves"  or  "ideas  of  God,"  either  dis- 
regards or  explicitly  denies  order  in  space,  it  loses  the  best  part  of  its 
force.  For  the  actual  conceivableness  of  an  order  of  nature  links  itself 
with  special  tenacity  to  the  order  in  space  reached  by  mathematical 
study.  This  arrangement,  in  view  of  the  affections  experienced  by 
our  senses,  is  not  merely  valid  as  an  order  within  our  consciousness, 
but  must  be  recognized  as  reaching  beyond  it ;  as  an  order  common 
to  our  consciousness  and  to  the  things  which  exist  without  it.' 

[84]     Existence  external  to  the  Mind. 

Berkeley,  §  73  :  'to  stand  in  need  of  a  material  support  (Tragers) 
...  it  follows  that  we  have  no  longer  any  occasion  to  suppose  the 
being  of  matter.' 

Ueberweg  :  '  This  inference  is  false.  Were  it  granted  that  none  of 
the  qualities  known  to  us  had  an  existence  without  the  mind,  yet  on  the 
basis  of  the  normal  order  of  nature  we  would  still  be  justified  in  in- 
ferring from  the  incitation  of  our  sensations  that  something  external  to 
the  mind,  some  "thing  in  itself,"  exists;  and  the  only  inference  justi- 
fied on  this  supposition  would  be  that  attributes  pertained  to  it  of 
which  we  were  ignorant.' 


A    SOMEWHAT.  375 

[85]     Consciousness,  its  External  Stimulations. 

Berkeley,  §  74  :  '  being  (seienden)  .  .  .  What  is  there  on  our  part 
(was  fiir  einen  Anhalt  haben  wir)  .  .  .  sensations  (Sinneswahrneh- 
mungen)  .  .  .  notions  (Begriffen)  .  .  .  reflection  (Selbst-betrachtung) 
inert  (tragen)  .   .   .  directed  (geleitet).' 

Ueberweg:  'In  Notes  32,  45,  54,  77,  and  elsewhere,  it  has  been 
shown  that  our  consciousness,  in  its  empirical  determination,  is  not 
without  distinct  external  stimulations.  In  this  lies  what  there  is  "on 
our  part"  to  induce  us  to  suppose  that  there  is  an  "occasion,"  though 
it  is  not  necessarily  to  be  regarded  as  something  absolutely  "inert" 
and  heterogeneous  to  the  mind.' 

[86]     A  Somewhat.         0 
Berkeley,  §  75  :   'a  stupid  thoughtless  somewhat  {Etwas)  ...  in- 
terposition (Einschiebung)  .   .   .  forsakes  us  (uns  im  Stich  lassen)  .   .   . 
if  anything  (wenn  iiberhaupt  irgend  etwas).' 

Ueberweg:  '"The  things  in  themselves,"  says  Herbart,  "are 
not  to  be  banished  by  reproaches."  Herbart  is  right;  and  this  fact 
is  a  proof,  not  of  the  power  of  prejudice,  but  of  the  power  of  sound 
reason.  But  it  is  not  necessary  to  conceive  of  "the  things  in  them- 
selves" as  a  mere  incognizable  "somewhat."  ' 

[87.] 

Berkeley,  §  77:  ' support  (Trager)  .  .  .  inert  (trage)  .  .  .  because 
we  have  not  a  sense  adapted  to  them  (weil  wir  keinen  auf  sie  einge- 
richteten  Sinn  haben).' 

Ueberweg  :  '  The  point  here  made  puts  into  the  mouth  of  the  op- 
ponent a  false  turn.  It  is  out  of  place  at  this  point  to  take  refuge  in 
other  possible  senses.  The  right  way  would  be  to  mark  that  it  would 
be  hard  for  us  to  refer  the  sensations  (sinnlichen  Empfindungen)  to 
their  two  co-operative  causes,  the  subjective  or  psychical  force  and  the 
external  excitant  (Reiz),  and  to  apprehend  the  external  purely  in  ac- 
cordance with  its  own  nature  (Beschaffenheit).  He  who  regards  this 
as  impossible  must  regard  the  nature  of  "matter,"  or,  still  better,  of 
"things  in  themselves,"  as  something  completely  unknown,  and  may 
yet  have  good  ground,  in  conformity  with  the  laws  of  causality,  to  infer 
the  existence  of  this  thing  unknown.  It  is,  nevertheless,  to  be  noted, 
in  conformity  with  what  was  before  said,  that  the  inference  is  robbed 
of  some  of  its  force  if  it  be  denied  that  the  extension,  with  the  forms 
and  movements  in  our  sense-perceptions  (Sinneswahrnehmungen),  is  the 


376  A  NN  OTATIO  NS. 

representation,  for  the  most  part  faithful  and  capable  of  increasing 
fidelity,  of  a  homogeneous  extension,  with  its  various  shapes  and 
movements,  situate  without  our  mind.' 

[88]  Miracles. 
Berkeley,  §  84 :  '  The  same  may  be  said  of  all  other  miracles.' 
Ueberweg:  'That  is,  of  all  the  biblical  miracles,  which  alone  Berke- 
ley has  in  view,  and  for  which  his  solution  is  adequate.  It  is  doubtful, 
however,  whether  it  would  suffice  for  the  miracle  of  transubstantiation, 
maintained  by  the  Catholics,  which  Berkeley  indeed  did  not  believe. 
In  that  miracle  substance  as  such  comes  directly  into  consideration, 
and  is  said  to  be  transubstantiated,  though  the  accidents,  especially  the 
taste  of  bread  and  wine,  remain.  This  assertion  does  not  seem  capa- 
ble of  ready  harmonizing  with  a  view  according  to  which  we  could 
only  give  the  designation  of  substance  of  bread  and  wine  either  to  the 
mind  of  the  participant  or  to  the  unity  of  the  accidents,  that  is,  to  their 
connection  with  one  another.  Yet  the  difficulty  may  be  met  perhaps 
if  we  might  understand  by  substance,  not  the  substratum  or  support, 
but  the  sum  or  complex  (Inbegriff )  of  the  essential  (Wesentlichen),  and 
might  then  say  that  in  the  religious  act  there  was  an  access  of  Christ's 
body  and  blood,  and  a  union  of  them  with  bread  and  wine,  and  that 
the  qualities  of  the  bread  and  wine  as  bodily  food  ceased  to  be  essential 
and  sank  into  mere  accidents ;  so  that  instead  of  the  earlier  substance 
there  was  now  another  substance  present.  This  explanation  would  also 
allow  of  a  harmony  of  the  Catholic  and  of  the  Lutheran  doctrine.' 

Editor:  Ueberweg's  harmony  of  transubstantiation  with  idealism 
turns  upon  a  mere  verbal  play.  Transubstantiation  in  its  own  nature 
denies  that  esse  is  percipi.  It  has  an  esse  which  it  is  impossible percipi 
by  the  natural  powers.  What  is  perceived  is  not  the  esse,  and  the  real 
esse  is  entirely  unperceived.  Berkeley's  doctrine  is  in  conflict,  also, 
with  the  church  doctrine  of  the  incarnation  and  of  the  resurrection. 

[89]     Miracles  of  two  classes. 

Berkeley,  §  84  :  'it  were  an  affront  to  the  reader's  understanding 
to  resume  the  explication  of  it  in  this  place.' 

Ueberweg:  'The  objection,  so  far  as  the  wine  is  concerned,  is 
certainly  met,  in  the  sense  of  Berkeley's  doctrine  and  use  of  words, 
by  what  has  been  said  before ;  but  Berkeley  is  not  entirely  justified  in 
assuming  that  the  difficulty  in  regard  to  the  serpent  is  equally  met,  for 
in  the  case  of  the  serpent  the  question  involves  more  than  its  being 
perceived  in  the  vicinity  of  the  spectators,  and  more  than  the  concep- 


OBJECTS    OF   SENSE.  Z77 

tion  of  these  persons  that  the  snake  is  possessed  of  animation.  The 
question  involves  the  actual  animation  of  the  serpent,  an  animation 
existing  outside  of  the  consciousness  of  these  persons.  The  change  of 
water  into  wine  involves,  according  to  Berkeley,  merely  the  change  of 
one  set  of  perceptions  into  another  set.  But  the  change  of  a  staff  into 
a  serpent  involves  this  also  in  part,  but  in  addition  to  this  the  trans- 
mutation of  the  staff  into  the  soul  of  the  animal,  a  soul  which  is  also 
furnished  with  perceptions.  It  is,  consequently,  a  potentiated  miracle, 
whose  special  features  deserved  a  separate  consideration.  A  well- 
grounded  objection  to  the  Berkeleyan  principles  is  nevertheless  just  as 
little  to  be  deduced  from  this  as  from  the  rest  of  the  miracles.  In 
spite  of  the  judgment  of  some  recent  writers  to  the  contrary,  it  must  be 
conceded  that  these  principles  are  in  as  good  harmony  with  the  mira- 
cles, as  they  are  irreconcilable  with  a  recognition,  severely  carried 
through,  of  the  conformity  of  nature  to  law.' 

[90]     Objects  of  Sense. 

Berkeley,  §  86  :  '  the  one  intelligible,  or  in  the  mind,  the  other 
real  and  without  the  mind.' 

Ueberweg  :  '  It  is  worthy  of  note  that  Kant  applies  this  very  term 
"intelligible"  to  the  ''things  in  themselves,"  which  exist  without  the 
mind  of  the  percipient  and  thinking  subject ;  while  he  holds  that  the 
phenomena,  which  are  in  our  consciousness  merely,  are  to  be  accepted 
as  the  things  or  objects  which  are  empirically  real  in  us.  Those  phi- 
losophers, however,  who  accept  a  real  existence  of  material  things  with- 
out the  mind,  may  very  well  grant  that  the  forms  (IS tat)  of  them  exist 
representatively  (abbildlich)  in  the  mind  also, — and  this  is  explicitly 
taught  by  the  Aristotelians, — but  they  can  only  metaphorically  give  the 
title  objects  of  sense  to  those  sense-images  which  they  suppose  to  have 
an  existence  in  the  mind,  and  to  "  be  immediately  perceived. ' '  The  use 
of  this  expression  readily  misleads ;  and  to  speak  of  a  twofold  existence 
of  the  "objects  of  sense"  would  be  as  preposterous  (verkehrt)  as  if  I 
were  to  call  my  conception  (Vorstellung)  of  the  spirit  of  Caesar  the 
immediately  presented  Caesar,  and  the  spirit  of  Caesar  himself  the 
mediately  presented  Caesar,  and  should  consistently  with  this  speak 
of  a  twofold  existence  of  Caesar.  The  objects  of  sense  exist  only  extra 
mentem — without  the  mind.     See  Notes  8,  12,  28.' 


378  A  NNO  TA  TIONS. 

[91]     Conformity  of  the  Perceived  to  the  Unperceived. 

Berkeley,  §  86  :  '  How  can  it  be  known  that  the  things  which  are 
perceived  are  conformable  (conform)  to  those  which  are  not  perceived, 
or  exist  without  the  mind  (Geistes)  ?' 

Ueberweg  :  •  Berkeley  here  touches  upon  a  real,  though  by  no 
means  insoluble,  difficulty.  But,  besides  this,  he  need  not  oppose  it  in 
the  exclusive  manner  in  which  he  has  here  done  it,  to  the  represent- 
atives of  the  views  which  conflict  with  his  own ;  for  the  same  difficulty, 
though  in  a  narrower  compass,  also  exists  if  we  accept  his  position,  to 
wit,  in  so  far  as  the  knowledge  of  other  spirits,  outside  of  the  mind  of 
the  cognizant  subject  himself,  is  concerned.  In  the  history  of  states, 
of  culture,  of  religions,  of  the  sciences,  and  similar  departments,  the 
main  object  is  the  intellectual  life  of  the  time  antecedent  to  our  own. 
This  life  may,  in  fact,  have  passed  completely  outside  the  conscious- 
ness of  the  historical  investigator,  who,  as  a  rule,  was  not  living  in 
the  era  in  which  occurred  the  events  with  which  he  desires  to  make 
himself  familiar.  His  knowledge  is  true,  or  has  validity  in  reference 
to  the  reality  to  be  known,  so  far  as  it  is  conformed  to  that  reality.  Our 
historical  apprehension  of  the  Homeric  religion,  of  the  Platonic  phi- 
losophy, or  of  the  Arabian  astronomy,  is  true  or  has  objective  reality 
(or,  to  speak  more  accurately,  has  validity  in  respect  to  the  reality  to 
be  known,  which  in  this  case  is  an  intellectual  reality)  in  as  far  as  it 
is  conformed  to  Homer's  mode  of  religious  thought,  to  Plato's  specu- 
lation, to  the  astronomical  conceptions  of  the  Arabians.  Here,  too, 
the  question  arises,  How  can  I  know  that  my  knowledge  which  is  in 
my  consciousness  is  conformed  to  such  (intellectual)  objects  as  are  not 
in  my  consciousness,  but  have  been  in  the  consciousness  of  other  per- 
sons centuries  ago  ?  But  we  must  not  press  these  questions  here,  nor 
in  reference  to  the  external  things  which  are  without  our  consciousness, 
as  if  they  were  unanswerable,  and  as  if  the  theory  on  which  they  rest  is 
absurd.  They  are  to  be  pressed  solely  for  the  purpose  of  finding  an 
answer.  The  assurance  of  the  harmony  of  my  knowledge  with  the 
thing  to  be  known,  if  this  thing  lies  without  my  consciousness,  can 
never  be  reached  directly,  by  comparison,  as  I  can  never  pass  beyond 
the  bounds  of  my  own  consciousness;  but  I  can  reach  it  indirectly,  by 
inferences,  which  rest  upon  the  presupposition  that  there  is  a  causal 
nexus  linking  itself  in  with  my  consciousness.  See  Ueberweg,  System 
of  Logic,  §§  41-44.' 

Editor:  See  additions  from  Ueberweg's  Logic  to  Note  8.  As  the 
question  here  raised  is  perhaps  on  the  whole  the  greatest  which  arises 


CONFORMITY   OF    THE   PERCEIVED,   ETC.     379 

in  metaphysical  speculation,  it  may  be  well  worth  while  to  give  a 
synopsis  of  the  entire  view  of  Uebervveg,  as  presented  in  his  '  System 
der  Logik:' 

'  1.  Perception  is  the  immediate  cognition  of  things  existing  in  juxta- 
position and  in  succession.  External  or  sense-perception  is  directed 
to  the  external  world ;  internal  or  psychological  perception  to  the 
psychical  life. 

'  2.  The  immediateness  of  the  cognition  in  perception  is,  however, 
always  merely  relative,  since  in  it  there  are  fused,  even  with  the  very 
activity  of  the  sense,  many  operations  of  the  mind.  These  operations, 
though  they  do  not  enter  separately  into  consciousness,  conjointly 
condition  the  total  result. 

'  3.  Perception  (Wahrnehmung)  is  distinguished  from  simple  sensa- 
tion (Empfindung)  by  this,  that  in  sensation  consciousness  is  fixed  upon 
the  subjective  condition  only,  while  in  perception  is  involved  a  refer- 
ence to  something  perceived.  This  percept,  whether  it  belongs  to  the 
external  world  or  the  subject  himself,  is  opposed  to  the  act  of  percep- 
tion, as  in  some  respect  objective. 

'  4.  Perception  is  distinguished  from  thought  (Denken)  by  its  rela- 
tive immediateness.  Thought  may,  however,  be  used  with  a  latitude 
which  makes  it  embrace  perception. 

'5.  To  logic,  as  the  doctrine  of  cognition,  belongs  the  question, 
Whether  in  sense-perception  (sinnlichen  Wahrnehmung)  things  appear 
to  us  as  they  exist  in  actuality,  that  is,  as  they  are  in  themselves  ?  To 
returning  an  affirmative  answer  to  this  question,  is  opposed,  first  of  all, 
the  sceptical  argument  that  the  consonance  of  Perception  with  Being 
would  not,  even  if  such  a  consonance  existed,  be  cognizable ;  as  the 
sense-perception  can  never  be  compared  with  its  object,  but  only  with 
another  perception.  The  doubt  is  confirmed  when  we  reflect  upon  the 
essential  nature  of  sense-perception.  For  as  an  act  of  our  mind  the 
perception  must  either  be  of  purely  subjective  origin,  or  in  any  case 
contain  in  it  a  subjective  element:  on  either  supposition,  the  theory  that 
it  renders  the  proper  real  being  of  the  percept  undisturbed  and  ex- 
haustively can  be  sustained  only  by  artificial  hypotheses,  which  it  is 
difficult  to  justify.  The  character  of  the  phenomenal  world  is,  in  any 
case,  conditioned  by  the  subjective  nature  of  our  senses.  .  The  senses 
may  be  differently  constructed  in  other  beings,  and  may,  consequently, 
lead  to  a  different  sort  of  sense-intuition  of  the  world.  From  all  these 
the  actuality  as  such,  as,  apart  from  every  particular  mode  of  appre- 
hending it,  it  is  in  itself,  that  is,  the  "  Ding  an  Sich,"  is  different. 

'  6.  Not  only  can  we  adjust,  on  the  basis  of  sense-perception  alone, 


380 


ANN  OTA  TIONS. 


the  proportion  in  which  it  is  conditioned  by  what  is  objective,  but  we 
cannot  even  at  all  cognize  the  existence  of  the  affecting  objects.  For, 
as  the  perceptions  are  acts  of  our  own  minds,  they  cannot  as  such  lead 
us  beyond  ourselves.  The  conviction  of  the  existence  of  external  ob- 
jects, which  affect  us,  is  grounded  on  the  hypothesis  of  causal  relations, 
a  hypothesis  which  does  not  rest  upon  sense-perception  alone. 

'  7.  The  doctrine  of  the  Scotch  School  (Reid,  Beattie,  and  others), 
that  "  Common  Sense"  reveals  immediately  the  existence  of  an  external 
world,  and  the  affiliated  doctrine  of  Jacobi,  who  claims  the  same  power 
for  Feeling  or  Belief,  is  a  fiction,  which  dispenses  with  a  scientific 
foundation. 

'  8.  Internal  or  psychological  perception,  or  the  immediate  cognition 
of  the  psychical  acts  and  images,  can  apprehend,  with  material  truth, 
its  objects  as  they  are  in  themselves. ' 

Logik,  Dritte  Aufi.,  §§  36-41.  Ueberweg's  development  from  this 
point  is  given  in  [8]. 

[92]     Substance. 

Berkeley,  §  91 :  'an  existence  independent  of  a  substance,  or  sup- 
port (Trager),  wherein  they  may  exist.' 

Ueberweg  :  'Berkeley  argues  as  if  the  difficulty  he  urges  (§  16) 
against  the  notion  of  substance  as  a  "support"  (Trager)  of  accidents 
involved  exclusively  the  notion  of  material  substance,  and  were  not  of 
equal  and  perhaps  of  higher  force  against  the  notion  of  a  spiritual  sub- 
stance. Berkeley  says  rightfully  that  in  regard  to  spirit  he  harmonizes 
with  the  dominant  view  of  substance  as  a  support  (Tragerin)  of  acci- 
dents ;  but  he  shows  neither  here  nor  elsewhere  that  he  rightfully  holds 
fast  to  this  supposition,  and  that  in  this  respect  his  argumentatio  ex 
concessis  is  an  argumentatio  ex  concedendis,  that  his  argument  from 
things  conceded  is  an  argument  from  things  that  ought  to  be  conceded.' 

[93]     Epicureans  and  Hobbists. 

Berkeley,  §  93:  'and  supposing  (voraussetzen)  .  .  .  fatal  (verhiing- 
nissvollen)  .  .  .  impulse  (Einwirkung)  .  .  .  without  which  your 
Epicureans,  Hobbists,  and  the  like  have  not  even  the  shadow  of  a  pre- 
tence (Vorwands).' 

Uederweg:  'Epicurus  (341-270  B.C.),  following  Democritus, 
taught  that  the  universe  came  into  being  by  the  concourse  of  atoms 
without  the  co-operation  of  a  Deity.  Similar  views  were  taught  by 
Hobbes  (1588-1679),  who  is  more  generally  known  by  his  political 
absolutism  than  by  his  philosophy  of  nature.  He  maintains  that 
matter  can  have  sensation  and  thought.' 


ABSTRACTION.  38 1 

[94]    Time. 

Berkeley,  §  98 :  '  Whenever  I  attempt  to  frame  a  simple  idea  of 
time  .   .   .  cogitation  (Denken).' 

Ueeerweg  :  'According  to  Aristotle  (Phys.,  iv.  ii.),  time  is  the 
number  of  movements  (of  change)  in  relation  to  earlier  or  later.  Ac- 
cording to  him  (Phys.,  vi.  ii.),  time  and  space  are  equally  infinitely 
divisible.  According  to  the  doctrine  of  Locke  (Hum.  Und.,  B.  11., 
ch.  xiv.,  §§  3,  5,  17),  reflection  on  the  train  of  ideas,  which  appear 
one  after  another  in  our  minds,  is  that  which  furnishes  us  with  the 
notion  of  succession;  the  distance  between  any  parts  of  that  succession, 
or  between  the  appearance  of  any  two  ideas  in  our  mind,  is  that  we 
call  duration;  and  duration,  set  out  by  certain  periods  and  marked  by 
certain  measures  or  epochs,  is  time — duration  designated  by  a  definite 
measure.  Though  the  notion  of  duration  has  arisen  from  reflection 
on  the  sequence  and  number  of  ideas,  it  is  yet  applicable  to  things 
which  exist  while  we  do  not  think,  as  the  notion  of  the  extension  of 
bodies,  though  it  has  been  derived  from  the  impressions  of  sight  and 
touch,  can  be  applied  to  distances  where  no  body  is  seen  or  felt.' 

[95]     Abstraction. 

Berkeley,  §  100 :  'the  doctrine  of  Abstraction  has  not  a  little  con- 
tributed towards  spoiling  the  most  useful  parts  of  knowledge.' 

Ueberweg  :  '  The  definite  demarcation  of  the  groups  of  conceptions, 
of  which  each  can  be  represented  by  a  definite  word,  by  means  of  com- 
plete and  well-arranged  specification  of  the  material  constituents  which 
come  into  the  consideration  of  those  conceptions,  in  other  words,  by 
means  of  definition,  is  an  indisputable  demand  of  all  scientific  reflection. 
There  is  great  merit  in  Berkeley's  denial,  on  principle,  of  the  false 
substantializing  of  abstracts,  and  in  his  own  striving  to  give  a  complete 
basis  to  general  notions  and  judgments  in  the  corresponding  concrete 
conceptions.  Yet  we  cannot  approve  of  his  polemic  against  the  effort 
to  form  and  define  the  most  general  notions.  In  the  ethical  sphere  the 
expressions  of  Berkeley  are  in  complete  opposition  to  the  Socratic 
basing  of  all  ethical  action  on  the  notional  cognition  of  the  ethical. 
There  is  a  justifiable  polemic  against  a  one-sided  over-estimate  of  the 
notion  and  of  the  rule.  This  polemic  has  been  directed,  in  the  sphere 
of  ethics,  against  Kantianism,  especially  by  F.  H.  Jacobi,  who,  in  his 
polemic,  gives  prominence  to  the  moral  tact,  and  who  lays  stress  on 
the  ethical  right  of  the  individual,  as  Schleiermacher  also  does.  But 
this  polemic  is  exposed  to  the  peril  of  falling  into  a  one-sidedness  of 


382  A  NNO  TA  TIONS. 

an  opposite  kind,  when  it  arrays  itself  not  simply  against  an  over- 
estimate of  the  general  notion,  but  against  the  thing  itself.  Scholastic 
and  sceptical  errors  are  to  be  overcome  by  genuine  science,  not  by 
returning  to  a  pre-scientific  position.  This  latter,  however,  though  it 
was  not  Berkeley's  design,  seems  to  be  a  very  easy  result  of  the  assault 
which,  without  the  proper  restrictions,  he  makes  upon  the  attempts  to 
define  certain  very  general  notions.' 

[96]     Essence. 

Berkeley,  §  102  :  '  that  everything  includes  within  itself  the  cause 
of  its  properties,  or  that  there  is  in  each  object  (Dinge)  an  inward 
essence  (inneres  Wesen),  which  is  the  source  whence  its  discernible 
(unterscheidbaren)  qualities  flow,  and  whereon  they  depend.' 

Ueberweg;  'This  is  the  view  of  Aristotle  and  of  the  Scholastics, 
by  whom  essence  (obaia),  that  is,  the  sum  of  the  essential  or  of  that 
which  is  involved  in  the  definition,  is  regarded  as  the  cause  of  the 
qualities  (itoid).' 

[97]     Gravitation. 

Berkeley,  §  103:  'and  it  may  as  truly  (for  aught  we  know)  be 
termed  "impulse,"  or  "protrusion,"  as  "attraction."' 

Ueberweg:  ' Undoubtedly  Newton  himself  has  left  this  possibility 
open  ;  but  the  majority  of  those  who  adopt  his  views  have  found  in  at- 
traction an  essential  property  of  matter.  The  Cartesians,  on  the 
contrary,  denied  the  doctrine  of  attraction,  and  endeavoured  to  ex- 
plain the  turning  aside  of  the  celestial  bodies  from  a  rectilinear  course, 
as  also  the  falling  of  the  terrestrial  bodies,  on  the  theory  of  an  impulse 
imparted  by  cether.  This  hypothesis  of  Descartes  was  held  by  French 
scholars  as  late  as  the  middle  of  the  eighteenth  century,  but  more  and 
more  lost  its  hold  as  the  conviction  grew  more  general  that  every  por- 
tion of  matter  in  the  universe  attracts  every  other,  in  conformity  with 
the  Newtonian  law  of  gravitation  [i.e.,  with  a  force  proportional  directly 
to  the  quantity  of  matter  they  contain,  and  inversely  to  the  squares  of 
their  distances].  The  comets  especially,  whose  course  it  is  impossible 
to  co-ordinate  with  that  of  the  aether,  furnish  a  powerful  argument, 
in  fact,  an  unanswerable  one,  for  the  Newtonian  school.  There  has 
been  a  growing  tendency  to  consider  attraction  as  an  immanent  prop- 
erty of  all  matter.  Yet  the  mooted  question  has  remained  and  yet 
remains  undecided,  whether  there  can  be  an  "actio  in  distans." 
Such  an  "actio"  seems  demanded  by  attraction,  yet  leaves  it  incon- 
ceivable, what  the  former  is  while  it  traverses  the  space  intervening 
between  the  masses,  whether  it  be  a  substance  or  a  property.     And  if 


GRAVITATION    UNIVERSAL.  383 

we  suppose — as  it  seems  thoroughly  necessary  we  should — that  there 
is  a  substantial  continuity  filling  all  space,  within  which  the  corporeal 
atoms  exist,  still  the  question  as  to  the  mode  of  the  extension  of 
power  or  force  remains  unsolved.  Kant's  Dynamic,  but  still  more 
Herbart's  doctrine  that  the  approximation  rests  on  modifications  of 
the  "internal  conditions,"  Schiller's  comparison  of  attraction  with 
love,  and  Schopenhauer's  Doctrine  of  the  Will,  seem  to  shed  some 
light  on  the  darkness.' 

[98]     The  Fixed  Stars. 

Berkeley,  §  106 :  '  Whereas  it  is  evident  the  fixed  stars  have  no 
such  tendency  towards  each  other.' 

Ueberweg  :  '  That  Berkeley  is  mistaken  in  this  assertion  is,  in  our 
day,  placed  beyond  all  dispute.  The  error  into  which  he  falls  was  a 
pardonable  one  in  his  day,  for  astronomy  at  that  time  very  properly 
concentrated  itself  on  the  investigation  of  our  planetary  system,  and 
the  question  in  regard  to  the  movement  of  the  fixed  stars  had  not  yet 
been  seriously  looked  at.  In  our  day  the  movement  of  the  fixed  stars 
is  no  longer  a  matter  of  doubt.  It  is  known  that  all  the  bodies  belong- 
ing to  the  system  of  our  Milky  Way  move  around  a  common  centre  of 
gravitation.  Madler  maintains  that  this  centre  is  in  or  near  the  Pleia- 
des; but  the  question  is  not  settled.' 

[99]     Gravitation  universal. 

Berkeley,  §  106:  'as  in  the  perpendicular  growth  of  plants,  and 
the  elasticity  of  the  air.' 

Ueberweg:  'These  errors  also  of  Berkeley  no  longer  need  a  con- 
futation. Every  part  of  the  growing  plant  and  of  the  elastic  air  has 
gravity.  The  gravity  itself  does  not  cease,  though  its  operation  be 
paralyzed  by  counter-operations  and  be  transmuted  into  its  counter- 
part. But,  throughout,  where  several  forces  co-operate  with  each 
other,  and  in  part  compensate  one  another,  it  is  impossible,  in  accord- 
ance with  Berkeley's  principles,  to  trace  and  acknowledge  the  efficacy 
of  the  very  laws  of  nature  which  clearly  reveal  themselves  in  the  more 
simple,  uncomplicated  cases;  for,  on  Berkeley's  principle,  the  results 
follow  the  immediate  operation  of  God. 

'  These  laws  appear  as  if  they  were  not  of  universal  validity,  though 
they  really  are  so,  and  only  seem  to  yield  to  other  laws,  to  which  we 
can,  therefore,  ascribe  no  more  than  a  very  limited  validity.  The 
principle  of  Berkeley,  as  we  again  see,  though  it  may  be  harmonized 
with  a  sort  of  general  recognition  of  the  laws  of  nature  as  rules  of  the 


384 


ANNOTATIONS. 


divine  activity,  cannot  be  brought  to  unison  with  an  acknowledgment 
of  the  laws  of  nature,  scientifically  carried  through.' 

[ioo]     The  Practical. 

Berkeley,  §  109  :  f  God's  glory,  and  the  sustentation  and  comfort 
of  ourselves  and  fellow-creatures.' 

Ueberweg  :  \  If  Berkeley's  advice  were  acted  on,  the  result  would 
be  a  zealous  striving  after  material  good,  and  a  comfortable  enjoyment 
of  life  on  work-days,  and  a  striving  equally  zealous,  on  Sundays  and 
church-festivals,  after  heavenly  blessedness.  Another  result  would  be  a 
theology  in  correspondence  with  these  practical  tendencies,  and  with 
both  we  should  have  the  sort  of  science  and  art  which  is  wont  to  fall 
very  short  in  the  striving  after  the  true  and  the  beautiful  without 
regard  to  subordinate  aims,  either  mundane  or  supramundane. 
Though  this  result  is  not  that  at  which  Berkeley  aims,  yet  in  this  way 
what  he  here  recommends  does  in  fact  most  commonly  take  shape.' 

Editor  :  Berkeley's  advice,  interpreted  by  his  intellectual  and  prac- 
tical life,  hardly  justifies  Ueberweg' s  stricture. 

[101]     Newton. 

Berkeley,  §110:  'The  best  key  for  the  aforesaid  analogy  or  natural 
Science  will  be  easily  acknowledged  to  be  a  certain  celebrated  Treatise 
of  Mechanics. ', 

Ueberweg  :  '  In  §  114  Berkeley  gives  the  full  title  of  this  Treatise. 
It  is  Newton's  Philosophiae  Naturalis  Principia  Mathematica,  first  pub- 
lished 1687.  The  distinctions  which  Berkeley  here  cites  and  contro- 
verts are  presented  in  the  Scholion  to  the  Eighth  Definition  in 
the  Introduction  to  his  Principia  (edit,  of  1687,  p.  5,  seq.).' 

[102]     Motion  Absolute  and  Relative. 

Berkeley,  §  1 1 1 :  '  Absolute  Motion  is  said  to  be  the  translation  of 
a  body  from  absolute  place  to  absolute  place,  as  relative  motion  is 
from  one  relative  place  to  another.' 

Ueberweg:  'According  to  this,  in  the  figure  given  in  Note  54a 
movement  in  the  external  object  AB  would  be  an  absolute  movement, 
a  movement  of  the  image  a'b'  among  the  other  images  in  the  space  of 
consciousness  would  be  a  relative  movement.  Yet  this  determination 
is  not  exactly  correct,  inasmuch  as  the  movement  of  the  external  object 
AB  may  be  referred  in  part  to  absolute  space,  in  part  to  particular  ex- 
ternal objects.  This  latter  relation,  also,  is  not  merely  brought  into 
consideration  by  us,  but  is  grounded  in  the  real  co-operation  of  the 


NUMBERS.  385 

powers  of  nature  itself.  Thus,  for  example,  the  double  motion  of  the 
moon,  the  one  motion  around  the  earth,  the  other,  with  the  earth, 
around  the  sun,  is  the  result  of  a  twofold  attraction,  an  attraction  to 
the  earth  and  an  attraction  to  the  sun.  Our  subjective  relative  notions 
in  general  rest  upon  objective  relations :  for  example,  the  subjective 
relative  notion  of  number  rests  upon  the  objectively  real  existence, 
one  with  another,  of  individual  things  with  like  natures ;  the  sub- 
jective relative  notion  embodied  in  the  word  "and"  rests  upon  an 
objective  connection;  and  so  in  other  cases.' 

[103]     Movement. 

Berkeley,  §  114:  '  For  the  water  in  the  vessel  at  that  time  wherein 
it  is  said  to  have  the  greatest  relative  circular  motion  has,  I  think,  no 
motion  at  all.' 

Ueberweg  :  '  The  water  is  supposed  to  be  in  a  vessel  which  is  attached 
to  a  cord  and  suddenly  whirled  round.  The  water  is  gradually  drawn 
into  the  movement  of  the  vessel. — If  Berkeley's  theory  be  correct,  that 
in  every  movement  the  power  of  God  operates  directly,  or  without 
"  secondary  causes,"  it  is  not  very  clear  what  is  meant  by  saying  that 
God  directs  his  power,  not  to  our  ideas  of  the  heavens,  but  to  our  ideas 
of  the  earth,  and  in  our  apprehension  of  what  seems  to  be  offered  to 
the  senses  there  may  be  an  error  in  this  direction.' 

[104]     Numbers. 

Berkeley,  §  119 :  'so  far  as  they  are  not  subservient  to  practice,  and 
promote  the  benefit  of  life.' 

Ueberweg:  'This  utilitarian  view  of  Berkeley's,  like  various  others 
which  he  expresses  in  depreciation  of  the  pure  mathematics,  reminds  us 
greatly  of  Bacon  of  Verulam.  We  may  regard  it  as  an  illustration  of 
what  was  said  in  Note  100.  There  have  been  various  fantastic  specula- 
tions in  numbers,  which  rest  upon  a  spurious  attributing  of  substantial 
character  to  the  results  of  abstraction.  There  have  been  mystic  dream- 
ings,  such  as  the  definition  which  Xenocrates,  the  Platonist,  gives  of 
the  soul,  that  "it  is  a  self-moving  number,"  or  the  Pythagorean  defi- 
nition of  rectitude  as  a  square  number.  But  Berkeley  makes  a  mistake 
in  placing  in  a  line  with  these  fancies  the  serious,  strictly  scientific 
theory  of  numbers.  We  admit  that  this  theory  is  not  directly  "sub- 
servient to  practice,"  and  that  it  rests  on  very  broad  and  compre- 
hensive abstractions.  But  these  abstractions  are  of  the  class  which  are 
scientifically  justifiable ;   they  are  abstractions  which  concentrate  the 

25 


386  A  NNO  TA  TIO  NS. 

observation  on  particular  aspects  of  the  total  object,  and  do  not  involve 
the  vice  of  a  false  substantializing  of  that  which  is  viewed  abstractly.' 

[105]  Number. 
Berkeley,  §  122  :  'or  reasonings  and  controversies  purely  verbal.' 
Ueberweg  :  '  It  would  be  far  more  correct  than  this  to  compare  the 
theory  of  numbers  with  the  investigation  of  the  laws  of  language.  That 
which  in  a  certain  respect  is  a  sign  may  yet  have  in  it  a  certain  con- 
formity with  law,  which  makes  it  worth  while  to  estimate  it,  not  as  a 
mere  auxiliary,  but  as  itself  an  object  of  investigation.' 

[106]     Extension. 

Berkeley,  §  124:  'If  by  finite  extension  be  meant  something  dis- 
tinct from  a  finite  idea,  I  declare  I  do  not  know  what  that  is,  and  so 
cannot  affirm  or  deny  anything  of  it.' 

Ueberweg  :  '  Though  Berkeley  cannot,  from  his  point  of  view, 
accept  any  extension  subsisting  outside  of  the  mind,  yet  this,  as  has 
been  shown,  by  no  means  proves  that  the  supposition  he  rejects  is 
false.  In  extension  in  itself  there  is  no  minimum.  In  our  subjective 
perception  as  such  there  are  minima,  the  minutest  separations,  in  which 
two  tactual  impressions  on  the  end  of  the  finger,  the  back  of  the  hand, 
the  tip  of  the  tongue,  the  lips,  and  other  parts  of  the  body,  two  exci- 
tations of  the  retina,  the  distance  of  which  from  each  other  is  con- 
ditioned by  the  visual  angle,  call  forth  two  separate  or  distinguishable 
sensations. 

'  As,  however,  any  external  object,  say,  for  example,  an  inch  line 
drawn  on  paper,  at  different  degrees  of  closeness,  and  especially  when 
we  call  the  microscope  to  our  aid,  allows  us  to  see  a  different  number 
of  parts,  restricted  in  fact  to  no  precise  limits,  it  follows  that  we  cannot 
fix  any  minutest  perceptible  part  of  an  object, — at  least  any  minutest 
part  perceptible  by  sight.  The  microscope  shows  us  even  the  ten- 
thousandth  part  of  an  inch.' 

[107]     Sum  and  Members  of  a  Series. 

Berkeley,  §  124:  'to  say  a  finite  quantity  or  extension  consists  of 
parts  infinite  in  number,  is  so  manifest  and  glaring  a  contradiction 
that  every  one  at  first  sight  acknowledges  it  to  be  so.' 

Ueberweg:  'Berkeley  has  simply  asserted  this  "contradiction;" 
he  has  not  proved  it.  A  contradiction  is  the  affirmation  and  denial 
of  the  same  thing.  It  would  be  a  contradiction  to  call  the  sum  of  a 
series  both  finite  and  infinite,  or  to  call  at  the  same  time  the  number 


THE    CALCULUS.  387 

of  the  members  of  that  series  both  finite  and  infinite ;  but  to  call  the 
sum  finite  and  the  number  of  the  members  infinite  is  not  a  contradiction, 
either  on  the  supposition  that  the  magnitude  of  the  collective  members 
is  an  infinitely  little  one,  or  that  the  magnitude  of  the  individual  mem- 
bers diminishes,  in  a  definite  manner,  infinitely.  Locke,  however 
(Hum.  Und.,  11.  xxiii.  31),  holds  that  "the  divisibility  in  infinitum 
of  any  finite  extension  involves  us,  whether  we  grant  or  deny  it,  in 
consequences  impossible  to  be  explicated  or  made  in  our  apprehensions 
consistent."  ' 

[108]     A  posteriori. 

Berkeley,  §  129  :  '  it  is  held  that  proofs  a  posteriori  are  not  to  be 
admitted  against  propositions  relating  to  infinity.' 

Ueberweg  :  '  Berkeley  here  uses  the  teim  "  proofs  a  posteriori"  in 
the  good  old  sense — pi  oofs  which  are  drawn  from  the  effects  (the  oarzpov 
fu<7£i,  natura  posterius).  He  knew  nothing  of  the  Kantian  abuse  of 
terms,  in  which  a  priori  implies  an  independence  of  what  is  empirically 
given,  an  independence  which  has  in  fact  no  existence  whatever,  and, 
in  harmony  with  that  definition,  makes  a  posteriori  completely  synony- 
mous with  empirical.' 

[103]     The  Calculus. 

Berkeley,  §  130  :  'Of  late  the  speculations  about  infinites  have  run 
so  high.' 

Ueberweg  :  '  Especially  after  Newton  had  discovered  the  method 
of  computation  by  fluxions.  With  this  method  essentially  coincides 
the  differential  and  integral  calculus,  brought  forward  by  Leibnitz  soon 
after,  and  in  fact  before  Newton  had  made  his  own  discovery  public. 
Both  come  together  under  the  notion  of  the  "infinitesimal  calculus." 
The  difference  is  only  in  form;  but  the  notation  and  mode  of  operation 
presented  by  Leibnitz  must  be  acknowledged  to  be  preferable.  New- 
ton began  in  1665  to  develop  the  "Arithmetic  of  Fluxions,"  and  up 
to  1672  had  communicated  it  to  particular  friends,  rather,  however,  by 
way  of  hints  than  of  complete  statement.  He  first  presented  it  to  the 
world  in  his  Principia  Philosophise  Naturalis,  1687.  Leibnitz, perhaps 
not  entirely  without  some  knowledge  of  Newton's  hints,  sustained, 
however,  by  his  own  earlier  investigations  of  series,  had,  with  at  least  a 
relative  independence,  reached  the  new  calculus  in  1676,  and  first  gave 
it  to  the  public  in  the  "Acta  Eruditorum,"  1684.' 


388  A  NN 0  TA  TIONS. 

[no]     Infinitesimals. 

Berkeley,  §  130  :  '  thinking  it  with  good  reason  absurd  to  imagine 
there  is  any  positive  quantity  or  part  of  extension  which,  though  multi- 
plied infinitely,  can  never  equal  the  smallest  given  extension.' 

Ueberweg  :  'Not  "with  good  reason,"  but  simply  because  of  a 
pure  misunderstanding  of  the  notion  of  infinitesimal  quantities,  this 
idea  of  Berkeley's  has  been  maintained  by  some.  Such  a  misunder- 
standing is  only  possible  when  the  representatives  of  the  opposite  view 
foster  the  error  that  the  infinitesimal  can  be  a  fixed  quantity.  By  an 
"  infinitesimal"  is  not  to  be  understood  a  fixed  quantity,  but  a  quan- 
tity which,  by  a  fixed  law,  takes  diverse  values  which  have  zero  as  the 
ultimate  value.  The  ultimate  value  is  that  value  which  a  variable 
quantity  constantly  approximates  without  ever  reaching  it,  and  so  that 
the  distance  from  it  may  be  less  than  any  particular  fixed  quantity  you 
may  name.  In  a  series  which  has  zero  as  the  final  value  it  must  con- 
sequently always  be,  name  what  fixed  quantity  you  please,  that  a  mem- 
ber can  be  found  which,  in  common  also  with  all  that  follow  it,  is  less 
than  that  fixed  quantity  named.  Thus,  the  infinite  quantity  in  the 
mathematical  sense — or  the  reciprocal  value  of  an  infinitesimal — is  not 
a  fixed  quantity,  but  one  which  in  accordance  with  the  series  takes 
diverse  values,  and  may  because  of  that  fact  be  greater  than  any  fixed 
quantity  which  can  be  named. 

'  Two  quantities  which  are  infinitely  small  or  infinitely  large  may 
be  compared  with  one  another  by  comparing  with  one  another  the 
corresponding  members  of  the  two  series,  from  which  arises  a  series  of 
relations.  The  ultimate  value  of  this  series  makes  the  relation  of  the 
one  infinitely  little  or  infinitely  great  quantity  to  the  other. 

'  The  augmentation  of  a  quantity  simply  by  infinitesimals  is  continu- 
ous. The  series  in  which  a  single  infinitesimal  is  represented  need  by 
no  means,  however,  consist  of  members  which  differ  from  one  another 
simply  by  infinitesimals,  yet  it  can  become  continuous  by  the  unlimited 
insertion  of  members. 

'  Let,  for  example,  the  first  series  be  as  follows  : 

'hbh&>  •  •  • 

'  Let  the  other  series  be  the  following  : 

'&*■«.*.  •   •   • 
'  These  series  are  so  formed  that  the  common  member  of  the  first  is 

— ,  the  common  member  of  the  second  is  — „  -f-  — -  = . 

2"'  2n  ^  2m  2m 


INFINITESIMALS.  389 

'  If  we  call  the  first  infinitesimal  a,  the  second  is  =  2a  +  <**•  On 
the  dependence  of  n  rests  the  association  of  the  members. 

'If  we  now  compare  with  one  another  the  corresponding  members  of 
both  series,  we  obtain  the  series  of  relations : 


4,  *h 


16' 


whose  common  member  is  2  -L  —  = .      Now,  the  members 

2n  2a 

of  the  third  series  have  an  ultimate  value,  which  they  approximate  be- 
yond every  difference  however  minute,  yet  without  ever  wholly  reach- 
ing it.  This  ultimate  value  is  =  2,  because  the  ultimate  value  of  the 
fraction  yet  to  be  added  to  2  (which  fraction  coincides  with  a,  as  given 
before)  is  =  o.  The  ultimate  value  2  is  not  .the  relation  of  any  two 
members  to  one  another.  If  we  should  consider  it  as  the  relation  of 
the  last  members,  or  of  the  members  in  process  of  vanishing,  we  should 
involve  ourselves  in  a  contradiction,  for  there  are  no  last  or  vanishing 
members.  As  long  as  we  remain  within  the  first  two  series,  and  com- 
pare two  corresponding  members  with  each  other,  the  relation  is  not 
=  2,  but  >  2  ;  but  if  we  go  beyond  to  the  ultimate  values  of  the  first 
two  series,  both  of  these  are  =  o,  their  relation  to  one  another  is  con- 
sequently =  %,  which,  again,  is  not  =  2,  but  is  something  wholly  in- 
determinate. But  we  are  involved  in  no  contradiction  if  we  seek 
neither  a  relation  of  the  last  members,  nor  a  relation  of  the  ultimate 
values,  but  the  ultimate  value  of  the  relation  of  the  entire  members. 
This  answers  for  all  applications,  as  in  them  we  have  also  to  do  with 
ultimate  values.  Thus,  for  example,  the  tangent  has  the  position  to 
which,  as  the  ultimate  position,  the  chords  protracted  from  the  point 
of  contact,  constantly,  by  continuous  diminution,  approximate,  beyond 
every  angular  difference  however  minute.  As  upon  both  sides,  in  the 
arithmetical  consideration  and  in  the  geometrical  application,  the  ulti- 
mate values  are  regarded,  an  absolutely  accurate  result  may  be  attained  ; 
the  mistake  would  be  to  identify  an  ultimate  value  with  one  member  of 
the  series. 

'  It  may,  however,  happen  that  the  members  of  the  series  of  relation 
itself  increase  or  diminish  infinitely.  In  this  case  the  one  infinitesimal 
is  considered  as  an  infinitely  small  portion  of  the  other,  that  is,  as  an 
infinitesimal  of  the  second  order.  If,  for  example,  we  take  the  first 
series  we  have  given,  and  make  the  second  \,  -fa,  -g-1^,  -^,  .  .  .  (or, 
make  the  first  quantity  =  a,  the  second  =  a*),  the  series  of  relation  is 
identical  with  the  first  series,  and  consequently  diminishes  infinitely; 
the  quantity  therefore  which  runs  through  the  values  in  the  second 


390  A  NN O  TA  TI O  NS. 

series  is  an  infinitesimal  of  the  second  order.  With  this  determination 
of  the  notion,  which  coincides  with  that  of  Eisenstein,  R.  Hoppe,  and 
others,  all  the  contradictions  which  Berkeley  and  others  have  urged 
against  the  doctrine  of  Infinitesimals  fall  away.  They  are  contradic- 
tions, which  in  fact  have  no  existence,  unless  the  infinite  be  regarded 
as  a  fixed  quantity.' 

Editor:  Playfair  (Prel.  Dissert.,  Enc.  Brit.,  650)  says  of  the  Con- 
troversy on  Fluxions,  '  Though  the  defenders  of  the  calculus  had  the 
advantage,  it  must  be  acknowledged  that  they  did  not  always  argue  the 
matter  quite  fairly,  nor  exactly  meet  the  reasoning  of  their  adversary. 
The  true  answer  to  Berkeley  was  that  what  he  conceived  to  be  an  acci- 
dental compensation  of  errors  was  not  at  all  accidental,  but  that  the 
two  sets  of  quantities  that  seemed  to  him  neglected  in  the  reasoning 
were  in  all  cases  necessarily  equal,  and  an  exact  balance  for  one  an- 
other. ...  If  the  author  of  the  Analyst  has  had  the  misfortune  to 
enroll  his  name  on  the  side  of  error,  he  has  also  had  the  credit  of  pro- 
posing difficulties  of  which  the  complete  solution  is  only  to  be  derived 
from  the  highest  improvements  of  the  calculus.' 

[111]     Immortality  of  the  Soul. 

Berkeley,  §  140  :  •  The  natural  immortality  of  the  soul  is  a  neces- 
sary consequence  of  the  foregoing  doctrine.' 

Ueberweg  :  '  The  soul  consequently  has  not  merely  an  immortality 
conferred  on  it  by  the  grace  of  God,  as  Justin  and  some  others  of  the 
early  fathers  maintained  in  express  opposition  to  Platonism.  At  a 
later  period,  mainly  through  the  mighty  influence  of  Augustine,  the 
Platonic  doctrine  of  the  natural  immortality  of  the  soul,  an  immortality 
grounded  in  its  very  essence,  became  the  predominating  doctrine  of 
the  Christian  Church.' 

Editor:  On  hardly  any  point  did  Christianity  find  a  completer 
chaos  of  human  thought  than  on  the  doctrine  of  the  future  state.  The 
confusion  yielded  very  slowly. 

[112]     Opinion  and  Character. 

Berkeley,  §  141 :  'And  this  notion  (Vorstellung)  has  been  greedily 
embraced  and  cherished  by  the  worst  part  of  mankind,  as  the  most 
effectual  antidote  against  all  impressions  of  virtue  and  religion.' 

Ueberweg  :  '  This  position  of  Berkeley  involves  a  support  of  the 
argument  by  the  moral  degradation  of  the  opponent.  Its  confirmation 
in  experience  is  not  without  exceptions.     There  has  been   faith  in  im- 


HOW  CAN  MIND    COMMUNICATE    WITH  MIND?  391 

mortality  which  has  not  been  conditioned  by  character,  and  character 
not  conditioned  by  this  faith.' 

Editor  :  Berkeley  simply  speaks  of  a  class,  and,  thus  qualified,  his 
remark  is  true.  Opinion  is  not  the  sole  shaper  of  the  external  life,  but 
it  is  the  mightiest  of  moral  forces ;  but  it  often  requires  a  long  time 
and  a  multitude  of  examples  to  determine  what  is  the  influence  of 
opinions.  Centuries  of  experience  have  left  some  questions  of  this 
class  still  in  doubt. 

[113]     Sundering  of  the  Faculties. 

Berkeley,  §  143:  'Men  have  imagined  (sich  vorgestellt)  they  could 
frame  abstract  notions  (Begriffe)  of  the  powers  and  acts  of  the  mind, 
and  consider  them  prescinded  (abgelost)  as  well  from  the  mind  (Seele) 
or  spirit  (Geiste)  itself,  as  from  their  respective  (beziiglichen)  objects 
and  effects  (Wirkungen).' 

Ueberweg  :  '  This  attack  of  Berkeley's  on  the  abstractive  sundering 
or  hypostasizing  of  the  "faculties  of  the  soul"  has  great  merit ;  it  would 
require,  however,  to  be  carried  much  farther  to  lead  to  the  results 
which  long  after  followed  upon  Herbart's  resumption  of  it.' 

[114]     How  can  Mind  communicate  with  Mind? 

Berkeley,  §  145  :  'I  perceive  (nehme  .  .  .  wahr)  several  motions, 
changes,  and  combinations  of  ideas,  that  inform  (bekunden)  me  there 
are  certain  particular  agents  (bestimmte  einzelne  thatige  Wesen)  like 
myself,  which  accompany  them  and  concur  (Theil  haben)  in  their  pro- 
duction (Hervorbringung).' 

Ueberweg  :  '  How  this  concurrence  (Antheil)  is  to  be  conceived 
of,  is  obscure.  The  concurrence  of  the  mind  in  the  evoking  of  its  own 
ideas  has  been  defined  by  Berkeley,  §  28-30;  but  how,  in  any 
ordinary  manner,  can  my  mind  operate  on  other  minds,  or  in  any  way 
whatever  concur  in  their  operation?  According  to  the  doctrine  of 
Berkeley  I  cannot  evoke  thoughts  in  others  immediately,  but  only  by 
means  of  my  own  "ideas."  My  "ideas,"  however,  and  their  changes, 
as,  for  example,  in  the  complex  of  ideas  which  I  call  my  body,  can, 
according  to  this  very  doctrine,  produce  no  operations  in  another 
person,  nor  evoke  ideas  in  him.  How  do  the  complexes  of  ideas  in 
different  persons  come  into  relation  to  one  another?  The  answer 
"  by  the  will  of  God"  of  course  helps  out  in  every  case ;  but  a  cogni- 
zable order  of  nature  falls  before  such  a  view.  Without  the  supposition 
of  a  connection  conformed  to  the  laws  of  nature,  I  can  only  infer  the 
existence  of  God,  not  the  existence  of  finite  beings  beside  myself.    On 


392  A  NN  O  TA  TIONS. 

the  supposition  of  this  connection,  however,  words,  writing,  and  other 
signs  can  only  be  the  means  of  producing  a  relation  between  different 
thinking  beings,  in  as  far  as  they  are  not  mere  ideas,  but  are  changes 
in  certain  objects  existing  in  themselves ;  on  which  objects  the  one 
mind  produces  operations,  and  these  thereby  modified  operate  in  their 
way  on  the  mind  of  the  other  person.' 

[Ueberweg  has  alluded  to  this  argument  against  Berkeleyanism  in  his 
Sketch  of  the  History  of  Philosophy,  vol.  iii.,  2d  edit.,  Berlin,  1868, 
p.  331:  'the  relations  between  thinking  beings  must  be  mediated  by 
real  unthinking  beings.'] 

He  has  developed  the  argument  in  the  Zeitschrift  fur  Philosophic, 
Bd.  54,  Heft  2.    Halle,  1869. 

[115]     Berkeley  and  Malebranche. 

Berkeley,  §  148:  'Not  that  I  imagine  (stelle  mir.  .  .  vor)  we  see 
God  (as  some  will  have  it)  by  a  direct  and  immediate  view,  or  see  cor- 
poreal things,  not  by  themselves,  but  by  seeing  that  which  represents 
them  in  the  essence  of  God,  which  doctrine  is,  I  must  confess,  to  me 
incomprehensible. ' 

Ueberweg  :  '  The  doctrine  referred  to  is  that  of  the  Cartesian, 
Malebranche  (1 638-1 715),  that  we  see  all  things  in  God.  Berkeley 
expresses  himself  more  at  large  on  this  point  in  his  "  Dialogues  between 
Hylas  and  Philonous,"  a  little  before  the  middle  of  the  Second  Dia- 
logue (Works,  Fraser,  i.  308).  Berkeley  does  not  say,  as  Malebranche 
does,  that  we  see  the  things  by  perceiving  that  by  which  they  are 
represented  in  the  infinite  substance  of  the  Godhead,  but  only  that 
the  things  which  we  perceive,  that  is,  our  ideas,  are  known  in  virtue 
of  the  will  of  an  infinite  Spirit.  According  to  Berkeley,  our  ideas, 
which  are  purely  passive,  cannot  be  like  the  divine  substance,  which  is 
wholly  active,  nor  even  like  a  part  of  this  substance,  which  is  wholly 
indivisible.  In  the  system  of  Malebranche,  moreover,  the  existence  of 
a  material  universe,  whose  "  perfections"  are  embraced  in  the  spiritual 
essence  of  the  Godhead,  is  accepted  in  a  completely  purposeless  way, 
and  involves  Malebranche's  theory  in  all  the  contradictions  to  it, 
which  are  derived  from  the  supposition  that  material  things  exist  out- 
side the  mind.' 

[116]     Providence. 

Berkeley,  §  154:  'Little  and  unreflecting  souls  may  indeed  bur- 
lesque the  works  of  Providence. ' 

Ueberweg  :  '  But  not  as  such.  Berkeley  from  his  own  point  of  view, 
not  that  of  the  supposed  antagonist,  regards  the  phenomena  in  question 


CONSCIOUSNESS   DEFINED.  393 

as  the  works  of  Providence.  If  he  did  take  that  view,  he  would  involve 
himself  in  gross  self-contradiction ;  as  he  does  not,  it  would  greatly  aid 
in  establishing  his  own  view  if  he  would  enter  thoroughly  into  the  antag- 
onistic position  to  evince  its  untenableness.  It  is  admitted  that  among 
modern  thinkers  this  has  been  done  most  thoroughly  by  Leibnitz 
(1646-1716).  In  his  Theodicee,  which  appeared  in  the  same  year  as 
Berkeley's  Principles  (17 10),  he  examines  the  problems  here  touched 
upon.' 

[117]     General    Recognition   of  the    Basis   of   Idealism. 
Definitions  of  Consciousness.     Definitions  of  Realism. 

Editor  :  It  is  an  element  of  strength  in  Idealism  that  beyond  other 
systems  it  seems  at  least  to  have  these  elements : 

1.  It  sharply  defines  consciousness  ;  2.  It  separates  the  primary  and 
unmistakable  acts  of  consciousness  from  the  inferences  made  from  those 
acts ;  3.  It  maintains  the  absolute  infallibility  of  consciousness ;  4. 
It  denies,  or  puts  on  a  lower  plane  of  evidence,  whatever  is  not  thus 
infallibly  testified  to.  That  its  position  here  is  a  strong  one  will  be 
apparent  from  the  definitions  generally  given  of  Consciousness. 

'  Consciousness  is  the  perception  of  what  passes  in  a  man's  own 
mind.'  * 

'  To  the  mind  is  attributed  apperception,  as  it  is  conscious  to  itself 
of  its  own  perception.  Leibnitz  uses  the  term  apperception,  as  synony- 
mous with  consciousness  in  the  writings  of  Descartes.'2 

Consciousness,  self-consciousness ;  Apperceptio  (Leibnitz),  Consci- 
entia  (Descartes) ;  Bewusstseyn,  Selbstbewusstseyn ;  perception,  con- 
science, sentiment  interieur.    This  word  is  used  by  Kant  in  two  senses: 

1.  It  means  consciousness  of  self,  that  is,  the  simple  conception  of 
the  Ego.  When  a  subject  capable  of  conceptions  has  conceptions, 
there  is  constantly  linked  with  them  the  further  conception  that  it  (the 
subject)  has  them.  The  second  conception,  that  I,  the  concipient 
subject,  have  these  conceptions,  is  called  consciousness  of  myself,  or 
apperception. 

2.  Kant  understands  by  the  term  thefacully  (Vermogen)  of  conscious- 
ness the  faculty  of  accompanying  the  conception  with  the  conception 
of  the  Ego.3 

'  Those  changes  in  the  mind  by  which  it  is  made  possible  to  it  to 
conceive  things  external  to  itself  are  called  in  the  Leibnitzo-Wolfian 
system  perceptions.     If  with  these  is  united  the  consciousness  of  self, 

»  Locke,  Hum.  Und.,  II.,  i.  19.       *  Wolff,  Psychol.  Empir.,  \  25  (1732),  Verona,  1779. 
3  Mellin,  Worterbuch  d.  kritischen  Philosophic,  1797. 


394 


ANN  OTA  TIONS. 


as  well  as  of  the  things  perceived,  we  have  apperception.1  'Conscious' 
ness  is  that  condition  in  which  we  distinguish  from  each  other,  and 
from  ourselves,  the  conceptions  of  things  as  changes  in  us,  and  with 
them  their  objects." 

Stewart  :  '  Consciousness  denotes  the  immediate  knowledge  which 
the  mind  has  of  its  sensations  and  thoughts,  and,  in  general,  of  all  its 
present  operations.'2 

Krug  :  '  Consciousness  is  knowledge  of  being,  an  immediate  linking 
of  both.'3 

Reid:  'Consciousness  is  .  .  .  used  ...  to  signify  that  immediate 
knowledge  which  we  have  of  our  present  thoughts  and  purposes,  and, 
in  general,  of  all  the  present  operations  of  our  minds.'4 

Hamilton  :  '  This  knowing  that  I  know  or  desire  or  feel,  this 
common  condition  of  self-knowledge,  is  .  .  .  consciousness.' 

'Consciousness  is  .  .  .  the  recognition  by  the  mind  or  Ego  of  its  acts 
and  affections.' 

Regis:  'We  obtain  this  knowledge  [of  our  own  minds]  by  a  simple 
and  internal  intimation,  which  precedes  all  acquired  knowledge,  and 
which  I  call  consciousness  (conscience).''  * 

Brown  :  'Consciousness  .  .  .  is  only  a  general  term  for  all  our  feel- 
ings, of  whatever  species  these  may  be, — sensations,  thoughts,  desires ; 
in  short,  all  those  states  or  affections  of  mind  in  which  the  phenomena 
of  mind  consist.'6 

Porter  :  '  Consciousness  is  .  .  .  the  power  by  which  the  soul  knows 
its  own  acts  and  states. ' 7 

'Consciousness  is  the  term  applied  to  the  internal  perception  of  that 
which  is  presented  and  takes  place  in  us  as  determination  of  the  mental 
life.'8 

Fraser:  'By  being  conscious  I  mean  knowing  phenomena,  whether 
extended  or  unextended,  which  are  immediately  and  actually  present 
to  the  conscious  mind, — with  all  the  conditions  or  relations  implied  in 
this.'9 

Morell:  'Locke's  fundamental  principle  that  all  our  knowledge 
consists  in  ideas  as  the  immediate  objects  of  consciousness  (is)  a  principle 

1  Lossius,  Real-Lexicon,  1803. 

»  Dugald  Stewart,  Outlines  of  Moral  Philosophy,  1793,  1801.  Works  (Hamilton),  1854, 
i.  13- 

3  Knig,  Handwort.,  1832.  *  Reid,  Int.  Powers,  Ess.  I. 

5  Syst.  de  la  Philosoph.,  quoted  by  Blakey,  Hist,  of  Philos.,  ii.  297. 

6  l'hilos.  of  Human  Mind.,  Lect.  XL  1  Human  Intellect,  New  York,  1869,  83. 

8  Brockhaus,  Convers.  Lex.,  Elft.  Aufl.,  1864,  iii.  189. 

9  Life  and  Letters  of  Berkeley,  Works,  iv.  389. 


CONSCIOUSNESS   DEFINED.  395 

which  had  never  been  questioned  from  the  time  when  it  was  asserted 
by  Plato  and  Aristotle  to  the  time  when  it  was  put  into  so  clear  a  light 
by  the  great  author  of  the  "Essay  on  the  Human  Understanding."  '  * 
To  this  may  be  added  that  few  out  of  the  entire  body  of  metaphysicians 
have  doubted  it  since. 

It  may  be  useful  to  have  some  of  the  definitions  of  Realism  before 
us.     (For  definitions  of  Idealism,  see  Prolegomena,  VII.) 

'  Realism  as  opposed  to  Idealism  is  the  dogmatic  affirmation  that  the 
things  in  the?nselves  are  as  we  perceive  them  in  our  conception.'  * 

'The  reality  of  mind  and  the  reality  of  matter, — Natural  Realism.' 
'A  scheme  which  endeavours,  on  the  one  hand,  not  to  give  up  the 
reality  of  an  unknown  material  universe,  and,  on  the  other,  to  explain 
the  ideal  illusion  of  its  cognition,  may  be  called  the  doctrine  of  .  .  . 
Hypothetic  Realism.'3 

'  Realism  has  different  meanings,  according  to  the  different  antitheses 
which  it  involves.  In  antithesis  to  Idealism  it  is  the  system  which 
maintains  that  the  existent,  that  which  constitutes  the  foundation  of  the 
phenomena,  is  independent  of  the  thinking  subject,  and  of  thought  in 
general.'4 

'  Realism,  as  opposed  to  Idealism,  is  the  doctrine  that  in  perception 
there  is  an  immediate  or  intuitive  cognition  of  the  external  object, 
while,  according  to  Idealism,  our  knowledge  of  an  external  world  is 
mediate  and  representative,  i.e.  by  means  of  ideas.'5 

'Realism,  .  .  .  the  system  which  maintains  that  what  is  exists  external 
to  and  independently  of  the  concipient  subject.'5 

'Realism,  the  philosophical  doctrine  which  ascribes  to  external 
things  an  actual  being  independent  of  our  conceptions.'7 

The  reader  can  hardly  fail  to  be  struck  at  some  of  the  approximating 
points  of  the  definitions  of  Idealism  and  Realism,  with  the  illustrations 
of  Iordano  Bruno's  principle  of  the  'Coincidence  of  Opposites.'  He 
can  understand  how  some  thinkers  have  hesitated  between  the  two, 
how  some  have  defended  the  one  system  on  the  principles  of  the  other, 
how  some  have  passed  from  one  to  the  other,  how  some  have  declared 
for  both,  and  some  have  refused  either,  and  some  again  are  claimed  on 
both  sides,  and  some  have  left  their  relations  to  the  two  theories  wholly 
insoluble. 

1  Historical  and  Critical  View  of  the  Speculative  Philosophy  of  Europe  in  the  Nineteenth 
Century,  New  York,  1851.  2  Lossius,  Real-Lexicon :  Realismus. 

3  Hamilton,  Reid's  Works,  748,  749.  *  Pierer,  Realismus. 

5  Fleming,  Vocabulary,— edited  by  C.  P.  Krauth,  Philad.,  Smith,  English  &  Co.,  i860. 

6  Brockhaus,  Convers.  Lex. :  Realismus. 

7  Heyse,  Fremdworterbuch,  12th  ed.,  1859. 


396  A  NNO  TA  TIONS. 

Hamann  said  that  'only  the  scholastic  reason  separates  Idealism  and 
Realism, — genuine  philosophy  knows  nothing  of  such  a  separation.' 
The  point  at  which  the  modern  tendencies  divided  is,  according  to 
Erdmann,  a  point  at  which  philosophy  was  neither  Realism  nor  Ideal- 
ism. ''The  attempt  to  prove  the  existence  of  the  things  of  sense,  says 
Jacobi,  leads  to  the  denial  of  them, — that  is,  to  Idealism.  The  most 
that  can  be  reached  in  that  way  is  an  empty  thing  of  the  understanding, 
a  non-entity, — chaos,  in  fact.  He  says  that  Kant's  position  was  that  of 
a  chameleon  shifting  between  the  hues  of  Idealism  and  Realism ;  had 
he  been  consistent  with  his  position  that  the  transcendental  object  is 
but  an  x,  an  unknown  quantity  posited  by  consciousness,  he  would 
have  been  an  idealist.  Fichte  was  the  true  Messiah  of  speculation, 
Kant  was  no  more  than  its  John  the  Baptist,  Reinhold  its  Nathanael. 
There  are  only  two  logical  systems,  the  Material-Idealism  of  Spinoza, 
or  the  inverted  Spinozism,  the  Ideal-Materialism  of  the  moderns, 
especially  of  Fichte.  ** 

All  this  connects  itself  with  what  Hamilton  calls  'the  startling' 
'general  approximation  of  thorough-going  Realism  and  thorough-going 
Idealism.' " 

It  is  hoped,  however,  that  the  definitions  will  at  the  same  time  be  an 
aid  to  the  reader  in  determining  the  precise  question  involved  in  these 
controverted  cases. 

[118J     Idealism — what  is  not  and  what  is  its  Question. 

Editor  :  Consciousness  in  its  direct'  attestation,  according  to  the 
general  judgment  of  thinkers  of  all  schools,  absolutely  demonstrates  no 
more  than  the  mind's  own  states  or  acts.  (See  [117].)  It  cannot  then 
directly  attest  the  external  causes  of  those  acts  or  states.  The  proof 
of  the  external  world,  in  every  philosophy,  on  this  basis,  is  therefore  an 
inference  from  the  facts  of  consciousness  proper.  The  inference  may 
be  justified,  may  be  regarded  as  necessary  and  intuitive,  but  it  is  an 
inference,  and  is  not,  in  any  case,  in  the  precise  grade  of  certainty  that 
the  act  of  consciousness  itself  is. 

When  Sir  William  Hamilton  says  that  the  object  non-Ego  is  given  in 
consciousness,  he  can  only  with  propriety  mean  that  it  is  logically  or 
mediately  given,  or  necessarily  involved  logically  in  the  consciousness 
of  the  Ego:  it  is  given  in  the  idea  of  consciousness,  not  in  its  act :  it 
is  implied,  not  expressed. 

In  other  words,  Ego  and  non-Ego  are  intuitional  logical  correlates 
in  consciousness.  Both,  as  more  than  empirical,  are  involved  in  the 
1  See  Prolegomena,  V.  20. 


IDEALISM— ITS    QUESTION.  397 

inferences  of  a  logic  which  is  intuitional,  or,  at  least,  undistinguishable 
from  the  intuitional.  But  the  Ego  is  no  more  conscious  of  itself  in 
consciousness  than  the  eye  sees  itself 'in  seeing.  Self-consciousness,  as 
the  consciousness  of  intellectual  acts  and  states,  is  directly  and  infalli- 
bly known ;  but  if  it  means  that  we  have  consciousness  of  a  self  apart 
from  acts  and  states,  or  distinct  from  the  acts  and  states  while  it  is  in 
them,  it  is  not  true  that  we  have  j^-consciousness.  Consciousness 
itself  is  a  specifically  conditioned  state;  and  to  know  ourselves  apart 
from  or  distinct  from  a  conditioned  state  would  imply  two  absurdities  : 
one,  that  mind,  as  known,  is  unconscious ;  the  other,  that  the  mind 
knowing,  which  in  this  case  is  the  same  mind  which  is  known,  is 
unconscious.  Furthermore,  unconsciousness  itself  is  a  state.  To  be 
conscious  of  absolute  self  is  a  contradiction  in  terms.  To  be  conscious 
of  self  in  its  states  and  acts,  or  through  its  states  and  acts,  is  to  be 
conscious  of  the  acts  and  states,  that  is,  to  have  an  immediate  cognition 
of  them,  while  our  judgment  of  the  essence  or  substance  acted  upon 
and  acting  is  mediate.  We  can  make  a  dialectic  separation  of  a  mind 
from  its  states,  but  there  can  be  no  real  separation.  And  in  the  dia- 
lectic separation  there  would  be  left  to  the  mind  nothing  but  dialectic 
being.  So  far  as  conceivable  reality  is  concerned,  its  being  would  be 
equivalent  to  non-being.  There  is  no  absolute  to  man's  cognition. 
He  does  not  know  substance,  either  matter  or  spirit.  The  Ego  itself 
we  know  then  only  in  and  by  its  acts  and  states,  not  apart  from  them. 
Mental  acts  and  states  are  alone  the  objects  of  immediate  or  strictly 
philosophical  cognition.  The  real  pritnary  question  hinges  on  this 
point  only.  The  sole  and  consequently  infallible  utterance  of  con- 
sciousness is  on  the  mind's  own  states  and  acts.  Out  of  the  facts  thus 
testified  to,  and  acknowledged  in  general,  alike  by  every  school  of 
philosophy,  everything  else  is  to  be  built  up.  On  this  general  ground, 
the  ground  of  the  phenomenal  facts,  there  is  no  controversy  whatever 
between  Berkeley  and  the  extremest  of  his  opposers.  That  the  thing 
to  which  consciousness  testifies,  as  the  act  of  putting  the  finger  into 
the  fire,  is  followed  by  what  consciousness  testifies  to  as  the  sensation 
of  pain,  is  as  certain  on  Berkeley's  view  as  on  Locke's  and  Reid's. 
The  world  of  the  phenomenal,  both  as  regards  causes  and  effects,  is  left 
untouched  by  Idealism.  Body  and  spirit  remain  phenomenally  as  dis- 
tinct as  ever ;  our  fellow-men  stand  in  every  phenomenal  relation  as 
before.  Our  own  bodies  are  known  as  they  were  known  before.  The 
divergence  belongs  to  the  sphere  of  the  supersensuous.  The  question 
is,  What  is  that  something  to  which  consciousness  does  not  immediately 
testify,  which  is  the  cause  on  which  are  conditioned  those  mental  acts 


398  A  NN  O  TA  TIONS. 

or  states  to  which  consciousness  does  immediately  testify  by  being 
their  inseparable  condition? 

There  are  then  two  distinct  questions.  The  first  is, — What  is  it  to 
which  consciousness  immediately  testifies?  The  second  question  is, — 
What  is  involved  mediately  in  that  testimony  ?  There  is  a  question  of 
testimony  and  a  question  of  judgment. 

On  the  first  question,  Idealism,  as  we  have  seen,  accepts  the  com- 
mon answer  of  philosophy,  past  and  present, — the  mind  is  conscious 
not  of  what  is  not  in  it,  but  of  what  is  in  it,  and  nothing  can  be  in  it 
but  its  own  acts  and  states.  Nothing  is  known  immediately  but  what  is 
known  to  consciousness,  and  whatever  is  known  to  consciousness  is 
known  immediately.  The  worlds  of  immediate  knowledge  and  of 
consciousness  are  conterminal;  each  is  in  each.  The  mental  state 
associated  with  the  sense-perception  of  a  tree  is  immediately  known, 
because  there  is  no  medium  between  the  state  and  the  consciousness, — 
the  mental  state  is  consciousness  itself.  The  tree  itself  is  mediately 
known,  if  it  be  known  at  all;  though  Idealism  and  other  schools  of 
thought  concur  in  the  principle  that  mediate  knowledge  is  no  knowledge. 
The  tree  is  known  through  a  medium,  or  rather  through  a  series  of 
media,  terminating  in  the  final  excitant  of  the  perceptive  act,  which 
excitant  may  be  called  the  medium  of  the  media.  Nearly  all  thinkers 
agree  that  there  is  no  consciousness  of  this  excitant;  we  only  know 
the  state  which  results  from  it.  Sir  William  Hamilton's  'Natural 
Realism'  assumes  that  there  is  a  consciousness  of  it, — it  is  the  only 
non-Ego  of  which  we  are  conscious;  but  as  the  great  non-Ego,  the 
external  empirical  world,  is  as  clearly  external  to  our  bodies  as  it 
is  to  our  minds,  Sir  William  defies  the  'common  sense'  to  which 
he  appeals.  Nor  would  the  race  be  better  satisfied  with  a  universe 
which  is  confined  to  Sir  William's  optic  nerve,  or  to  his  thalami,  than 
with  one  which  would  be  shut  up  in  his  mind.  At  the  risk  of  being 
thought  a  blasphemer  by  some  of  Sir  William's  admirers,  we  are  com- 
pelled to  confess  that  his  'Natural  Realism'  seems  to  us  virtually  a 
restoration  of  the  clumsy  and  exploded  theory  of  'a  representative 
entity  present  to  the  mind.'  The  hypothesis  on  which  the  Scotch 
school  combated  Idealism  had  reached  a  point  at  which  'there  is  no 
escape  from  confession  but  in  suicide;'  and  Hamilton's  Natural 
Realism  is  the  proof  that  'suicide  is  confession.' 

But  neither  on  the  ordinary  view,  nor  on  Hamilton's,  can  the  mind 
be  conscious  of  the  tree.  On  either  theory  it  can  only  be  conscious 
of  a  state,  for  which  it  supposes,  or  does  not  suppose,  the  existence  of 
a  material,  substantial  tree,  external  to  the  mind  and  the  body,  as  a 


IDEALISM— ITS    QUESTION.  399 

necessary  cause ;  for  the  state  itself  and  the  act  of  reference  of  that 
state,  or  the  refusal  to  refer,  are  both  in  itself.  It  cannot  indeed  shake 
off  the  empirical  reference.  The  world  of  an  idealist's  experience  is 
precisely  that  of  every  other  man.  He  sees  a  tree  as  a  Materialist  sees 
it.  Fichte,  born  idealist  as  he  was,  acknowledges  that  Idealism  cannot 
be  a  way  of  thinking, — can  only  be  speculation,  though  he  none  the 
less  held  that  it  was  the  veritable  truth  in  speculation.  It  is  the  specu- 
lative reference  on  which  the  question  hinges.  It  is  time  thrown  away, 
therefore,  to  attempt  to  settle  the  question  with  an  idealist  by  the 
mere  urging  of  the  empirical  phenomena  as  in  themselves  decisive.  As 
empirical,  Nature  puts  them  more  emphatically  than  Beattie  and  Reid 
can  put  them.  No  idealist  ever,  in  this  respect,  doubted  them,  or 
could  doubt  them,  or  pretended  to  doubt  them,  and  no  realist  ever 
felt  himself  in  any  degree  strengthened  by  an  argument  at  this  point. 

So  far  as  the  direct  reaching  of  the  empirical  facts  is  concerned, 
nearly  all  philosophy  is  idealistic,  and  hence  going  so  far  only  does  not 
constitute  what  is  pre-eminently  and  by  antithesis  Idealism.  It  is 
simply  generic,  not  specific,  Idealism.  Generic  Idealism  has  been  the 
predominant  view  of  thinkers  in  all  ages.  Specific  Idealism  has  by  no 
means  shared  so  largely  in  the  philosophic  confidence. 

When  we  come,  therefore,  to  the  second  question,  we  come  to  the 
dividing  point.  The  phenomenal  or  empirical  being  conceded,  the 
great  facts  being,  in  general  estimation,  beyond  dispute,  how  are  we 
to  account  for  them? 

Through  the  whole  range  of  the  perceptive  acts  of  all  educated 
consciousness  there  rises  a  phenomenal  external  world,  whose  normal 
features  are  generically  the  same  to  the  masses  of  men  of  all  lands  and 
of  all  time.     How  are  we  to  account  for  that  phenomenal  world  ? 

The  first  answer  is,  The  phenomenal,  empirical,  external  world 
involves,  as  its  concause,  the  existence  of  a  real,  substantial,  material 
world,  which  is  brought  into  mediated  relations  to  the  mind  through 
the  organs  of  sense,  or  by  the  act  of  God  to  which  they  furnish  occa- 
sion, or  by  a  pre-established  harmony,  or  in  some  unknown  way.  The 
world  is  substantially  real,  the  mind  is  substantially  real ;  phenomena 
are  the  results,  in  some  sense,  of  the  existence  of  both.  This  is  the 
answer  of  Realism.     [117.] 

The  second  answer  is,  either:  The  phenomenal  world  involves  no 
more  than  the  existence  of  mind,  real,  substantial  spirit,  which,  by 
the  action  of  another  mind  or  other  minds  on  it,  or  by  the  laws  of 
its  own  self-originated  conditions,  attains  its  various  states  and  acts  ;  or, 
That  world  involves  no  more  than  ideas,  conscious  states  and  acts, — 


40O 


ANNOTATIONS. 


the  question,  What  is  conscious?  being  thrown  out,  as  beyond  the  reach 
of  knowledge.  The  systems  involved  in  these  answers,  and  pre- 
eminently the  second  (and,  if  logic  be  laid  to  the  line,  only  the  second), 
are  Idealism. 

But  as  the  generally  received  Realism  of  philosophy  is  idealistic  in 
the  recognition  of  the  first  principles  of  human  knowledge,  so  a  great 
deal  of  Idealism,  and  especially  that  of  Berkeley  and  his  school,  has 
been  realistic,  in  acknowledging  real  spirit,  and  in  real  spirits  real 
phenomena  (that  is,  phenomena  objectively  produced,  by  object-spirit, 
not  by  the  subject-mind). 

It  is  not  true  that  Berkeley  maintains  that  all  is  mere  'show,'  or 
'illusion,'  or  'idea.'  In  Berkeley's  view  neither  that  which  receives 
nor  that  which  imparts  ideas  is  an  idea.  Both  the  giver  and  the 
recipient  are  substantial  realities,  and  the  'ideas'  themselves,  either 
directly  or  by  succession,  spring  from  God.  They  are  not  illusions, 
but  divine  verities.  The  objection  is  not  that  they  are  incredibly 
unreal,  but  that  they  are  incredibly  real ;  they  are  not  revelations 
through  media,  but  revelations  direct.  In  an  overwhelming  sense,  in 
Berkeley's  view  of  man,  'the  inspiration  of  the  Almighty  giveth  him 
understanding.'  The  theophany  of  nature  is  one  in  which  God  speaks 
to  man  face  to  face.  Berkeley's  world  is  one  in  which  a  Peniel  is 
never  far  off.  Our  realities  are  indeed  subjective,  for  they  are  ours; 
but  our  subjectivities  are  realities,  for  their  cause,  their  objective  base,  is 
a  substantial  personal  God.  In  this  aspect  Berkeley  claimed  to  be  the 
true  realist, — his  opponents  were  charged  with  unrealism. 

The  philosophical  division  between  the  generally  accepted  Realism 
and  the  various  forms  of  Idealism  turns  entirely  upon  the  answers 
given  to  the  second  question.  There  is  an  unmixed  Realism  which 
acknowledges  nothing  but  the  objectively  real,  and  makes  the  seemingly 
subjective  real  no  more  than  a  phenomenon  of  the  objective.  There  is  an 
absolute  subjective  Idealism  which  acknowledges  nothing  but  the  idea, 
and  makes  the  seemingly  real  in  both  matter  and  mind  mere  conditional 
ideas.  But  the  mass  of  philosophers  are  idealistic  realists,  holding 
to  direct  consciousness  of  the  idea  alone,  but  regarding  the  realistic 
inference  as  valid.  On  the  other  hand,  Berkeley  is  a  realistic  idealist; 
holding  that  the  realistic  inference  is  invalid  as  regards  matter,  but 
conceding  it  as  regards  mind.  He  holds  to  real  substantial  spirits, 
God  and  man.  Hence,  too,  his  monism  is  only  generic.  He  holds  to 
a  monism  of  genus, — to  spirit  alone ;  but  he  concedes  a  dualism  of 
species, — infinite  Spirit,  the  Cause  of  ideas,  and  finite  spirits,  the 
recipients  of  them.     But  this  his  strength  is  also  his  weakness.     Every 


MIND    AND    MATTER. 


401 


moral  advantage  of  his  Idealism  over  its  successors  is  secured  at  the 
expense  of  its  development  and  of  its  logical  consistency. 

[119]     Mind  and  Matter.     Spirit  and  Body. 

Editor  :  No  Physics  can  ever  be  worthy  of  its  name  which  excludes 
Metaphysics;  no  Metaphysics  is  entitled  to  attention  which  does  not 
accept  and  attempt  to  harmonize  the  facts  of  Physics.  Both  by  the 
law  of  its  genesis,  and  of  its  intellectual  supremacy,  J/^/^physics  must 
be  after  Physics,  and  Physics  has  no  intellectual  value  except  as  it 
prepares  the  path  and  the  materials  for  Metaphysics.  Metaphysics  is 
after  Physics,  but  Mind  is  before  both,  and  by  Mind  both  consist.  The 
great  weakness  of  psychology  has  been  that  it  has  not  done  justice  to 
the  personal  unity  of  man.  Receding,  as  it  ought,  from  the  monism 
which  annihilates  either  mind  or  matter,  spirit  or  body,  it  has  run  into 
the  dualism  which  hopelessly  antagonizes  them.  Man  is  a  unit,  beyond 
all  the  ordinary  concessions  of  his  unity.  Up  to  the  last  point  at  which 
human  philosophy  can  trace  him  he  is  an  inseparable  unity.  When 
the  bond  of  that  unity  is  broken,  philosophy  knows  him  no  more.  He 
has  passed  out  of  the  world  whose  best  souls  can  only  love  wisdom,  to 
that  world  whose  pure  intelligences  possess  it.  Philosophy  must  not 
be  a  philosophy  of  mind  apart ;  she  must  not  emphasize  the  and,  and  be 
a  philosophy  of  mind  and  body,  but,  taking  what  God  offers  her, 
become  a  philosophy  of  man.  Except  as  man  she  knows  not  soul ; 
except  as  man  she  knows  not  the  human  body,  for  when  matter  is 
severed  from  the  knitting  soul  which  made  it  body,  it  no  longer  is  for 
her ;  philosophy  surrenders  it  to  the  dissecting-table  or  the  grave. 

No  theory  of  the  body  of  man  is  worthy  of  attention  which  does  not 
acknowledge  the  soul  as  the  controlling  force  of  the  body.  No  theory 
of  the  soul,  as  we  know  the  soul  in  philosophy,  is  entitled  to  respect, 
which  ignores  or  diminishes  the  reality  of  the  personal  union  into 
which  it  has  taken  the  body  with  itself, — a  union  the  most  consummate 
and  absolute  of  which  we  know,  or  of  which  we  can  conceive,  infinitely 
transcending  the  completeness  of  the  most  perfect  mechanical  and 
chemical  unions, — a  union  so  complete  that,  though  two  distinct 
substances  are  involved  in  it,  it  makes  them,  through  a  wide  range  of 
observations,  as  completely  one  to  us  as  if  they  were  one  substance ;  so 
that  we  can  say  the  human  body  does  nothing  proper  to  it  without  the 
soul,  the  human  soul  does  nothing  proper  to  it  without  the  body.  As 
the  soul  operates  through  the  body,  the  body  operates  by  the  soul. 
The  soul  cannot  perform  the  most  exquisite  act  of  abstract  thinking 
without  a  co-operation  of  the  body  which  can  be  distinctly  demon- 

26 


402 


ANNOTATIONS. 


strated,  and  the  most  involuntary  and  trifling  acts  distinctive  of  the 
body  involve  and  demonstrate  the  presence  of  the  soul.  So  much  is 
this  the  case  that,  if  the  body  gave  no  other  evidence  of  the  presence 
of  the  soul  than  the  distinctive  tremulousness  of  the  smallest  muscle, 
or  the  slightest  conceivable  act  involving  true  muscular  movement,  it 
would  constitute  ample  evidence  that  the  soul  was  still  there.  The 
best  modern  science  accepts,  practically  at  least,  these  principles.  The 
extremest  spiritualist  in  philosophy,  though  he  may  talk  the  old  jargon 
which  treats  the  body  as,  if  not  a  prison,  at  least  a  mere  mechanical 
and  chemical  appendage  of  the  soul,  cannot  think  or  write  without 
showing  the  extravagance  and  hollowness  of  his  view.  To  nothing 
does  the  common,  as  well  as  the  educated,  consciousness  more  positively 
testify  than  to  the  personal  unity  of  man ;  his  body  is  not  an  append- 
age to  himself,  but  it  is  a  part  of  himself.  He  is  not,  as  he  has  been 
called,  an  'intelligence  served  by  organs,'  but  he  is  a  being  in  whom 
two  natures  constitute  one  indivisible  person, — that  is,  so  constitute 
the  person  that  if  divided  from  each  other,  absolutely  and  forever,  the 
personality  itself,  as  it  now  exists,  would  lose  its  completeness :  there 
would  remain  after  such  a  dissolution,  not  man,  but  at  most  the  spirit 
of  man,  a  higher  and  nobler  part,  and  yet  but  a  part.  The  soul  of 
man  is  but  a  part  of  man. 

The  dualism  of  the  current  speculation,  most  commonly  allied  with 
what  passes  for  orthodoxy,  is  so  shallow  that  it  has  been  the  great  pro- 
moter of  the  monism  of  Materialism.  Over  against  the  dualism  which 
persists  in  yoking  together  two  heterogeneous  incompatibles,  on  the  one 
side,  and  the  spurious  monism  which  ignores  or  perverts  the  most 
important  and  well-grounded  half  of  the  facts,  on  the  other,  Idealism 
comes  in  to  reach  a  higher  Monism  by  throwing  out  utterly  the  false 
everything  of  Materialism,  and  the  disturbing,  helpless,  useless  one- 
thin^ — matter — of  dualism.  Materialism  abuses  matter,  and  the  re- 
ceived dualism  cannot  use  it ;  and  Idealism  comes  in  to  take  out  of 
the  way  what  is  either  not  used  or  misused.  To  this  hour  Berkeley's 
sarcasm  retains  its  point.  The  mass  of  sticklers  for  substantial  matter 
do  not  know  what  to  do  with  it  when  they  have  it,  and  if  it  could  be 
quietly  taken  away  from  them  they  would  never  miss  it.  It  is  true 
that  over  against  even  this  poor  dualism,  Idealism  demonstrates 
nothing.  So  far  it  has  no  advantage  over  the  other  view.  It  is 
guess  against  guess.  But  it  has  the  charm  of  simplicity.  It  offers 
one  great  absorbing  mystery,  instead  of  a  thousand  frittering,  irritating 
difficulties.  Instead  of  the  perplexity  of  tracing,  and  of  attempting 
in  vain  to  trace,  the  manifold  streams  to  their  obscure  springs,  it  brings 


MIND    AND    MATTER.  403 

before  the  mind  an  all-embracing  ocean  of  speculative  mystery.  It 
goes  forth 

'  dread,  fathomless,  alone." 

It  is  at  least  deep  enough  for  a  despairing  man  to  drown  himself  in. 
Some  of  the  systems  spread  out  great  shallow  morasses  on  bottoms  of 
mud.  You  may  be  stifled  in  them,  but  you  cannot  be  drowned. 
Idealism  is  like  the  old  Church  of  the  West,  resting  on  one  idea,  the 
idea  of  the  One,  building  all  conclusions  on  a  solitary  premise,  giving 
you  all,  to  the  last,  if  you  grant  but  the  first.  Not  without  a  mighty 
charm  for  the  active  mind  in  the  proud  independence  it  offers  him, 
Idealism  also  has  its  fascinations  for  souls  weary  of  the  many  and  of 
the  much,  ready  to  cry, — 

'  The  world  is  too  much  with  us.' 

It  is  the  cloister  of  the  system-worn  thinker.  Relatively  it  meets  some 
great  tendency  of  the  human  mind.  Many  of  the  greatest  minds  have 
been  tempted  by  it, — some  of  the  greatest  have  yielded,  others  have 
resisted  it ;  some  have  dreaded ;  but  no  real  metaphysician  has  despised 
— no  real  metaphysican  can  despise — it.  If  it  be  an  error,  it  is  the 
error  most  difficult  to  sound;  if  it  rest  on  sophisms,  they  are  the  most 
perplexing  of  sophisms.  Herbart,  the  greatest  of  its  direct  assailants 
in  recent  time,  says,  '  Idealism  is  an  opponent  we  dare  not  despise ;  it 
plants  itself  in  our  way,  and  we  must  arm  ourselves  for  the  battle.'1 

It  is  on  grounds  of  great  importance  then  that  able  works  on  '  Body 
and  Mind,'  even  though  written  with  a  prevailingly  physical  or  medical 
aim,  have  a  great  attraction  to  the  true  metaphysician.  Metaphysics 
shall  be  perfect  in  all  its  theories  so  soon  as  physics  shall  be  perfect  in 
its  collection  of  all  its  facts.  The  contempt  which  ignorant  or  arrogant 
physicists  heap  on  metaphysics  is  really  the  disgrace  or  the  misfortune 
of  the  physical  sciences.  Reach  the  demonstrably  absolute  in  physics, 
and  we  shall  not  demand  in  vain  that  the  thinkers  of  the  race  shall 
give  us  a  demonstrably  absolute  philosophy.  On  the  general  theme, 
Mind  and  Matter,  Spirit  and  Body,  the  ages  have  pondered.  A  great 
body  of  literature  exists  in  connection,  in  various  aspects,  with  their 
relations.  Tuke,  one  of  the  most  recent  writers  on  Body  and  Mind,J 
enumerates  ninety  works  among  the  principal  authorities  to  which  he 
refers.  Nearly  all  of  these  are  English,  or  translations  into  English ; 
a  few  are  French.     Not  one,  except  through  translations,  is  German, 

1  Metaphysik,  Werke,  iv.  265. 

»  See  a  review  of  his  'Illustrations  of  the  Influence  of  the  Mind  upon  the  Body,' 
Penn  Monthly,  Oct.  1873,  722-728. 


404  A NN OTA  riO NS. 

though  the  German  possesses,  beyond  all  other  languages  combined,  a 
fund  of  books  bearing  on  this  theme.  In  addition  to  the  ample  treat- 
ment of  the  topic  in  the  systems,  and  the  more  general  psychological, 
anthropological,  practical,  and  religious  works,  there  are  special  treatises 
by  Erdmann  (1837,  1849),  Ennemoser  (1825),  Beneke  (1826),  Beraz 
(1836),  Hilgers  (1834),  Messerschmidt  (1837),  and  by  others  of  more 
recent  date,  devoted  to  the  discussion  of  the  essential  conception  of 
body  and  soul,  their  relation  to  each  other,  their  distinctness,  their 
intimate  reciprocal  action,  and  the  connection  between  just  views  of 
them  and  of  man's  moral  freedom  and  accountability,  the  question 
whether  the  phenomena  of  intellectual  activity  are  mere  operations  of 
a  high  organization,  or  of  an  essence,  united  intimately  indeed  with 
it,  but  distinct,  spiritual,  immortal. 

The  whole  body  of  evidence  in  regard  to  mind  and  matter  justifies 
certain  conclusions  in  regard  to  soul  and  body.  First,  they  prove  that 
soul  and  body  are  distinct.  Their  laws  of  action  on  each  other  belong 
neither  in  species  nor  in  genus  to  any  of  the  departments  of  physical 
power.  No  analogies  exist  to  them,  even  in  the  subtlest  forms  in  which 
matter  is  operative.  Matter  is  operative  on  mind,  but  under  laws 
wholly  distinct  from  those  by  which  it  operates  on  unpsychical  matter. 
Light  operates  on  the  mind  in  awakening  consciousness,  perception, 
certain  sensations  of  pleasure,  but  not  as  it  operates  in  the  whole  sphere 
of  the  unpsychical.  The  operation  of  light  and  of  all  matter  on  the 
body  is  accompanied  by  entirely  distinct  sets  of  results,  when  the  body 
is  possessed  of  the  soul,  and  again  when  it  is  destitute  of  it.  Fire 
will  not  burn  a  living  body  in  precisely  the  same  manner  in  which  it 
burns  a  dead  one,  and  the  vast  array  of  forces  which  dissolve  the  dead 
body  are  the  elements  of  the  life  and  power  of  the  living  body. 
Oxygen  consumes  the  dead  body :  the  living  body  consumes  oxygen 
and  converts  it  into  force. 

Second,  the  facts  show  that  though  body  and  soul  are  distinct,  their 
unity  is  very  close,  so  close  and  peculiar  that  out  of  it  arises  what  is  so 
transcendently  wonderful  that  up  to  this  hour  it  has  failed  of  due 
recognition,  though  the  evidences  of  it  have  such  overwhelming  force 
that  glimpses  of  it  exist  from  the  earliest  time  and  through  all  time. 
This  great  ignored  or  imperfectly  recognized  principle  is  the  principle 
of  the  personal 'fellowship  of  attributes ;  that  is,  that  in  the  unity  of  the 
person,  by  it,  and  in  consequence  of  it,  the  two  essences  really  share 
each  other's  properties,  so  that  we  have  a  personally  corporeal  soul  and 
a  personally  psychical  body.  In  consequence  of  this  the  body  receives, 
in  its  personal  union  with  the  soul,  real  attributes  which  it  cannot  have 


MIND    AND    MATTER.  405 

outside  of  that  union,  and  which,  within  it,  give  to  it  capacities  which 
mere  impersonal  matter  cannot  possess.  The  'seeing  eye'  and  ' hearing 
ear'  are  not  mere  forms  of  phrase,  but  the  eye  does  really  see  by  the 
soul,  as  the  soul  sees  through  the  eye.  The  nerve  which  thrills  with  the 
pain  feels  pain  by  the  soul,  as  the  soul  feels  pain  through  the  nerve. 
There  is  one  real,  indivisible,  personal  act. 

Every  sensation,  perception,  cognition,  imagination,  involves  a  real 
conjoint  affection  or  action  of  the  personal  soul,  and  of  the  personalized 
organ.  The  soul  is  not  a  spider  in  the  centre  of  a  cobweb  of  nerves, 
but  is  an  essence,  which  has  evolved  organism  by  taking  matter  into 
personal  union  with  itself,  and  which  gives  to  the  nerves  power  to  feel 
by  it,  as  it  uses  the  nerves  in  turn  to  receive  influence  through  them, 
neither  ever  acting  apart  from  the  other.  The  two  sets  of  acts  are,  in 
a  certain  sense,  distinct  as  the  essences  themselves  are ;  in  some  cases 
the  intervals  can  be  marked  by  time,  but  their  coalescence  is  the  act 
of  consciousness,  the  act  of  their  complete  unity.  The  separate  action 
of  touch  upon  the  nerves  is  conveyed  with  an  ascertainable  interval  to 
the  soul,  but  t he  perceived  touch  is  that  in  which  the  separation  ceases, 
and  the  one  indivisible  act  of  consciousness,  in  the  personal  mind  and 
the  personalized  body,  takes  place.  There  is  no  interval  in  perception. 
It  takes  place  indivisibly,  in  the  mind  through  the  nerve,  and  in  the 
nerve  by  the  mind.  The  motion  which  becomes  a  co-factor  in  percep- 
tion takes  time,  but  the  perception  takes  none.  Meanwhile,  the  nerve 
has  not  acted  apart  from  the  mind ;  the  soul  has  not  been  separated 
from  it  in  the  interval  of  unconsciousness;  the  soul  has  given  the  nerve 
its  nerve-power.  The  power  of  the  nerve  to  transmit  depends  upon  its 
personal  organic  union  with  the  soul.  The  nerve  of  a  dead  body 
carries  no  force  from  a  touch.  The  nerve  receives  real  attributes  from 
the  soul  in  the  union,  and  in  this  personal  connection,  and  because  of 
it,  though  real  matter,  does  what  matter,  as  such,  cannot  do, — it  feels ; 
feels  none  the  less  really  because  it  feels  by  the  soul.  The  people  and 
the  philosophers  here,  as  in  many  cases,  divide  the  truth  between  them. 
The  illiterate  man  thinks  that  the  pain  is  in  his  toe,  and  not  in  his 
mind ;  the  philosopher  thinks  the  pain  is  in  his  mind,  and  not  in  his  toe. 
The  fact  is,  it  is  in  both.  The  nerve  has  real  pain  by  the  mind,  the 
mind  real  pain  through  the  nerve.  The  pain  is  in  both,  indivisibly, — 
not  two  pains,  but  one  pain ;  not  two  parts  of  one  pain,  but  a  pain 
without  parts  in  one  person ;  in  the  mind  as  person,  in  the  body  as 
personalized  by  the  mind.  It  can  exist  in  neither  without  the  personal 
co-operation  of  the  other.  Take  away  the  nerve  from  the  organism, 
and  neither  nerve  nor  mind  can  feel  pain ;  abstract  the  mind  by  an 


4o6  A  NN  O  TA  TIONS. 

intense  interest,  and  neither  mind  nor  nerve  feels  pain.  We  can  hold 
a  burning  coal  within  our  hand  by  thinking  on  the  frosty  Caucasus, — 
on  a  simple  condition, — that  we  think  of  nothing  else.  We  assert  that 
there  is  no  cure  for  the  spurious  monism  of  Materialism  and  Idealism 
on  the  one  side,  and  for  the  hopeless  dualism  which  reigns  in  the 
current  philosophy  and  the  popular  thinking  on  the  other,  except  in 
the  recognition  of  the  personal  unity  of  man, — the  monism  of  person 
harmonizing  the  duality  of  natures.  Man  is  not  two  persons,  or  a 
jumble  of  person  and  non-person, — a  muddle  of  spirit  resenting  matter, 
and  of  matter  clogging  and  embarrassing  spirit.  Man  is  a  personal 
unity.  Man  is  a  unity  of  two  parts.  In  this  is  implied  that  the  parts 
are  not  co-ordinate  and  independent.  Two,  as  two,  cannot  be  one. 
One  must  be  first,  the  other  second;  one  must  be  higher,  the  other 
lower;  one  must  depend,  the  other  sustain;  one  must  have  personality, 
the  other  must  receive  it. 

Physics  and  Metaphysics,  the  former  negatively,  the  latter  positively, 
demonstrate  that  the  psychical  is  the  first,  the  higher,  the  sustainer, 
the  personal;  the  physical  is  the  second,  the  lower,  the  dependent,  the 
personalized.  The  entire  world  of  the  conscious,  taking  the  term 
conscious  in  its  widest  reach,  shows  that  the  psychical  in  the  organism 
is  that  for  which  the  physical  in  it  exists.  The  reason  why  the  matter 
of  an  oyster's  organism  is  not  left  inorganic  is  found  in  the  psychical 
element  of  the  oyster.  The  matter  in  his  organism  is  all  arranged  in 
adaptation  to  his  little  circle  of  sensations  and  perceptions.  Taking 
it  for  granted  that  all  conscious  being  is  in  part  an  object  for  itself,  the 
conscious  element  is  that  to  which  the  material  element  is  adjusted. 
All  nature  illustrates  this.  The  inorganic  is  for  the  organic.  The 
organic  is  for  the  psychical  in  it.  The  psychical,  then,  is  first.  It  is 
the  conditioning  power  of  the  material.  It  is  the  organizing  force 
which  lifts  the  organic  out  of  the  inorganic.  The  reason  why  that 
which  grows  from  the  germ  of  an  oyster  differs  from  that  which  grows 
from  the  germ  of  a  man,  is  not  in  the  material,  as  physical  science 
knows  it.  The  difference  in  the  material  is  already  conditioned  with 
reference  to  the  character  and  purpose  of  the  psychical.  The  chemical 
and  all  the  physical  differences  between  the  two  germs  shed  no  light 
on  the  differences  of  the  result.  The  psychic  is  not  a  mere  undis- 
covered material  force, — it  is  a  force  generically  different  from  matter. 

The  elementary  psychical  is  as  multiform  and  varied  as  the  element- 
ary physical,  and  out  of  its  varieties,  assimilating  the  varieties  of  the 
material,  each  to  its  own  wants,  arises  the  organic  world. 

What  are  the  psychical  and  the  organic?    They  are  the  embodiment 


MIND    AND    MATTER.  407 

of  two  great  ideas, — creator  and  creature,  artificer  and  workmanship, 
the  plastic  power  and  the  moulded  matter.  The  universe  is  the  out- 
thought  of  God,  and  God's  out-thought  can  be  nothing  other  than  the 
revelations  of  his  own  mind  and  activity.  He  is  conscious,  free  Cre- 
ator, Artificer,  Moulder.  His  work  is  creation,  the  Divine  Art  of 
Nature,  the  shape  through  which  the  finite  shifts  in  the  eternal  and 
infinite  line  of  grace,  power,  and  mystery.  In  the  psychical,  God 
posits  the  forces  which  are  shadows  and  remembrancers  of  his  own 
creative,  plastic  power,  and  puts  it  into  nature  for  its  work  of  sub- 
creation.  The  psychical  is,  in  a  larger  or  smaller  sphere,  a  Vice- 
Creator,  in  which  a  determinate  set  of  forces  is  divinely  immanent. 
The  psychical  enfolds  the  plan,  the  material  submits  to  plan,  and  the 
organic  is  the  result.  The  organic  is  the  harmony  of  the  psychical 
and  material  in  plan.  As  the  psychical  is  a  little  sub-creator,  the 
organic  is  a  little  sub-creation,  in  which  the  psychical  remains  imma- 
nent, as  the  sub-cause.  Each  organism  is  the  rising  of  a  new  world 
of  order  out  of  the  chaos  of  the  inorganic.  On  each  little  deep,  minia- 
ture of  the  vast  whole,  hovers  and  broods  the  psychic  spirit,  with  the 
less  or  greater  measure  of  embodied  force  appointed  to  it.  This  power 
of  the  psychic  on  the  physical  is  followed,  as  God  pleases,  by  the  feeble 
glimmer  of  mere  sensation,  never  growing,  or  by  the  day-spring  of  a 
light  whose  noon  is  the  resplendent  glory  of  reason  and  immortality. 


INDEX. 


The  leading  topics  of  the  Prolegomena  are  indexed  by  the  divisions 
and  paragraphs.  The  pages  are  given  where  a  minuter  subdivision  is 
necessary. 

The  Prefaces  of  Fraser  and  Berkeley  are  indexed  by  the  page. 

The  Introduction  and  the  Principles  of  Berkeley  are  indexed  by 
paragraphs,  and  this  Index  answers  for  every  edition  of  them.  The 
Appendixes  are  indicated  by  Letters. 

The  Annotations  are  indexed  by  their  Numbers  in  brackets  [  ]. 

ABBREVIATIONS. 

/^(troduction)  of  Berkeley. 

Prefaces)  of  Fraser  and  Berkeley. 

jPr»*(ciples). 

./V<?/(egomena) . 

«(otes)  by  Fraser,  at  the  foot  of  the  page. 


Abbild  (image),  Prin.  \  140. 
Absolute  dependence,  Prin.  \  88,  155. 
"         matter,  18. 
"         space,  no. 
"         truth,  76. 
Absoluteness  of  primary  qualities,  Prin.  \ 

12,  n. 
Abstract  existence,  Prin.  \  4. 
Abstract  ideas,  In.  \  6,  10,  «.,  II,  12,  14, 

15,  18;  Prin.  \  5,  11,  17,97,  143. 
Abstract  ideas,  Ueberweg  on,  [n]. 
Abstraction,  Pref.   154;  In.  \  8,   10,  II, 

17,  19,  «.,  23;  Prin.  \  5,  [n,  12,]  100, 

[95] ;  App.  A. 
Abstraction,  Ueberweg  on,  [5,  n,  12]. 
Accidents,  Prin.  \  73. 
Activity,  Prin.  \  61. 


Advantages   of    considering   ideas   apart 
from  names,  In.  \  21-24,  [7];  App.  A. 
Alciphron,  Prol.  I.  \  8. 
Algebra,  names  like  the  letters  in,  In.  \  19. 
America,  Berkeley  visits,  Prol.  I.  \  6. 

"         lines  on,  6. 

"         returns  from,  7. 

"         adherents  of  Berkeley  in,  Prol. 

IV-  \  is- 

Analogies,  caution  in,  Prin.  §  106-108. 
Analyst,  on  motion,  Prin.  \  112,  ». 

"        on  infinite    divisibility,  130,  «., 
[no]. 
Annihilation  and  creation  every  moment, 

Prin.  \  45,  56,  [57],  48,  [66]. 
'An  sich,'  existence,  things,  [9,  81,  86, 
90]. 

409 


4io 


INDEX. 


Antipodes,  Prin.  \  55. 

A  posteriori  arguments,  Prin.  \  21,  [34, 

108],  129. 
Apparatus,  Prin.  §  61. 
Appendixes  to  Principles,  Prol.  XV.  $  3. 
"  A.  Rough  draft  of  Principles, 

283. 
"  B.  Arthur  Collier,  317. 

"  C.  Theory  of  Vision  vindi- 

cated, 323. 
Apperception  defined,  [117] 
Apple,  Prin.  \  1. 
A  priori  arguments,  Prin.  §21,  [34,  108], 

129. 
Arbitrary   character   of  laws   of    nature, 

Prin.  \  31,  [46]. 
Archetype  of  sensible  system,  the  divine 

idea  the  ultimate,  Prin.  \  71,  [83]. 
Archetypes,  external,  Prin.    \   87;    Pref. 

158;   Prin.  \  9,  41,  «.,  99. 
Aristotelian  scholastic  definition  of  idea, 

CO- 

Aristotle,  materia  prima,  Prin.  §11. 
Arithmetic,  its  object,  Prin.  \  119,  121. 

"  regards  signs,  not  things,  122. 

Arrogance,   fostered   by    Idealism,    Prol. 

XIV.  \  13. 
Atheism,    atheists,    Prin.    \    35,   92,   94, 

[116],  154,  155. 
Attraction,  Prin.  \  103,  104,  [97]. 
Attribute  defined,  Prin.  \  49. 
Attributes,  personal,  fellowship  of  in  man, 

[119]. 
Augustine,  existence  of  an  external  world 

not  demonstrable,  Prol.  III.  \  15. 

Bacon  and  Berkeley,  Prol.  II.  §  I. 

"       In.  $  17;   Prin.  \  107. 
Baxter,  Andrew,  opponent  of  Berkeley, 

Prol.  V.  \  3. 
Beasley,  F.,  Dr.,  opposes  Berkeley,  Prol. 

V.  §  16.     (See  Princeton.) 
Beattie,  opponent  of  Berkeley,  Prol.  V.  \  8. 

"      defines  'common  sense,'  \  8. 
Beck   shows   that  the   critical    system  is 

Idealistic,  87. 
Begriff,  -e,  a  notion,  Prin.  \  74,  140,  142. 
notions,  143;  In.  \  6. 


Begriff,  -e,  ideas,  [46]. 
Being  (Wesens,  eines  Etwas,  eines  Seien 
den),   incomprehensible,  abstract   idea 
of,  Prin.  §  17,  74. 
Being,  conception  of  intelligible,  Prin.  \ 

99,  n. 
Being,  and  being  perceived,  Prin.  \  6. 

"      Ueberweg  on,  [13]. 
Beneke  disputes  Kant's  method,  [81]. 

"       on  body  and  soul,  [119]. 
Beraz,  on  body  and  soul,  [119]. 
Berkeley,    Life   and    Writings,   Prol.  I. : 
early  life,  works,  travels,  #    1-3,  6,  7; 
bishop,  8 ;  controversies,  mathematical, 
9;     death,  at  Oxford,   11  ;    works,  12, 
13;  translations  of,  14. 
Berkeley, precursors  of,  Prol.  II. 

"         System,  summaries  of,  Prol.  III. 
"         estimates  of  character,  writings, 
and  influence,  Prol.  VI.    (See 
Berke/eyanism.) 
"         Principles,  present  edition,  char- 
acteristics of,  Prol.  XV. 
"         a  student  of  Locke's  Essay,  Pref. 

153- 

"         influenced  by  Malebranche,  153. 

"         combats  Locke,  154. 

"         Idealism  and  Realism,  155,  n. 

"         follows  Locke,  In.  \  6,  n. 

"         proof  of  his  doctrine,  Prin.  \  3, 

4,  «. 
"         held  unity  of  substance,  7. 
"         assumes  causality,  26,  n. 
"         connects   cause   and   substance, 

37.  »• 

"         what  meant  by  his  potential  ex- 
istence, 45,  11. 

"         on  continual  creation,  46,  n. 

"         ort  miracles,  84. 

"         abolishes  representative  idea  in 
perception,  86,  n. 

"         holds  a  sort  of  spiritual  positiv- 
ism, 102,  n. 

"         a  true  realist,  [118]. 

"         his  monism  only  generic,  [118]. 

"         his  dualism,  [1 18]. 
Berkeleyanism,  its  friends,  affinities,  and 
influence,  Prol.  IV. ;  influence  of,  §  1 ; 


INDEX. 


411 


first  reception,  2;  opponents  and  objec- 
tions to,  V.;  ridicule  of,  I. 

Bewusstseyn,  consciousness,  [117]. 

Blackwell,  estimate  of  Berkeley,  Prol.  VI. 

2  3- 
Bodies,  external,  useless,  Prin.  \  18,  19, 
20;  denied  by  Ueberweg,  [32]. 
"       exist  in  the  mind,  23 ;  denied  by 

Ueberweg,  [37]. 
"       do  not  exist  when  not  perceived, 
47,  [60]. 
Body,  spirit  and,  [118]. 
Bolingbroke  on  abstract  ideas,  In.  \  10,  n. 
Brahm,    Brahma,  and    Schelling's    God, 

Prol.  XI.  9S-100. 
Brain,  Schopenhauer  on,  Prol.  XIII.  1 14. 
Brockhaus  (Real-Encyclop.): 

"  summary    of    Berkeley,   Prol. 

III.  I  II. 
"  Idealism  defined,  VII.  \  II. 

"  Realism  defined,  [117]. 

Brown,  Thomas,  Dr.,  on  Idealism,  and 
Reid,  Prol.  V.  \  15. 
"  on  power  in  ideas,  Prin.  \  25,  n. 

"         eliminates  all  power  from  material 

world,  32,  n. 
"      •    definition  of  consciousness,  [117]. 
Browne,  Peter,  Bishop,  controversy  with 
Berkeley,  Prol.  I.  \  7. 
"  on  abstract  ideas,  In.  \  IO,  n. 

Bruno  and  Schelling,  Prol.  XI.  97. 
"      and  Spinoza,  1 18. 
"      coincidence  of  opposites,  [117]. 
Buddhism,  Schopenhauer  on,  Prol.  XIII. 

116,  117. 
Buhle,  arguments  against  Berkeley,  Prol. 

V.?  11. 
Burthogge,  Prol.  II.  \  7. 
Butler,  Bishop,  on  atheism,  Prin.  \  145,  n. 

Calculus,  differential,  Prin.  \  132. 

"  infinitesimal,  130,  [109]. 

Cartesian  theory  of  occasional  causes,  Prin. 
§69. 
"  "       of  nature,  102. 

"  "       of  brutes,  Ueberweg,  [3]. 

Causality,  Schopenhauer  on,  Prol.  XIII. 
109. 


Causality  and  Idealism,  Prol.  XIV.  \  7. 
"        principles  of,  assumed  and  inter- 
preted by  Berkeley,  Prin.  \ 
26,  n. 
"        notion  of,  31,  32. 
"        views  of  Locke,  Hume,  Reid, 
Maine  de  Biran,  Kant,  Fichte, 
Schelling,  [46,47]. 
Causation,  physical,  contrasted  with  spirit- 
ual, Prin.  $  65,  u. 
Cause,  final,  Schopenhauer  on,  Prol.  XIII. 
109. 
"      and  Idealism,  XIV.  \  7. 
"      free  voluntary  activity,  Pref.  165. 
"      substance  connected  with,  Prin.  \ 

27,  n. 
"      corporeal,  53,  [71]. 
"      and  effect,  65. 
"       spirit  the  only  efficient,  102. 
Che>eh'en's    account    of  the   blind   boy, 

App.  C,  323;  Prol.  XV.  I  3. 
Chimeras,  difference  between  real  things 

and,  Prin.  \  34. 
Clarke,  S.,  opposed  to  Berkeley,  Prol.V.g  2. 
"     approaches  his  views,  V.  2. 
"     on  continual  creation,  Prin.  \  46,  n. 
"     on  the  being  and  attributes  of  God, 
117,  n. 
Coexistent  qualities,  idea  of,  In.  \  9. 
Collier,  theory  of  matter,  Prin.  \  49,  n. 
"        incidents  of  his  life,  App.  B. 
"        theory  of  inexistence,  App.  B. 
"        his  philosophy  applied  to   Chris- 
tian theology,  App.  B. 
"        introduction  to  his  Clavis,  App.  B. 
"        makes  sense-perception  and  im- 
agination differ  only  in  degree, 
App.  B. 
and  Berkeley,  Prol.  I.  \  5 ;  App.  B. 
Colour  and  extension,  In.  \  7,  8 ;  Prin.  \  99. 
Colours,  secondary  qualities,  Prin.  \  9,  10. 
"         exist  no  longer  than  perceived, 
46;  [58]. 
Commonplace  Book,  Pref.  171,  n. 
Common  sense,  argument  from,  Prin.  \ 

54,  n. 
Communication,  abstract  ideas  not  neces- 
sary for,  In.  \  14. 


412 


INDEX. 


Comte,  on  power  in  ideas,  Prin.  \  25,  n. 

"        eliminates  all  power  from  material 
world,  32,  tt. 

"        on  the  universe,  155,  «. 
Conceive,  we  cannot,  of  things  existing 

unconceived,  Prin.  \  23 ;  Ueberweg  on, 

[36]. 
Conform,  [91]. 
Conformable,  the  perceived,  to  the  unper- 

ceived,  Prin.  \  86;  [91]. 
Conscious    experience,  objects    of,  what, 

Pref.  157. 
Consciousness,  generally  recognized  prin- 
ciples in  regard  to,  Ideal- 
ism rests  on,  Prol.  XIV. 

Si. 

"  definitions  of,  [117]. 

Consequences   of  Principles    of    Human 
Knowledge,  Pref.  157;  Prin.  \  86. 

Copernican  system,  Prin.  \  51. 

Corporeal  causes,  Prin.  \  53. 
"         substances,  19. 

Creation,  continual,  advocated  by  school- 
men, Prin.  \  46,  [59]. 

Creative  act  continuous,  Prin.  \  152. 

Cudworth  on  abstract  ideas,  In.  \  10,  «. 

•  Darstellen ' — present   themselves,    Prin. 

S29. 
Day,  our  own,  Berkeleyanism  in,  Prol.  IV. 

15- 

Death   and  life,  Schopenhauer  on,  Prol. 

XIII.  I  24. 
Deception  of  words,  In.  \  23,  24. 
Definition,  [95]. 
Demi-atheism,  Prin.  \  155. 
Demonstration,   Berkeley  claims,  Prin.  \ 

61,  [75]- 
Derodon  on  abstract  ideas,  In.  \  10,  n. 
Descartes  and  Berkeley,  Prol.  II.  \  3. 
"         theory   of    matter,    Pref.    154; 

Prin.  I  73,  n. 
"         on  man's  finite  mind,  In.  \  2,  n. 
"         on  principles  of  knowledge,  5,  n. 
"         on  causality  in  sensible  things, 

Prin.  §  52,  ;/. 
"         on   the    existence   of    sensible 
things,  88,  H. 


Descartes  on  idea,  [1]. 

"         on  animals,  In.  \  II,  [3]. 

"         on  consciousness,  [117]. 
Dictionnaire  des  Sciences  Philosophiques, 

objections  to  Berkeley,  Prol.  V.  \  17. 
Diderot   opposed   to    Berkeley,  Prol.  V. 

I  7- 
Distance,  Prin.  \  42,  43,  [54]. 
Distrust  of  senses  by  philosophers,  Prin. 

§88. 
Divine   ideas   and   will   coincident  with 
laws  of  nature,  Prin.  \ 
57,  n. 
"  "      ultimate  archetype  of  sen- 

sible system,  72,  n. 
Divine   thought,   absolute   truth,  Prin.  \ 

76,  n. 
Divisibility,  infinite,  Prin.  \  47,  [61,  62, 

63,  64,  65],  124,  [107]. 
Divisible,  infinitely,  Prin.  \  128,  129,  130, 

[no]. 

Douval,  Jouve,   Idealism   defined,   Prol. 

VII.  \  9. 
Dreams,  ideas  in,  Prin.  \  18,  [30]. 
Dualism,  Berkeley's,  Pref.  155,  [118]. 
"         or  intelligible  Realism,  Prin.  \ 

3.  »• 
"         spurious,  [119]. 
Duality  of  existence   held   by  Berkeley, 

Prin.  \  7,  n. 
Dublin  University  and  Berkeley,  Prol.  IV. 

§12. 
Durandus,  the  world  a  machine,  Prin.  \ 

46,  «. 
Duty,  Prin.  \  156. 

Edinburgh  Review  on  Berkeley,  Prol.  VI. 

(12. 
Editor,  American,  Prolegomena,  1-148. 
"       translation  of  Ueberweg's  notes  on 

Berkeley,  329-407. 
"       additional    notes:    idea,    abstract 

idea,  [1]. 
"       on    objects   of  knowledge,    ideas, 

[8],  337-340. 
"       on  esse,  percipi,  [9]. 
"       on  primary  and  secondary,  [17]. 
"       on  matter,  [18]. 


INDEX. 


413 


Editor,  American,  on   similar   and    like, 
[21]. 
"       on  things  in  themselves,  [38]. 
"       on'eatinganddrinkingideas,'[5l]. 
"       on  New  Theory  of  Vision,  [55]. 
"       on  transubstantiation,  [88]. 
"       on  Ueberweg's  view  of  the  con- 
formity of  the  perceived  to  the 
unperceived,  [91]. 
"       on  infinitesimals,  [no]. 
"       on  immortality  of  the  soul,  [in], 
"       on  opinion  and  character,  [112]. 
"       Idealism,  basis  of;  consciousness; 

Realism,  [117]. 
"       Idealism,  its  question,  [118]. 
"       body  and  mind,  matter  and  spirit, 
[II9]. 
Edwards,  Jon.,  views  in  consonance  with 
Berkeley's,  Prol.  IV.  \  4. 
"         said  to  be  in  affinity  with  Spi- 
noza's, 4. 
Efficient  cause  none  but   spirit,  Prin.  \ 

102. 
Ego  is   substantial   and    causal,   Prin.   \ 
142,  n. 
the  non-Ego  given  in,  [118]. 
Eleati,  Pantheists,  Prol.  XIII.  117. 
Ennemoser,  body  and  soul,  [1 19]. 
Entity,  abstract  idea  of,  Prin.  \  81. 
Epicureans,  Prin.  \  93,  [93]. 
Erdmann,  objections   to   Berkeley's   sys- 
tem, Prol.  V.  \  14. 
"  point     of     modern     division, 

["7]. 

"  on  body  and  mind,  [119]. 

Esse  is  percipi  in  unthinking  things,  Prin. 

I  3- 
Ueberweg  on,  [9]. 
Essence  nominal,  Prin.  §  102. 

"  oiiala,  [96]. 

Exist    (existiren),    existence,   Prin.   \   3, 

[9],  35- 
Existence,  abstract  idea  of,  Prin.  §  81. 
"  of  an  idea  consists  in  its  being 

perceived,  2. 
"         intelligible  conception  of,  89,  n. 
Experience,  conscious   objects  of,   what, 
Pref.  157. 


Experience,  presentative  and  representa- 
tive, Pref.  159. 
Extension  (ausdehnung),  &c,  only  ideas, 
Prin.  I  9 ;  denied  by  Ueber- 
weg, [19]. 
"  neither  great  nor  small,  is  no- 

thing, 1 1 ;  denied  by  Ueber 
weg,  [23]. 
"  and  colour,  99. 

"  and  figure,  49,  [68]. 

"  abstraction  frames  the  idea  of 

colour  exclusive  of,  In.  \  8. 
"  a  primary  quality,  Prin.  \  9. 

"  and  motion,  10,  161. 

"  Ueberweg  on,  [21]. 

"  the  characteristic  of  the  mate- 

rial world,  II,  ft. 
"  an  accident  of  matter,  16. 

"  an  object  of  geometry,  123. 

"  finite,  124,  [106,  107]. 

External  bodies,  supposition  of,  Prin.   \ 
19,  20. 
"  "        their    existence   within 

our  knowledge    im- 
possible, 20. 
External  things    (aussere)    are  perceived 

by  sense,  Prin.  \  90. 
Externality,  how  seen,  Pref.  156;  Prin.  \ 

90,  n. 
Eyes,  Prin.  §  29,  [43]. 

Fall,  dogma  of,  Schopenhauer  on,  Prol. 

XIII.  119. 
Ferrier,  Prof.,  on  perception  and  matter, 
Prin.  \  50,  n. 
"        friend  of  Berkeleyanism,  Prol.  IV. 
§6. 
Fichte,  system  of,  Prol.  X. 

"       compared  with  Schelling,  97,  98. 
"       his  trilogie,  Hegel  adopts,  102. 
"       and  Hegel,  103. 
"       illustration    of   the    arrogance    of 

Idealism,  Prol.  XIV.  \  13. 
"       ■  thing  in  itself,'  Prol.  X.,  [81]. 
"       'Messiah  of  Idealism,'  [117]. 
Figure,  a  primary  quality,  Prin.  §  9. 
Fire,  idea  of,  and  real  fire,  Prin.  \  41. 
"     Locke  on,  [53]. 


414 


INDEX. 


Fleming,  Realism  defined,  [117]. 
Fraser,  summary  of  Berkeley,  Prol.  III. 

§13- 

"       on  Berkeleyanism  in  our  day,  Prol. 

IV.  \  5- 
friendly  to  Berkeleyanism,  13. 
opinion  of  Baxter,  Andrew,  Prol. 

V.  §3- 
on  Hamilton's  natural  Realism,  20. 
estimate  of  Berkeley,  Prol.   VI. 

§18. 
edition  of  Berkeley's  works,  Prol. 

XV.  I  1;  XVI.  \  1,2. 
notes  to  Principles,  Prol.  XV.  \  2. 
definition  of  consciousness,  [117]. 
Freedom,  Prin.  \  57,  93. 

Gassendi,  on  abstract  ideas,  In.  \  10,  n. 
General,  how  idea  becomes,  In.  g  12. 
General  ideas  not  denied,  In.  \  12. 
Generalization,  Locke  on,  In.  \\\. 
Geometry,  objects  of,  Prin.  \  123. 
German  metaphysical  terms,  Prol.  XV.  \  8. 
Germany,  Berkeley  in,  Prol.  IV.  \  14. 
Geulinx,  on  causality  in  sensible  things, 
Prin.  I  53,  n. 
"         on  matter,  70,  «.,  [71]. 
God,  natura  naturans  is,  Prin.  §  147,  148, 
152. 
"     his   existence   known   like   that   of 

men,  145,  n. 
"     is  known  certainly,  164,  174. 
"     ideas  of,  71,  [83]. 
"     seeing  things  in,  Malebranche's  view, 
148,  [115].     (See  Nature,  author 
of,  language  of.) 
Gravitation.     (See  Attraction.') 

"  not  essential  to  bodies,  Prin. 

§106. 
"  denied  by  Ueberweg,  [99]. 

Grote,    Prof.    John,    tends    to    Berkeley- 
anism, Prol.  IV.  \  7. 

Hantaan,  Berkeley  and  Hume,  Prol.  VI. 
?I7. 
"  Idealism  and  Realism,  [117]. 

Hamilton,  Sir  William,  on  Reid,  Stewart, 
Idealism,  Prol.  V.  \  20. 


Hamilton,  Sir  William,  natural   Realism 
of,  Fraser's  estimate  of,  Prol. 
V.  \  20. 
"  on  Berkeley,  Prol.  VI.  \  14. 

Idealism  defined,  Prol.VII.  §13. 
"  consciousness  defined,  [117]. 

"  Realism  defined,  [117]. 

"  Idealism  and  Realism,  [117]. 

"  his  '  natural  Realism,'  [118]. 

"  ideas  of  sense  exist  without  the 

mind,  Prin.  \  8,  n. 
"  on    representative    perception, 

86,  n. 
"  on  previous  existence  of  every 

new  phenomenon,  106,  n. 
Happiness,  Prin.  \  100. 
Heat  and  cold,  Prin.  \  14,  32. 

"  "       Ueberweg  on,  [26]. 

Hegel,  summary  of  Berkeley,  Prol.  III. 

§7. 
"       objections  to  Berkeley,   Prol.  V. 

813. 

"       system  of,  Prol.  XII. 
Hegel,  [81]. 

Hegelian  schools,  Prol.  XII.  104. 
Herbart  and    Schopenhauer,   Prol.  XIII. 

106,  121;    [81,86]. 
Herder,  on  Kant,  Prol.  IX.  86. 
Heyse,  Realism  defined,  [117]. 
Hilgers,  on  soul  and  body,  [119]. 
Hillebrand,  summary  of  Berkeley,  Prol. 

HI.  I  5- 
Hobbes  and  Berkeley,  Prol.  II.  2. 
"       referred  to,  In.  §  6,  [93]. 
Hobbists,  Prin.  g  93,  [93]. 
Home,    Henry,    of    Karnes,    opposed   to 

Berkeley,  Prol.  V.  \  5. 
Hume,   on   Berkeley's  philosophy,  Prol. 
VI.  4. 
Idealism  of,  Prol.  VIII. 
"        refers  to  Berkeley  as  a  nominalist, 

In.  \  6,  n. 
"        on  power  in  ideas,  Prin.  \  25,  «., 

30,  n. 
"       eliminates  all  power  from  material 

world,  32,  n. 
"       on  theory  of  universal  energy  of 
Supreme  Being,  72,  n. 


INDEX. 


415 


Hume,  on  representative  perception,  Prin. 
§  86,  n. 
"      on  the  universe,  155,  ft. 
"      as  pessimist,  119. 

Idea.     (See  Ideas.) 

defined,  Prin.  §  5,  «.,  49,  «.,  89. 
none  of  substance,  In.  g  14,  n. 
nor  of  spirit,  Prin.  (j  135. 
its  esse  is  percipi,  2. 
implies  passiveness,  25. 
denied  by  Ueberweg,  [39]. 
in  contradistinction  to  thing,  39. 
history  of  the  word  :  how  should  it 
be  expressed  in  German  in  trans- 
lating Berkele-y ,  Ueberweg  on,  [  I  ] . 
"      can  be  like  nothing  but  an  idea,  8. 
"      Ueberweg  denies  it,  [15]. 
"      distinct  from    its   being   perceived, 

45.  [57]- 
Ideal  and  real  not  identical,  Prol.  XIII. 

US- 
Idealism   defined,  Prol.  VII. 

"  definitions  of,  diversity,  \  15. 

"  development  of,  from  Berkeley 

to  the  present,  Prol.  VIII.- 

XIII. 
"  sceptical,  Prol.  VIII. 

"  critical,  Prol.  IX. 

"  sub'ective,  Prol.  X. 

"  objective,  Prol.  XI. 

"  absolute,  Prol.  XII. 

"  theoretical,  Prol.  XIII. 

"  ancient,  Schopenhauer  on,  107. 

"  modern    development,    history 

of,  by  Schopenhauer,  108. 
"  systems  of,  contemporary  with 

Schopenhauer,      contrasted, 

108. 
M  strength  and  weakness  of,  Prol. 

XIV.  122-142. 
"  received  in  the  East,  rejected  in 

the  West,  \  14. 
"  versatility  of,  15. 

"  not  ripest  result  of  speculation, 

16. 
"  logical  issues  of,  19. 

"  Fichte's  description  of,  20. 


Idealism  and  Realism,  Berkeley's,  Pref. 

»55- 

"  basis  of,  general  recognition  of, 

[»7]. 
"  what   is   not   and    what  is   its 

question,  [118]. 
"  leaves     the    phenomenal     un- 

touched, [118]. 
"  its  advantage  over  the  current 

dualism,  [119]. 
Ideas,  phenomena,  sensible    things,  Pref. 
154- 
"     archetypes  of,  157. 
"     advantages    of    considering    them 

apart  from  names,  In.  \  22. 
"     relations  of  to  principles  of  knowl- 
edge, Prin.  \  1-8. 
"     visibly  inactive,  25. 
"     cause  of,  26,  27. 
"     succession,  26,  28. 
"     of  sense  and  imagination,  33. 
"     and  things,  38,  39. 
"     divine,  ultimate  archetype  of  sensi- 
ble system,  70,  «. 
"     and  spirits  make  up  the  whole  of 

knowledge,  86. 
"     are  real  things,  90. 
"     scheme  of,  not  chimerical,  34,  [48]. 
"     succession  of,  59,  [74]. 
"     abstract,  In.  \  6-16. 
"     (vorstellung,  -en),  21,  22;  Prin.  g 

5-11,  13,97,  125,  143. 
"     occasion  of,  Prin.  \  69. 
"     sensible,  144. 
"     train  of,  59,  71,  77. 
"     universal,  126. 
Idolatry  (gotzendienst),  Prin.  \  94. 
Images  of  things,  ideas,  Prin.  \  33. 
Imagination,  its  power,  Pref.  160. 

"         confounded  with  sense,  Prin.  J 

23,  n. 
"         ideas  or,  30. 

"         Colli -r  and  Hume  on,  App.  B. 
Imagining,  faculty  of,  In.  £  10. 
Immortality  of    the    soul,    Prin.    \    141, 

[ill,   II2"I. 

"  proved  by  Berkeley's  Princi- 

ples, Pref.  165. 


4i6 


INDEX. 


Impenetrability  a  secondary  quality,  Prin. 

89. 

Inch,  Prin.  \  127. 

Inexistence  of  sensible  things,  Collier's, 

App.  B. 
Infinite    divisibility    of  finite    extension, 

Prin.  \  124. 
Infinites,  speculations  about,  Prin.  \  124, 

[109]. 
Infinitesimals,  Prin.  \  130,  [no]. 
Infinity,  difficulties  about,  In.  \  2. 

"       quantitative,  App.  B. 
In  itself  (in  sich),  In.  \  102. 
Intelligence,  an,  without  help  of  external 

bodies,  Prin.  \  20,  [33]. 
Intelligible  Realism  and  dualism,  Prin.  \ 
39,  n.,  91,  n. 
"  existence  of  sense-objects,  86. 

"  meaning  of,  [90]. 

Jacobi,  F.  H.,  on  Fichte's  doctrine,  Prol. 
X.  92. 
"       system  of,  100,  101. 
"       on  ethics,  [95]. 
"       the  world  as  free  act  of  will,  118. 
"       on    Fichte,  Kant,  Reinhold,  and 
Spinoza,  [117]. 
Jamieson,  George,  opposes  Berkeley,  Prol. 

V.  \  18. 
Jean  Paul  (Richter),  picture  of  Idealism, 

Prol.  XIV.  \  17. 
Johnson,  Samuel,  of  Stratford  and  New 
York,     a     Berkeleyan,     his 
works,  Prol.  III.  \  3. 
"  Berkeley  addresses  him  on  his 

essays,  Pref.  152. 
"  addressed  by  Berkeley  on  con- 

tinual creation,  Prin.  \  46,  n. 
Johnson,  Dr.  Samuel,  on  Berkeley,  Prol. 
V.  \  1  ;  VI.  5. 

Kant,  summary  of  Berkeley,  Prol.  III.  \  3. 
"     system  of,  Prol.  IX. 
"     compared  with  Sthelling,  Prol.  XI. 

97- 
"     and  Hegel,  Prol.  XII.  103. 
"     and  Schopenhauer,  Prol.  XIII.  105. 
"     Schopenhauer's  estimate  of,  106. 


Kant  lies  nearest  to  method  of  Berkeley, 
[81]. 

"     use  of  term  'intelligible,'  [90]. 

"     definition  of  consciousness,  [117]. 
Kantianism,  in  Berkeley,  Prin.  \  142,  «. ; 

in  the  sphere  of  ethics,  [95]. 
Knowledge,  objects  of   human,  defined, 

Pref.  155. 
Kroeger,  translation  of  Fichte,  Prol.  X. 

92,  «. 
Krug,  summary  of  Berkeley,  Prol.  III.  \  8. 

"     definition  of   Idealism,  Prol.  VII. 

17; 

"     definition  of  consciousness,  [117]. 

Language,   phenomena   of    universe    as, 
Prol.  XIV.  J  5. 
"  difficulty  of,  Prin.  \  144. 

"  its  nature  and  abuse,  In.  \  6, 

139- 

"  cause  of  error,  18-20. 

"  visible  ideas  are  a,  Prin.  \  44. 

"  of  Author  of  nature,  66. 

"  use  of,  83. 

"  and   numbers,   study  of,  122, 

Cos]. 

Laws  of  nature,  Prin.  \  30,  62,  [45,  77]. 
"     divine    ideas   and    will    coincident 
with,  57,  «. 
Leibnitz  on  symbolical  knowledge,  In.  \ 
19,  ;/. 
"         on  the  idea,  Prin.  \  33,  n. 
"         on  continual  creation,  46,  n. 
"         fheodic<5e,  [116]. 
"         apperception,  [117]. 
Leibnitz,  [81,  109]. 
Lewes's  estimate  of  Berkeley,  Prol.  VI.  \ 

13- 
Life  and  death,  Schopenhauer  on,  Prol. 

XIII.  \  24. 
Locke  and  Berkeley,  Prol.  II.  §  6. 

"       a  friend  of  Molyneux,  Pref.  152. 

"       essay  introduced  into  Trinity  Col- 
lege by  Molyneux,  153. 

"       Berkeley  a  student  of  the   essay, 
153,  In.  I  6,  n. 

"       combated  by  Berkeley,  Pref.  154. 

"       quoted,  171,  H. 


INDEX. 


417 


Locke  on  man's  finite  mind,  In.  \  2,  tt. 

"       principles  of  knowledge,  6,  n. 

"       on  abstraction,  11. 

"       on  generalization,  11. 

"       on  abstract  ideas,  12,  13. 

"       on  abuse  of  words,  23. 

"  ideas  of  sense  and  reflection,  Prin. 
\  1,  n. 

"  notion  of  material  substance  self- 
contradictory,  9,  n. 

"       on  matter,  10,  «.,  73,  n. 

"       on  unity,  13,  «. 

"  on  methods  for  exciting  ideas,  65, 
«. 

"       on  existence  of  sensible  things,  88, 

K. 

"       on  being,  89,  n. 

"       on  motion,  114,  tt. 

"       quoted  by  Ueberweg,  [2,  4,  7,  17, 

25.  27,  53.  94]. 
"       anticipations  of '  Theory  of  Vision,' 

[55]. 
"       definition  of  consciousness,  [117]. 
Locomotive  experience  in  sense,  Prin.  \ 

II,  ft. 
Logic,  In.  g  6. 

Lossius,  Idealism  defined,  Prol.  VII.  \  6. 
"        consciousness  defined,  [117]. 
"        Realism  defined,  [117]. 

Mackintosh,  Sir  James,  estimate  of  Berke- 
ley, Prol.  VI.  I  11. 
Maja,  popular  form  of  Hindoo  Idealism, 

Prol.  XIV.  \  14,  15. 
Majer  and    Schopenhauer,    Prol.    XIII. 

105. 
Malebranche  and  Berkeley,  Prol.  II.  \  4. 
Malebranche,  In.  \  2,  tt. ;  Prin.  \  70,  tt. 
"  influence  of,  on   Berkeley, 

Pref.  153. 
"  causality      of      insensible 

things,  Prin.  \  53,  n. 
0  on  matter,  73,  «.,  82,  «.,  88, 

tt. 
'*  on  motion,  112,  tt. 

"  seeing    in    God,  148,  [71, 

"53- 

"  Norris  a  disciple  of,  App.  B. 


Malebranche,  occasionalism,  [71]. 

Man  and  the  animals,  Schopenhauer  on, 

Prol.  XIII.  109. 
Man,  powers  of,  their  feebleness,  In.  \  2. 

"     personal  unity  of,  [119]. 
Manicheism,  Manichean  heresy,  Prin.  \ 

154. 
Mankind,  assent  of,  Prin.  \  54,  55. 
Mansel  approaches  Berkeley,  Prol.  IV.  \  8. 
Materia  prima  of  Aristotle,  Prin.  \  11. 
"  "     modern    notion   of  matter 

resembles,  11. 
Material  substance  defined,  Prin.  ^  17. 
"        motives  for  supposition  of,  73. 
Material  world,  extension  the  characteris- 
tic of,  Prin.  g  11. 
Materialism,  Idealism  as  opposed  to,  Prol. 

XIV.  \  9. 
Materialists  acknowledge  that  the  senses 
do  not  prove  the  existence 
of  matter,  Prin.  \  18. 
"  cannot  tell  how  our  ideas  are 

produced,  19. 
"  invent  matter  to  support  acci- 

dents, 74. 
"  Berkeley's  peculiar  use  of  the 

word,  [29,  31]. 
Mathematics,   application   of    Berkeley's 
principles  to,  Pref.  165. 
"  a  province  of  speculative 

science,  Prin.  \  58,  118, 
119,  123. 
"  discussed,  101. 

Mathematicians,  Prin.  \  132. 
Matter,  what,  Prin.  \  9-76. 

"      Descartes'  theory  of,  Pref.  1 54. 

"      a  negative  notion,  156. 

"      Locke  on,  Prin.  \  10,  tt. 

"      substratum  of   external  qualities, 

16. 
"      infinite  divisibility  of,  47. 
"      unknown    occasion,   67,  68,   70, 

[81]. 
"      support  of  accidents,  72,  73,  74. 
"      unknown  somewhat,  75,  80. 
"      Scriptures  on  existence  of,  82. 
"      idea  of,  pernicious,  26,  96,  133. 
"      inert,  9. 


27 


4i8 


INDEX. 


Matter,  denied  by  Ueberweg,  [18]. 

"       involves  a  contradiction,  Prin.  \  9. 

"       denied  by  Ueberweg,  [20]. 

"       and  its  qualities,  Ueberweg  on, 

[22]. 

"       relation  of,  to  mind,  Prol.  XIV. 

83- 

"       and  mind,  [119]. 
M'Cosh,  Dr.  Jas.,  against  Berkeley,  Prol. 
V.  \  19. 
"         estimate  of  Berkeley,  Prol.  VI. 

\  14. 

Mellin,  graduated  list  of  Kant's  terms,  [8]. 

"      definition  of  consciousness,  [117]. 

Messerschmidt,  body  and  soul,  [119]. 

Metaphysics,  nature  of,  Schopenhauer  on, 

Prol.  XIII.  no. 

"  abstract  ideas,  objects  of,  In. 

I  6. 
"  true  position,  [118]. 

Mill,  J.  S.,  defends  '  Berkeley's  Theory  of 
Vision,'  Prol.  IV.  \  10. 
"         permanent  possibilities  of  sen- 
sation, Prin.  \  3,  n. 
"         on  power  in  ideas,  25,  n. 
"         eliminates  all  power  from  ma- 
terial world,  32,  n. 
"         on  touch,  44,  n. 
Mind,  the  acting  perceiving  spirit,  Prin.  \ 

2. 

"      sensible  qualities  must  be  in  the,  10. 
"      acts   and   powers,  not  to  be  pre- 
scinded, 143,  [113]. 
"      its  omnipresence,  148. 
"      and  matter,  [118]. 

Mind,  Prin.  g  2. 

Minimum,  sensibile,  Prin.  \  132. 

Miracles,   relation  to    Berkeley's   princi- 
ples, Prin.  I  84,  63,  [79,  88,  89]. 

Mitchell,  James    (deaf  and  blind),   case 
of,  App.  C. 

Molyneux,  William,  ma-le  Locke's  Essay 
known  in  Trinity  College,  Pref.  152. 

Monism,  systems  of,  Prol.  XIV.  §  8. 

MoreU,    on    Locke's    definition   of    con- 
sciousness, [1 17]. 

Moses'  rod,  Prin.  \  84. 

Motion  of  the  earth,  Prin.  \  58,  186,  [73]. 


Motion,  absolute  and  relative,  Prin.  \  no, 

III,  112,  113,  114,  115,  [102,  103]. 
Music,  Schopenhauer  on,  Prol.  XIII.  116. 

Names,  like  letters  in  algebra,  In.  $  19. 
Natura  naturans,  is  God,  Prin.  §  46,  n. 
Natural  effects,  uniformity  in  producing, 

Prin.  \  62. 
Natural  philosophy,  purified  by  the  Prin- 
ciples, Pref.  165. 
"  "  discussed,  Prin.  \  101. 

Nature,  laws  of,  Prin.  \  30-32. 

"        laws   of,  coincident  with  divine 

ideas  and  will,  57,  n. 
"        sense  symbolism  of,  60,  n. 
"        methods  of,  styled  language   of 
its  Author,  33,  64,  66,  106,  «., ' 
107. 
"        volume    of,   how   to   read,    109, 

[100]. 
"        what,  150. 
Necessary  connection  between  ideas,  no, 

Prin.  \  31. 
Newton,   Sir   Isaac,  on  motion,  Prin.  g 
114. 
"  treatise     on     mechanics,     no, 

[101]. 
"  on  infinites,  130. 

"  and     Leibnitz,     the     calculus, 

[109]. 
Nichol,  summary  of  Berkeley,  Prol.  III.  \ 

10. 
Nirvana  and  Sansara,  Prol.  XIII.  117. 
Noblest  spirits,  many,  nurtured  by  Ideal- 
ism, Prol.  XIV.  \  13. 
Nominal    essence,   the   real    essence   of 

things,  Prin.  \  101,  n. 
Nominalism,  Pref.  119. 
Nominalist,  Berkeley  not  a,  App.  416,  n. 
Nominals,  App.  A. 

Norris,    John,    of     Bemerton,    a    Male- 
branch  ian,  Pref.  153. 
"         on  material  world,  Prin.  \  82,  n. 
"         a  neighbor  of  Collier,  App.  B. 
Nothing,  Prin.  \  8a 
Notion  (begriff)  and  idea  (idee),  Prin.  \ 

27,  [42]. 
Notions  of  relations,  Pref.  154. 


INDEX. 


419 


Notions,  particular  or  universal,  In.  \  15, 
n. 
"        how  represented  in  the  phantasy, 

18,  «. 
"        how  applied  to  the  object- world 

of  the  senses,  Prin.  \  5,  n. 
"       visibly  inactive,  25. 
Number,  a  primary  quality,  Prin.  §  9. 
"         a  creature  of  the  mind,  12. 
"         abstract  ideas  of,  object  of  arith- 
metic, 119. 
Nunneley,  on  case  of  born  blind,  App.  C. 

Object,  external,  Prin.  \  14. 

"       outward,  a  contradiction,  15,  n. 
"       signification  of,  5,  n. 
Objections    to    Berkeley's   Principles   of 
Knowledge,  Pref.  157, 162 ; 
Prin.  \  34-84. 
"  ninth  of  these,  [72]. 

Objects  of  knowledge,  defined,  Prin.  \  I. 
"       perceived  by  sense,  defined,  91. 
"       ideas   as    objects   of    knowledge, 

Ueberweg  on,  [8]. 
"       of    conscious    experience,    what, 

Pref.  157. 

"       in    themselves,    a    contradiction, 

Prin.  \  24;  denied  by  Ueber- 

weg,  [38]. 

Occasion,  Prin.  \  68,  69,  70,  74,  [82,  85]. 

Occasional  causes,  theory  of,  Prin.  §  53, 

68,  «. 
Occasionalists,  [71]. 
Omnipresence  of  mind,  Prin.  \  148. 
One,  the,  and  all,  Schopenhauer  on,  Prol. 

XIII.  \  23. 
Optimism,  Prin.  \  153,  [116]. 

"  Schopenhauer  on,  Prol.  XIII. 

"  Leibnitz,  and  Voltaire's  Can- 

dide,  Prol.  XIII.  119. 
Origin  of  Essay  towards  a  New  Theory  of 

Vision,  Prin.  \  43. 
Oswald,  James,  against  Berkeley,  Prol. 

V.?  9- 
Outness,  Prin.  \  43. 

Pain  in  the  world,  Prin.  \  153. 


Pantheism,  Schopenhauer  on,  Prol.  XIII. 

|23- 

Parr,  on  mode  or  attribute,  Prin.  \  49,  «. 
Passiveness  implied  in  an  idea,  Prin.    \ 

25- 
Pembroke,  Earl  of,  dedication  to,   Pref. 

169. 
Perceivable,  Prin.  \  8. 
Perceivable,  Ueberweg  on  the  term,  [16]. 
Perception  of  God,  Prin.  \  147,  148,  n. 

"  images  of,  [54]. 

Perceptions,  inefficacious,  Prin.  \  64. 

"  defined,  [117]. 

Personality  of  man,  and  Idealism,  Prol. 

XIV.  I  2. 
Pessimism,  Schopenhauer's,  Prol.   XIII. 

§23- 
Phantasy,  notion  how  represented  in,  In. 

\  18,  »• 
Phenomena,    sensible    things,   ideas    of 
sense,  Pref.  154. 
"  objects    of    human    knowl- 

edge, Prin.  \  1,  n. 
"  numerically  different  in  each 

mind,  147,  n. 
"  explained   without    matter, 

5°- 
"  denied  by  Ueberweg,  [70]. 

Philosophical  spirit,  and  Idealism,  Prol. 

XIV.  I  12. 
Philosophical    Transactions,    Cheselden's 

and  other  cases,  App.  C. 
Philosophy  defined,  In.  \  1. 
Physical   causation,   contrasted  with    effi- 
cient or  spiritual,  Prin.  \  65,  n. 
Physics  and  metaphysics,  [118]. 
Pierer   (Univ.    Lex.),    Idealism    defined, 
Prol.  VII.  I  10. 
"        Realism  defined,  [117]. 
Platner,  summary  of  Berkeley,  Prol.  III. 

u- 

"        estimate  of  Berkeley,  Prol.  VI.  \ 

8. 
"        definition  of  Idealism,  Prol.  VII. 

§3- 
Plato  and  Schelling,  Prol.  XL  \  97. 

«     idea,  [1]. 
Plotinus  and  Schelling,  Prol.  XL  \  97. 


420 


INDEX. 


Polytheism,  Schopenhauer  on,  Prol.  XIII. 

§116. 
Porter,  definition  of  consciousness,  [117]. 
Positivism,  spiritual,  Berkeleyanism  a  sort 

of,  Prin.  \  102,  n. 
Potential  existence,  what  Berkeley  meant 

by,  Prin.  \  45,  «. 
Potentially,  sensible  things  exist,  Prin.  \ 

45.  »■ 

Power,  voluntary  activity,  Pref.  153. 
"      impossible  in  world  of  ideas,  Prin. 
I  25)  n. 

Practical,  arithmetic  should  be,  Prin.  §119, 
[104]. 

Prediction,  scientific,  Prin.  \  59. 

Presentati  ve  and  representative  experience, 
Pref.  159. 

Primary  qualities,  ideas  of,  Prin.  \  9. 
"  "        their   absoluteness,    12, 

n. 

Primary  and  secondary  qualities,  distinc- 
tion between,  Prin.  §  9. 

Primary  and  secondary  qualities,  Ueber- 
weg  on,  [17]. 

Princeton,    Berkeleyanism    at,   Prol.  IV. 

2  4. 

Princeton  Club,  Prol.  XVI.  \  6. 

Principles  of  Human  Knowledge,  present 
edition,  objects  and  uses  of, 
Prol.  XVI. 
"         Berkeley's,  best  book  for  com- 
mencing reading,  Prol.  XVI. 

§3- 

"  a  classic  in  philosophy  and  lit- 
erature, Prol.  XVI.  \  4. 

"  arranged  as  an  introduction, 
Prol.  XVI.  §  5. 

"         criticiMns  of,  Pref.  1 5 1 . 

"         editions  of,  Pref.  151. 

"         analysis  of,  Pref.  155. 

"         consequences  of,  Pref.  157. 

"  objections  to  the,  Pref.  157, 
162;  Prin.  \  85-156. 

"  universals  combated  in,  Pref. 
154. 

"         against  sceptics,  Pref.  171. 

"  original  introduction  to,  App. 
A. 


Principles  of  human  knowledge  investi- 
gated, In.  \  4. 

Production  of  ideas,  Prin.  \  19. 

Prolegomena  to  Principles,  1-148. 

Proof,  Berkeley's,  of  his  doctrine,  Prin.  \ 
4,  n. 

Prcwidence,  immediate  works  of,  little 
souls  burlesque,  Prin.  \  154,  [116]. 

Psychical  and  physical,  [119]. 

Psychology,  its  weakness,  [118]. 

Qualities,  do  not  exist  apart,  In.  \  7. 
"  coexistent,  idea  of,  8. 

"  primary  and  secondary,  Prin. 

I  9- 
"  primary,  can  exist  only  in  the 

mind,  73,  [84]. 
Quiddity,  abstract  idea  of,  Prin.  \  81. 

Real  and  substantial  in  nature,  what,  Prin. 

\  34,  3°- 

Real,  sense-ideas  are,  Prin.  \  90. 
Realism  defined,  [117]. 
Realism   and    Idealism   contrasted,  Prol. 
XIV.  \  10. 

"         Berkeley's,  Pref.  155,  «. 

"         or  dualism,  intelligible,  Prin.  § 

39.  «• 

"         foundation  of,  92. 
Reality  in  ideas,  Prin.  \  36. 
"        meaning  of,  89. 
"        of  things,  91. 
"        not  denied,  36,  [49]. 
Reason  gives  us  knowledge  of  external 

things,  Prin.  \  18. 
Reasoning  and  thinking,  distinction   be- 
tween, In.  \  12,  ». 
Reflection,  Locke's   ideas  of  sense  and, 

Prin.  \  I,*. 
Regis,  definition  of  consciousness,  [117]. 
Reid,   summary  of   Berkeley,  Prol.  III. 

\  2- 
"        first  accepts,  then  rejects,  his  views, 

Prol.  V.  \  4. 
"        estimate  of  Berkeley,  Prol.  VI.  \  9. 
"        on  representative  perception,  Prin. 

\  86,  ;/. 
"        on  plurality  of  Egos,  145. 


INDEX. 


421 


Reid,    on    definition    of    consciousness, 

C«7]. 

Reinhold,  K.  L.,  argument  against  Ideal- 
ism, Prol.  X.  87. 
Relativity  of  motion,  &c,  Prin.  \  113. 
Religion,  Hegel  on,  Prol.  XII.  104. 
Representative  idea  in  perception,  Prin.  \ 

86,  n. 
Representative   and  presentative   experi- 
ence, Pref.  159. 
Rest,  a  primary  quality,  Prin.  §  9. 
Ritter,  estimate  of  Berkeley,  Prol.  VI.  \  15. 
Rothenfiue,  summary  of  Berkeley,  Prol. 
HI.  \  9- 
of  Hume,  Prol.  VIII. 
of  Kant,  Prol.  IX. 
"  of  Fichte,  Prol.  X. 

of  Schilling,  Prol.  XI. 
"  of  Jacobi,  Prol.  XI. 

of  Hegel,  Prol.  XII. 

Satze,  propositions,  Prin.  \  129. 
Sansara  and  Nirvana,  Prol.  XIII.  117. 
Scepticism,  refuted  by  Berkeley's  Princi- 
ples, Pref.  165. 
"  its  causes,  In.  \  1. 

"  its  root,  Prin".  \  86. 

Sceptics,  Principles  useful  to,  Pref.  171. 
Schelling,  system  of,  Prol.  XI. 

"  relation  to  Hegel,  Prol.  XII. 

102. 
Schiller,  on  the  laws  of  nature,  Prin.  \ 

32,  n. 
Schlegel,  Frederick,  Idealism,  definition, 

Prol.  VII.  \  4. 
Schmid,  Heinrich  Th.,  on  the  strength 
and  weakness  of  Idealism,  Prol.  XIV. 

§17. 
Scholten,  summary  of  Berkeley,  Prol.  III. 

§14. 
"  Fichte's  system,  Prol.  X.  89,  92. 

"  on  Schelling,  Prol.  XI.  93. 

Schoolmen,  their  doctrine  of  abstraction, 
In.  \  17. 
"         argue  for  a  continued   crea- 
tion, Prin.  \  46. 
Schopenhauer,  definition  of  Idealism,  Prol. 
VII.  \  14. 


Schopenhauer,  Idealism  of,  Prol.  XIII. 

"  estimates   of,  by   Herbart 

and  Zeller,  Prol.  XIII. 

Schwegler,  summary  of  Berkeley,  Prol. 

III.  \  12. 
Scotch  school,  runs  into  Idealism,  [118]. 
Scotus  Erigena,  pantheist,  [117]. 
Scripture,  on  existence  of  matter,Prin.  \  82. 
Secondary  qualities,  their  occasion,  Prin. 

\  9- 
Sensation,  signification  of,  Prin.  \  5,  n. 
Sensations,  cannot  exist  but  in  a  percipient 
mind,  Prin.  \  3. 
"  visibly  inactive,  25. 

"  uniformity  of,  72. 

"  in    the     mind     are    perfectly 

known,  87. 
Sense,  and  reflection,  Locke's   ideas  of, 
Prin.  \  1,  n. 
"        ideas  of,  exist  without  the  mind, 

Sir  William  Hamilton,  8,  n. 
"        locomotive  experience  in,  II,  n. 
"        and  imagination  confused,  23,  «. 
"        ideas  of,  29,  [43]. 
"        supposed  want  of  a,  77,  [87]. 
Sense,  common,  Beattie's  definition,  Prol. 

V.  §8. 
Sense-ideas,  how  distinguished  from  imag- 
ination, Prin.  \  28-30. 
Sense-objects,  archetypes  of  real  things, 

Prin.  \  41,  n. 
Sense-symbolism  of  nature,  Prin.  \  60,  n. 
Senses  are  to  be  believed,  Prin.  \  40,  n. 
[52] ;     distrusted    by    philoso- 
phers, 88. 
"       do  not  prove  matter,  18;   Ueber- 
weg  on,  [28]. 
Senses,  the,  Schopenhauer  on,  Prol.  XIII. 

Sensibile,  minimum,  Prin.  \  132. 
Sensible  objects,  have  no  abstract  exist- 
ence, Prin.  \  4. 
"  "         Ueberweg  on,  [10]. 

Sensible  qualities,  are  the  secondary,  Prin. 

2  9- 

"  "         must  be  in   the  mind, 

10,  n. 


422 


INDEX. 


Sensible    system,    divine    ideas   ultimate 

archetype  of,  Prin.  \  72,  n. 
Sensible     and     perceivable,    the    terms, 

Ueberweg  on,  [16]. 
Sensible  things,  exist  potentially,  Prin.  \ 

45- 
"  "         existence  of,  88. 

Shaftesbury,  Alciphron,  Prol.  I.  \  7. 
Sight,  ideas  of,  distinct   from   those    of 
touch,  Prin.  \  44. 
"       gives  the  idea  of  light  and  colour,  1 . 
Sign,  a  word  a  sign  of  general  ideas,  In. 
I  n. 
"      relation   of   with    thing    signified, 
Prin.  I  65,  [80]. 
Signs,  regarded  by  arithmetic,  not  things, 

Prin.  I  22. 
Simon,  Collyns  T.,  a  Berkeleyan,  Prol. 
IV.  \  7. 
"        suggested  rendering  of 'idea,'  [1]. 
Sinneswahrnehmung,     'sensation,'    Prin. 

\  137,  146. 
Siris,  Prol.  I.  §  10. 

"     its  relation  to  the  Principles,  Prin. 
I  67,  «• 
Solidity,  a  primary  quality,  Prin.  \  9. 
"         figure,  &c,  have  no  activity,  61, 
[76]. 
Somewhat,  matter  as,  Prin.  \  75,  [86]. 
Soul,  its  natural  immortality,  Prin.  \  141. 
"     and  body  do  not  act  apart,  [119]. 
"     and   body   distinct,    yet    in    unity, 
[II9]. 
Sounds,  secondary  qualities,  Prin.  \  10. 
Space,  absolute,  Prin.  §  112,  n. 
Spinoza  and  Berkeley,  Prol.  II.  \  5. 
"        and  Schelling,  Prol.  XI.  97. 
•*        Schopenhauer  on,  Prol.  XIII.  \ 

21,  22. 

"        on   substance,  Prin.    g    135,  n. ; 
idea,  [1]. 
Spirit,  defined,    Pref.    160 ;    Prin.   \    27, 
[40],  89,  138. 
"       is  the  only  substance,  7;    Ueber- 
weg on,  [14,  40]. 
"        alone  can  act,  57. 
"        the  only  efficient  cause,  102. 
"       no  idea  of,  135. 


Spirit  and  body,  [118]. 
Spirits  and  ideas,  or  phenomena,  every 
thing  known,  Prin.  \  86. 
"        heterogeneous,  89. 
"        other,   how   known    by   us,    145, 
[114]. 
Spiritual  causation,  contrasted  with  physi- 
cal, Prin.  I  65,  n. 
Spiritual  positivism,  Berkeleyism  a  sort 

of,  Prin.  \  102,  «. 
Stars  fixed,   not  attracted,   Prin.   \    106; 

denied  by  Ueberweg,  [98]. 
Stewart,    Dugald,   on   abstraction,    In.   \ 
19,  n. 
"  "         on  Baxter,  Prol.  V.  \  3. 

"  "         on  Diderot,  7. 

"  "         on  Berkeley,  10. 

"  "         on  Malebranche,Norris, 

and  Reid,  10. 
"  "         estimate    of    Berkeley, 

Prol.  VI.  \  10. 
"  "         definition  of  conscious- 

ness, [117]. 
Stirling  and  Berkeley,  Prol.  IV.  \  II. 
"       estimate  of  Berkeley,  Prol.  VI.  § 
17 
Strauss  and  Hegel,  Prol.  XII.  104. 
Subject,  Prin.  \  27,  [41],  49,  [67]. 
"         or  substance,  49. 
"         Aristotelian  distinctions,  [69]. 
Substance,  and  Idealism,  Prol.  XIV.  \  6. 
"  meaning   of,    Pref.    153,    156, 

159;   Prin.  \  37. 
"  no  idea  of,  [50],  14,  n. 

"  unity  of,  held  by  Berkeley,  7, ». 

"  is  spirit,  soul,  135. 

"  no  unthinking,  139. 

"  connected   by    Berkeley  with 

cause,  26,  n. 
"  cause  of  ideas  must  be  a,  27. 

"  in  vulgar  sense,  37. 

"         as  a  support  of  qualities,  91. 
"  cannot  be  an  idea,  [92],  135. 

"  and  accidents,  17;   Ueberweg 

on,  [27]. 
"  extended    moveable,  an    idea, 

22;  denied    by  Ueberweg, 
[35]- 


INDEX. 


423 


Substantial  and  real  in  nature,  Prin.  \  34. 
Substratum,  no  unthinking,  Prin.  \  7. 
"  matter  is  a,  16. 

"  of  qualities,  77. 

Succession  of  ideas,  Prin.  \  26,  59,  98. 
Suggestion  of  experience,  Prin.  \  145. 
Swift,  estimate  of  Berkeley,  Prol.  I.  \  3 ; 

VI.  I  1. 
Symbolical  knowledge,  Leibnitz  on,  In. 

I  19,  »■ 
Symbolism,  sense-,  of  nature,  Prin.  \  60,  «. 
Symbolism  of  nature,  universal,  Prin.  \ 

65,  n. 

Tar- water,  Prol.  I.  \  10. 
Tastes,  secondary  qualities,  Prin.  \  100. 
Tennemann,  summary  of  Berkeley,  Prol. 
III.  \  6. 
"  objections  to  Berkeley,  Prol. 

V.  \  12. 
"  definition  of  Idealism,  Prol. 

VII.  \  8. 
Theism,  Schopenhauer  on,  Prol.  XIII.  1 1 6. 
Thing,  meaning  of,  Pref.  155,  «.,  Prin.  § 
89,  n. 
"       in   contradistinction  to  idea,  38, 

[50- 

"       real,  33,  172. 

"       not   regarded  by  arithmetic,  but 
sign,  122,  219. 
Things,  reality  and  existence  of,  not  de- 
nied, Prin.  g  36,  [49]. 
Thinking  and  reasoning,  distinction  be- 
tween, In.  \  12,  n. 
Thought,  universe  as  a  thing   of,  Prol. 
XIV.  \  4. 
"         divine,  absolute  truth,  Prin.  \ 
76,  n. 
Tiedemann,  estimate  of  Berkeley,  Prol. 

VI.  §  7. 
Time,  finite,  apprehension  of  changes  of 
our  ideas,  Pref.  153. 
"      idea  of,  Prin.  §  98,  [94]. 
Touch  and  sight,  heterogeneous,  Prin.  \ 
44. 
"        the  ideas  acquired  by,  1. 
Transcendental,  Prin.  \  118. 
Tuke,  literature  on  mind  and  body,  [119]. 


Ueberweg,  edition  of  Principles,  Prol.  I. 

§15. 
"  Preface,  15. 

"  summary   of    Berkeley,    Prol. 

HI.  I  15. 
"  correspondence   with    Simon, 

Prol.  IV.  \  9. 
"  estimate  of  Berkeley,  Prol.  VI. 

I  16. 
"  Annotations  on  the  Principles, 

Prol.  XV.  \  4;  XVI.  j  329. 
"  Logic,  Prol.  XV.  \  4. 

Understanding  implies  spirit,  Prin.  \  27. 
Uniformity,  in  production  of  natural  ef- 
fects, Prin.  g  62. 
"  of  sensations,  72. 

Unity,  love  of,  Idealism  appeals  to,  Prol. 
XIV.  \  8. 
"      an  abstract  idea,  13. 
"       arbitrary,  12. 
"      denied  by  Ueberweg,  [24]. 
"      Locke   on,  quoted   by  Ueberweg, 

[25]- 

"       in  abstract  denied,  1 20. 
"      of  substance  held  by  Berkeley,  7, 
n. 

Universal  assent  of  mankind,  an   argu- 
ment for  matter,  Prin.  \  54. 

Universal  or  particular  notions,  In.  \  15, 
n. 

Universality,  in -what  it  consists,  In.  \  16, 
147. 

Universals    combated    in  the  Principles, 
Pref.  154. 

Vanini  and  Spinoza,  Prol.  XIII.  118. 
Virtue,  strongest  incentive  of,  Prin.  \  155. 
Visible  ideas,  are  a  language,  Prin.  \  44. 
Vision,  origin  of   Essay  towards  a  New 
Theory  of,  Prin.  \  43>  [553- 

"        essay  on,  referred  to,  1 16. 
Vogel,  summary  of  Berkeley,  Prol.  III.  \ 

16. 
Voltaire,  opposed  to  Berkeley,  Prol.  V.  § 

6. 
Voraussetzung,  principle,  Prin.  \  129. 
Vorstellung,  Schopenhauer,  Prol.    XIII. 

106,  107. 


424 


INDEX. 


Vorstellung,  notion,    Prin.  \    130,    141, 
142. 
idea,  [43]. 

Warburton,  on  Baxter,  Prol.  V.  \  3. 

"  on  Berkeley,  Prol.  VI.  §  I. 

Watch,    illustration    from,    Prin.    \    62, 

[78]. 
Will,  the  world  is,  Schopenhauer  on,  Prol. 
XIII.  in,  112. 
"     defined,  113. 
"     world  as,  universal  recognition  of, 

"3- 

"     is  active  spirit,  Prin.  \  27. 

"     or  spirit,  some  other  produces  our 

ideas,  Prin.  \  29. 
"     Ueberweg  on,  [44]. 
Willich,  Idealism,  definition  of,  Prol.  VII. 
IS- 


Wolff,  definition  of  Idealism,  Prol.  VII. 

8  * 

"      definition  of  consciousness,  [117]. 
Words,  deception  of,  In.  g  23. 
"       Locke  on  abuse  of,  23. 
"       embarrass  and  delude,  24. 
"       men  amuse  themselves  with,  Prin. 

§24. 
"       Ueberweg  on,  [6]. 
"       Locke  on,  quoted  by  Ueberweg, 

[7]. 
World  not  a  dream,   Schopenhauer  on, 
Prol.  XIII.  III. 
"       is  will,  III. 
"       a  makranthropos,  117. 

Zeller  on  Beck,  Prol.  X.  87. 
"      on  Hegel,  Prol.  XII.  105. 
"      on  Schopenhauer,  Prol.  XIII.  g  25. 


14  DAY  USE 

RETURN  TO  DESK  FROM  WHICH  BORROWED 

LOAN  DEPT. 

RENEWALS  ONLY— TEL.  NO.  642-3405 

This  book  is  due  on  the  last  date  stamped  below,  or 

on  the  date  to  which  renewed. 

Renewed  books  are  subject  to  immediate  recall. 


NOV  13  1303  (9 

REC'D  LD   NOV 

11 '69-11  AM 

—     * 

*M*«*»V? 

,8rter    ggj      «»T2  #  W 

RECD  LD    DEC 

h     72    -°    PM^^ 

*t        it     ■,£,     CKyx 

MAR  25  15)74  3 

ftECD  qaaAJ 

ysffy 

p* 

MAY  17  1974 

FFB     6  1976 

, 

MftCK.    JAN    3'78 

LD21A-60m-6/69 
(J9096sl0)476-A-32 


General  Library 

University  of  California 

Berkeley 


14  DAY  USE 

RETURN  TO  DESK  FROM  WHICH  BORROWED 

LOAN  DEPT. 

RENEWALS  ONLY-TEL.  NO.  642-3405 

This  book  is  due  on  the  last  date  stamped  below  or 
R^»       °°  ^^te  to  which  renewed  ' 

Renewed  books  are  subject  to  immediate  recall 


recd  ld  my 


11 '63 -11  AM 


-  &- 


— >  ^ 


-RECQJiUiEC 


~MfflT2315TO 


i^-!^-3-iJM#4;1 


H   ■ 


MAY  IJ  197 


AM 


_ 


■fm—64m 


m~m 


14  D  \y  USE 


